Elections Bill

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lady Hayman, I will speak to this amendment while she searches for her glasses.

These are classic Committee amendments in which we try to probe exactly what lies behind these clauses and in particular the clause that we do not agree with that we debated earlier. It is important to address the question that the noble Lord, Lord Butler, asked: what is the question to which this clause gives an answer? It is not clear, and I hope that we can address that with this amendment and the series in the following group to try to elicit some answers.

I was intrigued by the explanation of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, that the statement is about the political environment that the commission operates in. That can change rapidly, not least the closer we get to a general election. Now that we do not have fixed-term Parliaments—not that that really determined when a general election could be held—it is not clear what timetable would be involved in this requirement to produce a statement, which the commission “must” take cognisance of. Let us have some answers from the Minister.

I will repeat the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Butler: what are we trying to solve here? What is the commission not doing that the Government think it should be doing at the moment? It is not clear. I have not heard a single criticism about the failure of the commission to carry out its statutory functions. I have heard political criticisms. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is fortunately not in her place so I will say what I want to say. I am prepared to accept that Parliament agreed to a referendum, and Parliament will abide by the result of that referendum and the Government do so, but I am not in favour of referendums. I am in favour of parliamentary democracy. I know who used referendums a lot: Hitler used referendums to store up his power, and so does Putin. It is important to understand what we are talking about here, which is a body that oversees statutory functions in the conduct of elections.

Therefore, with these probing amendments we are seeking to know—despite the detail of what the clause says—how frequently the Minister thinks these statements will be issued. When will the first be issued? Will it be six months before the next general election? Could it disrupt the way that people, political parties and civil society react to the general election? Let us hear it. How often does the Minister think this should be reviewed? The Bill says that this is something we should expect every five years and that it will fall into the cycle of elections, but our political environment is not as stable as that, so there may be other issues that prompt this. I would like some answers to those questions.

Also, what is the Minister’s expectation for how long it will take to produce the statement and the requirement for consultation? What does he expect between the start of the process and its end? What does he think the implications will be not only for the Electoral Commission but for the political process itself and the way political parties operate? It is really important that we get some answers to those questions.

I turn back to the point the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, raised. I have been intimately involved with the Electoral Commission, certainly for the three-year period I was general secretary of the Labour Party. One of the innovations I thought was really good was that the Electoral Commission has the experience of people with quite detailed knowledge of the electoral process. It has members who are aware of the way political parties operate. It is not working in isolation; it has that experience.

One of my roles was to nominate somebody to the commission. It has a Member of this House, the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, who is a friend of mine. Even though we are in opposite parties, we have collaborated in better understanding the rules and regulations that operate on political parties. Sadly, the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, cannot be here this afternoon but I think all members of the Electoral Commission, even though they are nominated—some of them by political parties—take their responsibilities and independence very seriously. I think if he were here the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, would explain that that was why he did not sign the letter from the Electoral Commission; he is a Member of this House, and it would perhaps have been inappropriate. But that does not stop him taking his responsibilities on the Electoral Commission seriously.

I do not get it; I really do not get what this is all about. What are the Government trying to correct or do? There are mechanisms now, as we heard in the previous debate, about accountability, the Speaker’s Conference and representations. Of course, just as importantly, political parties nominate to the commission—not just the Conservative Party or the Labour Party, but the Lib Dems and the Scottish nationalists have representation on that body. It is independent representation, but they take their statutory responsibilities seriously.

Let us get some answers if we can, not only to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, but also to when the first statement will be produced. How long will it take? How close will it be to the next general election? What impact will such a statement have on the conduct of that general election? These are vital questions, irrespective of a future debate on whether the clause stands part. We need answers to these questions because they will determine our attitude to whole aspects of this Bill. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury, has ranged rather more widely than the contents of the two amendments in this group, but I respect that Committee is an opportunity for probing detailed aspects. I want to speak only to the second amendment about the length of time you would normally expect a statement to exist.

We have to see these as strategic statements; they are about strategies and policies. Too short a timeframe simply would not work. The presumption in the Bill is five years, which is a reasonable medium-term timeframe for giving some stability, with the option for reviews earlier on various grounds listed in the Bill. I support the general concept of five years being a good starting point, recognising that there can be occasions when this has to be revised. But they should not be picked up and looked at every year or in the run-up to an election, because they should be dealing with issues that have a longer duration.

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

Can I just ask the noble Baroness a question? If she looks back over the last 20 years, or even over the period of the Electoral Commission’s existence, what have the gaps between general elections been?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I do not think that is a relevant question because I do not believe the statement is going to be used to try to fine-tune what is done in relation to any particular election. It will be about more strategic things like getting more participation from certain groups in the democratic process and those sorts of issues.

