Thursday 10th March 2022
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberElections Act 2022 View all Elections Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 96-I(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (10 Mar 2022)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Lord True) (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord opposite for tabling these amendments. Let me say that it is entirely proper, legitimate and normal to table probing amendments. There is a limit to which probes will get answers because I am not going to be led into hypothetical sets of circumstances.
We all know that electoral law and practice evolves over time and things happen that are inconceivable at the time we may happen to legislate. Who would have conceived, for example, of the practices seen in Tower Hamlets in those local elections? We have collectively—I think there will be agreement across the House on this—moved to adapt the law and our practices and to respond to change. It is reasonable that there should be some flexibility. I do not wish to get into a detailed challenge—
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
I was intimately involved in Tower Hamlets. I was general secretary and suspended the mayor from membership of the party at the time. Can the Minister answer the specific question? The law at the time dealt with abuses in Tower Hamlets; in what way will this statement address any inadequacies? I am not even sure that there were inadequacies in the law because it was able to address the problems in Tower Hamlets.
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, I hope the statement and some of the things that the Government suggest might be in it will be considered unexceptionable when we come to it. I hope people will examine it. I was venturing some response to the question of why anyone should consider that anything needed to be said to the Electoral Commission. I was about to preface it—before the noble Lord quite reasonably got up—by saying that I did not want to get into any kind of generalised criticism of the Electoral Commission because one respects its independence and its role.
Since I have mentioned Tower Hamlets, this was a case where the Electoral Commission did not act in a particularly appropriate way. It did not check that the Tower Hamlets First party even had a bank account. It did nothing to tackle the activities of the corrupt mayor. Election judge Mawrey noted in the Tower Hamlets case:
“It can be said that because the Commission rubber-stamped the application for registration it may be inferred that the Commission was satisfied. All one may say, with the greatest of respect for the Commission, that the enquiries into the structures of”—
Tower Hamlets First—
“cannot have been excessively rigorous.”
The election judge was critical in that case.
I am sure that the Electoral Commission has learned lessons from that, and one would hope that this would be the case, and I do not make any imputation or reference to existing members of the Electoral Commission. The Committee on Standards in Public Life said in its report,
“In the course of gathering evidence”—
and this is not me or the Government, this is the committee—
“we heard some affecting personal stories of a small number of MPs and campaigners who have been regulated by the Electoral Commission. Their experiences were clearly extremely difficult and stressful – both personally and professionally – and we think there are changes that can be made to improve the way the Electoral Commission approaches its role.”
We may have differences about how we should proceed in a set of circumstances but, if I am asked if there is any evidence that in the past perhaps not everything was perfect in that world—well, I have just given two examples that are not from the Government. One is from a judge, and the other is from the Committee on Standards in Public Life.
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
May I interrupt again? The Minister jumps from the specific to the general and keeps saying that this statement is going to be innocuous. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, says it is going to be about five-year plans and longer-term strategies, and then the Minister talks about specific illegal acts and the failure to address some of them. We are jumping around. If there are problems—and this is why I jumped up before—particularly on postal votes, let us put in laws to address them. But we are not talking about new laws and new regulations; we are talking about how the Electoral Commission operates within its statutory functions, and the Government now want to interfere in that. This is the issue that concerns everyone. The Minister jumps from broad, innocuous strategy to specific regulation—very dangerous.
Lord Stunell (LD)
I appreciate the Minister giving way. I hope that his response will include a little more about what the Committee on Standards in Public Life recommended as the solution to the problem that the Minister quite rightly drew to our attention, because the solution recommended by the committee to the Government is not included in the Bill, and the solution brought forward by the Government is condemned by the committee.
Lord True (Con)
I was answering the question I was asked in Committee; I was asked in a supplementary question, and then in another, to give an example of where there has been a complaint about the Electoral Commission, so I tried to serve the Committee by giving two answers. Perhaps that was ill-advised, but I am happy for them to stand on the record. I did say that we would be discussing on this legislation what the appropriate response is. We think that the measures that the Government have put forward, and we will debate this shortly, are proportionate and reasonable, and they are not a direction. When we see what is contained therein, they neither constrain the role of the Electoral Commission, nor direct it.
