Libya

Kwasi Kwarteng Excerpts

Wednesday 26th October 2016 Westminster Hall

[Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered British engagement with Libya.

It is a great pleasure to introduce a debate of such importance—it is a wonderful privilege as a Member of Parliament to have the opportunity to raise subjects of international importance. We all know, given where we have come from with the debates on Brexit, Heathrow and all the rest, that we focus a lot on domestic issues. We particularly focus on European issues, but the situation in Libya is of enormous importance for the country and the wider picture in the middle east. The waves of migration we are seeing in Europe are in many ways a direct consequence of the total collapse of order and civic administration in Libya. I do not want to exaggerate that and suggest that Libya is in a complete state of anarchy, but there is no doubt that there have been many failures of omission in Libya, as the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Crispin Blunt), and his team have pointed out.

We have had five years in which it has been unclear what the future political make-up of the country will be in terms of its institutions. Muammar Gaddafi saw his end five years ago, in October 2011. It is disconcerting to see that there is no single constituted political entity or Government in Libya. Instead, there are two Governments and various militias. The country is divided geographically between the east and the west, with their respective centres of power in Tobruk and Tripoli. The Government of National Accord have been backed by the United Nations, by us and by the international community, yet when we read reports on what is happening on the ground in Libya with the militias and military activity, the striking thing is that the GNA’s forces do not seem to be making much impact. In fact, I rarely read about what they and their military forces are doing.

[David Morris (Morecambe and Lunesdale) (Con)]

I thank my hon. Friend for securing this timely debate. Does he agree that Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar would possibly be a better person to lead security in Libya at this time?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

I want to address precisely that point in my remarks. There seems to be a complete disjuncture between what we want to happen with the people we want to back for our own reasons—they could have a legitimacy or legal primacy—and what is happening on the ground. That has been a constant feature of the western approach to the area. We have our own ideals and beliefs about the process, the rule of law and what we think should happen, but when we look on the ground at the instrumentalities, as Woodrow Wilson used to call them, we see a complete mismatch. The people whom we want to be in charge—the people whom we believe have legitimacy—have very little capacity to enforce their will and ensure that their writ is run through the country we hope they can rule. That fundamental problem always comes up.

Haftar represents Operation Dignity. He has set himself up as an anti-Islamist strongman. There is no doubt that he is a controversial figure, but it is difficult to envisage a stable Libya without his active participation. He simply has a lot of muscle and many forces. He controls a significant portion of the country, particularly in the east. A few weeks ago we discovered that his forces took over a lot of the oil installations at the beginning of September. He has to come round the table if we are to reach a satisfactory solution.

There have been dark rumblings in regard to Haftar. We have read many times that the French secret service is supporting him. They are rumours, but it is important that we know what is being said. We also know that allies, including our friends in Egypt and the Egyptian Government, are openly supporting Haftar. The United Arab Emirates is broadly in support of his objectives. Many of our allies are openly or covertly supporting General Haftar, yet we stick to this idea, perhaps rightly, that the GNA is the legitimately constituted Government of Libya.

[Daniel Kawczynski (Shrewsbury and Atcham) (Con)]

I am pleased that my hon. Friend is spending time talking about General Haftar. Our Government’s line has repeatedly been for the past five years, “We must wait for a Government of National Accord and national unity.” It is clearly evident after five years that that will not happen, and it is unrealistic to expect it. We should support General Haftar to bring peace and stability to the country.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. I am trying to say—in many ways, it is the crux of this debate and nearly any debate about the middle east—that we have our own ideals and our own sense of what the rule of law and due process are, yet the realities on the ground in many instances bear no relation to the theoretical aspirations and structures that the international community constructs. I am trying to grope towards some way in which we can accommodate or harmonise our intellectual construct and method with what is happening on the ground.

The reality is that there are something like 1,700 militias. General Haftar is probably the biggest military presence, and many of our allies openly support him. My hon. Friend asks an interesting question: why do we not just support General Haftar? I do not propose to answer that definitely today. It is a difficult question and there are lots of balancing factors. The fact is that General Haftar is not universally popular. We have big issues with militias in Misrata. A number of other tribes on the western side have said openly that they are not prepared to tolerate rule by him. Their belief is that, if we support Haftar, we will be substituting one military dictator for the former military dictator, Gaddafi.

Be that as it may, I want to talk about my hon. Friend’s suggestion. Our strategy has not moved the country forward in five years. The financial situation is such that whatever oil reserves Libya had are rapidly dwindling. Libya’s GDP was something like $75 billion in 2011 and is now something like $41 billion—it is roughly of that order; that figure is from a couple of years ago, but it is the latest we have. We are talking about an economy that has essentially halved in five years. GDP per capita was something like $12,500 in 2011, at which point Libya was one of the wealthiest countries in Africa. It was seeing some degree of material progress. Today, GDP per capita is about $7,000. No country in Europe has seen such a diminution of its wealth, including Greece. That has huge implications for the security situation in the region and outside.

Not only have people become a lot poorer, but the political institutions in many instances have broken down. Whatever Gaddafi’s strengths and weaknesses were—let’s face it, he was a tyrant—he had a degree of control over the country’s borders. Those who know geography will know that Libya is an enormous country with something like 4,000 miles of borders. To stem the flow of migration, it was very important that a centrally constituted Government—a central authority—could control the borders. That has now completely collapsed, which is why hundreds if not thousands of people come from very poor countries in sub-Saharan Africa through Libya and find themselves on boats in the Mediterranean going to Italy, in many instances ending their lives there.

I did not want to talk about the EU—we have had plenty of debates in this place about it—but one of the failures it needs to address is the lack of a co-ordinated plan for Libya. There is no point pretending it is going to go away, because it is not. The problem will get worse.

[Charlotte Leslie (Bristol North West) (Con)]

I thank my hon. Friend for securing this timely, topical debate. Does he agree that, although focusing on Libya’s coastline is very important to prevent the tragedy of human trafficking, it is also important to look at Libya’s southern borders, where people are coming up from sub-Saharan Africa? Perhaps we could be doing more to understand what is going on there and to tackle trafficking at its source.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

As is often the case, my hon. Friend is absolutely right. That goes to the heart of the question. There is no centrally constituted Government or central power to hold the country together and control the borders that she talks about, which are pretty porous.

I secured the debate because I have spent time in Europe speaking to German colleagues and MPs and politicians from other countries, and I am struck by the fact that there does not seem to be any real plan of action. Nothing has happened for five years. The country is not in a state of chaos—that would be an exaggeration—but it is certainly not stable. Its oil reserves are dwindling. It is still fairly rich by African and developing country standards, but its wealth is being depleted, and if it diminishes further the problem will get worse. It is no use pretending it is simply going to go away, because it is not.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

One of the biggest problems is that when the United Nations or outside organisations such as the European Union try to help one side or the other, they are regarded with the deepest suspicion by a large number of people in Libya. That is one of the reasons why the latest plan seems to have failed.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend makes a fair point, but I am told that one of the reasons why the Libyans view western involvement with such scepticism is that 2011 was not this country’s finest hour. I agree substantially with many of the findings in the Foreign Affairs Committee report. We went in there, but we did not have a plan or a follow-through. Given that context, it is not surprising that Libyans are sceptical.

Our ideals—what we want to happen—and what we can actually do are often completely different. I completely understand the support for the Government of National Accord, but it is difficult to see how we can empower them to take control of the country. None of the militias that one reads about—Haftar and Operation Dignity, Libya Dawn, ISIS and various al-Qaeda militias—are GNA forces. They are not under the control of the Government of National Accord, yet we carry on in a fantasy world in which they are the official, legal Government and we are going to support them. I totally understand those pious words, but nothing is happening on the ground.

We can go on like this. I am sure that in five years’ time I, or some new MPs, will take up the issue. We can go on forever and a day talking about what is going on, but in this debate I want to say, “Look, this is a big problem. What are we going to do about it?” I do not propose any definitive answers, but it is highly important that MPs have the opportunity to speak and think about these issues. We do very little thinking in this place; we do a lot of talking, posturing and virtue-signalling, but as parliamentarians we need to engage our minds critically with these problems.

[Daniel Kawczynski]

My hon. Friend said that 2011 was not our finest hour. May I remind him—I am sure he remembers this very clearly—that only one Conservative Member of Parliament voted against military action: our colleague from the Foreign Affairs Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron)? Does he agree that we need to learn from that terrible mistake? We saw on our television screens constant coverage of the alleged bloodbath that would ensue if Gaddafi was not stopped. We reacted quickly without thinking about the consequences and without the follow-through that was needed.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

That is a very timely intervention, because that is exactly the kind of thing I am talking about. For far too long, we have had emotional responses to situations. I remember the debate very vividly, although I was a new Member of Parliament and less experienced and less versed in issues relating to the middle east then. We talked a lot about the humanitarian crisis and what we needed to do to intervene to stop the potential bloodbath. All of that was well understood, but we did not stop and think.

[Alistair Burt (North East Bedfordshire) (Con)]

I thank my hon. Friend for securing this debate. I apologise for not being able to stay for the whole debate to hear what the Minister has to say in response. May I gently remind my hon. Friend that simply to dismiss our intervention in Libya as an emotional response and to say that the Government and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office did not think through the consequences is not fair? That does not adequately describe the work that went into Libya afterwards, which included intensive work with politicians to create the opportunity for elections. In recognising what happened, which is immensely difficult, he might pay tribute to the work of the Foreign Office, our diplomats and our ambassador, who worked so hard to try to create something. He must not assume that it was simply an emotional response without regard to the consequences.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

I fully appreciate my right hon. Friend’s point. He was at that time a Foreign Office Minister largely responsible for the middle east, and he served in that post with considerable distinction. I fully appreciate his efforts.

My phrase “emotional response” might be a little dismissive. It is very brutal and horrible to have to say this, but we have to look at the consequences of what happened. We have to look at the situation, put our hands up and say, “This is not a good situation.” I appreciate that there were lots of motivated, highly skilled diplomats, and that lots of thought went into the intervention on the ground. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the NATO Secretary-General said that, if we just look at the means by which we carried out the intervention, it was effective, but I am afraid that the judgment of history is that it was not particularly successful, based on the consequences of our actions. At some point we have to be hard on ourselves and look at the outcomes. We can say, “We discussed this endlessly, we met all these committees, we had all this planning and we got votes through Parliament”, but—to use that old phrase—the proof of the pudding is in the eating. If the pudding does not taste very good, something has gone wrong, and we have got to accept that.

[Alistair Burt]

While we are looking at our intervention in Libya in 2011, perhaps we might also look at the consequences of the vote on Syria in 2013. Perhaps my hon. Friend will agree that deciding whether to intervene or not is very difficult. The same consequences can arise from both because we are not fully in charge of all the circumstances.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

The conclusion—one does not require the brains of an archbishop to reach this—is that when we intervene, we should have a plan for the follow-through, perhaps for up to 18 months. I am not one of those people who is against all interventions, but I am against interventions the consequences of which have not been properly considered, or properly planned for. That is not a radical thing to ask.

[Mr Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing the debate, which is the latest in a number of debates on Libya, in this Chamber in particular. I agree with a lot of what he is saying. One of the consequences of the chaos in Libya and the lack of any centralised Government is the failure, or inability, to get to grips with getting justice and compensation for the victims of Libyan-inspired IRA and other terrorism. That is a major problem. Many of the victims are getting older and they wait in great frustration for our Government to do more, and to get what they are entitled to. Does he agree that that is another aspect of what is happening?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

Absolutely. For those who study the outbreak of the second world war, the question then was always, “Who do you call in Berlin?” or “Who is actually responsible for the action?”, and that is exactly the kind of question that we need to ask about Libya. If we want to start the compensation process, who on earth do we call? Yes, the GNA is in control of the central bank, but they are not in control of the oil production or the generators of wealth, so it is a legitimate question.

To wrap up, our foreign service’s capabilities in diplomacy are second to none, as a country, but once in a while we have to admit, “We might not have done this very effectively. We might have got things wrong.” After all, President Obama, our closest ally, said that Libya was the worst mistake of his presidency. He had the honesty and candour to put his hand up and admit that and, if we are to proceed as a more effective player or counsellor in the politics of the region, we have to have the courage to admit when we get things wrong.