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt but I think this is an important dialogue to have. We bandy around the words, “strategy” and “long-term strategy” but what we have not had from the Government—though the noble Baroness has attempted to give us an answer—is the answer to: what is behind this clause on this statement? Why do we need this statement?

I agree with the noble Baroness that one of the important things, and what this Bill should be about, is how we increase participation. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, is unfortunately not here, but this Bill should be about what we do to increase participation in our democratic process. How do we ensure that more people are able to participate and what do we do to take down the barriers that inhibit participation? If the noble Baroness is saying that this statement will be about that, why are those things not in the Bill?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I am going to let my noble friend the Minister answer all this in detail because I am not a government spokesman on this. I was merely offering my opinion on the timeframe. When we get to the stand part debate, I am going to offer some other opinions about why these statements are useful in the context of regulators.

My concern is to see that these statements are strategic in nature and that means not short term in nature. They should be seen in that context. The timeframe of five years is fine for that, but I am going to leave my noble friend the Minister to respond in more detail to the broader questions that the noble Lord has asked.

[Lord Rennard (LD)]

My Lords, these amendments may lead to some mitigation of the effects of the Government taking control of the strategy and policy of the Electoral Commission if the Bill is passed in its present form. If Clauses 14 and 15 are not taken out of the Bill, as they should be, we can still limit some of the damage by preventing the party in power continually changing the statement in accordance with its own interests.

Amendment 3 would not allow a new statement 12 months after the Act is passed, while Amendment 13 tests how often the Government might seek to change such a statement. As the noble Lord, Lord Collins, pointed out, the amendments probe the Government’s intention in relation to the timings and processes of the proposed strategy and policy statement to which the Electoral Commission will be subject. The governing party appears to want to emasculate the role of the independent watchdog.

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[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, it is interesting to follow the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who says that this is a strategic statement that is there for five years and not for revision. If we look at page 24 of the Bill, new Section 4E says that there is a power to revise the statement and that the Secretary of State may revise the statement at any time. It goes on further to say that:

“The power under subsection (1) may be exercised … on the Secretary of State’s own initiative”.


If this is a strategic statement, it then goes on to say about revision on page 25 under new Section 4E(4):

“The Secretary of State may determine in a particular case that section 4C(2) (consultation requirements) does not apply in relation to the revised statement.”


The view of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, is that this is a five-year strategy where the Secretary of State does not want to intervene because it is about the long-term view of the commission. But the Secretary of State can solely decide that not only are they going to revise but that no consultation is needed. May I ask the Minister under what circumstances and for what purpose would the Secretary of State wish to revise the strategy and policy statement? Under what circumstances would the Secretary of State deem it inappropriate to consult on the new statement, particularly if we follow the view of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, that this is a strategic view where the Secretary of State does not need to get involved on day-to-day issues because the strategic direction is set for five years? Why have the revision policy and, particularly, why can the Secretary of State determine alone to change the statement without consultation?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, if I may respond to that, I was careful to say that it a broad presumption of five years and that the Bill allows for other opportunities, which I am sure my noble friend the Minister will explain. The noble Lord failed to deal with the fact that the revision can be considered at the request of the commission as well—it is not just a one-way street—and that is provided for in new Section 4E.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

If noble Lords will allow me, the point I was raising was the basis on which the noble Baroness said that it was a strategic five-year statement and therefore the noble Lord, Lord Collins, had got the concept wrong. If it is a five-year statement that gives a long-term vision for the commission, the Secretary of State should not have sole power to revise without consultation. That is the point that I was making. It is in the Bill.

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[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

It is me again. Here, we are trying to better understand what the Minister means when he repeats reassuring paragraphs, not least, “This is not the Government imposing on the Electoral Commission; this statement will be subject to Parliament, and there will be consultation”—although, there will be circumstances where there will not be consultation, which is even more worrying.

We are trying to probe exactly how engagement and approval of both Houses of Parliament will work. This is important, because in the other place the majority rules, which means there is sometimes a lack of scrutiny and attention to detail. The Government have a majority and the Executive, if they take an opinion, try to force their view through the House of Commons, naturally, by the function of the majority party. So, scrutiny gets squeezed. This was one of the interesting things about the scrutiny the Commons did on this Bill in Committee. It was done in two and half hours. There were some really important clauses on funding that got no consideration at all, which is why the role of this unelected House—again, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is not in her place—is so vital. Our job is to scrutinise, to ensure that when legislation is passed by the majority in the other place, it is fit for purpose, does what it is intended to do and does not have other implications.