The Government oppose these amendments. Amendment 3 proposes that the power to designate a statement expires after 12 months of the Act being passed. It is unclear if the intention is that the initial statement should be designated within 12 months or that no statement should be enforced after 12 months. If the limitation is intended to attach to the initial statement, the Government’s view would be that it would add unnecessary pressure to the timetable and could curtail the amount of time afforded to the consultation.
I cannot anticipate the length for production—I was asked that, and I do not think I can respond in writing on this, because it is provisional, in a sense. Parliament has to agree the concept first, then the consultation has to proceed. It does say within the Bill that, in a subsequent review, the review period would be nine months; that is what is envisaged in the case of a review, but in saying that I am not making any commitment on progress, should Parliament agree to these procedures. I am not in a position to do so. If the statement, as drafted, prevents any further statement or revision beyond the initial 12-month period, we could not accept that, because we believe that it is important that, subsequent to any additional statement that Parliament may agree, the Government of the day and the Secretary of State should have the power to make changes and to review to ensure that it remains up to date with any emerging concerns.
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
Before the noble Lord sits down, I wish to say that one of the issues that I raised, and why these probing amendments are there, is to ask not only how quickly and regularly the report will be produced, but what the implications are of a report being produced very close to a general election. Does the Minister think that there are any implications to that, and that it may impact on the political process, particularly how political parties operate?
Lord True (Con)
When one looks at the areas which are covered in the indicative proposals, I do not think that there are things that would seriously affect the conduct of elections. The Government submit that these are matters which, in the current circumstances, would be of ongoing importance—improving accessibility, increasing participation, combatting foreign interference in UK elections and improving transparency.
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
Just on that last point—I keep interrupting, but this is Committee and I think it is important that we get clear answers—if a strategy paper said it is okay to take money from Russian donors, would that not have an implication for a general election? Would it not impact on certain political parties? Maybe even look at its reverse: perhaps certain money from trade unions should not be accepted. The funding of political parties is a critical issue and, if it is in this indicative statement, it will have huge implications for a general election.
Lord True (Con)
The permissibility of donations is a matter of the law of the land, and we will be considering the law on political donations later. As the noble Lord will see, the issue is publishing clear and easily accessible information about spending and donations, which is a job done by the Electoral Commission, but it would probably be prudent to look at foreign interference at this time. I think that would be supported across the House. I give you that as an illustrative example.
Lord Scriven (LD)
Before the Minister sits down, I must press him further to answer the two questions that I asked. First, this is a strategic document: what would a Minister require, on his or her own initiative, to change a strategy? Because a strategy is there for the long term. It is not about day-to-day issues. Regardless of what happens, you keep to your strategy—that is one of the key issues of leadership. Could the Minister give the Committee examples of something, rather than general “unforeseen circumstances”, that might happen that would require a Minister to intervene to change a strategy?
Secondly, the Minister did not answer my question about why they would wish to do that under new Section 4E(4) without any consultation.
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, the Government are setting out a structure in which there would be a regular review. As I outlined, I am not in a position to answer hypothetical questions about a future that might arise. I did say that things have arisen that require a response, and which I am hoping to persuade Parliament in the course of this Bill, following the Pickles report, that we should respond to. Such things might occur in the future, but the structure and timing the Government are setting out are those set out in the Bill. I am not going to be led into hypothetical consideration of what might or might not happen in the future.
Lord Scriven (LD)
Could the noble Lord answer the second point: why, regardless of any change, would you wish to change something without any consultation? That is a key issue. What would stop consultation taking place on an issue that a Minister decided to change in a strategy?
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, I am sure that any Government’s preferred position would be to consult, but the Government believe there is a need for a contingent power here. If noble Lords object to that, no doubt they will lay down amendments.
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
My Lords, this has been an extremely useful exercise. Rather than answers, we have more questions, which I think we will pursue in later debates in terms of not only clause stand part, but some of the other elements of the Bill we need to address. Certainly, if we end up on Report with this clause still in place, we will need to come back with strict and clear amendments, particularly on the fundamental issue of consultation. Despite a very useful debate, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)
My Lords, just on that point on consultation, I suggest that the Minister, when he responds, thinks of the expression “more haste, less speed”. Rushing things through without proper consultation can lead only to difficulties and the issue being revisited at a later date.
