Immigration Bill

Lord Ashton of Hyde Excerpts

Monday 18th January 2016 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

43: After Clause 7, insert the following new Clause—
“Labour market enforcement undertakingsPower to request LME undertaking
(1) This section applies where an enforcing authority believes that a person has committed, or is committing, a trigger offence.
(2) An enforcing authority may give a notice to the person—
(a) identifying the trigger offence which the authority believes has been or is being committed;(b) giving the authority’s reasons for the belief;(c) inviting the person to give the authority a labour market enforcement undertaking in the form attached to the notice.(3) A labour market enforcement undertaking (an “LME undertaking”) is an undertaking by the person giving it (the “subject”) to comply with any prohibitions, restrictions and requirements set out in the undertaking, as to which see section (Measures in LME undertakings).
(4) “Trigger offence” means—
(a) an offence under the Employment Agencies Act 1973 other than one under section 9(4)(b) of that Act;(b) an offence under the National Minimum Wage Act 1998;(c) an offence under the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004;(d) any other offence prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State;(e) an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d);(f) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 in relation to an offence so mentioned;(g) an offence of inciting a person to commit an offence so mentioned;(h) an offence of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence so mentioned.(5) “Enforcing authority”—
(a) in relation to a trigger offence under the Employment Agencies Act 1973, means the Secretary of State or any authority whose officers are acting for the purposes of that Act (see section 8A of that Act);(b) in relation to a trigger offence under the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, means the Secretary of State or any authority whose officers are acting for the purposes of that Act (see section 13 of that Act); (c) in relation to a trigger offence under the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004, means the Secretary of State or any authority whose officers are acting as enforcement officers for the purposes of that Act (see section 15 of that Act);(d) in relation to an offence which is a trigger offence by virtue of subsection (4)(d) (including an offence mentioned in subsection (4)(e) to (h) in connection with such an offence), has the meaning prescribed in regulations made by the Secretary of State.(6) In subsection (5), a reference to an offence under an Act includes a reference to an offence mentioned in subsection (4)(e) to (h) in connection with such an offence.
(7) In this section references to the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004 are references to that Act only so far as it applies in relation to England and Wales and Scotland.”

[Lord Ashton of Hyde (Con)]

My Lords, these government amendments introduce new clauses to create a new regime of labour market enforcement—LME—undertakings and orders, backed up with a criminal offence for non-compliance. As such, they are an important part of the Government’s response to the consultation Tackling Exploitation in the Labour Market, where respondents agreed that there was a need to tackle exploitation falling between routine breaches of labour market legislation and very serious offences, which are dealt with by the police or the National Crime Agency. This means that, for the first time, individuals within rogue businesses face the possibility of imprisonment for repeated or serious breaches of labour market legislation, many of which are currently punishable only by a fine. However, as I am about to describe, a business will have several opportunities to put matters right before facing prosecution.

Taking national minimum wage offences as an example, an initial offence would be dealt with using the existing civil penalty regime. Money owed to the worker would also be recovered and the new regime will not affect this. However, if a business decided to take the hit and continue underpaying its workers then a labour market enforcement undertaking could be sought, requiring the business to take reasonable steps to ensure compliance in future. This could be an update to its software, for example, a measure which a law-abiding business would have implemented on its own initiative. If the business refused to give or failed to comply with an undertaking, the enforcer could apply to the court for a labour market enforcement order. This would contain similar corrective measures, as ordered by the court. A court could also make such an order when sentencing for a labour market offence. Only where the business failed to comply with the order would prosecution be a consequence.

The new clause inserted by Amendment 43 allows one of the enforcement bodies to request that a subject enters into an LME undertaking where it believes that a trigger offence has been or is being committed. “Trigger offence” is defined as meaning,

“an offence under the Employment Agencies Act 1973 other than one under section 9(4)(b) of that Act … an offence under the National Minimum Wage Act 1998”,

or,

“an offence under the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004”,

including secondary and related offences.

The new clauses inserted by Amendments 44 and 45 set out what measures may be included in an LME undertaking and their duration. These must secure compliance with labour market legislation, publicise the undertaking and subsequent remedial action or be a measure of a kind prescribed in regulations by the Secretary of State. We envisage this power being used to prescribe measures to protect workers such as taking steps to inform them of their rights or preventing the unlawful retention of documents. All the measures must be just and reasonable, and at least one measure must be necessary to prevent or reduce further offending. The undertaking must make clear how any such measures will secure compliance. An undertaking takes effect when accepted by the enforcing authority unless alternative arrangements are made within it, and can last for a maximum of two years. The enforcing authority may release the subject from an undertaking, and must do so if none of the measures within it is necessary to reduce or prevent further offending. The new clause inserted by Amendment 46 governs the service of a notice to request an undertaking, including where the suspected offender is a body corporate or a partnership.

