Lord Bates
“Measures in LME undertakings
(1) An LME undertaking may include a prohibition, restriction or requirement (each a “measure”) if, and only if—
(a) the measure falls within subsection (2) or (3) (or both), and(b) the enforcing authority considers that the measure is just and reasonable.(2) A measure falls within this subsection if it is for the purpose of—
(a) preventing or reducing the risk of the subject not complying with any requirement imposed by or under the relevant enactment, or(b) bringing to the attention of persons likely to be interested in the matter—(i) the existence of the LME undertaking, (ii) the circumstances in which it was given, and (iii) any action taken (or not taken) by the subject in order to comply with the undertaking.(3) A measure falls within this subsection if it is prescribed, or is of a description prescribed, in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(4) The enforcing authority must not—
(a) invite the subject to give an LME undertaking, or (b) agree to the form of an undertaking,unless the authority believes that at least one measure in the undertaking is necessary for the purpose mentioned in subsection (5).(5) That purpose is preventing or reducing the risk of the subject—
(a) committing a further trigger offence under the relevant enactment, or (b) continuing to commit the trigger offence.(6) An LME undertaking must set out how each measure included for the purpose mentioned in subsection (2)(a) is expected to achieve that purpose.
(7) In this section, the “relevant enactment” means the enactment under which the enforcing authority believes the trigger offence concerned has been or is being committed.”
Lord Bates
“Labour market enforcement ordersPower to make LME order on application
(1) The appropriate court may, on an application by an enforcing authority under section (Applications), make a labour market enforcement order against a person if the court—
(a) is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the person has committed, or is committing, a trigger offence, and(b) considers that it is just and reasonable to make the order.(2) A labour market enforcement order (an “LME order”) is an order which—
(a) prohibits or restricts the person against whom it is made (“the respondent”) from doing anything set out in the order;(b) requires the respondent to do anything set out in the order.See section ().(3) In this section “the appropriate court”—
(a) where the conduct constituting the trigger offence took or is taking place primarily in England and Wales, means a magistrates’ court;(b) where that conduct took or is taking place primarily in Scotland, means the sheriff;(c) where that conduct took or is taking place primarily in Northern Ireland, means a court of summary jurisdiction.(4) An application for an LME order under this section is—
(a) in England and Wales, to be made by complaint;(b) in Northern Ireland, to be made by complaint under Part 8 of the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/1675 (N.I. 26)).”
Lord Bates
“Applications
(1) An enforcing authority may apply for an LME order to be made under section (Power to make LME order on application) against a person (the “proposed respondent”) if—
(a) the authority has served a notice on the proposed respondent under section (Power to request LME undertaking), and(b) the proposed respondent— (i) refuses to give an LME undertaking, or(ii) otherwise fails, before the end of the negotiation period, to give an LME undertaking in the form attached to the notice or in such other form as may be agreed with the enforcing authority. (2) An enforcing authority may also apply for an LME order if the proposed respondent—
(a) has given an LME undertaking to the enforcing authority, and(b) has failed to comply with the undertaking.(3) In subsection (1) “the negotiation period” means—
(a) the period of 14 days beginning with the day after that on which the notice mentioned in paragraph (a) of that subsection was given, or(b) such longer period as may be agreed between the enforcing authority and the proposed respondent.”
Lord Bates
“Measures in LME orders
(1) An LME order may include a prohibition, restriction or requirement (each a “measure”) if, and only if, the measure falls within subsection (2) or (3) (or both).
(2) A measure falls within this subsection if it is for the purpose of—
(a) preventing or reducing the risk of the respondent not complying with any requirement imposed by or under the relevant enactment, or(b) bringing to the attention of persons likely to be interested in the matter—(i) the existence of the LME order, (ii) the circumstances in which it was made, and (iii) any action taken (or not taken) by the respondent in order to comply with the order.(3) A measure falls within this subsection if it is prescribed, or is of a description prescribed, in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(4) Where an LME order includes a measure for the purpose mentioned in subsection (2)(a), the order must set out how the measure is expected to achieve that purpose.
(5) In this section the “relevant enactment” means the enactment under which the trigger offence concerned has been or is being committed.”
Lord Bates
“Further provision about LME orders
(1) An LME order has effect for the period specified in it but the maximum period for which an order may have effect is 2 years.
