Elections Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, we had a debate on the previous group. Despite the beguiling invitation of the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, I am not going to rehash that debate. I am certainly not going to accept advice from those Benches on how many legs I should stand on at one particular time. They often seem to have about five or six legs, in my campaigning experience.

The Government oppose these amendments. I understand that they are probing, but I can reassure the noble Lord that we do not consider them necessary because, under the Bill as we propose it, the approval of Parliament—the whole of Parliament, both Houses—is required when a statement is created or whenever it might be revised. That is, as my noble friend Lady Noakes said, there in the Bill. That will ensure that the Government consider its views and then gives Parliament the final say over whether a statement takes effect.

This measure, in our judgment, will improve the accountability of the commission to the UK Parliament and ensure that Parliament, in the last resort, remains firmly in control of approving any statement. That is why the Government have proposed the affirmative procedure in the Bill for the approval of a new or revised statement and I can certainly confirm for the noble Lord that any statement must be approved by both Houses, including your Lordships’ House, before it can be designated. Therefore, we think these amendments are unnecessary.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

The Minister is relying so strongly on the case that Parliament would have final control over whether the statement was acceptable, he must be assuming that each House has the capacity to turn down and reject the statement. Can we take it that he will not, in those circumstances, say that it is somehow unconstitutional for this House to say that the statement is in defiance of the principles of democracy and damaging to our electoral system?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, again, I am not going to be led into a wide and potentially very interesting debate on how your Lordships would behave in regard to any legislation, including primary legislation. I draw attention to what is before the Committee, which is that your Lordships would have to pass an affirmative resolution, and that does give your Lordships a power in law.

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[Lord Beith (LD)]

I am sure that the noble Baroness believes firmly that the Government she so strongly supports would not issue a statement that would challenge the independence of the commission. However, there is absolutely nothing about the illustrative statement—or, indeed, in comparison with statements made for other regulators—that in any way circumscribes the ability of this Government or future Governments to go much further than that, unless they are restrained by things that we put into the legislation.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

At the end of the day, there is a requirement for Parliament to agree. That is an important part of the framework. It is not something the Executive can do alone. It would need to become a parliamentary approved statement and, as we discussed earlier, it must be approved by both Houses of Parliament.

My second point is that we should be absolutely clear that strategy and policy statements are not directions. No power of direction exists for the Electoral Commission, and Clause 14 does not create one. Noble Lords would be rightly concerned if Clause 14 created a power of direction in relation to the Electoral Commission. I think that the Electoral Commission was just plain wrong, in its written briefing, to claim that it would be subject to government direction as a result of Clause 14.

I regret to say that the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, for whom I have the highest regard, was also wrong, when he spoke on the first group of amendments, to assert that this statement amounts to a direction. It does not. Directions are very clear in what they can force public bodies to do. This does not force anything. The only requirement, as we have heard, is in new Section 4B for the Government to “have regard to” the statement. We discussed that in the first group of amendments, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has made some comments on the ineffectiveness of that, because it does not refer to other things which it could “have regard to”. It does not trump the commission’s statutory objectives; it does not compel the commission to do anything at all, or to take account of anything else.

We must keep all this in proportion. It is an additional thing for the Electoral Commission to take into account; it does not replace all the existing law relating to the commission. This is the formulation used for all existing regulators, and I believe it is the right approach to protect regulatory independence. As I said, no concerns have been expressed to date about the independence of any of the regulators subject to statements.

The important thing is that the commission has to report on what it has done in consequence of the statement. In practice, as we will see from the way in which the statements tend to align with what the independent regulators are doing, statements generally reinforce what those bodies are doing, and relatively new information beyond what would be included in the annual report comes as a result of those statements.

However, it is important that the independent regulator explain any divergence from the Government’s priorities as approved by Parliament. For example, if the Government said that their priority was to improve democratic participation, not just generally but for particular groups, we would want to know what the commission had done about that and whether it had had any impact. That really does not threaten independence.

I believe that transparency and accountability are what the strategic and policy statements are really all about, and why they are useful. One element is for the Government to be transparent about their policies and priorities, because they have to set them down, get them consulted on and then have them approved by both Houses of Parliament. The regulators then have to be transparent in reporting on what they have done in respect of those priorities—or whether they have done nothing at all. That allows them to be held to account by Parliament—in the case of the Electoral Commission, through the Speaker’s Committee. I hope noble Lords will see that this legislation is not the monster they have created in their own minds. In fact, it can be seen as a very positive development for improving transparency and accountability. I hope we will allow these clauses to stand part of the Bill.

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[Lord Hayward (Con)]

I am very conscious of that. I did not necessarily say that the Lords to whom I was referring were present in the Chamber; I gesticulated towards the Bench opposite. I hope I did not offend the noble Lord in saying that.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I am very glad to follow the noble Lord. He has delivered a message to people in his party that you can be severely critical of the Electoral Commission and consider that it has shortcomings and has not always owned up to things it has got wrong, but it does not follow that it makes sense to remove a body which is, in many respects, a guarantee of the democracy of our system. His illustration from Zimbabwe is telling. Who among us has not talked to people from various countries with very shaky regimes about the need to have a fair and reliable electoral system? Many have taken part as election observers, as he has, and seen a lack of independence in the electoral process that is fatal and damaging. The fact that the existing members of the commission believe that the provisions of these two clauses would inhibit their ability to behave independently tells its own story. It is on that and one other point that I want briefly to contribute.

The noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, quoted from the letter that all but one of the members of the commission sent to Ministers. However, he did not go on to take a further quote from it, which says:

“If made law, these provisions will enable a government in the future to influence the Commission’s operational functions and decision-making. This includes its oversight and enforcement of the political finance regime, but also the advice and guidance it provides to electoral administrators, parties and campaigners, and its work on voter registration.”


It goes on to say that the “have regard” duty would

“provide a mechanism, driven by the then governing party, enabling that party’s ministers to shape how electoral law is applied to them and their political competitors.”

That is pretty clear, and anyone who took up a position on the Electoral Commission with this law governing how they conducted themselves would be likely to be severely inhibited by it. That raises a question of who will be willing to serve on the Electoral Commission with this kind of statutory statement as something to which they are obliged to have regard.

The other point I want to make is to reinforce something I said by way of an intervention. It really is no use the Government relying on the fact that they have produced an illustrative or indicative statement. That statement may be regarded by some as motherhood and apple pie; it might be regarded by others as offering a few hints of things that might be unsatisfactory in future statements. It is not the law. It does not inhibit or guide even this Government, let alone future ones, as to what kind of statements they will seek to get through the process.

Remember that the process is effectively one of statutory instruments—affirmative procedure, the same as statutory instruments—which, for various other reasons, many noble Lords are reluctant to use in this House to the extent of actually defeating a statement. Indeed, the Labour Party has often taken a public position that it is not appropriate for this House to take such an action, but the noble Lord on the Front Bench pointed out that we are dealing with a different matter here. We are dealing not with a general policy issue but with protection of the integrity of the election process and the body required to regulate it, and the independence that body needs to be able to do those things.

I end with the hope that the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, will be read by quite a lot of other members of his party, who might then feel free to join those of no party, my party and the Labour Party in saying that this matters. This is a threat to the independence and perceived independence of the body that regulates elections. However many of its decisions we disagree with or which may have been discomforting to our own individual party or cause, we must maintain its independence. That requires the removal of these clauses.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, I will follow on from the points made very powerfully by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. In effect, these clauses will empower the regulated over the regulator. I listened very carefully to the point from noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, that statements of policy over regulators are not new. Let us take the logic of what these clauses actually do and of who is writing the statement to its conclusion. Would we allow the dominant electricity and gas company to write the strategy and policy statement for the energy regulator? Would the Government be happy for the largest water company in the country to write the strategy and policy statement for the water regulator? Would the Government legislate for the largest telecommunications company to write the strategy and policy statement for the telecoms regulator? I ask those questions directly to the Minister. If not, why not? We know as well as those outside this House do that that would empower the regulated over the regulator. We have independent regulators so that those who are regulated have no power whatever over the regulator.

Therefore, why is it that the Government seek in this Bill to allow the largest political party—that is, the Government—to write the strategy and policy statement for the regulator of elections and electoral policy? There is no logical reason to do that in order to keep that regulator independent. It completely puts the regulator at the behest of the Government in power, and it sets direction.

I want to follow what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, says, because it is important that we look at what is in these clauses. A number of times, both the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, have kind of given us warm tea and soothed us: “Don’t worry, have your cup of tea, sit down, and everything will be fine. It is a statement purely of strategy. This strategy won’t get into the operation. The Government won’t be directing what the commission does.” But let us look at new Section 4A(3)(b) introduced by Clause 14. The Secretary of State will be given the power to put in the statement

“any other information (for example, about the roles and responsibilities of other persons) the Secretary of State considers appropriate”—

any other information. It basically gives the Secretary of State carte blanche to direct the regulator of elections and the electoral system to do whatever the Secretary of State decides. It is such a wide power. It is not a strategy power; it is a power that could get right into who the Electoral Commission employs, what the role of that person is and the kinds of powers that person has.

I ask the Minister: what powers would be excluded from new Section 4A(3)(b)? The Bill says

“any other information … the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”

Is that a catch-all? If not, what would be excluded on the face of the Bill? I cannot see anything on the face of the Bill that says what the strategy and policy statement would exclude. I see that the statement could include any information the Secretary of State sees fit.

Furthermore, the Secretary of State, as we have already discussed, could do this of their own volition and without any consultation. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, was absolutely clear. “Consultation” does not necessarily mean anything. I am a former council leader. We consulted. You do not necessarily have to change what you have decided based on consultation. Some of the most powerful and important considerations we have to make in this clause are that those who have worked in and led arm’s-length bodies have said very clearly that when a Government say something is on the face of the Bill and you have to have regard to it, it is a direction and an instruction. It is not just something bland; it is a clear instruction that those people within those organisations and the Electoral Commission will see as something they have to take forward. It is very clear that the powers in this clause are much greater than a kind of “It’ll be all right, you don’t have to do it”. New Section 4B(2) says that the commission “must”—not “may”—

“have regard to the statement when carrying out their functions.”

New subsection (4)(b) says that the commission must report after the end of

“every subsequent 12-month period, on what they have done—”

not on what they have not done—

“in consequence of the statement.”

Remember: the statement is about the priorities of the Government.

I believe that these clauses, which are so widely written, give the Government such powers over the regulator that they completely and totally take away the basis of a regulator that free and fair elections can be built on and undermine the very basis of our democracy. It is for those reasons that these clauses should not stand part of the Bill.