The new clauses inserted by Amendments 47, 48 and 50 set out the arrangements by which the enforcing authority can apply to the court for an LME order and the measures it may contain. An application may be made where the proposed respondent has refused or failed to enter into an undertaking within a negotiation period of 14 days, or longer by agreement. An application may also be made where the proposed respondent has failed to comply with the undertaking. The court must be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the trigger offence has been or is being committed. The court must also be satisfied that the order is just and reasonable. The measures that the order can contain are the same as the undertaking. The appropriate court is the magistrates’ court, sheriff court or court of summary jurisdiction, according to where the conduct constituting the offence took place.

The new clause inserted by Amendment 49 makes provision for a sentencing court to make an LME order following conviction for a trigger offence. The new clause inserted by Amendment 51 states that an order may not be made in respect of a child and that its maximum duration is two years. When making an order, the court may release the respondent from any previous order or from any undertaking made in respect of the same trigger offence. The new clauses inserted by Amendments 52 and 53 make provision for orders to be varied, discharged and appealed.

The new clause inserted by Amendment 54 puts a duty on the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice on the exercise of the new enforcement regime. This will make it clear to enforcing authorities how the regime should be applied alongside their existing sanctions. The code of practice will be laid before Parliament and published, and the enforcing authorities must have regard to the current version.

The new clause inserted by Amendment 55 provides that the powers conferred on officers to investigate trigger offences may also be used when investigating breaches of an LME order. In the case of the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, these powers will be extended by Amendments 17 and 40, and it will therefore have the powers to investigate trigger offences under employment agency and national minimum wage legislation.

The new clauses inserted by Amendments 56 to 59 create a criminal offence where a respondent fails to comply with an LME order. The maximum penalty is two years’ imprisonment and/or a fine on conviction on indictment, or 12 months’ imprisonment and/or a fine on summary conviction. Where the offence is committed by bodies corporate, unincorporated associations or partnerships, an offence is also committed by the officers of the company, the members of the unincorporated association or partners respectively, where it is proved that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of, or attributable to the negligence of, that individual. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have some amendments in this group. The first is an amendment to government Amendment 47, on the power to make an LME order. Under subsection (1) of the new clause, the court must be,

“satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the person has committed, or is committing, a trigger offence”.

My amendment would change the balance of probabilities to “beyond reasonable doubt”. A trigger offence relates to offences under other legislation as well as being an offence in itself so I do not understand why the civil standard of proof is thought to be appropriate. If the answer to this is that it is in effect covered by the new clause in Amendment 49, which is different, then is there not a problem in having differing standards of proof? I would be grateful for an explanation here.

Amendment 50A is an amendment to government Amendment 50. It would leave out the provision that one of the purposes of a measure—a “prohibition, restriction or requirement”—included in an LME order is bringing it,

“to the attention of persons likely to be interested in the matter”,

and other points. If this is about communication across the actors in labour market enforcement, should it not be for the director to make sure this happens? Why is it a measure in a court order? It does not seem a matter for the courts. I can see that it may be necessary, for instance, to inform employees about an order but it seems very cumbersome and not appropriate in this context.

My final amendment in the group is an amendment to government Amendment 57, which, dealing with “Offences by bodies corporate”, defines an officer of a body corporate as including a “manager”. My amendment would take that out. I am used to seeing directors, secretaries and so on as officers of a company but a manager—though I admit I will be very out of date on company law provisions—to me means something quite different and not with the same responsibilities as a director of a company.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hylton (CB)]

My Lords, what I have to say follows from what the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, has just said. Amendment 43 refers to offences under four existing Acts together with inciting, aiding, abetting or counselling such offences. These can trigger undertakings. Amendment 44 refers to notices, orders and enforcement. All this is bound to cost money. Resources have been repeatedly mentioned today, so I must ask: how much of this additional expenditure will be new money and how much will be transferred from the enforcement mechanisms of the existing legislation? It would be a great waste of our time and effort to create a series of new offences without having the means to cope with them.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their remarks. Before I move to the amendments spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I shall comment on the points raised on the government amendments.