(2) An LME order may not be made against an individual who is under 18.
(3) If a court makes an LME order, the court may also—
(a) release the respondent from any LME undertaking given in relation to the trigger offence concerned;(b) discharge any other LME order which is in force against the respondent.”
Lord Bates
“Offences by bodies corporate
(1) If an offence under section (Offence) committed by a body corporate is proved—
(a) to have been committed with the consent or connivance of an officer of the body, or(b) to be attributable to any neglect on the part of such an officer,the officer, as well as the body corporate, is guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.(2) In subsection (1) “officer”, in relation to a body corporate, means—
(a) a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body;(b) a person purporting to act in any such capacity.(3) If the affairs of a body corporate are managed by its members, subsection (1) applies in relation to the acts and defaults of a member in connection with the member’s functions of management as if the member were a director of the body corporate.”
Lord Bates
“Application to unincorporated associations
(1) In a case falling within subsection (2), an unincorporated association is to be treated as a legal person for the purposes of sections (Power to request LME undertaking) to (Offence).
(2) A case falls within this subsection if it relates to a trigger offence for which it is possible to bring proceedings against an unincorporated association in the name of the association.
(3) Proceedings for an offence under section (Offence) alleged to have been committed by an unincorporated association may be brought against the association in the name of the association.
(4) For the purposes of such proceedings—
(a) rules of court relating to the service of documents have effect as if the association were a body corporate, and(b) the following provisions apply as they apply in relation to a body corporate—(i) section 33 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925 and Schedule 3 to the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980;(ii) sections 70 and 143 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995;(iii) section 18 of the Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1945 (c. 15 (N.I.)) and Schedule 4 to the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/1675 (N.I 26)). (5) A fine imposed on the association on its conviction of an offence is to be paid out of the funds of the association.
(6) If an offence under section (Offence) committed by an unincorporated association is proved—
(a) to have been committed with the consent or connivance of an officer of the association, or (b) to be attributable to any neglect on the part of such an officer,the officer, as well as the association, is guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.(7) In subsection (6) “officer”, in relation to any association, means—
(a) an officer of the association or a member of its governing body;(b) a person purporting to act in such a capacity.”
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)
My Lords, the Government have four amendments—Amendments 65, 68, 69 and 70—in this group. I shall speak to the amendments and then come back to the very legitimate points that have been raised and questions posed. I shall respond to them in turn.
Noble Lords are familiar with the reason why the Government are creating the offence of illegal working: to address a genuine gap in the law which currently impedes our ability to address the economic incentives behind illegal work where they exist. It is against this explanation and the safeguards to ensure its appropriate use that I turn to the amendments that have been tabled.
The Government have carefully considered the amendment to introduce the defence of “without reasonable excuse”. However, we believe that this introduces considerable ambiguity. Introducing such a wide defence risks making it very difficult to achieve a successful prosecution. The Government have also considered the amendment to remove voluntary work from the ambit of the offence. However, we believe that this is unnecessary because someone undertaking genuine voluntary work would not be working under the purposes of a contract. Therefore, genuine voluntary work is not caught by new Section 24B(9), introduced by Clause 8, and it therefore falls outside the ambit of the offence.
I share the concerns of noble Lords who want to ensure that this offence is used appropriately. The offence is not aimed at the victims of modern slavery, where the statutory defence in Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act will still apply, as will common-law defences, such as duress. The circumstances of someone’s illegal working will be taken into account by the CPS and prosecutors in Northern Ireland and Scotland when deciding whether it is in the public interest to prosecute.
I also urge noble Lords to see the creation of this offence in the context of other measures in the Bill and elsewhere to increase the protection and support for victims of slavery and trafficking, strengthen enforcement against exploitation through the creation of the Director of Labour Market Enforcement and taking tougher action against employers of illegal workers.
We should remember that individuals with an irregular immigration status are already likely to be committing a criminal offence, regardless of whether they are working. The Government’s policy remains unchanged and they will continue to seek the removal of illegal workers from the UK, and prosecute only where the CPS or prosecutors in Northern Ireland and Scotland consider that their prosecution is in the public interest. This remains the right approach. The new offence, however, will serve as an important deterrent to illegal economic migrants and close a gap in the Proceeds of Crime Act powers, which do not necessarily require a conviction.