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, we had a debate on the previous group. Despite the beguiling invitation of the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, I am not going to rehash that debate. I am certainly not going to accept advice from those Benches on how many legs I should stand on at one particular time. They often seem to have about five or six legs, in my campaigning experience.
The Government oppose these amendments. I understand that they are probing, but I can reassure the noble Lord that we do not consider them necessary because, under the Bill as we propose it, the approval of Parliament—the whole of Parliament, both Houses—is required when a statement is created or whenever it might be revised. That is, as my noble friend Lady Noakes said, there in the Bill. That will ensure that the Government consider its views and then gives Parliament the final say over whether a statement takes effect.
This measure, in our judgment, will improve the accountability of the commission to the UK Parliament and ensure that Parliament, in the last resort, remains firmly in control of approving any statement. That is why the Government have proposed the affirmative procedure in the Bill for the approval of a new or revised statement and I can certainly confirm for the noble Lord that any statement must be approved by both Houses, including your Lordships’ House, before it can be designated. Therefore, we think these amendments are unnecessary.
Lord Beith (LD)
The Minister is relying so strongly on the case that Parliament would have final control over whether the statement was acceptable, he must be assuming that each House has the capacity to turn down and reject the statement. Can we take it that he will not, in those circumstances, say that it is somehow unconstitutional for this House to say that the statement is in defiance of the principles of democracy and damaging to our electoral system?
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, again, I am not going to be led into a wide and potentially very interesting debate on how your Lordships would behave in regard to any legislation, including primary legislation. I draw attention to what is before the Committee, which is that your Lordships would have to pass an affirmative resolution, and that does give your Lordships a power in law.
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
The question has been asked better than I was trying to put it. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, acknowledged that in this House we are extremely reluctant to use the nuclear option, because we are not elected; the elected House has primacy. But we are not talking about legislation in the normal sense of the word—we are talking about a strategy statement that will influence the operation of a body that oversees the conduct of our elections, which could be issued quite close to a general election and might impede the operation of political parties. Constitutionally, I am always very reluctant for this unelected House to challenge the elected House on legislation, but I think we need to be clear and the Minister has to answer this question. This is very different and that is why we are so concerned about it: it concerns the way our general elections are conducted. If this House thinks that a statement is going to impinge on the way our political parties are able to operate, does the Minister agree that we should have the authority to reject it?
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, the noble Lord confuses various things. The constitutional position is as I set out. With the greatest respect, I say to him that the precise proposition that he has put before the Committee in this amendment is that the House should have the opportunity to reject. I do not know about standing on various legs, but he is logically opposing his own amendment. For our part, we think—
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
Let us be clear about this. We have had the Leader of this House challenge this House when it has simply sent something back, let alone rejected it. Then we have a Prime Minister who says, “Well, we’re going to put loads more Peers in the House.” This is a separate issue. It is not a constitutional issue about the rights of the House of Commons; it is about a strategy statement for the Electoral Commission, which has statutory duties to be independent. I can see circumstances where a statement is produced, maybe even as close as four months prior to a general election, that could have severe implications for the conduct of political parties in that election. In those circumstances, even though I am in general against this House rejecting the democratic will of the House of Commons, this Bill imposes a duty on this House to consider whether it needs to operate the powers that it has.
Lord True (Con)
I note what the noble Lord opposite says. I believe that I have set out the correct constitutional position. If he wishes to persuade your Lordships’ House to act differently from the way it normally operates, it is up to him to make that argument and it is his privilege at the time, but that is not the argument before the Committee. I do not believe that the statement or the illustrative example of a statement justifies the kind of language which has been used about it today. We will have a debate on clause stand part shortly, but since the effect of the amendment is simply to replicate what is already in the Bill, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw it.
Lord Stunell (LD)
On a straight point of information, if an emergency statement is produced without consultation, can the Minister give us an assurance that it will itself come before both Houses of Parliament or will it bypass that process as well?
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, any statement has to be treated in the light in which Parliament enacts statements to be approved, and that is by affirmative resolution.