The report from the Committee chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate did that—although perhaps it cast blame too narrowly and was not overly generous in its interpretation of what happened—but we have to recognise when we get things wrong. We have to be more realistic about what we can achieve when we intervene. We also have to be realistic about the kinds of players involved and with whom we have to deal. My hon. Friends have mentioned General Haftar, and he is clearly an important figure. There is no point pretending that he will disappear because he does not constitute a legitimate authority, so he can be ignored—he cannot be ignored. He is a fact in the Libyan scene who needs to be dealt with.

In conclusion, I am grateful for the opportunity to have this debate. I am interested to hear what colleagues have to say about the situation and, if I were to summarise the kind of conclusion that I want to reach, the kind of thought that I want to stimulate, it is to ask how we are going to marry our ideals with what is happening on the ground. How will we do that? We have endless debates, but perhaps we have to shift our ideals and to compromise if we cannot reach a solution. There is no point sticking our heads in the sand and saying, “Well, this is the legitimate Government”, but then nothing happens. That is a complete waste of time.

I beg for consideration of this. I beg right hon. and hon. Members to spend time thinking about how to move forward and to marry ideals with what is happening on the ground in Libya, and about what we as parliamentarians and broader supporters of the Government and of our country can do to bring some degree of stability and order to a country that for far too long has lived with a level of chaos that none of us would accept in our own lives and in our own country.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

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[Charlotte Leslie (Bristol North West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Chope. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Kwasi Kwarteng). People always refer to debates as timely, but this debate has special merit because it shines a light on an area that is often forgotten in the shadow of the atrocities in Syria, but that has a huge role in the region’s stability.

I did not vote for a no-fly zone in Libya in 2011; I abstained. I wondered then whether that was to my shame. Sadly, on balance, I do not think that it was. Back then, as a new MP, I was not sufficiently confident that there would not be mission creep, I could not see a concrete plan for what Libya would look like were there to be mission creep, and I looked at the west’s track record of removing nasty dictators, and it was not good. It is easy to be wise after the event and rehearse mistakes that were made. We can say that lessons will be learned—that cliché is often used—but we can perhaps best demonstrate that we are going to learn the lessons by tackling the situation properly and realistically now.

I am often surprised that Libya does not feature more in the media and political discussion, particularly on compassionate grounds. Libya is well known as a haven for people traffickers, who often traffic people to their deaths in the Mediterranean. When I was in Sicily last year helping to redecorate and renovate a migrant hostel, some young men from Africa told me that they were kept locked like animals in storage containers in Tripoli for two weeks and were basically forcibly starved. One man speculated that that was to ensure that they were smaller so the traffickers could fit more people on the boats. Those are the kinds of human atrocities that are happening, but they do not seem to be attracting Twitter hashtags commensurate with appalling human rights abuses. What are we doing on Libya’s southern border to prevent such atrocities from happening at source? Once people are at the coast, it is in a sense almost too late, although we must of course take action there too.

Libya is obviously of strategic importance. We know that it has become a fertile breeding ground for IS and other violent Islamist groups. It would be a mistake to limit our attention solely to Daesh. We might eradicate Daesh, but the ideology that it espouses will be articulated in another way. Let us not be simplistic and attach ourselves to defeating just a name and not an ideology. The chaos—some call it chaos; some call it deep instability—in Libya is deeply destabilising for neighbouring nations. The last thing that we want is a destabilised Egypt, which has its own challenges. Having a neighbour in such a situation as Libya is in is deeply destabilising for Egypt. As a nation, we are partially responsible for creating that situation, so we have a responsibility to engage energetically in trying to return some form of stability to Libya.

I am far from an expert, and I am aware that I am in the company of far greater experts, so I will make a few observations and then ask some questions of the Minister. We backed a revolution, which is always a risky business. Revolution is very different from reform. In many ways, having taken the actions that we took, we cannot be surprised that we are where we are in Libya.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend mentions that we backed revolution. That is precisely the point: we had no idea what was going to come after the revolution. We simply thought that things would right themselves on their own, and that once we had destabilised the situation, Humpty Dumpty would somehow just come back and reform almost spontaneously.

[Charlotte Leslie]

My hon. Friend refers to a nursery rhyme; I was going to say that we have a slightly short attention span and in many ways a fairytale view of foreign policy—“It’s all going to be fine and everyone will live happily ever after once we’ve done the nice thing that the Twitterati will approve of.” We are where we are.

We in the west in general—I do not intend to label any one person as responsible—make two mistakes. First, we tend to see situations in a binary way. We are quick to call the good guys the good guys and the bad guys the bad guys. That has led us to be allies with questionable people just because we want to defeat Daesh. Does that really mean that we should align ourselves with Islamists who perhaps have ideas not that different from Daesh? The reason that they are anti-Daesh may be that they see it as a competitor in the region, not that they share our values.

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[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Kwasi Kwarteng) on securing the debate, which has given us time to think. I heard a remark of Henry Kissinger’s about a month ago; he said that the problem these days was that when politicians came to see him they asked what they should say, not what they should think. My hon. Friend has provided us with an opportunity to think, and in the time available to me I want to deal with just one issue. I want to take on the slightly concerning chorus of voices saying that General Haftar—or Field Marshal Haftar, as he has now been styled by the House of Representatives—might somehow be the solution.

Given the enthusiasm for strong men in the middle east, my colleagues might do well to reflect that such men both create and perpetuate the conditions that make them necessary. I was slightly surprised at the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Shrewsbury and Atcham (Daniel Kawczynski), who was, of course, with us on the Select Committee visit to Tunis, when we sat down with Imhemed Shaib, the first vice-president of the House of Representatives, and a number of his colleagues. At that time, in March, they were trying to put together a House of Representatives vote to support the Government of National Accord. Our brilliant ambassador, Peter Millett, and the team of other international diplomats there have worked hard on that, to try to create what the Committee concluded was the only show in town to avoid the descent into civil war.

It was clear from the discussion that the Members of the House of Representatives had been intimidated and practically prevented from gathering together to vote so that they could support the new Government of National Accord. The House of Representatives had no votes between January and August this year, and indeed by May or June the United States had decided to sanction the Speaker, Aguila Saleh, as an obstacle to putting together support for the Government of National Accord, which all nations are formally signing up to as the best vehicle to take things forward.

It is undoubtedly true that Field Marshal Haftar commands the most substantial military force in Libya, and as my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne mentioned, he is getting aid of one sort or another, covertly from the United Arab Emirates and elsewhere, and almost overtly from Egypt, where a degree of air power of course gives him military superiority. In the end, the solution is in the hands of Khalifa Haftar: will he place himself under the civilian authority of a Defence Minister appointed within the Government of National Accord? If that were to happen, we would begin to see the possibility of Libya finding its way through the appalling crisis that it has been in since our intervention in 2011.

The international community should be making sure that all our allies are not playing a double game in their own interest. They should instead be playing a game in the interest of the whole international community and the people of Libya, to find the best way of getting a Government who will bring all the people of Libya together. To my hon. Friends who are contemplating what I might describe as a Haftar shortcut, I would say that it would be a shortcut to civil war. The people of Libya have suffered enough. We should do everything in our power to try to prevent such an outcome.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

It is all very well to say that things will descend into civil war, but in a country with 1,700 militias at the latest count, and two Governments, there is effectively civil war now.

[Crispin Blunt]

My hon. Friend is correct, but if there is to be a unification of the forces of the west against the military forces under Field Marshal Haftar, we shall see civil war on an even greater scale, with a greater scale of human misery, than we have now.

The issue for us and our interest is the collapse of central authority in Libya. That is why there is no control of the littoral, and why there is now uncontrolled emigration out of Libya and the appalling trafficking of people from the south up to the north. I add my voice to that of my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol North West (Charlotte Leslie) on what is happening on the Libyan southern border. Some of the migration trails need to be interdicted at that point, but that will be immensely more difficult if we cannot establish a decent central authority in Libya. It was the conclusion of the Foreign Affairs Committee that the Government of National Accord was the only game in town. In my judgment, we should all be focused—including through our leverage over other members of the international community—on supporting its efforts. All the alternatives are far, far worse.

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[Patrick Grady]

I am afraid I must disagree with the Minister. This is a matter of basic human rights and of our responsibility for the safety of individuals who have made their way here through some horrific situations.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

Surely the hon. Gentleman understands that there is a massive difference between the guidance given to nationals going to their country and the ability of another country to absorb migrants. For example, it is perfectly understandable for the Government to advise people not to go to Egypt, but that does not mean that everyone coming here from Egypt should be granted asylum.

[Patrick Grady]

I am afraid I simply do not accept that. If people have made their way here through really horrific situations, as we have heard from other hon. Members, for the UK Government to say it is safe to deport those people back to a country that they are not willing to advise their own citizens to travel to is, frankly, rank hypocrisy. I thank the Minister for his intervention and for making the Government’s continued position clear, but we will have to agree to disagree.

Hon. Members from Northern Ireland raised the issue of compensation for victims of terrorism. Again, a peaceful and diplomatic solution to that must be found.

In short, the UK Government must take responsibility for their failure to plan for the aftermath of their military intervention in Libya, and they must demonstrate a willingness to learn lessons from that failure. Sadly, there is little evidence of that so far, given that the objectives for military action in Syria do not appear to have materialised. Later today the House will discuss the situation in Yemen, where the Government refuse to admit any complicity, despite Saudi troops being trained in the UK, being accompanied by UK military observers and allegedly using weapons manufactured or sold in the UK. As the hon. Member for Spelthorne said, we have debates such as this and Select Committee reports for a reason. It is not too late for the Government to follow the example of Barack Obama, admit to their mistakes and set out how they intend to make amends.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr Tobias Ellwood)]

It is a pleasure to respond to what has been an important debate. I will put out a written ministerial statement on this matter. It is clear there is an awful lot of information that the Government are aware of, but there is also a lot of disinformation and confusion. I will also make a recommendation to the Foreign Secretary that, as with Syria and Iraq, an oral statement is made to the House on a regular basis, updating colleagues on what is happening here. Today’s debate is pertinent and it is a pleasure to respond to it.

Many discussions on Libya go straight into the details. That needs to be done, but I want to step back for a second and look at the context in which this is playing out. It is often seen through the prism of Gaddafi and the consequences of his removal. Seeking solutions to today’s challenges requires a deeper understanding of what is happening and the character of this north African piece of land. Going back to the 7th century BC, Libya has been occupied or run by the Venetians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Arabs and the Ottomans, each of them carving their own personality unto the three regions of Libya: Fezzan, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.

During the interim war period, it was occupied by Italy, and then by us and the French after the second world war. Then came independence in 1951, under King Idris, who was removed in the coup that we know led to 40 years of misrule by what started off being Lieutenant Gaddafi—talking of promotions, he promoted himself to Colonel because he was trying to emulate Colonel Nasser further to the east. That 40 years of misrule destroyed any tribal relationships that existed. It stifled any political representation and undermined the development of institutions. That all came about and was laid bare in the 2011 revolution.

Sadly today—we have heard a little of this in the Chamber this morning—some people are attempting to rewrite recent history, linking the 2011 decision for the west to intervene with the very difficulties we face today. That glosses over important events in between. We must not forget that the decision to intervene was international and supported by UN Security Council resolution 1973 and by the Arab League. We took action to prevent attacks on civilians that were about to take place. There would have been a bloodbath if we had not intervened. Even before Gaddafi went into hiding, more than 60 countries, with the African Union, recognised the National Transitional Council—the body of Libyan people based in Benghazi who were looking ahead to a post-Gaddafi world.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Ellwood]

I will give way briefly. I have only a short time left.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

I am sure my hon. Friend’s skill will enable him to make a more concise speech than the one written for him, or that he wrote himself.

Why would President Obama say this was the worst mistake of his presidency if everything were as hunky-dory and rosy as my hon. Friend suggests?

[Mr Ellwood]

First, I confirm that I write my own speeches and I am happy to place that on the record. Secondly, if I may, I will come to the aftermath and what is happening in relation to international views later.

