Lindsay Hoyle
Main Page: Lindsay Hoyle (Speaker - Chorley)Department Debates - View all Lindsay Hoyle's debates with the Cabinet Office
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberWith permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement on claims relating to an ongoing counter-terrorism police investigation that were reported in The Sunday Times yesterday, Sunday 10 September. The story alleged that two individuals, including a parliamentary researcher, had been arrested on charges of conducting espionage on behalf of China.
These are serious allegations, and it is right that they are being thoroughly investigated by the police and relevant agencies. We must not hamper their work or prejudice any future legal processes by what we say today—as I believe, Mr Speaker, you said at the beginning of today’s proceedings. As you would expect me to say, it would therefore be inappropriate for me to comment on any specific aspect of the active investigation itself. I would, however, point the House to what the Metropolitan police said in their own statement:
“The investigation is being carried out by officers from the Met’s Counter Terrorism Command, which has responsibility for investigations relating to allegations of Official Secrets Act and espionage-related offences”.
Of course, any decision on whether to proceed with a prosecution under the Official Secrets Act, and related legislation, would be a matter for the Crown Prosecution Service.
It remains an absolute priority for the Government to take all necessary steps to protect the United Kingdom from any foreign state activity which seeks to undermine our national security, prosperity and democratic values. The Government have been clear that China represents a systemic challenge to the United Kingdom and to our values. That has been evidenced in China’s continued disregard for universal human rights and international commitments in Xinjiang, its erasure of dissenting voices and stifling of opposition under its new national security law in Hong Kong, and disturbing reports of Chinese coercion and intimidation in the South China sea. We are clear-eyed about that challenge, and we must be able to look the Chinese in the eye and call out unacceptable behaviour directly, just as our Prime Minister was able to do this with Premier Li at the G20 summit in New Delhi this weekend—an approach that has also been taken consistently by our Five Eyes allies.
Actions speak louder than words, and that is why I took the decision to instruct Departments to cease deployment of all surveillance equipment subject to China’s national intelligence law from sensitive Government sites in November last year. It is one of the reasons why I banned TikTok from Government devices; the Government investigated and called out the so-called Chinese overseas police service stations and, as the Minister for Security, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), set out in a statement to this House in June, instructed the Chinese embassy to close them; we significantly reduced Chinese involvement in the UK’s civil nuclear sector, including taking ownership of China’s stake in the Sizewell C nuclear power project; and, as Digital Secretary, I took the decision to ban Huawei from our 5G networks.
This afternoon the Procurement Bill is being debated in the other place. The Bill will include national security debarment provisions that will enable us to act when we see malign influence in our public procurement. In taking this approach, we are aligned with our Five Eyes allies and other G7 partners—indeed, every single G7 partner.
The UK will deploy, again, an aircraft carrier to the Indo-Pacific in 2025; we have announced AUKUS, a new security partnership that will promote a free and open Indo-Pacific that is secure and stable; and we will work with Italy and Japan through the global combat air programme to adapt and respond to the security threats of the future, through an unprecedented international aerospace coalition.
These Houses of Parliament stand as a monument to the freedoms of expression and belief that underpin our values, but just as these institutions have provided the paradigm for so many modern democracies, there are still those who fear such freedoms, and who seek to undermine them and to interfere in our society. We maintain constant vigilance in our efforts to understand and root out that interference, and we will always take action to address it, whatever its source.
In 2022, the Government established the defending democracy taskforce, a group that works to co-ordinate across Government to protect the integrity of our democracy from threats of foreign interference. It is engaging across Government, with Parliament, the UK’s intelligence community, the devolved Administrations, local authorities, the private sector and civil society on the full range of threats facing our democratic institutions. Those threats include foreign interference in the electoral process, disinformation, physical and cyber threats to democratic institutions and those who represent them, foreign interference in public offices, political parties and our universities, and transnational repression in the United Kingdom.
Earlier this year, the Government passed the National Security Act 2023, which has overhauled legislation applicable to espionage, sabotage, and any persons acting for foreign powers against the safety and interest of the United Kingdom. The measures in the Act will enable our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to deter, detect, and disrupt the full range of modern-day threats, including threats from China. New offences in the Act will enable the disruption of illegitimate influence conducted for, or on behalf of, foreign states, whether designed to advance their interests or to harm the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom Government will do whatever it takes to protect our national security and this nation's democratic institutions, which have stood for centuries as a beacon of liberty—wherever the threat may come from.
I commend this statement to the House.
I thank the shadow Home Secretary for the overall constructive approach with which she has addressed this issue. It is important that we treat issues such as this on a cross-party basis in defence of our democratic institutions, and it is timely that this statement should be made on the anniversary of 9/11. I will endeavour to address the points that she has raised, and I will be happy to write to her on any points that I inadvertently miss out.
The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary regularly raise with their Chinese opposite numbers Chinese interference in democratic institutions. This is an ongoing approach that has been going on for some time.
The right hon. Lady asked about the defending democracy taskforce, which is led by my right hon. Friend the Minister for Security. It reports into the National Security Council, on which I sit, and we receive regular updates on the work that he is doing, working with Departments across Government, not least the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, which is responsible for large elements of electoral integrity, the devolved Administrations, local authorities and other matters. The purpose of the taskforce is to bring together all those different elements to pursue a whole-of-Government and whole-of-society approach when addressing those threats.
The principal purpose of the investment security unit is to provide advice to me, as the quasi-judicial decision maker, in respect of acquisitions that may invoke national security questions. I take advice from the unit on whether the Government should intervene, and we have issued 15 directions in respect of acquisitions in the past year. That is to say we are asking companies to take action, the hardest being to block the acquisition, but it could be some other remedial action. More than half of those directions are in respect of Chinese companies.