These probing amendments try to push the Government into giving clearer answers about how Parliament is going to engage in the process of this statement. We are also seeking a clear position on the role of this House in scrutinising and ensuring that the majority party of the Executive is not able to force things through, which can have huge implications. I was going to say it can have huge implications for the Opposition parties, but of course, it may also do so for the majority of the votes cast in our democratic process.

I come back to the fundamental point that many noble Lords have mentioned. Changes to our electoral system should be made by consent and in a way that all political parties can accept—these are the rules, and we are all going to follow them and abide by them. As soon as an Executive start pushing things through that favour their party and cause damage to the other parties, that is a very dangerous road to go down. We are trying to ensure through these amendments that changes in statements are not just written and approved by the Executive and forced through by the Whips of their party, but are subject to proper involvement, engagement, consultation and approval by Parliament, because we are a parliamentary democracy. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I am going to start by banking an agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury. I completely agree, as I think the whole House does, that the quality of scrutiny in the other place underlines the importance of what happens in your Lordships’ House. Having banked that, I could not understand why these amendments have been tabled. Amendment 4 asks for the strategic and policy statement to be approved in draft by each House—but that is exactly what proposed new Section 4C calls for. It calls for the Secretary of State to lay a draft before Parliament that cannot be designated until it has been approved by each House of Parliament. These are standard procedures in each House, including, importantly, your Lordships’ House. I understand why the noble Lord might want to seek a way of saying that we want more than the normal procedures that apply to secondary legislation, but these amendments do not get any closer to that. They simply duplicate in a different place what is already in the Bill, both for the initial statement and for the revised statements.

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

I accept the point the noble Baroness is making, but I think everyone in the House is always concerned about the way in which secondary legislation is implemented. Even though we have the opportunity to scrutinise it, it is extremely difficult ever to change it; and although we have certain powers in secondary legislation, it is not clear that they will apply to this statement. I am not very keen on using fatal motions, for example. Is that going to be an opportunity for this House? That is why we are asking these questions. These are probing amendments that do not simply say that this is the position we want to see. However, the principle of proper parliamentary engagement is one we want to ensure, and doing so might mitigate some of the aspects of this proposal.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I completely understand that point, but the noble Lord is raising something much broader, which goes beyond the existing procedures we have for handling secondary legislation. I agree with the noble Lord that we should have a full and proper debate about whether there should be alternatives to the nuclear option. However, that is not a debate for this Bill.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I hesitate to rise to speak, given the entrenched views already expressed, both in this debate and in earlier debates this afternoon, but I think the reaction to Clause 14 has been disproportionate. Strategy and policy statements for regulators are not new. They are now an established part of the regulatory landscape, although it is still a relatively new concept and noble Lords may not have been following this development. As has been said, strategy and policy statements already exist for other regulators. There is absolutely no evidence that they have in any way impaired the independence of those regulators from government. If there had been a problem with them, it would be well known by now, as all regulators have multiple routes for making their views known. There is no significant difference between the functions of the Electoral Commission and the other regulators, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, sought to say. There is no significant difference to make them exempt from what is a development in the regulatory practice in this country.

I was deputy chairman of Ofcom when the Government announced that they would legislate for a strategy and policy statement for Ofcom. That was eventually included in the Digital Economy Act 2017. Like all regulators, Ofcom was extremely protective, and somewhat precious, about its independence. It is fair to say that, within Ofcom, the reaction was of considerable suspicion of the Government’s motives. I had left the board before the final statement was eventually published in 2019, so I have no insights into the final process. However, having read that statement, it is difficult to see that there is anything in it that would cause any concern about the independence of Ofcom. I have not heard of anything to that effect. In fact, the statement itself looks rather anodyne to me, as do the statements in relation to the other regulators. I have not had an opportunity to look at the draft statement for the Electoral Commission, but even the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, found nothing disobliging to say about it when he spoke earlier.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

I am sure that the noble Baroness believes firmly that the Government she so strongly supports would not issue a statement that would challenge the independence of the commission. However, there is absolutely nothing about the illustrative statement—or, indeed, in comparison with statements made for other regulators—that in any way circumscribes the ability of this Government or future Governments to go much further than that, unless they are restrained by things that we put into the legislation.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

At the end of the day, there is a requirement for Parliament to agree. That is an important part of the framework. It is not something the Executive can do alone. It would need to become a parliamentary approved statement and, as we discussed earlier, it must be approved by both Houses of Parliament.