I stress the point about the context in which things happened in 2011, which was made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt), a former north Africa and middle east Minister, who is no longer in his place. There were elections in July 2012 and the General National Congress was formed. Libya was starting to take charge of its own destiny. In 2014, there were elections for the new Council of Deputies.

It is recognised today that perhaps we did not do enough. Perhaps the west could have done more, but many agencies, including UN agencies, were asked to leave Libya because the Libyan people wanted to take ownership of the path they wanted to pursue without interference from the west. Could we have done more? Of course we could have done more. That is what President Obama is looking at and why he is making those comments.

I certainly believe that, with the disparate society we are dealing with that had 40 years of misrule, not enough happened during Gaddafi’s reign for society to develop. I politely disagree with my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne that nothing has happened over the past five years. Elections have taken place, there is a Prime Minister in place and there is a structure, including a Government of National Accord, a Presidency Council, which needs to be confirmed and put in place, a House of Representatives and a State Council.

Those important infrastructure institutions must be given the opportunity to work. It is right to say that they are not working as efficiently as they should, because there are spoilers and stakeholders who are choosing to follow their own agendas. The challenge facing us today is getting them to realise who benefits if they do not support that infrastructure—the criminal gangs that move the migrants through and the extremism that flourishes in that vacuum.

The Skhirat process helped to empower the moderates and the Khartoum process brought together countries around Libya to ensure that they secure their borders and provide support to Libya—that was raised as a concern in the debate. International countries have come together. I have sat in many meetings discussing how better to co-ordinate our international aid and our work to improve governance, and to ensure that that happens. The issue came to the fore in December 2015 with the agreement that rolled into Security Council resolution 2259 formally recognising the Government of National Accord as the sole legislative body to take Libya forward.

I will pose a question, but I do not want to go down this rabbit hole. Which countries can intervene when something very bad is happening in another part of the world? I take hon. Members back to Rwanda and what happened there. The world blinked while a travesty took place. Is it right that the international community glosses over things and asks who in the world can step forward and which nations have the ability and commitment to do that? There are very few and they can be counted on one hand, but we are one of them. What would colleagues do if they were in No. 10 and Benghazi had tanks on the outskirts that were about to roll in? Would they have a plan for what happens next? They would have to think about that, and also about our duty as a permanent member of the United Nations interested in supporting international security and stabilisation and decide whether to act. That is exactly what David Cameron did and I believe it was the right decision.

Libya’s governance structure today is not as strong as it should be, but we must give our support to Prime Minister Siraj. I believe that the Libyan political agreement is the framework to enable things to move forward and make that happen. We want the Libyan Government to submit promptly a revised list of Ministers which the House of Representatives must endorse and we need a more unified command structure under General Haftar. He is a general and he needs to answer to civilian governance structures. That is very important indeed.

We must address the challenge of Daesh and people traffickers. If there is time I will come to that.

The conflict is unique and very different from all the others. There is a lot of plate-spinning in the middle east and north Africa, but this is different because there are working institutions. Oil is flowing—there are up to 500,000 barrels a day—and that money is going into the central bank. It is paying people who, ironically, are fighting on both sides of the argument. The salaries of teachers, doctors and nurses are being paid because those basic structures are in place. However, we certainly need to do more and that is why we have allocated £10 million to provide technical support for the Government of National Accord.

Operation Sophia was mentioned a couple of times. It is important to stem the flow of migrants choosing to make an horrific journey in an attempt to get to Europe. Unfortunately, we can work only in international waters. We cannot get into territorial waters at the moment because the Government are not fully in place to give us that permission and Russia is denying us the ability to use military capability in that space. We must answer that, otherwise we are encouraging people to come here. When ships pick them up, which British ships have done, those people are taken to Italy, so we are still not breaking the chain. We are now working to train a local coastguard to break that chain so the boats never leave Libyan soil in the first place.

Several hon. Members mentioned Daesh. It is absolutely right that we are concerned about the vacuum. Its numbers are down to 200 or 300 in strength and many are indigenous local people choosing to join that gang because that is where the money is. That is where the guns come from and where the success seems to be. That is why it is important that the Government offer something different to fill that vacuum of governance. It is important to recognise what we can do, but also where things are in the country. It is not as bleak as some of the comments today have suggested, but we are not there yet in any sense whatever.

In conclusion, Libya is extremely complex, as has been highlighted by colleagues today. It is dynamic and certainly challenging. The process of building trust between communities, confidence in political institutions and willingness to compromise for the common good will not be easy. It is up to the political leaders of Libya—I stress this—to make this work. We remain committed to supporting them, but also to working for peace and security in Libya, not just for the sake of stability in the region where the UK has important interests, but for the sake of the Libyan people.

I very much welcome this debate and look forward to the closing comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne. I will seek to provide a full and regular oral statement so that the House is informed as progress moves forward.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

I am grateful for the Minister’s remarks. We have covered many of the issues that bedevil Libya and have a huge impact on our safety and security here in Europe, with particular regard to the question of migration. I conclude by saying this is not the end of the matter, but the beginning of a fruitful and, I hope, effective engagement with many of the issues that have been raised this morning.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered British engagement with Libya.

Yemen

Kwasi Kwarteng Excerpts

Wednesday 26th October 2016 Commons Chamber

[Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)]

I am grateful to you, Mr Speaker, for calling me to speak in this important debate. A number of issues have been touched on very ably by right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House.

The first thing we have to consider is that Saudi Arabia—I have visited the kingdom twice in the past three years—is itself on a journey. I first went there in 2013 as part of a delegation, when it was clear that one regime was coming to an end. I and a few colleagues went there earlier this year, and it was equally clear that the country had evolved. There were new programmes in place under the direction of Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who spoke candidly about the nature of Saudi involvement in Yemen, as has his Foreign Minister, Adel al-Jubeir, very ably in many instances.

The Saudi action in Yemen is not coming out of the blue. It is not something that the Saudis are doing for the sake of it. They are doing it in response to UN resolution 2216, which other Members have alluded to, so in this instance they have the force of international law behind them.

I do not dispute that there have been incidents. I do not dispute that the Saudis have, at times, been overbearing and acted ultra vires, as we used to say—beyond their authority—and that civilians have been killed. That is greatly to be regretted, and it is an appalling violation. When there have been violations, they need to be looked at, but I do not believe that suspending the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia would help this country or the interests that are represented so ably by colleagues such as my hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble (Seema Kennedy), the hon. Member for Preston (Mr Hendrick) and other north-west Members. To do so would not help them or their constituents, nor would it be of any strategic value to the region itself.

In the past five years, there has been an appalling collapse of order right across the middle east. Libya has descended into chaos, and Yemen has been riven by this terrible conflict, in which right is clearly on one side. The Houthis are rebels and do not wish to conduct themselves according to international law as set out by the UN. There has been chaos in Syria. It is absolutely clear that, in this instance, Saudi Arabia is not acting unilaterally. It is acting as part of a coalition, as my hon. Friend the Member for Shrewsbury and Atcham (Daniel Kawczynski) suggested. Many Arab countries—not just Gulf countries, but countries such as Morocco—are involved in the action. Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are all involved—[Interruption.] They may not be the shining democracies that you would like to see in Scotland, but they are functioning Governments that are a source of stability.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I did not say anything about what I would like to see in Scotland.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

I know that, Mr Speaker. I just had a rush of blood to the head when I saw the hon. Member for East Lothian (George Kerevan) chuntering from a sedentary position.

It is quite clear that the countries I have just mentioned are sources of stability, and it makes absolutely no sense for us to turn our backs on them. On the contrary, we must work with them and make sure that where there are violations, the right people are held to account. It makes no sense for us to walk away. We have important strategic relationships with these kingdoms. To achieve stability in the region, we will need to be mature in our relations with them, and friendly and co-operative when we can be, but we can also be particularly critical if we feel that that is needed.

Britain-Iran Relations

Kwasi Kwarteng Excerpts

Wednesday 12th October 2016 Westminster Hall

[Mr Ellwood]

I will come to that point in a second. The short answer is that the two issues are quite separate. The nuclear deal stands alone and is specifically to do with containment of the ability to create a nuclear weapon. Resolution 2231 is to do with ballistic missiles and the capability of launching an intercontinental or a nuclear weapon using that vehicle. The tests that are taking place are triggering further sanctions separate to the nuclear deal.

The next question that my hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble asked was about dual nationals. That is a very sensitive issue, as hon. Members will be aware, because Iran does not recognise dual nationality, which causes problems and is a concern to anybody choosing to travel to Iran thinking that they will be supported by Britain in the way they would if they had sole British citizenship. That is the challenge that we face. We are working very hard on a number of consular cases, particularly those of Kamal Foroughi and Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe. Those are two of the most prominent cases, and hon. Members will have had many letters on those matters. They are dual nationals, and that is the challenge that we face. I encourage anybody with a dual nationality who is thinking of travelling to Iran to look carefully at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office website before travelling so they are fully aware of the situation.

My hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble also talked about Iran’s maturing stance following the nuclear deal. The deal allows a change in attitude towards Iran and further dialogue on the human rights issues that have been discussed, to which I am afraid I cannot do justice in the short time remaining.

Iran is at a crossroads. The nuclear deal that has been signed with the UK and the other E3+3 countries is an opportunity.

[Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Ellwood]

I cannot give way, because I have to allow a couple of minutes for the proposer of the motion to speak.

We must take a balanced approach. We must robustly enforce the nuclear deal and check the human rights concerns that have been raised in this debate, while promoting trade opportunities. We stand ready to help Iran at this juncture, but we expect it to check its proxy influence in the region around it and play a responsible role as it moves into the future.

Egypt: British Support

Kwasi Kwarteng Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd March 2016 Westminster Hall

[Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered British support for stability in Egypt.

It is a great honour to introduce this debate. I refer Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I visited Egypt many times before I came to this place: I went there as a student and in 2008 I spent a month in Cairo trying to learn Arabic—very unsuccessfully, I should add. I have also had the honour of visiting Egypt many times on parliamentary delegations with the Conservative Middle East Council and others.

This is a timely and important debate, for a number of reasons. First, we need only open the newspaper every day or look online to see the absolute turmoil that much of the region has plunged into. I am also conscious of the fact that a lot of the turmoil and confusion that has crept into our world has emerged very recently. I recall travelling to Egypt for the first time in 1998. There had been a terrorist outrage in Luxor in 1997, a terrible incident in which dozens of people were killed, but when I visited—obviously this was all before 9/11—there was a real optimism about the place. It was a broadly secular country: people could walk freely, there was no real pressure for women to dress in any particular way and alcohol was served freely. It was a country looking towards a bright future.

It is not my place to go through the recent history of the region today, but as a consequence of what has happened there in the past 15 years since the events of 9/11, and everything that has been going on since the Arab spring, the need for stability in Egypt and its role in the world have increased. The mood there has been a lot more pessimistic, and its people and Government have gone through a very difficult past five years.

[Mr Gregory Campbell (East Londonderry) (DUP)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing this debate. The Egyptian people and nation are central to the middle east. Does he agree that it is crucial for the future wellbeing of the middle east and the wider region that Egypt restores itself to a position of centrality and stability in order to spread that across the region?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

The hon. Gentleman has highlighted very pithily—more pithily than I did—the key fact that Egypt is absolutely central to the Arab world. We need only look at the numbers: something like 90 million people—well over a third of the Arabic-speaking people across the globe—live in Egypt. In Al-Azhar University, Egypt has one of the key centres of Islamic scholarship and learning. Egyptian media dominate the Arabic-speaking world. The Egyptian Arabic dialect is widely understood across the Arab world.

Egypt is also important for historic reasons. In the 20th century we need only look at the careers of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. These were huge figures in the Arab world who played a role in securing stability in this important region. As the hon. Gentleman said, Egypt is therefore absolutely central to any form of stability or solution to the ongoing problems in the middle east. I called for this debate because we need to recognise, in this Parliament, throughout the country and throughout the international community, that stability in Egypt is crucial and we should all be investing heavily in it.