I have listened carefully to noble Lords’ concerns regarding the strict liability nature of the offence. While I am of the opinion that there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that the offence is used appropriately and that victims of modern slavery are protected, I can assure noble Lords that I will reflect very carefully on today’s discussions and the points which have been made ahead of Report.
I now turn to the offence of employing an illegal worker in Clause 9 of the Bill. The Government’s intention in using “reasonable cause to believe” as the test is to provide a more objective test for the existing offence of employing illegal workers and so make the offence easier to prove. The test is intended to capture those employers who have wilfully turned a blind eye to someone’s immigration status when employing them so that the employer cannot be said to have known.
Introducing a test of recklessness would not resolve the difficulties in establishing an employer’s state of mind that the Government are seeking to address in the Bill. This is because the test of recklessness would remain subjective, requiring proof that the employer foresaw a risk that the person had no right to work, yet went on to take that risk and employ them.
The test of reasonable cause to believe is not the same as negligence. The intention is to continue to apply the civil penalty sanction to those employers who are simply negligent—that is to say, who act without reasonable care and skill—in terms of not checking a person’s right to work, or not doing so correctly.
The Government’s amendment requires an employer positively to have a reason to believe that the individual cannot accept the employment. It will enable prosecutions to be brought against employers who choose not to undertake the necessary checks because they have reasonable grounds to believe that such checks will reveal that the employee has no right to work. This is in addition to the Government’s intention to continue to prosecute those who we can show actually know that someone has no right to work here, as we can do now under the current wording of the offence.
I now turn to some of the points raised during our debate. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked about the projected size and suggested that the sums that we were talking about were fairly minuscule. I refer noble Lords to my letter to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on 8 January, to which the noble Lord, Lord Green, referred. On page 2, it says:
“In 2014-15, the courts approved the forfeiture of cash totalling £542,668 seized by immigration officers. Following criminal convictions for immigration-related offences courts ordered the confiscation of assets totalling £966,024. We expect that in-country seizure could double with the use of the extended powers enabled by the new illegal working offence”.
Therefore, I do not think that these are inconsequential amounts—£1 million is quite a substantial amount. It is twice the budget of the relevant employment agency body. As I say, these are significant sums.
There is a slight sense that we were looking at destitute, highly vulnerable people, and that they would be the target of these initiatives. We are talking here about people who have on their person a significant amount of cash in excess of £1,000.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett
I am sorry to interrupt but I meant to mention that because I saw it in the noble Lord’s very helpful letter. But where is it in the legislation? I looked for it but I could not find any reference to a £1,000 limit or anything. I wondered whether I had missed it.
Lord Bates
It comes under the Proceeds of Crime Act. What we are doing here is simply drawing that element into line. The accusation appears to be being made that somehow the Government are targeting people who are here illegally. Of course, if they are here illegally, they should not be here and they should rightly be removed. However, it is odd that under the legislation to which I referred, we can currently prosecute those who have permission to be in the UK and are working in breach of their conditions. We can confiscate the relevant sums under the Proceeds of Crime Act for those who are legally here in breach of their conditions. However, if someone is illegally here, or they have overstayed, we cannot do that. Noble Lords will need to comment on that themselves. However, if they believe that this provision is too punitive for people who are working illegally in this country, they ought also to say—I am not inviting them to do this by Report—that people who breach the terms of their existing stay in the country, such as students who work beyond the hours legally allowed, ought to be exempt as well. The fact that there is one rule for people who are legally here but breach their conditions, and another for people who are illegally here, seems to me wrong as there is a gap. We are trying to close that gap.
Baroness Ludford
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way and apologise for interrupting. My question may simply reflect my ignorance of immigration law but I am reminded that I asked at Second Reading why immigration law could not be changed. We have so much immigration law that I should have thought that the situation was covered. So, for the offence of breaching conditions attached to immigration status, you can be prosecuted and your proceeds removed, but if you work in breach of immigration law as a whole—that is, you have totally driven a coach and horses through immigration law through being here at all—you apparently cannot be prosecuted and be subjected to POCA. Therefore, it seems to me that the root of the problem stems from immigration law and that the solution is not to create a new offence of illegal working but to go back to immigration law to determine why you can deal with some people breaching it but not others doing so.