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
Once again, my Lords, the debate has generated more areas of concern than it has put at ease. Undoubtedly, we will need to think about coming back to some of these issues, whatever happens in the debate on whether the clause should stand part. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment reflects a recent change in Select Committee arrangements in the House of Commons.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, I have the great privilege of being a member of the Select Committee chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, which considered citizenship and civic engagement in 2018 and has recently reconvened to look at the matter again. Largely with that in mind, I support Amendment 7, in particular. Bad as this Bill is in many ways, we have to treat it from the standpoint that, somehow, it could be a mechanism to improve representation, participation and the understanding of the electoral process by wider society.
The reason why it is important that civil society organisations be evidently included is that they do something unique. They represent people who are not in Parliament—all sorts of diverse and minority communities: precisely the people who are not engaged, and consequently not represented. We have already begun to see the beneficial effects of the Government talking to civic society organisations in the preparation of the Bill. I would make a case similar to that which the noble Lord, Lord Collins, made for trade unions, and say that we should be unafraid of including those groups in the development of the statement for the Electoral Commission.
One group of civil society organisations that we might think about are those concerned with citizenship, such as Young Citizens or the Association for Citizenship Teaching, organisations which exist with the primary purpose of improving the knowledge of future generations and their engagement and involvement in the electoral process. That is a thoroughly commendable thing and by including it in this Bill, we would not be doing anything that would in any way inhibit the Secretary of State or damage the process. This would be a small but valuable addition to the Bill.
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, I always have some empathy with the noble Lord opposite, who I greatly respect, when he speaks of Labour tradition, the tradition of working people and social traditions. My mother’s grandfather and his family were brought up in Salford and teeming parts of Manchester, and the education they had that led them to improve their lives and secure some degree of prosperity came through the mechanics’ institutes and institutions created by civil society with a good social instinct. So I understand what the noble Lord says and how he feels. I also understand how the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, feels when she speaks about civil society.
These amendments propose extending statutory consultation to specific groups, however defined. As the Bill stands, the consultation process provided in Clause 14 will already ensure that the statement will be subject, where applicable, to some statutory consultation with key stakeholders, including the Electoral Commission, the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission and the Levelling Up, Housing and Communities Committee. If the amendments your Lordships agreed earlier and are about to agree are agreed by the House of Commons, those institutions and bodies would be involved before the draft statement is submitted for the approval of Parliament.
The Secretary of State and officials will hear what has been said, but of course, the Secretary of State is not limited to consulting with only those bodies in considering legislation. I am grateful for what the noble Baroness said about reaching out to civil society. Government Ministers regularly engage with relevant stakeholders across civil society—I am sure that will continue—and a wide range of views can be considered by the Secretary of State when preparing a draft statement. I remind the Committee that the Secretary of State concerned is the one who bears responsibility for local government. Obviously, there is a particular, constant and important engagement between their department and local government. I understand the meaning and sense of the amendment asking for local government to be consulted, but that is, if you like, a standing counterparty of that department.
In addition, both Houses of Parliament play an important role in allowing for the views of wider society; your Lordships’ House is admirable in that. This already ensures that groups such as those noted in these amendments, including trade unions—which never lack a powerful voice in this House, notably from the noble Lord opposite—will be adequately represented through Parliament in scrutinising any draft statement. Additionally, the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission, which is a statutory consultee, is a cross-party group of MPs and that will further allow for representation of the views of different parts of the electorate.
So, while understanding the spirit in which these amendments are advanced and certainly giving the assurance that the Government are not limited to consulting only those bodies listed in the Bill, I urge that the amendments be withdrawn or not moved.
Lord Stunell (LD)
Could the Minister confirm that, when he referred to the Speaker’s commission just now, he meant the Speaker’s committee? He suggested that it had a wide remit to consult with society, whereas I am sure he will recall that it is substantially made up of Conservative Cabinet Ministers.
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, that was not a correct characterisation. I meant to say, “the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission”, which is a cross-party representation of MPs. If I misspoke, I apologise.
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord for his response to this debate. Consultation will be an important part of how we proceed on this and an issue which we will keep emphasising and reiterating. However, in the light of the comments, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendments in Lord True’s name relating to the inserted section 4A of PPERA.
