Crime and Policing Bill Debate

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Department: Northern Ireland Office
In terms of the dangers, there are two things difficult for anyone to dispute. In terms of the risks to the woman, the later the abortion, the greater the risk. We can debate what the statistics are, but a late abortion will, almost by definition, create a greater level of physical risk to the mother. Secondly, an abortion—by its nature and legally, it cannot be carried out without clinical help—that is done at home through pills through the post at a very late stage will, with the removal of that medical support, create additional risk to the mother. For a range of reasons, it is dangerous. A number of amendments have been put forward that offer either amelioration or potential solutions to that. All of those are better than Clause 191. While we try to grapple with a sensitive and difficult issue—irrespective of one’s views, broadly speaking, on abortion as a whole—the main thing to my mind is that Clause 191 is not the solution to those problems.
Lord Alton of Liverpool Portrait Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
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My Lords, I support the mitigating amendments from a number of noble Lords, but I particularly support the proposition from the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, that Clause 191 should not stand part of the Bill. I do so for a number of reasons; some are to do with principle and some to do with parliamentary procedure. Listening just now to the noble Lord, Lord Weir, and before that to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, I think that there are plenty of reasons why this deserves the kind of detailed examination that we have been giving it on the Floor of your Lordships’ House today, whatever our personal views may be.

Abortion is not just a medical procedure. It is not just about choice; it ends the life of a nascent human being. As the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said early in our debate, it is about the sanctity of human life. That is one of the key questions that we must always wrestle with when we come to this issue.

Since 1967, when Parliament permitted what were supposed to be terminations carried out in rare and exceptional cases, there have been more than 11 million abortions in the United Kingdom. That is one life taken across the UK every two minutes. Since 1990, we have permitted eugenic abortions on the ground of disability right up to birth. That includes things such as cleft palate or club foot; 90% of all babies with Down syndrome are now aborted in the United Kingdom, according to NHS figures.

Laws have profound consequences. We are not a debating society but we do send signals. Laws, to some extent, are like semaphore: they send a signal to society. They have profound consequences—social, personal, economic and demographic—and not just for the unborn child. Clearly, from what noble Lords have said this afternoon, there are consequences for the women and everybody else who is involved. The amendments in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Maclean, Lady Meyer, Lady Lawlor, Lady Coffey, Lady Stroud, Lady Foster and Lady Eaton, and my noble friend Lady O’Loan, make it clear that this has profound consequences for women. We should take that into account as well.

Some noble Lords have touched on the question of law and whether international norms require us to do this. I remind the Committee that there is no such recognised right as the right to abortion in the European Convention on Human Rights. Decisions from the European Court of Human Rights have confirmed that the convention does not guarantee a right to have an abortion, nor does it guarantee a right to perform abortions. The court has also been clear that Article 8, which guarantees the right to private and family life, does not confer a right to abortion. The court has ruled that domestic laws that prohibit abortion do not violate Article 8. In contrast, human rights laws grant protection to the unborn. The preamble to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which the United Kingdom is a signatory, states that the child

“needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth”.

We need to ask ourselves, when we talk about conforming with what other jurisdictions do, how well we conform to those norms as well.

Things have changed as a result of the Health and Care Act 2022. I took part in the proceedings on that legislation. On the fourth day, an amendment was brought forward to make permanent the Covid arrangements permitting at-home abortions. Let me remind the Committee of the words of the then Health Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, who told the House, when announcing the end of the policy in February 2022,

“that it was always intended to be a temporary measure”.—[Official Report, 10/2/22; col. 1820.]

Too often, though, temporary measures become permanent and new arguments are brought forward to justify them.

One of the key arguments put forward in support of Clause 191 today is the alleged rise in the prosecution of women in recent years. If there has been a rise, that is intrinsically linked to abortion pills by post. I was particularly struck that Jonathan Lord, now of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists and a former medical director of Marie Stopes, acknowledged that for the 160 years prior to 2022,

“only three women have ever been on trial”.

Between 1 January 2012 and 31 July 2022, data from the Metropolitan Police shows that of 42 arrests under Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Persons Act and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 34 of those arrested were men, and that of the seven who were ultimately charged, none of them were women. Prosecutions of women, I am glad to say, remain very rare indeed.

I know that there is agreement across the Committee, because we have all said it during the debate today, that any investigation of a woman following a pregnancy loss is a matter that requires deep compassion and sensitivity. Like others who have spoken in the debate, those of us who are fathers may have experienced the loss of a child as a result of miscarriage. We know what that means for men, as well as for women—what it means for everyone. It is the loss of a new child. Either life begins at conception or it does not. If it does, then the sanctity of human life that the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, described earlier surely must be a consideration.

I acknowledge that there may be circumstances in which accessing care and support may be less straightforward, but that does not justify the removal of in-person clinical safeguards altogether, particularly where there are well-documented risks around gestational error, coercion and missed complications. A compassionate and appropriate response would surely be to address access problems through properly funded, local, in-person services and targeted support for vulnerable women who may be coerced or even trafficked, rather than relying on a remote model that prioritises speed and convenience over safety.

There are radical alternatives to the defeat. As many have said in this debate, wherever we come from on the substantive issue, abortion itself is not something that is good or desirable; we must do all we can to try to find alternatives to it. Instead of asking a Select Committee to examine the sorts of arguments we have heard, instead of pre-legislative scrutiny, instead of examining the dangers to women or the inevitable increase in the number of terminations, instead of looking for alternatives which promote the well-being of both mother and child, instead of—as one noble Lord rightly referred to earlier—an impact assessment or any of the normal requirements in promoting legislation, this new clause was added simply as a Back-Bench amendment at a late stage of a Bill which is not primarily about abortion, and it was given a cursory 46 minutes of Back-Bench debate in the House of Commons. That would not have happened in my day in the House of Commons. This is no way to make law. The Government would be well advised to withdraw this clause, pending further consideration of the practical issues that it raises.

The uncomfortable truth which all of us must wrestle with, irrespective of our in-principle views on abortion, is that with Clause 191 on the statute book, if a woman intentionally induces an abortion at a very late stage and the baby dies in utero or during the process and is not born alive, there would be no criminal offence available in respect of her actions, regardless of gestation.

Abortion pills are powerful drugs. They can involve significant bleeding, pain and complications, and they can be tragically misused. The purpose of an in-person consultation is not delay or obstruction but to provide a vital clinical and safeguarding checkpoint. I urge noble Lords, even if they cannot support the substantive objections that I have made to Clause 191 in supporting the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, to at least support Amendment 460, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud. I hope that, when we return to this question on Report, there may have been some movement in that direction.