Although Egypt has attained a modicum of stability, people will recognise that the degree of stability that has been reached is not complete. There are still dangers. We saw an appalling terrorist outrage in November, when a Russian civilian aircraft was blown up in the sky with huge loss of life. There are threats still lurking in the Egyptian scene. Although there is a terrorist threat, it must be admitted that the Egyptian Government have taken some very severe steps. As friends of Egypt—as people who are interested, in every sense of the word, in maintaining stability in and supporting Egypt—it is our job to ask probing questions about its Government’s treatment of political prisoners and people who have expressed doubts about or even opposition to the regime. It is our job to ensure that the Egyptian Government are held to the highest standards with respect to human rights and individual freedoms. I do not deny that at all.

Many people in Britain view some developments in Egypt with considerable concern. I need only mention the Italian University of Cambridge PhD student who was found killed, clearly murdered, in Cairo six weeks ago. We do not know what happened and we have not heard any definitive answers from the regime. The Egyptian Government cannot simply be given a blank cheque by their friends and allies in the west. I regard myself as a friend of Egypt—broadly speaking, Britain and the British Government are friends of Egypt—but being a friend does not mean that we blindly accept everything that the Egyptian Government do, nor does it mean that we should acquiesce or turn a blind eye to the outrages or abuses we have identified.

[Sir Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con)]

Recently, I was delighted to be able to join my hon. Friend, and other Members present, on an extremely informative visit to Cairo. He is making an important point about how the Egyptian Government operate, which is of concern to our constituents. Nevertheless, does he agree that for the Egyptian people—indeed, for the whole region—there is one thing of huge importance that probably dwarfs everything else: stability? He mentioned that Egypt is a very large country, with a population of 90 million. It has a huge history, unlike many other Arab countries. It has a big contribution to make, so stability will be an important factor, and we should be supporting the Egyptian Government in that pursuit.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend makes a pertinent point. At the centre of this issue is the fact that we have to deal with a very fine balancing act in Egypt, which is why this debate is so important. On the one hand, we have a fragile situation in the region and a country that has gone through enormous economic pressure and two destabilising revolutions in four years. On the other hand, it is a country that is crucial to the stability of the region. There is the need for order and stability, but there is also a Government who have a mixed record, if I can put it that way, on guaranteeing human rights and the pressure and force they have applied in domestic situations.

We in Parliament have to appreciate that very fine balance, because frankly we do not understand the immense pressures that the Egyptian people have gone through. One startling fact is that in 1952 the population of Egypt was 20 million. I have spoken to Cairenes who remember those times, and they remember a completely different Egypt. Cities such as Cairo and Alexandria were much smaller, yet much more spacious. In many ways they were much more luxurious than they are today. Over the past 60 years, the Egyptian population has more than quadrupled. That demographic pressure constitutes Egypt’s greatest challenge.

As can be imagined, in a country where more than 50% of people are under the age of 25, there needs to be employment, a degree of economic progress and a Government who recognise the ambitions and aspirations of their young people. In that context, government can be very difficult. Against that backdrop of a growing population and economic pressure, there is also the rise of, for want of a better phrase, political Islam and the complications that radical Islamic thinking—takfiri thinking, as it is called—bring to the political mix.

While I am talking about the demographics in Egypt, we also should remember that there are nearly 10 million Copts—Egyptian Christians who have been there for 2,000 years, since the birth of Christianity—who comprise something like 10% of Egypt’s population. They will point out that they have been there for longer than Islam has existed as a religion, so they have a deep historic connection to and experience of the country of their forefathers.

I have had the privilege of visiting Egypt a number of times in the last six years. In that time, I have seen four or five different Heads of State and three different Governments, and I have had the privilege of speaking to several Ministers. In the brief period after the Muslim Brotherhood took over and were running the country, it was clear to me there was huge pressure on the Copts. Churches were being burned and Coptic people were being attacked. No community breathed a greater sigh of relief when the Muslim Brotherhood was removed, as it were, from government than the Copts. No group of people was happier to see a restoration, as they would see it, of some kind of order under the form of General Sisi.

For us in the west looking at that development, we can quibble about the details and say that, like Mubarak, Sisi is some kind of military dictator, but that is to overlook a lot of the changes that have happened in Egypt. We had the privilege of meeting Egyptian parliamentarians, who treated us and hosted us incredibly generously and respectfully in their Parliament. They were very keen to adopt the best parliamentary practices from Britain and apply them to their new Parliament, which met less than two months ago. They are absolutely committed to building a form of parliamentary democracy. That process might take a long time. Egypt’s parliamentary democracy is certainly not perfectly formed, but few parliamentary democracies can claim to be perfect and fully formed. We have just been considering how the House of Lords operates in our country. Parliament has existed for hundreds and hundreds of years, yet we are still evolving and trying to look at the nature of the two Houses and how they co-ordinate with each other.

[David Morris (Morecambe and Lunesdale) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that, although Egypt has had its unique problems since the Arab spring—or the Arab winter, as it is called in some quarters—the fact that the Egyptian Government are forcefully putting forward a democratic mandate is a good thing for the region?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

I think my hon. Friend is right. People will dispute the extent to which Egypt is a full, participatory democracy—people can have different views—but it is clearly going in the right direction. We can discuss where along the road we think it is, but the movement is positive. Many of the elections that were held in Mubarak’s time were far more tightly controlled than the parliamentary election we have just witnessed in Egypt. The nature of political life in Egypt is evolving. That goes to the core of what I am saying. Stability—some degree of law and order in the streets—is absolutely essential. Anecdotally, we were told that at the time of the Muslim Brotherhood there was practically a self-imposed curfew in Cairo. Now people are beginning to go out—they feel a bit more secure and safer—and a civic society is growing.

I have talked briefly about political developments and aspirations, about structures and about Parliaments, but we need to think about a basic economic question, which I alluded to when I was talking about the population increase. Demographic pressures and the economy are absolutely crucial. Anyone who knows anything about Egypt will know that, broadly, about 20% of its economy is based on tourism. One thing that we can do directly to help Egypt to build up its economy is to help tourism. Our delegation learned that the suspension of British flights to Sharm el-Sheikh was a matter of grave concern to Egyptian businessmen and the Egyptian Government. I recommend that the Government look seriously at that—I know we are doing that and are inching towards lifting the ban and stopping the suspension of flights. If that were to happen, sooner rather than later, it would be an immense boon to Egyptian tourism and its economy.

[Sir Gerald Howarth]

I apologise for intervening again—I am not seeking to catch your eye, Mr Pritchard, as I have to entertain 101 Logistic Brigade from Aldershot shortly, so I will not be able to make a speech—but I want to pick up on this important point my hon. Friend has made. Does he agree that the British Government have moved heaven and earth to do whatever they can to ensure that we can resume flights to Sharm el-Sheikh, and that the Egyptians have come a long way towards meeting the British authorities’ safety requirements? It is imperative that both sides work even harder so we can resume flights in time for the summer season.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Something like 1 million British tourists go to Egypt every year, under normal circumstances. We have tried extremely hard to help in that regard—I know that my hon. Friend the Minister and others have spoken eloquently and tried hard behind the scenes—but this is a matter of critical importance. Egypt has a deficit of something like 10% or 12% of GDP, which is very high. It has a very high unemployment rate—it is something like 12%—and the demographic pressures that I have talked about are not getting any easier. The economy is critical to the stability of Egypt and the wider region. That is something that we can do directly to help Egypt.

I would not want to anticipate or prejudge any of the security considerations, because they are obviously paramount, but I want to put on the table the fact that directly supporting Egyptian tourism will have a knock-on effect. It will help the Egyptian economy and provide employment. That in itself will defuse a lot of the tension, militate against the attractions of extremism and prevent young people from going down that route.

In conclusion, I think we have a good and helpful relationship with Egypt. I would not want to inflate his ego too much, but we have a Minister responsible for the region who has a deep knowledge of and commitment to, not only Egypt, but other countries in the middle east—I know, because I have travelled with him. Broadly, our relationship with the Egyptian Government is very strong. I would suggest that we closely consider the issue of flights. Economic support will obviously be important in years to come. Lastly, while we have done many good things and built up a good relationship, there is some way to go. This is an evolving relationship and there will be challenges ahead, but I hope that in those challenges Egypt can find a solid and steadfast friend in Britain, the British Government and our people.

--- Later in debate ---

[Charlotte Leslie (Bristol North West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. I refer right hon. and hon. Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

I too have been able to visit Egypt to inform myself about what has been and is now going on. I associate myself with and echo the concerns hon. Members have expressed about the tragic fate of Giulio Regeni and other human rights abuses, which I will discuss further later in my speech. Recent events in Egypt have fundamentally disturbed us and have challenged us to think about the dynamics underlying the Arab spring, posing basic questions to western politicians which have been played out in Egypt on a global stage. In many ways, events in Egypt fundamentally challenge our sometimes lazy notions of democracy and challenge us to consider the realities of the balance and tensions between freedoms and the merits of stability.

We should not underestimate the uniqueness of Egypt’s position. Look at its neighbours, which also experienced the Arab spring tidal wave in 2011. In Syria, horrific, blood-stained chaos is suckling the diabolical death culture of Daesh. It is a humanitarian catastrophe and a centre of global tensions, the effects of which include not only untold numbers of inhumane acts of cruelty against individuals, children, and homosexuals, but the destabilisation of the whole of Europe. Look at Yemen, sunk beneath a flood of war, and Iraq, struggling against the onslaught of Daesh. Libya is now a failed state and an arena of warring militias and jihadists. These are Egypt’s neighbours and it is important to consider Egypt’s actions and challenges in that context.

By contrast, look at Egypt. There was an uprising in 2011 and Mubarak was removed in February. In June 2012, Egypt held elections and Morsi was elected, but then the direction that Morsi began taking dramatically alarmed the country, including many of those who had thought that the Muslim Brotherhood would prove genuinely moderate. Between January and the summer of 2013 public protest reached boiling point, and on 30 June Morsi was removed. In May 2014, after some constitutional preparations and changes, General el-Sisi, a Muslim who was appointed by Morsi, was elected as president to serve as a Muslim who wants a secular state. At the time, the west described that as undemocratic, but this is one of those times when we should step back, take a reality check, and consider our priorities and where our judgment should lie.

A close friend of mine who is half-Egyptian and whose Copt family lives in Alexandria and Cairo reported to me the rapidly growing mortal fear felt by Copts, as members of their congregation began to disappear and churches were attacked. The culture of fear under Morsi escalated quickly and alarmingly. Egyptian Muslims have anecdotally told me that they also became frightened when the Muslim Brotherhood appeared not to be what it originally said on the tin. They became alarmed at Morsi’s attempt to make himself constitutionally unchallengeable. We can all think of a great leader—perhaps not so great—in the last century whose first challenge to Europe was to make himself constitutionally unchallengeable. In that growing fear and alarm about oppression, Egypt simply rejected the path to political Islam that it was being hurled down with brute force.

We have to remember that democracy was never going to happen in Egypt as it does in Tunbridge Wells. To think otherwise is to demonstrate the naivety that the west sometimes displays when it tries to impose on other countries standards and structures that took our countries several hundred years of bloody war to establish, and then becomes judgmental. When travelling around Egypt, I looked for the results of the process that Britain called undemocratic. I was lucky enough to be at the opening of the new Suez canal expansion, which was achieved in less than a year—necessary, but far from sufficient in aiding the Egyptian economy to stabilise and thrive. This is anecdotal, but in the city of Cairo I observed nothing but tangible relief that at last someone had taken control of a country people had felt was teetering over into oblivion. To my surprise, that feeling was expressed by conservative Muslims as well. That fundamental sense of relief was echoed by mothers, students and taxi drivers—yes, there was apprehension for the future, but there was fundamental relief that Egypt was finally under some kind of control. Ironically, although not democratically elected as the west might have preferred, Sisi, as far as we can tell, enjoys a popularity that many elected leaders in this country would do a lot for.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

Sisi was democratically elected. Although some of the returns were impressive—something like 90% or 95% of the vote—there was a democratic process.