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for the amendment in Lord True’s name at page 22, line 14.
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, of course I listen carefully. Having listened carefully, I infer that your Lordships view these clauses with somewhat modified rapture. Even if I were as eloquent as Pericles, which I am not, I might not be able to change your Lordships’ minds over the next five to 10 minutes. However, I hope that, as we engage on this Bill—which I hope we will continue doing—these clauses will remain in as we go forward to Report. We should always consider modes of improvement, as well as modes of rejection. I will certainly undertake to have further conversations.
I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, on his return from the United States. I understand that he was not at Second Reading, but I will correct the record by saying that I made no reference to the precautionary principle in that debate. It is not my habit to do so. If he finds in Hansard that I did, then I will gladly apologise to him.
I will address the amendments proposed to Clauses 14 and 15, and the excision of these clauses from the Bill. All noble Lords will agree—as I do—that it is vital that we have an independent regulator which commands trust across the political spectrum. This is the view of Her Majesty’s Government. The public rightly expect efficient and independent regulation of the electoral system. We must reflect at all times on the current structures charged with this important responsibility and, where there is a need for change, be prepared to make it. The one thing that will not change is that the Electoral Commission is independent and will remain so.
We believe that the Government’s proposals represent a proportionate approach to reforming the accountability of the Electoral Commission, while respecting its operational independence. I listened very carefully to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and will examine the Hansard record of his analysis of the clauses. There is no direction in the clause for the Electoral Commission to act in any particular way. There is the requirement to “have regard to” the strategy document —to which I will return later.
Clause 14 seeks to make provisions for the introduction of a strategy and policy statement which will set out guidance which the Electoral Commission “must have regard to” in the discharge of its functions. It is not a direction, as my noble friend Lady Noakes said, in what, under the circumstances, was a somewhat courageous speech and one with which I agreed. She set this out clearly.
It has been claimed that the “duty to have regard” to the statement introduced by the provisions will weaken the independence of the commission. I understand that noble Lords should be concerned about that. It is a perfectly legitimate concern. If that were the case, I would understand where noble Lords were coming from. We do not believe that the duty weakens the independence. It is also argued that the Government are given too much influence. Indeed, it was said that the duty gave “control” over the Electoral Commission’s affairs. Again, in our submission, that is wrong. We strongly reject that characterisation of the measure. This is guidance, not a directive, and, as such, the Electoral Commission will remain operationally independent as a result of this measure. It will be required to “have regard” to the statement in the exercise of its functions. This legal duty does not replace or undermine the commission’s other statutory duties. They will remain.
It is entirely appropriate for the Government and Parliament to provide a steer on electoral policy and ensure that their reforms on electoral law are properly implemented. It is not about meddling with operational enforcement decisions on individual cases or any change in the commission’s statutory duties. By increasing policy emphasis on electoral integrity, however, inter alia the Government are seeking to prevent interference in our democracy from fraud, foreign money and hostile state actors.
At present, the Electoral Commission is not fully held to account by anyone. My noble friend Lord Hayward referred to the issues of family voting in Tower Hamlets, on which I recently read an article by that courageous campaigner for honesty in elections, Councillor Peter Golds, who documents his difficulties in getting the commission to address fully and seriously, as he sees it, the problems presented by this issue. The proposed illustrative document that has been given to noble Lords, for example, asks the Electoral Commission to look into the dangers of fraud and such issues that emerge from family voting. It is reasonable to ask the body tasked with preventing fraud to address the bullying of female voters and to give priority to that.
The statement has a democratic check by being ratified by Parliament, as we discussed on an earlier amendment. Your Lordships have the power to accept or reject these proposals on the statement when it comes forward. The duty to have regard that we are introducing means simply that when carrying out its functions the commission will be required to consider the statement and weigh it up against any other relevant considerations. I do not accept the contention of the noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, and others that a statement is not appropriate for a public body. I agree with my noble friend Lady Noakes in her response to that.
Lord Kerslake (CB)
Perhaps I might clarify this point for the Minister. I did not say it applied to any public body. I said it related to the Electoral Commission. There is a critical difference here in its role, its standing and the nature of its accountability. The situation is quite different for other regulatory bodies.
