Courts and Tribunals Bill Debate

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Department: Ministry of Justice
Lord Ashcombe Portrait Lord Ashcombe (Con)
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My Lords, I begin by thanking the Minister for his introduction to the Bill. I look forward to the contributions of the great legal minds we have across this Chamber. I am not a lawyer myself, but I hope that I can offer the common-sense perspective. I also look forward to the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Stace. I am sure his expertise will be valuable to the House.

Before I address the content of the Bill, I want to acknowledge the backlog facing our court system and note that we appreciate the desire to provide victims, witnesses and defendants with justice in a timely manner. The statistics show 81,000 cases awaiting resolution in the Crown Court, of which nearly 24,000 have been waiting over a year. We absolutely agree with the Government that victims should not have to wait years for their cases to be heard, nor should defendants spend years awaiting the resolution of proceedings that determine their freedom. However, that does not mean that we agree on the reforms to the criminal justice system that have been set out in the Bill. There is a need to balance the efficiency of the court system with the fairness of the justice system. I do not believe that the Bill strikes that balance.

As currently drafted, the Bill is not the right way to reduce the court backlog. It is worth noting that the Bill we are presented with now represents a significant departure from the one that entered the other place eight months ago. The original Bill proposed a significant attack on jury trials; the ancient English right to be tried by a jury composed of your peers was not protected. I thank my right honourable friends for their tireless work in opposing these measures. I am grateful for their voices, alongside those of numerous experts, who were able to convince the Government to drop this clause. However, despite the removal of the most egregious clause, there remain serious problems throughout the Bill.

I turn to my concerns regarding the measures in the Bill that we have received here, as introduced by the Minister. We are particularly concerned by the removal of a defendant’s right to elect for a trial by jury for “either way” offences, the increased power proposed for magistrates’ courts, the removal of juries from complex and lengthy trials, the expansion of the definition of complex and lengthy cases through secondary legislation, and the removal of the presumption of parental involvement.

I first turn to the removal of the defendant’s right to elect for trial by jury in “either way” cases. The right to a jury trial is an ancient English right that dates back as far as the Magna Carta. If the Government have accepted that this right is valuable, they should remove this clause, as well as the previous Clause 3. Trial by a jury of your peers is an important safeguard in our criminal justice system, and one that people have immense trust in. By eroding this right, the Government are attacking a functional aspect of the system. Does the Minister have evidence that shows that this change to the system will not reduce public confidence?

I understand the Government’s desire to reduce the backlog of cases, but there is insufficient evidence to suggest that diverting cases away from the Crown Court will have such an effect. In fact, placing all these cases on the magistrates’ court is likely to have the effect of simply shifting the caseload from one place to another. Rather than causing a meaningful reduction in the backlog, this will increase the pressure on the already strained magistrates’ courts. Indeed, analysis from the Institute for Government notes that these proposals will increase the speed at which cases are heard in the Crown Court by only 1% or 2%, and the Government’s own assessment indicates that these measures will not take effect until 2028-29 at the earliest. These numbers highlight how little impact this would have on the victims and defendants facing these backlogs. It certainly does not seem a sensible trade-off to infringe upon the right to a trial by jury for this negligible reduction.

I turn next to my concerns regarding the extension of magistrates’ sentencing powers and changes to the arrangements for appealing their decisions. The Bill would increase the maximum custodial sentence available to magistrates’ courts for relevant “either way” cases, as well as replace the existing automatic right to appeal to the Crown Court with a permission-based process. Together, these changes represent a significant departure from the existing system.

Magistrates’ courts are undoubtedly important and we recognise their indispensable role in the administration of justice. Increasing their sentencing powers will allow them to deal with more serious cases, while requiring permission to appeal will add a further procedural hurdle for defendants. These proposals seem to rest on the misguided assumption that the magistrates’ courts have sufficient capacity to work through a proportion of the Crown Court backlog. What consultation have the Government undertaken on whether magistrates’ courts are prepared for this additional workload, and, if they are not prepared, what support will they be given? How will they monitor the changes to the appeals system on the number of appeals and the time taken to resolve them?

I turn to the provisions allowing certain complex and lengthy cases to be tried by a judge alone. Although certain cases can be demanding, this inconvenience cannot be the reason for the removal of juries. Indeed, in Jonathan Fisher’s fraud review, he sets out that the measures in the Bill send the “wrong message” about the seriousness of fraud cases and that juries are able to handle these cases perfectly well when they are “properly managed and presented”. What evidence do the Government have to suggest that this is the appropriate way to reduce the backlog?

As well as this, the Government are leaving the list of “complex or lengthy” cases open to amendment through secondary legislation, with the only exceptions being homicide offences and sexual offences. Schedule 1, which lists all the offences to which a judge-only trial applies, can be amended through secondary legislation. Although the Explanatory Notes suggest that this would be through the affirmative procedure, this is not evident in the Bill. That is highly concerning and leaves the potential for serious changes to be made through statutory instruments with far less parliamentary scrutiny. Fundamental changes to legislation should not be possible through secondary legislation. Delegated powers ought to be used for the implementation of technical provisions. But, as drafted, expanding the definition of what constitutes a “complex or lengthy” case seems significant.

The provisions that repeal the presumption of parental involvement under the Children Act 1989 are also of concern. Let me clarify that we wholeheartedly believe that the safety and welfare of the child must always be paramount. Courts should absolutely have the ability to respond and prevent contact where there is evidence of abuse or risk of harm. However, it is equally important to recognise the value of a safe and meaningful parental relationship.

The existing presumption allows a court to consider the individual circumstances of a child, but it starts from the position of recognition that parental involvement generally will benefit the child unless the opposite is shown. The Bill repeals this without providing any sort of replacement. The objective should be to strengthen the protection of children rather than simply removing the importance of safe parental involvement.

There are further provisions in the Bill that deserve careful scrutiny. Although we do not have time to list them all, we will, where necessary, seek to provide constructive amendments. Where there are measures that demonstrably improve the delivery of justice, we will support them. This legislation must be tested on its ability not only to decrease the backlog but to deliver justice in a fair manner. I look forward to the Minister’s response.