Lord Bates
This is an Immigration Bill. I take the point that of course we need to continue to look at all these points. I am simply saying that it has somehow been portrayed that we are being inconsistent in singling out people who have fallen on hard times and are having a tough time in life, and mercilessly pursuing them. In fact, all we are doing is ensuring equality of treatment. Moreover, and more seriously, if we were introducing this measure in 2014, I would feel a lot more uneasy about it. Since the Immigration Bill 2014—taken through by my noble friend Lord Taylor of Holbeach—we have introduced the Modern Slavery Act, Section 45 of which is a statutory defence for people who are the victims of crime. This is widely welcomed and appreciated. That defence was not there in the Immigration Bill 2014 but is there now, and we are plugging a gap.
The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, asked why there are different sentences across the UK. The maximum prison sentence for a Clause 8 offence is the same across the UK. This will remain the case until Section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 is commenced. This reflects devolution and is set out at subsection (3) of the new offence. If that does not make it crystal clear to the noble Lord, I can assure him that he is not alone. If, when we read that in the Official Report, further explanation is needed, I will be happy to provide it. The gist is that the sentence is consistent across the United Kingdom.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Hamwee, both asked how many prosecutions had taken place of Bulgarian, Romanian and Croatian nationals. Parliamentary Questions 12752 and 12753 on this were answered in 2015. Between 2007 and 2013 there were three prosecutions where this was the principal offence—that is, the offence where the heaviest penalty may be imposed. During the financial years 2006-07 to 2013-14, a total of 491 penalty notices were issued. This offence, and penalty, only related to those migrants who were subject to accession regulations, while the new offence will relate to all migrants who work illegally in the UK.
It is not the case that an employer of an asylum seeker with permission to work has no protection unless the asylum seeker has leave to be in the UK. Section 24 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 ensures that those on temporary admission, including asylum seekers, are deemed to have leave for the purposes of the Section 21 offence. Therefore, if, as an exception, they have permission to work, they will not be committing an offence simply because they do not have leave.
A number of noble Lords asked about voluntary work. For work to fall within the ambit of the offence it must be under or for the purposes of a contract. Genuine voluntary work should not be subject to a contract. Volunteering must not be used as a pretence for paid work. A question was asked about whether visitors can undertake activities on a voluntary basis. The answer is yes, they may volunteer, providing this is incidental to the purpose of their visit to the UK, is unpaid and for a period of less than 30 days. I was also asked about an illegal migrant who starts as an illegal worker but whose working conditions deteriorate to the point where they may become a victim of modern slavery. For illegal workers to benefit from the statutory defence, their illegal working must be as a direct consequence of their slavery or human trafficking. They will therefore not have the defence for any illegal working committed prior to the deterioration of their working conditions to the extent that they became a victim of modern slavery. However, their subsequent slavery or human trafficking will be relevant factors for the Crown Prosecution Service to take into account when considering whether a prosecution is in the public interest. For absolute clarity, only the wages earned before the statutory defence applies to them would be recoverable under the proceeds of crime legislation.
I think I have covered most of the points raised. If there are any that I have missed, I will be happy to deal with them. I covered the point about reasonable excuse and reasonable cause in my main contribution. It remains our view that what is unfair is firms undercutting their competitors through exploitative use of illegal labour, so distorting competition, and those illegal workers taking jobs that should be available to all workers who are legally here and legally part of the labour market. I therefore commend the amendment standing in my name in this group, and ask the noble Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment at this stage.
Baroness Hamwee
I have two points, if I may. The Minister might have realised that referring to voluntary work and volunteering provoked quite a lot of chuntering around me, and on the Cross Benches. Listening to him, it seemed that the concepts of volunteering and voluntary work were being confused. When I looked at this a little while ago, I understood that they are different. I was confused at the beginning of the Minister’s speech when he talked about voluntary work not involving a contract. I am not sure whether that is always the case. I do not think we will be able to debate this now, but it would be very helpful if we could understand it a little more clearly—I think I speak for at least four of your Lordships, and possibly those behind me as well.
The other point is quite different. I would not necessarily agree with them but I followed the Minister’s comments about recklessness. He said that if the words “reasonable excuse” were included in the new illegal working provision in Clause 8, it would mean fewer successful prosecutions. That is indeed self-evident but it does not answer the point about whether it should be a defence, or whether the offence should be one where there is no reasonable excuse. Earlier in the debate, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, raised the possible situation of someone being confused by what permission he had, or by the documents and so on. I would like, at any rate, to understand better what I heard from the Minister on that point.