Lord True (Con)
I respectfully disagree with the noble Lord on that. The Electoral Commission is a public body and many other such bodies have important duties and activities that impinge on the public and public well-being. I stand by my statement and agree with my noble friend Lady Noakes on that.
The propositions that we are putting forward work in similar ways to other existing statutory duties that require public bodies to have regard to specific considerations in carrying out their functions; for example, the requirement for public bodies to have regard to matters of equality when exercising their functions. The statement will not allow the Government to direct the commission’s decision-making. They—any Government—will not be able to do so. My noble friend Lady Noakes is, again, right.
Lord True (Con)
Yes, my Lords, new Section 4A(3)(b) allows the statement to contain—I am repeating what the noble Lord has just read out for the Committee; I am trying to help the Committee by doing so—any information considered appropriate, such as information
“about the roles and responsibilities of other persons.”
This could include other bodies with which the EC has relations, for example. The commission cannot be held responsible for the functions of other bodies which might be mentioned. New Section 4B(2) is disallowed from the commission’s duty to
“have regard to the statement when carrying out their function.”
New Section 4B(3) says:
“Subsection (2) does not apply to information contained in the statement by virtue of section 4A(3)(b).”
It is therefore intended specifically, for the reasons that the noble Lord puts forward, for that provision in the Bill.
The Government are clear in their submission that a statement will not undermine the commission’s other statutory duties. It could be used to provide guidance in areas where the commission is exercising the significant amount of discretion it is afforded, and will continue to be afforded, in terms of activity, priorities and approach.
More generally, statutory consultation in applicable circumstances, and the required approval of the UK Parliament when a statement is created or revised, will ensure that the Government consider the UK Parliament’s views and will give Parliament, including your Lordships’ House, the final say over whether the statement takes effect. This measure will improve the commission’s accountability to this Parliament and ensure that Parliament remains firmly in control of approving any statement.
I turn to the amendment relating to Clause 15. The purpose of Clause 15 is to expand the remit of the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission, a statutory committee which is chaired impartially by the Speaker of the other place. Its existing remit is limited to overseeing the commission’s finances, its five-year plan and the appointment of Electoral Commissioners. In expanding the committee’s remit, so that it may examine the commission’s performance of its duties to have regard to the statement, the Government are seeking to extend Parliamentary accountability of the commission to the Speaker’s Committee. This will enable the committee to perform a scrutiny function similar to that of Parliamentary Select Committees, allowing it to retrospectively scrutinise the commission’s activities in light of its duty to have regard to the statement. This power will sit alongside the committee’s existing statutory duties, which we are not amending in any way.
For clarity, Clause 15 will not enable the committee, any more than the Government, to direct the commission’s decision-making. The commission will remain operationally independent and continue to be governed by the commissioners. For completeness, this clause also gives the Speaker’s Committee powers to request relevant information from the commission
“in such form as the Committee may reasonably require”,
while ensuring that the commission is not required to disclose information that
“might adversely affect any current investigation”
or that
“would contravene the data protection legislation.”
This is important in protecting the commission’s ability to investigate, and also the interests of those who may be under investigation. For the reasons that I have set out, we contend that this clause will actually improve the commission’s accountability to Parliament, while respecting the regulator’s operational independence.
Those are the reasons why the Government think that these clauses are proportionate and reasonable, and I urge that your Lordships do not seek to remove these clauses from the Bill.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, the Minister suggested that he did not use the precautionary principle in his speeches at Second Reading. At col. 314, he drew a direct analogy between the need for photographic evidence to vote and locking a door to prevent burglars. Is not that the precautionary principle?
Lord True (Con)
No, it was a humorous remark for the Committee. The precautionary principle is one that the European Union applies in considering legislative activity; it is not a principle that I espouse and not one that I endorsed in the speech.
Viscount Stansgate (Lab)
Can the Minister at least address another point made by my noble friend, on the effect that these clauses will have on the perception that our electoral process is as proper as it should be? Given the comparison that he drew with what we have seen across the Atlantic, and the damage that could be done if any electoral process suffers from a growing sense that it is in some way unfair, or has been interfered with, it is simply not worth having these clauses, to prevent the type of damage that we have seen across the Atlantic.