The right hon. Lady is entirely right to raise the question of critical national infrastructure, on which I have worked very closely with the head of MI5 and others. Countries around the world are looking again at their critical national infrastructure, particularly in relation to the threat of cyber-crime, which often has a blurred link with hostile states. I take cyber-crime very seriously, and I chair regular meetings on it. We are constantly upping the work we do, against a background in which the external threat continues to rise.
The Government will very shortly respond to the ISC’s report. The draft is with Ministers, and it is about to be signed off. I hope it will be with the House this week.
The right hon. Lady rightly raises points about Iran and Russia, particularly in relation to cyber but also across a whole range of issues. As part of our overall approach, we have done two things. First, we have tried to give the agencies a public face with which to interface with businesses and private citizens in a whole-of-society approach. For example, GCHQ now works through the National Cyber Security Centre to advise businesses and individuals on cyber-risks. Equally, we have just created the National Protective Security Authority, which essentially enables MI5 to interface with businesses and individuals on protective security. Those agencies, working through the Cabinet Office and particularly with the Home Office and the Foreign Office, work across the range of issues that particularly arise in relation to Iran and Russia.
Although we take this investigation very seriously, and it clearly should be conducted independently, I reassure the right hon. Lady and the House that the Government are taking a whole-of-society approach across all these issues to strengthen our defences against rising threats.
Without referring to any specific case, may I gently remind the Government that their initial response to the ISC’s substantial and wide-ranging report on the national security threat from China, published just two months ago, was to suggest that our findings might be out of date? Will the Deputy Prime Minister therefore confirm that the full Government response, when it comes—we gather it is coming very soon—will set out specific steps to address the threat of Chinese interference, particularly within our democratic system?
The short answer is yes. I have reviewed the response, and I am content that it does exactly that. It will be with my right hon. Friend shortly.
It is timely that we are having a security update today. My thoughts and the thoughts of my colleagues are with all those impacted by 9/11 on its anniversary.
I am glad the Deputy Prime Minister mentioned the issues relating to sensitive Government sites and cameras, but Members on both sides of the House had to ask questions on Hikvision for months before the Government took any action. Will they commit to acting more quickly in future, and will the Procurement Bill, as he states, allow that to happen?
I am glad to hear that the response to the ISC report is coming. Will the Government also commit to implementing the recommendations of the ISC report on Russian interference in British politics? Hopefully that response will also come soon.
To turn to some specific questions, when did the Deputy Prime Minister himself learn of these allegations and arrests? Why did MPs only learn of this from The Times? Will the Government institute, as soon as possible, a review into the decision-making process that led to MPs not being told, in order that such critical updates are given to MPs in future and that this decision-making process is never allowed to happen again?
Order. We have to be very careful here. This is a major security issue and it would be wrong to expect to break all that in order to brief MPs. The MPs who needed to be told were told and worked very closely on this. Please, be very careful. I think my earlier statement addressed some of the points, but, if need be, we can re-address things.
Thank you, Mr Speaker. On the first point that the hon. Lady raised, we take an evidence-based approach to action. It is right that Ministers take action not on a hunch or an intuition, but on the basis of detailed analysis provided to us by the agencies and by others. That is precisely the approach we took in relation to Hikvision and other China-based companies subject to China’s national security laws.
On when I or others learned about this, as Mr Speaker said in a number of the points he made, Members would not expect me to give the House a running commentary on intelligence briefings that I have received, but the House would expect me to be briefed on all matters.
In conclusion, I will make a broader point about parliamentary security. We have the Parliamentary Security Department and it works very closely with the agencies to support Members of Parliament, including with general advice. If Members have specific concerns, they can raise those with the PSD. That is the correct approach, which respects the division between Parliament and Government, and the independence of the House.
May I extend my genuine sympathy to the two Conservative colleagues who appear to have been targeted by a suspected Chinese spy who was employed in Parliament and paid for out of public funds? I do know what they are feeling. The House will be aware—
Order. I am not sure that is the case. I think that is quite a bit of speculation. I would stick to a general question rather than trying to go into the details of what may have happened.
Thank you, Mr Speaker. I did say “suspected”.
The House will be aware that the subject of the security alert last year, Christine Lee, was never arrested, has never been charged with spying or, indeed, any other offence, and was said by the previous Home Secretary to have done nothing criminal. However, there is a court case pending. I understand that Ms Lee has taken out a civil suit against the Government; will the Deputy Prime Minister update the House on when that case is likely to be heard and what the Government hope to learn from it?
I thank the Deputy Prime Minister for his statement. I am sensitive to the restrictions on both the questions and the answers, but we know—these facts are in the public domain—that two individuals have been arrested on suspicion of working for a hostile power and that they were parliamentary passholders. Their passes will have been sponsored by individuals who are probably in this Chamber, and they passed the security vetting for a parliamentary pass. Does the Deputy Prime Minister agree that in due course—not today—an important question will have to be answered: were they recruited by the hostile power before or after they became passholders?
Order. We must be careful what detail we go into, and I know the Deputy Prime Minister is aware of that.
The hon. Gentleman made a number of suppositions in his question that are subject to an ongoing police investigation. When that investigation has concluded and indeed if the Crown Prosecution Service decides to take any action under the Official Secrets Act, there will be a time for this House to debate the lessons from that, and the Government will of course—with you, Mr Speaker— help to facilitate the time for that to happen.