Lord Bates
It is the same argument as before: whether the same test applies to people who are here legally—in one form—but are exceeding or abusing the terms by which they are in the UK. The noble Baroness may be saying that if that provision contained the phrase “without reasonable excuse”, it should be read across. But there is no ability to say that you can be prosecuted for the proceeds of crime unless you have a reasonable excuse. It is therefore consistent to apply the same test to somebody who is here illegally as to somebody who is here legally but exceeding the terms of their permission to be here.
Lord Rosser
Before I respond to the Minister, I thought he said earlier that he would be reflecting on certain aspects ahead of Report. I wonder whether he would mind repeating what issues he will reflect on before Report.
Lord Bates
The short answer is, of course, that I reflect on all the comments made by noble Lords ahead of Report. I have nothing specific in mind, but it would be helpful if the noble Lord came back with a further question.
Lord Rosser
Is the Minister agreeing to reflect on the points made in the debate this evening and to come back with a response, negative or positive, before Report? Is that what he is agreeing to do, without any specific commitment?
Lord Bates
The new offence will serve as an important deterrent. I have listened very carefully to the noble Lord’s concerns. Although I am of the opinion that there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that the offence is used appropriately and that victims of modern slavery are protected, I said that I would reflect on that point very carefully, listen to the debate and come back with further remarks on Report. The particular point was about whether the defences are sufficient for those who may have been the victims of modern-day slavery.
Lord Rosser
Do I understand that it will not cover the example that I referred to and which the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has just referred to? That is where an individual had effectively been told by their employer that they could be employed, but it was subsequently found out, for example, that the employer was not properly sponsoring them because for some reason or other they had not completed the necessary paperwork correctly, and therefore the individual found themselves in a situation where they were not entitled to work. That was, in essence, the point I was raising.
I appreciate it is probably unfair to expect the Minister to respond to that point now, but I get the impression from what he has said that the area he has agreed to reflect on is very limited. I would hope that he might be willing to say, without making any commitment, that he will reflect on the necessity of this whole issue relating to the offence of illegal working for employees. I accept that this is not the only argument that has been raised, but the principal argument is that the threat of action being taken will be used to deter vulnerable people who may be being exploited, to a greater or lesser degree, from coming forward to expose and report their abusers. That is the principal effect that this new offence is likely to have, and it is likely to be used in that way by unscrupulous employers. I do not think that the Minister has responded directly to that point and I simply urge him to reflect on what has been said on that particular issue—without, I accept, making any commitment—between now and Report.
Lord Bates
I am very happy to do that. If it would be helpful, I would also be very happy to meet with the noble Lord and other interested Peers, with the relevant officials, to talk through our experience on that, which is what has led us to the position that we have taken, and to hear what evidence they may wish to present to the contrary. I think both sides will find that very helpful ahead of Report.
Lord Rosser
In that case, I will not say any more other than to express my thanks to the Minister for agreeing to do that. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Bates
“(1) Section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (offence of knowingly employing illegal worker) is amended in accordance with subsections (1A) to (2).
“(1A) In subsection (1) for the words from “an adult” to the end of the subsection substitute “disqualified from employment by reason of the employee’s immigration status.”
(1B) After subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) A person commits an offence if the person—
(a) employs another person (“the employee”) who is disqualified from employment by reason of the employee’s immigration status, and(b) has reasonable cause to believe that the employee is disqualified from employment by reason of the employee’s immigration status.(1B) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (1A) a person is disqualified from employment by reason of the person’s immigration status if the person is an adult subject to immigration control and—
(a) the person has not been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, or(b) the person’s leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom—(i) is invalid,(ii) has ceased to have effect (whether by reason of curtailment, revocation, cancellation, passage of time or otherwise), or(iii) is subject to a condition preventing the person from accepting the employment.””
Lord Bates
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, this amendment and the two other amendments in both my name and that of my noble friend Lord Rosser are very straightforward and come to your Lordships’ House following the concerns raised by the report of the Constitution Committee published on 11 January. The amendments require the consent of the relevant devolved institution before regulations can be made covering their nation. The clauses that these amendments seek to amend presently allow the Secretary of State to by regulation make provisions in the other nations that would have similar effect to the provisions enforced in England—English provisions.