My second point is that we should be absolutely clear that strategy and policy statements are not directions. No power of direction exists for the Electoral Commission, and Clause 14 does not create one. Noble Lords would be rightly concerned if Clause 14 created a power of direction in relation to the Electoral Commission. I think that the Electoral Commission was just plain wrong, in its written briefing, to claim that it would be subject to government direction as a result of Clause 14.

I regret to say that the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, for whom I have the highest regard, was also wrong, when he spoke on the first group of amendments, to assert that this statement amounts to a direction. It does not. Directions are very clear in what they can force public bodies to do. This does not force anything. The only requirement, as we have heard, is in new Section 4B for the Government to “have regard to” the statement. We discussed that in the first group of amendments, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has made some comments on the ineffectiveness of that, because it does not refer to other things which it could “have regard to”. It does not trump the commission’s statutory objectives; it does not compel the commission to do anything at all, or to take account of anything else.

We must keep all this in proportion. It is an additional thing for the Electoral Commission to take into account; it does not replace all the existing law relating to the commission. This is the formulation used for all existing regulators, and I believe it is the right approach to protect regulatory independence. As I said, no concerns have been expressed to date about the independence of any of the regulators subject to statements.

The important thing is that the commission has to report on what it has done in consequence of the statement. In practice, as we will see from the way in which the statements tend to align with what the independent regulators are doing, statements generally reinforce what those bodies are doing, and relatively new information beyond what would be included in the annual report comes as a result of those statements.

However, it is important that the independent regulator explain any divergence from the Government’s priorities as approved by Parliament. For example, if the Government said that their priority was to improve democratic participation, not just generally but for particular groups, we would want to know what the commission had done about that and whether it had had any impact. That really does not threaten independence.

I believe that transparency and accountability are what the strategic and policy statements are really all about, and why they are useful. One element is for the Government to be transparent about their policies and priorities, because they have to set them down, get them consulted on and then have them approved by both Houses of Parliament. The regulators then have to be transparent in reporting on what they have done in respect of those priorities—or whether they have done nothing at all. That allows them to be held to account by Parliament—in the case of the Electoral Commission, through the Speaker’s Committee. I hope noble Lords will see that this legislation is not the monster they have created in their own minds. In fact, it can be seen as a very positive development for improving transparency and accountability. I hope we will allow these clauses to stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I regret that, like the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I was unable to attend the Second Reading debate. At the time I was on an aeroplane returning from work in the United States. However, I have read the full proceedings in Hansard with great care and I feel appropriately informed.

Moreover, some time spent in the United States has also given an added perspective on some of the measures in the Bill, for there is about it a definite odour of the Donald J Trump playbook. There is the whiff of voter suppression in the extra requirements being added for access to the franchise. There is a distinct stench of the politically partisan in the measures that undermine the independence of the Electoral Commission. But perhaps the strongest stink arises from changes in the franchise being imposed by the current majority party, without pre-legislative scrutiny or a Speaker’s Conference. This strikes at the foundations of our constitution, written and unwritten.

I predict that in due course, much as the late Enoch Powell predicted, Mr Johnson will be defeated in an election—and then there will be a, perhaps minor but none the less significant, online campaign claiming that the election was stolen or rigged. While it would be unfair to claim that the noble Lord, Lord True, had planted the seeds of such a threat to our democracy, he will have added a little natural fertiliser. In his speech introducing the Bill at Second Reading, he made much of the precautionary principle, and of taking steps to protect the integrity of elections from potential, if as yet hypothetical, threats. He did not, however, extend his precautionary principle to the measures in Clauses 14 and 15 that, as the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee stated, risk undermining public confidence in electoral outcomes by diminishing the independence of the Electoral Commission, both in perception and in reality.

As the late Lord Hailsham famously observed, this country is governed by an elected dictatorship. A Government with a substantial majority in the other place can do virtually what they please. That is why this House, with its, let us say, peculiar composition, has a particular responsibility to protect the constitution, written and unwritten, against partisan proposals by the governing party. Here, the discussion by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, of statements for regulators gives us a valuable insight, because, in this case, the statement is made by the regulated entity. It is as if one of the broadcasters could have a statement telling Ofcom to what it should have regard. The Secretary of State is a political figure. In the electoral arena, he is a regulated entity. He should not be in a position to provide advice of any sort to the regulator.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said at Second Reading,

“there is a constitutional necessity, in a system of democracy based on universal suffrage, that any electoral commission should be wholly and totally independent”.—[Official Report, 23/2/22; col. 239.]

By rejecting these clauses and affirming the independence of the Electoral Commission, this House will make a vital commitment to free and fair elections.