[Charlotte Leslie]

I thank my hon. Friend for clarifying that. There was of course a democratic process after considerable institutional and constitutional preparations were made for the transition, which, given the context, was quite remarkable, particularly compared with the fates of other countries surrounding Egypt. I was referring to the fact that many people did not want Morsi to be removed; they wanted him to hang on and then elections to take place. From what I saw of people living in Egypt—I admit this is only anecdotal—the idea that elections would take place in a free and fair way in that culture of fear was optimistic at best.

I do not want anyone to think that I am describing a rosy situation—it is far from rosy. The younger population is very concerned and, interestingly enough, their concerns chime with the concerns about human rights abuses and clampdowns that we have heard in the Chamber today—concerns about the imprisonment of journalists and the appalling, tragic and diabolical treatment of the Italian Cambridge student. I do not have to take up valuable time in expressing how abominable that case is, because other hon. Members have done so far better than I could. Interestingly, students and young people said that it was not only abominable, but politically unnecessary, because Sisi enjoyed sufficient popularity not to need to clamp down in that heavy-handed way.

That brings me on to my next point: that such human rights abuses are not only fundamentally morally wrong, but dangerous for the country itself. Human rights abuses foster the kind of radicalism, extremism and takfiri thinking that Egypt is fundamentally pitched against. In looking at radicals such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, we see the detrimental effect that prison torture plays in radicalising budding or existing extremists. If we think that we have an incentive to crush extremism, look at Egypt’s neighbours and see just how urgent the crushing of that extremist takfiri mentality is to them. How can Egypt become more successful in eradicating extremism? My impression is that, in common with many countries that are facing modernisation and a perhaps already modernised younger generation, Egypt is experiencing the counterintuitive paradox of needing to grip less tightly in order to be stronger.

We had the great privilege and interesting experience of meeting many Members of the nascent Parliament. I remember the confusion in this Parliament—a great institution—when in 2010, for the first time in a long time, we had a coalition Government. Everyone ran around not quite knowing what was going on. Imagine a completely new Parliament, a set of 200 or so pieces of legislation that had to be reviewed in a short space of time and the establishment of much of the constitution—something we take for granted in this country. That is a Parliament that is really trying to get off the ground, so it would seem bizarre for Britain, which has such an established Parliament, not to take a lead in helping and nurturing that fledgling to fly and to become the solid institution that is so important to form a politically stable Egypt. The country is a brave and resilient one, trying to form a bastion of democracy amid a sea of hostility.

There are also deep concerns about Egypt’s economy. With oil prices falling, support from the Gulf is waning, and that is worrying. To create a healthier economy, Sisi has to perform a difficult balancing act by weaning the country off subsidies, while avoiding the public protests that would emerge to destabilise Egypt were prices of bread on the street to go up. Tourism accounts for 10% to 15% of the Egyptian economy—about 1% to 5% is from Britain. If we want Egypt to remain stable and to flourish, we need Sharm el-Sheikh flights to resume as soon as possible. The work there must be concluded quickly. In assessing the security of Sharm el-Sheikh flights, obviously we must put the safety of our citizens first, but we should also consider the security implications of not resuming the flights. An awful lot of Egyptian people depend on tourism. If they are left jobless and feeling spurned by Britain, we have to consider where they might turn for a livelihood and security. We do not want them to turn to extremism.

The stakes are high. If Egypt crumbles economically and social disorder breaks out, the ongoing migrant crisis in Europe that we fear now and this summer will increase dramatically. The exchange rate of the Egyptian currency is artificially high and floating the currency on the open market is a frighteningly risky prospect for the country. It would be a leap of faith, and in making any leap everyone needs to feel surrounded by friends who will help. Furthermore, if we do not help Egypt to modernise, social disorder will feed and nurture Daesh and other pro-Islamic State players.

We can do so much. We have a rich experience of democracy, so we can help Egypt to form a Parliament and functioning state institutions. Education is also vital. The broken-down education system in Egypt needs almost a complete revamp. That, too, is something in which Britain has expertise and experience. As we all know, education and forging a future for young people is one of our key weapons in preventing young people from falling prey to the predatory nature of extremist and takfiri thinkers. If we are not proactive in forming such a relationship with Egypt and in helping it to become the democratic nation that it is trying hard to be—not perfectly, but it is trying—other nations will step into that gap. I am not sure that we especially want Russia to in and to be seen as the primary friend of Egypt. We need allies in the region, so we need to support them.

When looking at the human rights abuses, which are appalling, we need to ensure that we are measuring carefully what it is that we are concerned about. If we are concerned about human beings and their suffering, the metric of our judgments and actions on human rights abuses must be the number of people enduring such suffering. It can be easy to focus blame on the locus of responsibility, whether a Government or an institution, but much less easy to blame a failed state, because there is no one there to blame. We are, however, concerned about human beings and their lives, so we need to look at where the most human rights abuses take place: in a stable state or in a failed state.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

With respect to human rights abuses, it is important to mention Giulio Regeni, a research student who I believe lived in the constituency of the hon. Member for Cambridge (Daniel Zeichner). I followed the case and it seems difficult to apportion blame directly, because not only are the Government responsible for some abuses, but there are rogue elements within the security apparatus. One thing that we have not mentioned is the fact that the Egyptian military is broadly involved in ramifying branches of economic and social life, business and so on. When people talk about the Egyptian Government, the notion is complicated.

[Charlotte Leslie]

My hon. Friend makes the case most eloquently. The more that we can help the Egyptian Government to stabilise institutionally and to have a better grip on its institutions, the more we can help the security services to operate in a way that we in the west like to see our security services operate. The more the security service and its activities can be aligned with the state, the more stable the country will be.

To go back to the point I was making, just because it is hard to allocate blame in countries such as Syria and Libya and to solve the problem that is causing untold numbers of human rights abuses, we should not let the fact such abuses are taking place under a Government deter us from tackling them where they are happening on an abominable scale. It is easy for us to put our own moral virtue, in liking to blame someone, ahead of our concern for human welfare.

My hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Kwasi Kwarteng) made a powerful case for the need for stability in Egypt. We owe it to the Egyptian people, to the British people, who are concerned about stability and the migrant process, to Europe and to everyone everywhere, whether moderate Muslims, Christians or of any religion, not to sit and condemn and carp at a country that is certainly not doing everything well and that certainly gives rise to much concern, but to help it to obliterate the things that cause us concern—to help one of the lone islands of stability attempting democracy that has not succumbed to instability and an Islamic takfiri alarming state to thrive and flourish. That is in the interests of all of us.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jim Shannon]

As a married man, I have to be careful. [Laughter.] I am very loyal and dutiful to my wife, who I love, but if it was in a purely platonic way, I think that would be okay.

The ambassador praised the efforts of Egypt to re-emerge from the years of instability she suffered following the Arab spring and the Muslim Brotherhood takeover. Three years ago I had a chance to visit Egypt with the all-party parliamentary group on Egypt. I had always wanted to visit Egypt—I had a purpose. The APPG met President el-Sisi in his palace, so I had a chance to put to him issues about freedom of religious belief, which are important for me and for my Christian brothers and sisters in Egypt, and I was impressed by his response to the questions put—I could not say otherwise. He showed his commitment to the change he wanted to see and the society he wanted in Egypt. I was impressed by that. He also won the election shortly after that, and let us be quite clear: a democratic process was carried out and he was overwhelmingly elected. The people were not happy with the Muslim Brotherhood—although they were not happy with Mubarak either—but I believe that President al-Sisi delivered a democratic process to them.

On our visit the members of the all-party group had a chance to raise some issues. We met a pastor in a church in Cairo, called Pastor Sami. People often say to me, when I mention him, “Is he from Belfast?” I say, “No, he is not; he is from Cairo, and he is an Egyptian.” Seven thousand people attend that evangelical church in Cairo, but you will never hear about that, Mr Pritchard. It is one of those things that come out only from visits to Egypt or from having direct contact with places in the area. Pastor Sami wanted the changes. I expressed to him my concerns about people who had converted from Islam to Christianity, and a block being put on them, and asked about the level of direct representation at every level of the democratic process—not just with respect to President el-Sisi. There was a meeting about a month ago of the all-party group on religion or belief, which I chair, and we met some people from Egypt. There are a number of Christian MPs in Parliament in Egypt, taking part in the democratic process and making changes, as they should.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

Would the hon. Gentleman suggest how, if at all, what he describes is an improvement on the regime of the Muslim Brotherhood?

[Jim Shannon]

First, it is an improvement because people can pursue their religious beliefs without fear in Egypt today. There are still attacks, but there is a change, and I have seen that. When I visited I had a chance to meet the Grand Mufti. It was an opportunity to meet someone of Muslim beliefs at a high level and to ask him his personal opinion on the new Egypt that we would see shortly afterwards. He made a commitment to ensure that people would have the opportunity to express their religious belief without repercussions. I want that to come from the top, and to go all the way down; and I think there are levels further down that it has not yet reached. There are steps to be taken—small ones and big ones.

The Islamic groups that have infiltrated into Egypt are more violent. In the Sinai region, radical groups seem to operate with impunity. Christians are punished and pushed outside the proper legal process. Coptic Christians, as the hon. Member for Spelthorne mentioned, have been expelled from their villages. There is persecution and discrimination, and one example I know of concerns a schoolgirl whose name is Marina. She is 10 and the youngest of six children. Her mum and dad are illiterate, but they send all the children to school. As a Christian, she has to sit at the back of the class on her own, isolated and perhaps marginalised. It is such levels that must be reached if there is to be real change for people in Egypt. I know that everyone in the Chamber wants that to happen as well. Christian women have been kidnapped and raped, and involved in relationships that they find abhorrent. Christian buildings and churches have not been repaired in some cases, but in fairness there has been some change on that. There has been rebuilding of churches, and protection, in Cairo.

The response to the saddening and shocking events at Sharm el-Sheikh is an example of exactly what is needed on every level. Britain, Germany and Russia, to name a few of the nations in question, have taken steps to co-operate further with the Egyptian Government to ensure that Sharm el-Sheikh can be a model for security at airports and show strength and resilience in the face of terror and cowardice. There is a young girl who works in my office as my researcher, and when she got married she had her honeymoon in Sharm el-Sheikh. At the time there was not any bother, and she recommended it for a holiday—a honeymoon is of course a bit better as a holiday—and an opportunity to enjoy some special time.

There is great development potential in the Nile delta. On our visit we hoped to see some of that development. With the water source there is agriculture and agribusiness, which create jobs and enable food to be grown, moving Egypt, with its massive population, towards some sort of self-sufficiency, if that is possible. Among various issues there has been talk of Ethiopia building a dam, which might cause some problems. I do not know whether the Minister will be able to respond on that, or give us an idea of where things are in that process, but Egypt can develop and create jobs. The resurgence of gas and oil and access to Egypt’s vast energy resources are of interest to everyone, and helping an ally to develop those resources is much better than relying on enemies for energy, as the west too often finds itself doing. BP and British Gas have found Egypt to be an ideal business partner recently, and utilising our relationship with Egypt to further voluntary co-operation and trade across the region will open up the prospect of prosperity to millions of oppressed people—a vast population who need employment. We should remember that they need prosperity as well as the peace we all continue to work for.

I have outlined an array of issues on Egypt, including the concerns of the all-party group. I have mentioned the role of my right hon. Friend the Member for Lagan Valley as an envoy to Egypt, and there is already an apparatus that we can build on to ensure support from the United Kingdom. I hope that will help to ensure that what was once a towering pillar of stability and a beacon of hope in the Arab world can come roaring back to its former self and sit again at the top table of global powers and economies, alongside the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

I am grateful for this wide-ranging debate in which we have hit many of the principal issues. The tragic death of Giulio Regeni stains Egypt’s reputation, but I am sure that with the Minister’s good offices our Government will do their part in bringing some form of closure and justice to the situation.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered British support for stability in Egypt.

Oral Answers to Questions

Kwasi Kwarteng Excerpts

Tuesday 20th October 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

No, I do not. The hon. Lady underestimates the important fact that we shall be offering a home to people who are among the most vulnerable and traumatised as a result of the conflict. We need to ensure that they are given a proper reception and the full package of support from the national health service and, in many cases, local authority social services. They have to be properly provided for.

[Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)]

Given the increased terrorist activity in Turkey, what assurances can the Minister give on the support the British Government are specifically giving Turkey with respect to the migrant question?

[Mr Lidington]

We have made it very clear to the Turkish Government that we stand with them in resisting terrorism. We have a history of good counter-terrorist co-operation with the Turkish authorities, and we have told Turkey that we are willing to explore how we can further strengthen that.

Oral Answers to Questions

Kwasi Kwarteng Excerpts

Tuesday 14th July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Ellwood]

All in the House pay a huge tribute to the families of the fallen victims. This was a terrible disaster for both Tunisia and Britain. The numbers climbed in the first hours from five to six, then eight, then 12, then 30. Then it was not just 30 in number; they became names, individuals, parts of families, as the hon. Lady has outlined. We must stand by these people in their years of need. She rightly points out that Tunisia needs support. It is the country where the Arab spring began; it is where Bouazizi set himself alight and ignited the Arab spring. We must not allow that country to slide back into extremism, so we have teams working in a variety of areas, from airport security to the police to collecting intelligence, which is the crucial ingredient in understanding what is happening behind the scenes in the mosques, as well as next door in Libya.

[Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)]

With respect to the appalling tragedy in Tunisia, will the Minister give the House an assurance that our response will be part of a wider package across the region from Egypt to Libya, where there is a great lack of stability? Are the Government working across the piece to ensure that terrorist outrages such as these are minimised?

[Mr Ellwood]

My hon. Friend makes a pertinent point, which the House needs to consider. The person and the group that were involved in that terrible killing were trained by an ISIS operation, Ansar al-Sharia, which has now chosen to fly the black flag in Libya. We are seeing the same thing happening in Algeria with Boko Haram, and in northern Sinai with Ansar Beit al-Maqdis. Terrorist groups all across the northern Maghreb are joining forces with ISIS, and this country and the international community need to do more to tackle this extremism.

Egypt

Kwasi Kwarteng Excerpts

Wednesday 29th January 2014 Westminster Hall

[Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)]

Thank you very much, Mr Havard; it is a pleasure to speak on this subject under your chairmanship. I am also delighted to see several Members of the House here to take part in the debate. Looking around, I can see that a number of people have a considered and well developed interest in the region.

As far as I am concerned, the developments in Egypt are, in terms of the middle east’s long-term history and development, in many ways the most significant. Why do I say that? Egypt is very much at the centre of the Arab world. Ninety million Egyptians reside in the country and a number of other people—from Saudi Arabia, from all around the Gulf, and from across the Arab world—live in Egypt. As a proportion of the Arab world, Egypt represents well over a third of the Arab-speaking peoples. Historically, it has always been a country in which developments are looked to. Culturally, the Egyptian film industry is dominant in the region, and anyone who has travelled in the region will say that the Egyptian dialect is the most widely understood, simply because of wide media outlets and the popularity of Egyptian film. Egypt is absolutely at the centre of developments in the middle east.

Two weeks ago, I returned from a delegation to Egypt organised by the Conservative Middle East Council. It was the fourth delegation of which I have been a member since the revolution in 2011, when General Hosni Mubarak was toppled. It is only really by going back to the country over a number of years that we managed to develop, I think, an interest, expertise and knowledge of what is going on in a fast-moving, complicated situation. Our aim has been to understand better the historic events that are occurring in the country, and we have spoken to many people in the Egyptian political scene.

Unfortunately, as people will know, the Muslim Brotherhood was declared a terrorist organisation at the end of last year and has effectively been outlawed. As a consequence, in our last delegation we were not able to meet members of that organisation, but we have—I can say this openly—met them in the past. We have engaged with many members of the Muslim Brotherhood, with people in the army and the armed forces in Egypt, and with people right across the political spectrum, from the Facebookers, who initiated the first revolution in January and February 2011, to other players in more recent events.

We always thought Egypt was a binary situation—I am talking on behalf of members of the delegation—and felt that the army and the Muslim Brotherhood were by far the two most powerfully organised and structured organisations in the country. It seemed to us at the time—we documented it in our short pamphlet, “Egypt 2011: Revolution and Transition”—that the political future of Egypt would largely be determined by the relationship between the army and the Muslim Brotherhood. We saw, in effect, a temporary resolution to that dialogue in the way in which the army stepped in in the middle of last year.

[Guy Opperman (Hexham) (Con)]

I warmly congratulate my hon. Friend on securing the debate. Unlike him, I was not on that delegation but spent time there recently on my own. Does he accept that although the army and the Muslim Brotherhood are the main players, the vast majority of the population, particularly those outside Cairo, have absolutely no interest in the conflict and are totally committed to a resolution and a cessation of any dispute?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend raises an important point. Naturally when we go on such delegations, we tend to gravitate towards Cairo, which is the centre and capital of Egyptian life. I might add that as a capital, it is very significant. Twenty million Egyptians live in Cairo, which is a high proportion of the total population. However, he is absolutely right that Egyptians across the country are less interested in the power dispute and are more concerned about economic stability and the future for themselves and their families. I will talk about the consequences of the dispute between the Muslim Brotherhood and the army.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

I compliment the hon. Gentleman on securing the debate. He seems reluctant to describe what happened last year in Egypt as a military coup, which, in reality, it was. Is he not concerned that that is a precedent, and that large numbers of opposition people have been arrested in the same way as many were arrested under Morsi? There is a serious denial of many people’s human rights throughout the country at present.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. It is undoubtedly the case that the army has been very heavy-handed in dealing with protesters and dissent. There is a new protest law under which people have been put away for three years simply for protesting and being out on the street. I am tentative about describing what happened as a coup, because the army’s view is very much that it was a popular uprising. The army would suggest that—I heard it many times in Cairo—although the events of February 2011 have been described as a revolution, what it feels was another revolution in June last year has been described as a “coup”. We have to be careful about the language we use.

Clearly, it is true that the army flexed its muscles at the end, but there was popular support, with Tamarod and people on the streets, so to describe what happened as a coup does not perhaps get the right tone. Generally, coups around the developing world are led from the top: a general and a few of his associates might seize power for themselves. The army in Egypt would very much contest whether a coup is an accurate description of what happened last summer and no doubt historians, politicians and diplomats will debate how to describe it for years to come. I am very reluctant to use the word “coup”, even though I appreciate that it has been widely used in the media.

The big question at the moment is how to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood. Clearly the army has gone down one route, which is heavy-handed—really the iron fist. Our perception was certainly that the army was willing and ready to deal with, in an uncompromising fashion, any attempts on the part of political Islamists to use violence. It was expressing the view that it had had enough of the Muslim Brotherhood and of trying to accommodate them, and that it would handle any threats from that quarter with a great deal of repression. Those were not the words that the army used, but that was very much the indication that it gave us. There is clearly a massive problem with that, potentially, because—

[Guy Opperman]

My hon. Friend is leading on to the point about the co-existence of the two particular factions. Does he also accept the point that was stressed to me on my visit, that the vast majority of all faiths peacefully co-exist, are friends with one another and have no dispute with one another, and that it is only the more extreme elements—for example, of the Muslim Brotherhood—that are necessarily pushing the dispute and the aggression towards the army and towards the alternatives?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The two broad groups that I have characterised—I will talk about secular parties later—are the two most powerful groups, and of course within those groups there is a wide range of views and dispositions. There are extremist elements in the Muslim Brotherhood. There are also some quite extreme repressive elements in the army. My hon. Friend is right again to say that the majority of people are trapped in the middle of those two contending and powerful forces, but I must stress that the fundamental problem with Egypt at the moment, as I see it, is that one side is simply unwilling to reach any kind of accommodation with the other.

Let us look at the elections that have taken place in the past three or four years. The one fact that has come out starkly and undeniably is the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood. I can say, as a member of the delegation that has travelled to Egypt over three or four years, that each time we asked, “How popular is the Muslim Brotherhood?” its support was underestimated; it was never overestimated. People always said 15% to 20%, but then in the elections it always performed much better than anyone had anticipated. Equally surprising was the strength of the Salafis, who got one quarter of the parliamentary seats. Political Islam in Egypt is a powerful force. What I think should draw the attention of this House and Members of Parliament is the fact that the army’s attempt to sideline political Islam is fraught with danger. That is potentially one of the fundamental causes of stress and conflict in the years ahead.

The big question is how the army will deal with acts of terror in the future. Clearly, in the past two weeks we have seen an intolerable level of violence in Cairo. We have also seen sporadic terrorist bombings. Added to that is military repression. We are entering on a particularly vicious cycle, and everyone in the west—politicians, diplomats and everyone else in the outside world—will have to take a view on that. It is obvious to me and to members of our delegation that the army is determined to impose itself as the central player in Egyptian politics. Anyone who doubts that need only look at the referendum that took place two weeks ago.

[Mr Iain McKenzie (Inverclyde) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing the debate. He says that the military are imposing themselves as the dominant power in Egyptian politics. Does he not agree that they are putting themselves forward as the only power in Egypt’s politics? Now it looks very much as though the general who led the coup will put himself forward for the presidency, putting the country back into a situation in which the military are in charge.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

Yes, that is a broad characterisation of where we are. However, we have to accept that the army is supported by a large number of people. That is why I am always hesitant to talk about coups and all that sort of thing. There is popular support for the army, and it is unrealistic and perhaps rather naive of us to think otherwise. It is not a military junta that has suddenly emerged out of nowhere and is seeking to dominate the country. There is a groundswell of support for the army. How big that is and whether it constitutes a majority, no one knows.

However, this is a much more nuanced situation than one in which a bunch of generals have decided to claim power for themselves. If we look at the economic conditions in which Egypt has suffered for the past three or four years—the total collapse of tourism, which constituted between 15% and 25%, depending on different estimates, of the economy—we see that there is a massive and pressing need for stability, and it was in that cauldron that that military regime, if we want to call it that, emerged. That has happened across modern history. Across the world, we have seen situations in which there is a cry for stability and then someone emerges, often from a military background, to try to impose order. That is a very similar situation to the one that we find in Egypt.

The leading indication, the most obvious example, of the army’s determination was the result of the referendum: 98.1% of people voted for the constitution. Those of us who live in democratic countries such as Britain will know that there is not a single issue on which 98% of people would vote one way. I even suggested to one of my researchers that if there was a referendum on what day of the week it was—on a point of fact—we would not see 98% of people agreeing to that. We might see 90%, but there would still be dissent on what is a very palpable and obvious question, so the 98.1% does arouse suspicions about the transparency, openness and fairness of the process. If we look for other examples in the Arab world of 98% mandates—actually, I was told that Saddam Hussein used to get 100% in his elections—we find that there are not that many other examples of people getting 98%.

[Mr McKenzie]

The hon. Gentleman is very kind to give way again. On those statistics, does he agree that that 98% was based on a 38% turnout?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

Absolutely, but 38% is not a disgracefully low turnout. That is quite a large turnout. In our local elections, we would be quite happy to get 38%. That does not invalidate them as exercises in local democracy, so I do not think that the turnout was particularly depressing. It was a reasonable turnout, but the 98% of the 38% does raise legitimate questions.

[Guy Opperman]

I promise that this is the last time I will intervene. Is not the endorsement not necessarily of the constitution but, in particular, of the desire for stability and a path back to some degree of economic prosperity?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend has made a number of very pertinent interventions, all of which I agree with. It is absolutely the case that what he refers to is what this whole issue is about, but what we have to consider—I want to deal with this in my closing remarks—is our relationship to incipient democracies, if we want to call them that, and to political governance in the Arab world.