Lord True (Con)
I accept what the noble Lord said on that point—and, indeed, what the noble Viscount has said. What I would say is, first, that a Minister at the Dispatch Box should not criticise either a former or a present President of the United States, or any members of the parties that support them. We all make and contribute to the perceptions that people have, and one problem is with the risk of importing the rhetoric of the USA about voter suppression, fair voting or whatever, when actually every opinion poll in the United States, including among African Americans, supports the principle of voter identification. If we import that rhetoric into our public affairs, we ourselves potentially contribute to the very kind of perception that I wish to avoid, and I know that the noble Viscount also does—although he has not been in this House that long, I know that his integrity is resounding. All of us who want to avoid that ought to watch our own language in this respect. That is the only thing that I would say in response. We will debate this later, but the Government are seeking to suppress nobody’s vote. We wish to maximise participation in elections.
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
I hope that the Minister can answer the direct point from the noble Lord, Lord Hayward. Although the noble Lord criticised the operation of the Electoral Commission and spoke about how it might improve, he referenced something fundamental. He spoke about his experience in a country where an electoral commission operated under the direction of a Government who hindered and harmed the opposition. Does the Minister not think that, when we complain to that Government about that electoral commission, today’s action and his speech today will inhibit our ability to criticise that Government?
Lord True (Con)
Absolutely not—and I very much hope not. I come to your Lordships’ House to listen to your Lordships’ House, and I hope every government Minister does just the same. The direct answer to the noble Lord opposite is the one that I gave in my speech—that this Government do not seek to direct the Electoral Commission, and nothing in the Bill contains a power of direction.
Lord Judge (CB)
I am very grateful to everybody who has taken part in this debate. It has been a very interesting debate, with aspects of the issue to which my eyes have certainly been opened.
Noble Lords will not want me to try to address every point made by the Minister, but I shall draw attention to a couple. First, if there are problems with how the Electoral Commission is doing its job, or problems with the extent of its job and the ambit of its responsibilities, what we should do is reform the Electoral Commission. We do that in primary legislation before both Houses, not by a ministerial statement.
Secondly, the Minister said that there was nothing in here that used a direction, because “must have regard to” is not a direction. It is not a direction—but the issue is not merely power but influence, and undue influence. However much one tries to avoid the fact, if the Electoral Commission must have regard to whatever the Minister says, the perception of undue influence is obvious, the fact of undue influence is, I suggest, inevitable, and the truth of the matter is that over the years the Electoral Commission will become more and more dependent on what the Secretary of State’s statement asserts.
Finally, the point I sought to make was that the Speaker’s Committee was fine and good when we had the Electoral Commission exercising the responsibilities it currently has, without the introduction of the new Secretary of State’s statement. But what alarms me—and, I suspect, alarms the House—is simply this: there will be two government Ministers examining the work of the Electoral Commission and checking whether it has complied with, or responded to, the Secretary of State’s statement. Fine: they will be seeing whether their ministerial colleague’s directions, invitation and suggestions have been obeyed. In other words, the Electoral Commission will be judged by somebody in the same Cabinet, or the same party. That is a serious change in the way in which the commission works.
I am sorry to say this but, having listened to the Minister, I am in the same position as PACAC was. Incidentally, PACAC is one of the bodies that the Secretary of State is supposed to consult, but its recommendation has been totally ignored. The Minister has not demonstrated that the proposed measures that we are considering are both necessary and proportionate. Nor has he demonstrated that the risk of
“undermining public confidence in the effective and independent regulation of the electoral system”
has been avoided. For those reasons, among many put forward, although for today’s purposes I shall not press the matter, we shall have to return to this on Report.
Lord True (Con)
I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this brief debate and I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Khan, as another member of the team on the Front Bench opposite for this Bill. I look forward to working with him as I do with other noble Lords opposite.
The purpose of Clause 17, which the noble Lord opposes, is not to change anything but to maintain the existing role of the Crown Prosecution Service and Public Prosecution Service in Northern Ireland in bringing prosecutions under electoral law by clarifying the extent of the Electoral Commission’s existing powers.
