Ukraine

Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts

Tuesday 10th September 2024 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

I have said that Ukraine is my first-order priority, and I was in Odessa on my second day in the job. I have now had the privilege of meeting President Zelensky four times while in post, and I have met his Defence Minister six times. Like the previous Government, we consistently try to respond to the needs that Ukraine says it has for systems and ammunition. At the moment, above all, it needs new supplies of ammunition and stronger air defence systems capable of taking down Russian missiles and drones at different distances. While the US made a commitment at Ramstein last week to an extra $250 million in air defence systems, we made a commitment of an extra £160 million through a short-range modern air defence system—650 LMMs, with production under way—the first of which will be delivered to Ukraine before the end of the year. We are stepping up the support that we pledged for Ukraine and speeding up the support that we deliver to Ukraine.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

On behalf of the Liberal Democrats, I wish to add to the tributes that others have paid to Lieutenant Rhodri Leyshon. He served with the Commando Helicopter Force in 846 Naval Air Squadron at Yeovilton. The Royal Navy said that Rhodri was one of their

“most trusted and highly capable aircraft captains and instructors”.

Our thoughts are with his family.

I am reminded of the saying “train hard, fight easy”. It is attributed to the 18th-century Russian commander Field Marshal Suvorov, but the Russians are not practising that today, sending to the front Russians who have had as little as two weeks’ training. By contrast, the training that has been provided under Operation Interflex has enabled Ukrainian troops to hold ground and exploit Russian weaknesses. The Liberal Democrats welcome the announcement last week at the Ukraine Defence Contact Group that Operation Interflex will continue until the end of 2025. Indeed, we have welcomed announcements on Ukraine from the current Government and the previous Government, and we would not want to see any party political capital sought from the solid British support for Ukraine.

We have seen some failures by the British state in recent years to plan for contingencies, whether post-invasion planning for Iraq or for a non-flu pandemic. We have discovered that sometimes in the British state there is a little bit of “hope for the best”.

On support for Ukraine by the United States, what contingency planning is being undertaken for an uplift in our support for Ukraine—and by other states in the Ukraine Defence Contact Group—in the event that a gap opens up with a US Administration under Trump and Vance?