[Mr Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP)]

I, too, congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing this important debate. Before he goes on to the other issue, may I put this to him? He mentions the constitution, which has increased provision for religious freedom compared with what there has been recently. However, in relation to ethnic and religious minorities, particularly Christians and Copts, does he not agree that words are fine—the constitution may make provision in certain areas—but the issue is the enforcement of and the abiding by those provisions and the human rights afforded to religious minorities in particular? How does he see the role of our Government in ensuring that those minorities are properly protected?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My right hon. Friend the Minister can speak with more authority than I can on this, but our Government have been absolutely clear about our commitment to human rights and to religious freedoms in Egypt. What the right hon. Gentleman should be aware of is that the Copts—we talked about a coup last year—were very much in favour of the military stepping in. They saw the Muslim Brotherhood as no particular friends to them. Indeed, they felt that the incidence of religious violence and of terror against their community increased dramatically in the brief period of Muslim Brotherhood rule.

There are many conflicting issues that we have to deal with. On one side is the protection of minority rights; on the other is the democratic will as expressed by the majority. Often in these cases in the Arab world, those two things are in conflict. One justification for military involvement was on precisely this issue. The army would say—it did say to us—that the Muslim Brotherhood did not look after the human rights of all Egyptians; it was sectional, and it looked merely to its own. In that context, the army has taken on itself the role of guardian of minority rights.

Egypt’s parlous economic situation is the context in which that military strongman, for want of a better term, may well emerge. The budget deficit has risen to $34.8 billion, which is 14% of GDP. To put that in context, our deficit was 12% of GDP in 2010, which was the highest proportion it had been in our peacetime history. Public debt in Egypt is running at about 90% of GDP. Clearly, there has been a massive economic crisis and the country is under a lot of pressure. There are also problems with terrorism and the rule of law. When we first arrived in Egypt in 2010, we managed to drive through the Sinai peninsula on our way to Gaza, but the presence of armed militias and armed forces in the Sinai peninsula, and the battles that rage there, make such a trip impossible today. The country suffers under massive economic pressure and the spectre of renewed terrorism.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

The hon. Gentleman is being most generous in giving way. Does he concede that the new Government have displayed a disappointing attitude by not opening up the Rafah crossing, which has created further problems and tensions in Gaza? I recognise what he says about the journey across the Sinai; that is a fair point.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

In the Sinai peninsula, which has generally been, for the past 40 years, under Egyptian control, the situation is one of relative anarchy. In that context, it would be asking a lot to expect any Egyptian Government to open the border. I cannot see such a development taking place, given where we are today. The army has a real job on its hands in trying to introduce some element of rule of law in the Sinai peninsula.

I conclude by making one or two remarks about our response. We went to our embassy in Cairo, where we received generous hospitality, and we encountered some hard-working and committed diplomats. The feeling that we received from people to whom we spoke in Egypt, at all levels, was that the west had failed Egypt and that we, as one of Egypt’s longest-standing partners, had not fully grasped the nature of the situation. That might be a misrepresentation, but I can only report what I was told. There was a perception that we had been slightly wrong-footed by events. In a fast-changing environment it is easy to back the wrong horse and then find that the winning horse is suspicious of people who have not fully supported it.

For decades to come, we will have to question the operation of the multi-party system. Over the past four years, secular parties have not emerged. The two power blocs of the army and the Muslim Brotherhood are the dominant forces in Egypt, and they may well be for some time to come. The Al-Nour party, which won a quarter of the parliamentary seats, is a Salafist party inspired by political Islam. It is difficult to see how a multi-party secular democracy can emerge in a country in which the army and political Islam, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, play such dominant roles.

In Westminster and across western capitals, we will have to come to terms with that. We will have to reassess the somewhat naive idea that Egypt might become a multi-party system like Australia, for example. If anyone thought in 2011 that that might happen, it was a rather naive assumption. We simply have to describe what we see on the ground and how popular will is expressed. Secular parties have not developed as many of us anticipated, and it is an open question whether we should try to encourage their growth or simply focus our attention on the humanitarian and economic situation in Egypt.

I am grateful for the care and attention with which Members of the House have listened to my remarks, and I look forward to listening to and participating in the subsequent debate.

[Mr Dai Havard (in the Chair)]

Four Members have indicated that they wish to speak, and I want to start the wind-ups at about 10.30 am. About 15 minutes from each speaker with interventions will probably take us there.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I pay tribute to both previous speakers and, despite the friendly sedentary intervention of my friend, the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), I intend to follow in their footsteps. I congratulate in particular my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Kwasi Kwarteng) on introducing such an important subject. I am pleased that people have not gone automatically into a mode of suggesting that all the good is on one side and all the evil on the other. In Egypt, we are confronted with a choice of which is the lesser evil. I agree with the hon. Member for Inverclyde (Mr McKenzie) that the correct course to follow is not to rush to endorse what has happened in Egypt. We should ensure that we maintain pressure on whatever Administration or regime emerges to follow a path back to constitutional democracy at the earliest opportunity.

It sometimes bothers me that people think that when a dramatic development occurs, it is automatically to be interpreted in the context of what we have experienced in recent European history. I felt the very coinage of the term “Arab spring” to be inappropriate. I did not feel that the spate of revolutions that took place in one middle eastern country after another should be compared to the attempt by central and eastern European countries, which had been well set on the path to constitutional democracy before they were hijacked by the Soviet empire, to go back to the democratic path. There was no direct comparison between those European countries asserting their right to return to democracy and what was happening in at least some of the middle eastern countries.

In 1941, Churchill was famously teased by one of his left-wing opponents when he spoke up for Russia after it was invaded by the Nazis. After all, Churchill was the architect of British intervention in the Russian civil war, and he famously wanted to “strangle Bolshevism at birth”. He had the right answer to his critic: he said that if Hitler invaded hell, he would at least have a good word to say for the devil in the House of Commons. In other words, he recognised that it was a choice between evils.

It is often thought that when a totalitarian regime emerges, based on a totalitarian ideology, it does so in a coup, with no popular support at all. That is not necessarily the case; in fact, I would say that it is not usually the case. There was certainly popular support for the Nazis, as well as for the communists in many cases where they succeeded in coming to power. The paradox in trying to deal with such situations was that there was a degree of democratic legitimacy to the initial taking over of the country, but once that had happened, the regimes proceeded to dismantle the very framework of democracy—however great or limited it was at the time—that had enabled them to come to power on the basis of some form of popular support. Such popular support was often allied to a specific type of devious perversion of political language when the regime was consolidating its grip on power.

The question that must be faced by democracies looking on as such situations develop is what we do when a group of people come to power, initially with a greater or lesser degree of democratic legitimacy, and proceed to subvert the system so that they will never again have to submit themselves to democratic elections. I suggest that what was happening in Egypt was a movement in that sort of direction. The country was faced with the choice of whether it wished to see Islamism take control, as it has done following what I prefer to call the Arab uprisings, to the disappointment of many of us who were hoping to see constitutional democracies emerge in other middle eastern countries. The issue is what we do about that. Do we simply rush to condemn the fact that Islamists have been ejected from power in Egypt, or do we recognise the real difficulty of the choice that Egyptians have had to make between one extreme situation and another?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

The situation in Egypt was even more extreme than that, in terms of the groundwork laid for political Islam. In the parliamentary elections, 50% of the seats were won by the Muslim Brotherhood and 25% by Salafis, so 75% of the seats were won by parties that openly supported political Islam. There was no room for an alternative in that system.

[Dr Lewis]

That is absolutely correct. My hon. Friend will put me right if I am mistaken, but I recall that part of the deal at the outset was that the Muslim Brotherhood undertook not to run for the presidency—I think that I am right in saying that. That promise was very promptly broken.

In my time trying to comment as best I can on defence and security-related subjects in Parliament, not too many months—certainly not too many years—go by when I do not have recourse to mentioning one of my favourite political quotations from the late, great, Sir Karl Popper in his famous book, “The Open Society and Its Enemies”. I have quoted it before and I suspect that circumstances will require me to quote it again. The paradox of tolerance is that in a free society, people must tolerate all but the intolerant, because if you tolerate the intolerant, the conditions for toleration disappear and the tolerant go with them. I am sure that this is what the people who ousted the Islamists in Egypt would argue was their justification. Although I said earlier that one must not make simplistic comparisons, I am now probably about to do just that. Those people would probably point to the situation in Germany in the 1930s and say, “Wouldn’t it have been better if the army had thrown the Nazis out, once it became clear that they were going to rip up the constitution and remove any chance of a democratic future, and when it saw what the Hitlerites were trying to do to the German system—which had more or less democratically elected them to power in the first place—using the techniques that we are so familiar with in totalitarian takeovers, to get an iron and irreversible grip on the society?” How would we feel now if the army had stepped in then?

I worry when I hear people use phrases such as moderate Islamism. The description of Islamism is the description of an extreme, intolerant ideology; there is no moderate Islamism, any more than there is moderate totalitarianism or moderate extremism. The reality is that there was a choice in Egypt between an Islamist takeover and the ejection of a group of people bent on destroying any sort of emergent democracy in that country and making a terrible mess of running it in the process.

Syria

Kwasi Kwarteng Excerpts

Monday 3rd September 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

We cannot force other countries to do so. We can highlight the good example that we have set; that is one of the reasons that I went to the Security Council in New York last week. We can work through the European Union to increase aid, although the use of EU funds is at a good level. However, many nations in the EU have not made large bilateral donations. I will take that up with my EU colleagues, all of whom I will see at the end of this week, but we shall be active through our embassies all over the world, and very active in the forthcoming General Assembly, when we will be able to address all the nations of the world.

[Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)]

With regard to regional players, what efforts is my right hon. Friend making, alongside his colleagues in the Department, to engage such organisations as the Arab League, as well as wider players such as Kurdistan and others that share borders with Syria, to reach some sort of resolution?

Oral Answers to Questions

Kwasi Kwarteng Excerpts

Tuesday 17th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

I have to say to the hon. Gentleman that he needs to acknowledge that there are limits to the leverage that the UK alone and the EU collectively have with Russia. However, we always ensure, both bilaterally and in European conversations, that the central importance of human rights and respect for democratic processes is brought home to our Russian interlocutors.

[Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)]

7. What discussions he has had with his EU counterparts on the situation in Syria; and if he will make a statement.

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague)]

I discuss Syria regularly with EU colleagues. At the March Foreign Affairs Council, we condemned the violence of Assad’s regime and supported Kofi Annan’s six-point plan. We agreed to adopt further sanctions, including an asset freeze on two Syrian petroleum companies.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

I am very grateful to my right hon. Friend for his answer. What role does he envisage for the Security Council in the ongoing crisis in Syria?

[Mr Hague]

The Security Council has, I am glad to say, at last agreed a Security Council resolution. It did so on Saturday and I pay tribute to our mission at the United Nations in New York for the way in which it helped to achieve that. This resolution embodies the Kofi Annan plan, but it also sets out very clearly how the role of the monitors for the ceasefire that has now, at least partly, come into effect in Syria, should be regarded, in terms of giving them access to where they need to go and to people they need to talk to. For the first time the Security Council has passed a resolution uniting all the members of the Security Council, against which the Assad regime and its behaviour can now be judged.

North Africa and the Near and Middle East

Kwasi Kwarteng Excerpts

Monday 28th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

The hon. Gentleman is right that even in the monarchies there are human rights problems, including in the United Arab Emirates in the past few days. Ministers have resigned from the Kuwaiti Government because of protests over various developments there. In Saudi Arabia, it is more a protest of the Shi’a minority. They are big minority—20% of the population—but they can never aspire to power, and if the Saudi Government have sense, they will try to achieve a policy of reconciliation with them.

I want to turn to a second point—one that came up briefly in the earlier exchanges—about the role of Islamist parties in the region. Like most people in the United Kingdom or the west generally, one feels more comfortable if secular parties win elections; however, we should not get too over-exercised by the fact that parties that call themselves Islamist are doing rather well in a number of countries in free elections. The first point, which is perhaps the most important, is that, from the point of view of al-Qaeda, what is happening with Islamist parties in those countries is a disaster. The whole point of al-Qaeda is to reject a parliamentary route to power, to reject the sharing of power and to insist that only by revolution combined with terrorism can the Islamist ideal be achieved.