I remind noble Lords that, when PPERA was passed—and it was an important reforming Bill by a Labour Government that established the commission—Labour Ministers then were absolutely explicit that the Electoral Commission should not have prosecution powers. The noble Lord, Lord Bach—a fine noble Lord—said at the time that the Neill committee, which was the independent committee that had looked into this,
“made clear its view that prosecutions in respect of breaches of the law relating to controls on donations and election expenses should be placed in the hands of the Director of Public Prosecutions and should not be the concern of the commission … the commission does not have that power … the commission will be an enforcement authority but not a prosecuting authority.”—[Official Report, 20/11/2000; col. 631.]
That was what the noble Lord said then, and I agree with him now.
The Explanatory Notes for PPERA clearly state that the Electoral Commission shall have
“a duty to monitor compliance (but not to mount criminal prosecutions).”
That was the basis on which the commission was set up, and all parties at that time assented to that proposition, including the Liberal Democrats.
What has actually changed? The Electoral Commission publicly stated in its Interim Corporate Plan 2020-21 – 2024-25 its intention to develop a prosecutorial capability that would allow it to investigate and bring suspected offences directly before the courts. That was in the aftermath of what some might consider the debacle of the pursuit by the commission of some citizens, which was summed up in by a headline in the Guardian on 14 September 2018:
“Elections watchdog got law wrong on Brexit donations, court rules”.
While the commission considers that current legislation provides scope for it to develop this function, that has never been explicitly agreed by any Government or Parliament. Indeed, as I just suggested to noble Lords, absolutely the reverse was the intention of Parliament when the Labour Government introduced this legislation. It is therefore important to clarify, in the light of the Electoral Commission’s statement, the relevant legislation to make it clear that the commission should not bring criminal proceedings and to put the matter beyond doubt. By doing so, we will avoid the risk of wasting public money as well as the risk of duplicating the work of the prosecution authorities who are already experts in this domain—I agree with the noble Lord opposite that that is where the resources should go.
The clause that the Government propose would add to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 to make clear the original attention of Parliament that the commission should not bring criminal prosecutions in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. This would not apply in Scotland where there is already a single prosecutorial authority.
The clause will not amend any of the commission’s other existing powers. The commission will continue to have a wide range of investigatory and civil sanctioning powers available to it, and it will remain able to refer criminal matters to the police, as is currently the case. We must not forget that, as the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, himself reminded us, the commission has never brought a criminal prosecution to date, although it may be talking of wanting to develop that role. Clause 17 merely retains that status quo in practice, so our measure will not add a burden to the prosecution authorities or lead to fewer prosecutions.
The proper place for criminal investigations and prosecutions lies with the experts in this domain—namely, the police and prosecution authorities. That is in line with the Regulating Election Finance report by the Committee on Standards in Public Life, which found that there was no evidence or support for allowing the regulator to develop a prosecutorial ability in order to increase the number of prosecutions. The proper place for criminal investigation and prosecution is with the police and the Crown Prosecution Service, and the Public Prosecution Service in Northern Ireland. These are the experts. Having the commission step into this space is unnecessary.
I draw the Committee’s attention to the Crown Prosecution Service’s evidence to the Committee on Standards in Public Life in July 2021, when it stated that
“the CPS deals with criminal offences under the RPA and criminal charges under PPERA, while the Electoral Commission has civil powers to deal with PPERA cases. We assess this is an appropriate division. There are important prosecutorial functions that the CPS has vast experience of, and expertise in, including police PACE processes, adherence to CPIA legislation and to disclosure rules … In our view”—
this is the CPS, not the Government—
“a criminal-civil divide provides a good level of precision … Any unintentional blurring of the lines would be counter-productive.”
I think that is advice from prosecutorial authorities who know what they are doing.
We are committed instead to supporting the police as necessary to enforce electoral regulation proactively and effectively. For that reason, I urge the Committee to resist this opposition to the clause. If your Lordships were to follow it, it might encourage the Electoral Commission to develop this function. I think the existing practice should be maintained, and therefore I urge that Clause 17 should stand part of the Bill.