I was asked when the new system, which the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, described as burdensome, will be used. This is a new power to be used after the existing penalties have been applied under the existing Acts. For example, in national minimum wage regulations, the current penalty is naming and shaming. In other areas, there are civil penalties. These amendments are designed for egregious offences and repeated offences where, for example, some companies may decide to take the fine and continue to pay their workers less than the minimum wage. We have included these new powers to put an end to breaches of labour market rules. We think they are an important part of the new toolkit to address these serious matters.

Resources have been mentioned on several occasions this evening. I take the point that if these new powers are not properly enforced, there will be no point in having them. My noble friend has already committed to talk about resources and to write to noble Lords on that subject, and I will ask him to include this in his letter.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, raised the subject of electronics. He cleverly included matters which are nothing to do with this Bill. Of course, electricity is dangerous when it is incorrectly applied. The electronic means in this Bill bring it into the 21st century, but that does not mean that they should be used in all cases.

The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, talked about the four current Acts which can trigger the possibility of going into enforcement, and—again—he mentioned money. I agree it is bound to cost some money. As I said before, my noble friend will include that in his reply, if I could leave it like that for the time being.

Of course, the Director of Labour Market Enforcement will set out in his strategy how the funding that is available for the enforcement agencies should be allocated. Every year he makes an annual report. It would be very surprising, if he were underresourced, that he would not refer to that in his annual report.

As I have said to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, routine cases will continue to be dealt with using existing powers. There will be LME undertakings, and then orders will be for the more serious cases.

I move on to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to which I listened carefully. Amendment 47A would change the court’s power to make an LME order on application from an enforcement agency, so that the court would have to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the person had committed or was committing a trigger offence.

We think it appropriate that a court should be able to make an LME order on application from an enforcement agency on the basis of the balance of probabilities rather than the criminal standard of proof. In these circumstances, the order is designed to prevent further offending, not as a means of sentencing the person on conviction for an offence. The amendment would limit the ability of enforcement agencies to invoke the LME order regime to secure compliance as an alternative to straightforwardly prosecuting the person for a trigger offence.

Amendment 50A would remove the court’s power to include a prohibition, restriction or requirement in an LME order on bringing the order, the circumstances in which it was made and any action by the respondent to comply, to the attention of persons likely to be interested in the matter. However, we think it right that the courts, in making an LME order, should be able to require a business to make the matter known to interested parties, and failure to do so would result in a breach of the order with the possibility of prosecution for the consequent offence. It is properly for the courts, not the Director of Labour Market Enforcement, to impose this requirement. The amendment would significantly weaken this provision, possibly enabling those subject to an LME order to conceal it from its employees, creditors and trading partners.

Amendment 57A would remove from the provisions relating to offences by bodies corporate the possibility of a manager committing the offence of failing to comply with an LME order where they have consented or connived in the offence or it was attributable to their neglect. However, it is appropriate that managers, in addition to their companies, should be held liable for the offence of failing to comply with an LME order where the offence resulted from their neglect, consent or connivance. Secondary liability provisions of this kind, including liability for managers, are commonplace in other legislation. The principle that managers can be held liable for offences committed by their company in certain circumstances is well established.

In the light of what I have said, I hope that the noble Baroness will agree not to move her amendments.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

The Minister made reference to a point I picked out about electronic communications. It is his party that decided to allow the use of electronic communications in this Bill for contacting people who may have committed some very serious offences. Another Bill, also on the Floor of this House around the same time, is denying law-abiding citizens to get their communications by electronic means. I asked the Minister if he would point out that contradiction to his friends in BIS, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. I would be grateful if he could confirm that he will do that.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I am very happy to report the noble Lord’s comments to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe. I would not necessarily call that a contradiction but I will certainly bring his remarks to her attention.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I will go back and look at the standard of proof that is required. My concern was that an LME order is a step along the way—a part of a process that seems to require, as an appropriate standard of proof, to be beyond reasonable doubt.

With regard to “an officer” including a manager, my concern is whether the term “manager” is understood in the same way by everyone. We know what a director is—it is defined in legislation, you sign up to it and so on—but there could be doubt as to whether an individual was actually a manager or not, and that is where my anxiety lies. I appreciate that the Minister is not in a position to make any further comment today but perhaps it is something that we can look at. This is not intended as an opposition political point; it is a real concern about how the legislation will work.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

I am happy to say that my noble friend is prepared to talk to the noble Baroness about that before the end of Committee—or before Report, anyway.

Amendment 43 agreed.