The Government take the view that the clause does not engage the conventions so the legislative consent Motions are not required. This has been disputed by many interested parties including the Law Society of Scotland, for example. It would be helpful for the House if the noble Lord, Lord Bates, in responding could set out carefully the reasoning behind the Government’s decision not to seek approval via the legislative consent Motion process. I am also grateful to the Constitution Committee for highlighting the differential legislative approaches adopted in respect of England and other parts of the United Kingdom and the difference in the degree of scrutiny that that implies. I for one am not convinced that this is a good way to handle these important matters. Again, I would be grateful if the noble Lord, Lord Bates, could outline why he thinks this is appropriate. I beg to move.
Lord Bates
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for moving the amendment and giving me an opportunity to say more on the record. I also pay tribute to the work of the Constitution Committee. I know that a number of recommendations in the report will have further bearing on our discussions in Committee. However, immigration is a reserved matter and the subject matter of all these amendments relates to parts of the Bill that remain within the immigration reservation which have not been devolved or transferred to a devolved legislature.
Amendment 72A relates to the measures to prevent illegal working on licensed premises. The Bill integrates protection against illegal working into the existing licensing regime, including by adding the Home Secretary to the list of responsible authorities for the purpose of the Licensing Act, by making the prevention of illegal working an objective of the licensing regime, and by requiring licence applicants to have the requisite right to work. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, raised the questions posed by the Constitution Committee on whether legislative consent Motions will be required. The legislation has a reserved purpose. It is necessary to amend devolved licensing laws in consequence of that reserved purpose. Legislative consent from devolved legislatures is not required.
We have consulted the devolved Administrations as the provisions have been developed. Alcohol and late-night refreshment licensing legislation in Scotland and Northern Ireland is complex and, in the case of Scotland, that legislation itself is subject to prospective amendment by the Scottish Parliament. We have therefore been working with the Scottish and Northern Irish Governments on the provisions to ensure that they can operate effectively within their licensing regimes. This work is ongoing and will continue in order to make equivalent provisions in regulations, using the order-making powers in the Bill once it has come into force.
Amendment 157A relates to the provisions in the Bill about residential tenancies. These provisions restrict the access of illegal migrants to private residential accommodation in the UK and concern the reserved area of immigration control. This is not an area in which Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland have the competence to legislate and their consent is not required for the UK Government to legislate in this area. It is therefore inappropriate for the application of the residential tenancy provisions in the Bill to the rest of the UK to be subject to the consent of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. It could lead to separate immigration controls applying in different parts of the United Kingdom, which would be to no one’s advantage, and to illegal migrants moving to jurisdictions which are perceived to be more lax.
Amendment 236A relates to provisions in Part 5 which will make it easier to transfer unaccompanied migrant and asylum-seeking children from one local authority to another and enable the Secretary of State to require local authorities to co-operate in the transfer of unaccompanied migrant children from one local authority to another, should voluntary arrangements fail. Immigration is a reserved matter, and immigration legislation already provides a UK-wide framework for migrants’ access to local authority services. The dispersal of migrant children is not an area in which Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland have the competence to legislate and their consent is therefore not required for the UK Government to legislate in this area. The Government have been clear that they hope that the arrangements will remain voluntary and have been liaising with the devolved Administrations to see how this might extend to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, but we must avoid the repetition of the situation we saw in Kent in the summer, so we will enforce dispersal if necessary to promote and safeguard the welfare of children. The regulations in Clause 43 are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, so they will be scrutinised by Parliament before they come into law.
I will write to the Constitution Committee shortly to respond to its helpful report in more detail. Further, the Government propose to publish the text of the licensing regulations to extend the measure to Scotland and Northern Ireland before Report. We are unable to produce regulations immediately on residential tenancies because we are working out how this will interplay with the Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Bill currently making its way through the Scottish Parliament. On the final measure in respect of children, discussions continue with the devolved Administrations.
I hope that in the light of these reassurances and the commitments I have made this evening the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment at this stage.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his helpful response. At this stage, I am very happy to withdraw my amendment. I will look at the record when it is published and reflect on it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.