What we are seeing, not just in Tunisia and Morocco, but with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt too, is a recognition—for a number of reasons and motives—that, at the very least, power will need to be shared. There is a public declaration of a commitment to multi-party democracy and the rule of law. Of course there will be people in those parties who do not share those values, but so far the evidence supports the view that those declarations are what those parties are about. As I mentioned when I intervened earlier, opinion surveys in Egypt suggest that elections in Egypt are likely to be similar to the two elections so far. The Muslim Brotherhood will do well—it will probably be the largest party—but all the evidence so far, including independent surveys of opinion, suggests that it will not form a majority by itself. It, too, will have to share power, which is crucial.

Earlier I mentioned another factor in relation to Egypt which seems not to have been commented on, but which is significant. If the House accepts that the most important reason, apart from a general desire for the rule of law and freedom, for the revolutions in Egypt and elsewhere was a demand for economic progress—those countries are economically stagnated, having fallen woefully behind Brazil, south-east Asia and countries of the far east in their economic development—that means that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt faces a particular problem. Anyone ruling Libya will have vast amounts of oil wealth and will be able to afford to act in an extreme way—if that is the way they want to go—because they do not need the co-operation of the rest of the world. The Muslim Brotherhood knows perfectly well that if it were to acquire power in Egypt and then use it as though it had the right to impose an Islamist system on a population that did not want it, that would immediately destroy any possibility of overseas investment in Egypt. Who would invest in Egypt if it seemed to be going the way of Iran? The people of Egypt would never forgive an Egyptian Government who destroyed the prospect of economic growth by pursuing a theocratic agenda. I believe that the Muslim Brotherhood understands that perfectly well and that the first priority of any Egyptian Government has to be to reassure the outside world that Egypt will be an attractive place to come as a tourist and to invest in its resources, in order to help build the economy.

[Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend accept that as a consequence of the 25 January revolution and the uncertainty, Egypt has seen enormous capital flight, so much of the risk and the economic disaster that he outlines has already happened?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

Yes, of course, that has happened over the past few months, but it could be reversed if there were a prospect of stability and progress. The tragedy of Iraq is that the Iraq war went on long after the military conflict, with the whole economy destroyed as a consequence. It is only now that Iraqi oil production has got back to its original level. Libyan oil production should be back in a year or 18 months or so—perhaps even earlier. Tourism will return to Egypt when there is stability, but not without it. Any party that destroys that prospect will not be thanked.

Let me turn briefly to two other issues. The first is Syria. There are serious limits to what can be achieved by the outside world in relation to Syria. I pay tribute to the people of Syria who I never expected for a moment would be able to survive eight months of this appalling treatment by their own Government. I assumed wrongly that it would be like the tragedy of Iran and that when the Government used the police, the security forces, the prisons and the torture chambers, the Syrian opposition would, within months, have been pushed under ground, though not destroyed. That has not happened as it did in Iran. The Assad regime is doomed; the question is how we can assist that process.

I welcome the fact that the Government have already opened up contacts with the Syrian opposition. That is highly to be encouraged. I make just one additional point. It seems to me that, although for all the reasons that are increasingly understood, there cannot be a military dimension to the help we give the country, what the Syrian opposition need most is for their morale to be boosted and for them to be able to demonstrate to the people of Syria that they are increasingly winning, not losing, this conflict. That is the significance of the Arab League’s decision and the imposition of economic sanctions. That is how the United Kingdom, the European Union and the United States can make an impact—by demonstrating solidarity with those in Syria who are seeking change.

The final area on which I want to comment is, of course, Iran. There has to be very serious doubt as to whether the current policy of economic sanctions has any prospect of working. However much they are extended, there is no evidence that the Iranian Government are terribly interested in dialogue or even in a carrot-and-stick policy.

One problem—we have heard about it elsewhere— is the attitude of Russia and China. The question is whether there is any way in which the Russian and Chinese Governments can be persuaded to change their position. Russia is acting in an utterly illogical way, even given its own national interest. It is difficult to understand why Russia, with a large Muslim minority of its own and considerable destabilisation in the Caucasus, should acquiesce in the growth of nuclear weapon capability in Iran. If one looks for a Machiavellian explanation, there is a very simple one. The Machiavellian explanation for Russia’s opposition to what is happening with Iran is that it does not want sanctions to work and hopes that the Israelis or the Americans or both will use the military option. That would have the dual benefit of destroying or damaging Iran’s nuclear capability, without Russia having to share the responsibility and thus benefiting both ways from the consequent developments. That is a Machiavellian explanation. I hope it is not true, but I am not yet convinced because I cannot think of any other reason why Moscow should behave as it is.

If there is to be any prospect of economic sanctions working, the only opportunity I can see for success takes us back to the Arab League. As the Foreign Secretary has remarked, the Arab League has already acted in an unprecedented way—first with Libya, when it called for the international action to be taken. As a consequence, Russia and China, which would otherwise have vetoed the international action, came round to allowing the resolution to be passed. Secondly, the Arab League has acted impressively in the case of Syria.

In respect of Iran, however, there is an extraordinary silence. Were it not for WikiLeaks, we would not have been made aware of any public comments showing not just the distaste of Arab countries, but their absolute horror at the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon as a result of the geopolitical impact it would have on the region as a whole and on account of their perception of their own security. The situation is extraordinary. As any of us who meet Arab Ministers, Governments or leaders privately will be aware, this is at the top of their agenda: what is the west going to do to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon?

It was thanks to WikiLeaks that King Abdullah was quoted as saying that the head of the serpent must be cut off—a clear endorsement of the kind of military action by which some Members do not seem to be too enthused. The question is, why can the Arab leaders not express their views publicly? If they did, they would put a great deal more pressure on Russia and China. Those who put that question to them, as I have, are normally told, “We must have equivalence between Iran and Israel. We cannot just call for sanctions against Iran, because Israel has a nuclear weapon, and unless Israel responds as well, it would not be acceptable.”

I must say that I find that a pretty pathetic and unconvincing argument. Israel has had nuclear weapons, rightly or wrongly, for probably some 30 years. Of course the Arabs do not like it—they hate it—but they are not frightened of Israel’s nuclear weapons. If they were, they would have moved towards acquiring nuclear weapons themselves some 30 years ago, but they have not made the slightest effort to do so. They know that, while Israel is a threat in other respects, it possesses its nuclear weapons—rightly or wrongly—essentially in order to protect its very existence as a state should it be subjected to unassailable odds in some conventional conflict.

The Arabs have learnt to live with that, but they do not find it acceptable in the case of Iran. They know that this is all about Iranian nationalism. The Shah, as well as the ayatollahs, was interested in acquiring nuclear weapons, although he did not do much to achieve it. Iran’s traditional enemy is not Israel, but the Arab states themselves. If the Arab states are deeply disturbed by this prospect—if they believe, privately if not publicly, that it is a much greater threat to their security than Israel’s nuclear weapons have ever been or are ever likely to be—they must be as bold in respect of Iran, through the Arab League and individually, as they have so splendidly been in respect of both Syria and Libya.

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[Ann Clwyd (Cynon Valley) (Lab)]

I welcome this debate on the middle east, an area in which many countries continue to undergo political upheavals following decades of authoritarian rule for the benefit of those in power and at the expense of the ordinary citizen.

Much attention has, of course, been directed towards Egypt, where the struggle for democracy, accountability and transparency appears, unfortunately, to be far from over. Like many others, I hope that the military will be persuaded to give way soon to a fairly elected civilian Government. However, I shall focus on two other states in the region, which have been mentioned often this afternoon, and where the legitimacy of the Government in power has been challenged. Those Governments now have to decide whether they will undertake reform of their own volition, or precipitate greater instability, and create mistrust and suffering among their own citizens. Those two countries are, of course, Bahrain and Syria.

As has been widely reported, there was widespread protest and serious unrest in Bahrain between February and March of this year. On 15 March, after political negotiations between the Government of Bahrain and the opposition had broken down, the Government declared a three-month state of national safety, which was lifted on 1 June. Gulf Co-operation Council forces were also deployed in the country from about that time. There was a serious and heavy-handed Government crackdown on those believed to have been directing the protests, as well as on leading opposition figures.

These recent events must be put into context. Although there have been attempts by the Government of Bahrain to reform and to address human rights concerns in the recent past, particularly since the ascension to power of the current monarch, reports by well-known international human rights organisations have highlighted the use of torture by the security apparatus, impunity, unfair trials, arbitrary arrests and restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly as ongoing and serious problems not just this year, but for many years.

Amnesty International’s background report on the situation in Bahrain in 2010 stated:

“During 2010, sporadic protests took place in predominantly Shi’a villages against alleged government discrimination in relation to housing and employment opportunities. In some cases, protesters blocked highways with burning tyres and threw home-made petrol bombs at the police and security forces. Hundreds of people were arrested”—

I reiterate that this is a report on the situation in 2010, not 2011—

“particularly in August and September, in connection with protests and riots, including many leading opposition figures, most from the Shi’a majority community. Many were allegedly arrested without warrants and held incommunicado for up to two weeks after arrest.”

On the situation in 2009, Amnesty International said:

“The authorities failed adequately to investigate allegations of torture and other ill-treatment of detainees. Government critics were briefly detained and several websites were closed down. One person was executed. The government indicated it would decriminalize certain publishing offences, reduce legal discrimination against women and introduce other reforms.”

Political analysts have highlighted long-standing demands in the country for political, constitutional and socio-economic reform. In particular, calls have been made for an elected Prime Minister, an accountable Government and a fully empowered and democratically elected legislature. Previous attempts by the Government of Bahrain to address these demands have not been viewed as very successful by opposition leaders, and resulted in a lack of trust in the Government’s willingness to implement genuine and meaningful political and socio-economic reform. The protests earlier this year must be seen against this backdrop of long-standing violations and grievances.

The Bahrain independent commission of inquiry—BICI—was set up by the Government of Bahrain to investigate and report on the allegations and events of 2011, and to make such recommendations as it deemed necessary. I, of course, welcome the King’s initiative to set up this commission and to allow for the full publication of the report’s 500 pages. It presents a detailed and balanced account of events surrounding the Bahraini protest movement, the context in which it occurred and the response by Government agents. Its findings set out in considerable detail the manifestly repressive nature of the Government’s crackdown on protesters and opposition leaders.

The report states that the security forces

“in many situations violated the principles of necessity and proportionality, which are the generally applicable legal principles in matters relating to the use of force by law enforcement officials. This is evident in both the choice of weapons that were used by these forces during confrontations with civilians and the manner in which these weapons were used.”

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

What does the right hon. Lady say to the accusation that I have heard from some people in the region that Iran was very much involved in fomenting the unrest in Bahrain?

[Ann Clwyd]

If the hon. Gentleman is a little patient, I shall come to that point in a moment.

The report also states:

“A large number of individuals were prosecuted before the National Safety Courts”.

It went on to say:

“Numerous violations of due process rights were recorded…it appears that the Military Attorney General chose to rely on those statutory provisions that were the least favourable to the arrested persons and to the defendants appearing before the National Safety Courts.”

It continued:

“The manner in which the security and judicial agencies of the GoB”—

Government of Bahrain—

“interpreted the National Safety Decree also opened the door for the perpetration of grave violations of human rights, including the arbitrary deprivation of life, torture and arbitrary detention.”

The report also details that many of the detainees were subjected to torture and other forms of physical and psychological abuse while in custody, and it lists the methods as follows:

“blindfolding; handcuffing; enforced standing for prolonged periods; beating; punching; hitting the detainee with rubber hoses (including on the soles of the detainee‘s feet), cables, whips, metal, wooden planks or other objects; electrocution; sleep-deprivation; exposure to extreme temperatures; verbal abuse; threats of rape…and insulting the detainee‘s religious sect”.

Those subject to this were predominantly Shi’a.

Many of those held by the authorities claim that they were forced to sign confessions or admit to committing crimes. It is especially pertinent that the report notes on more than one occasion that the actions of the authorities were “systematic”. I emphasise that word, as it shows that these violations were not the fault of a few bad apples or rogue elements; the security personnel in Bahrain were carrying out actions that were expected of them and that were implicitly, if not explicitly, condoned by superiors and other branches of the Government.

With at least 35 deaths, thousands arrested, 4,500 employees dismissed for their support of the protests, more than 500 students expelled and 30 religious sites demolished, it is simply not credible that such a vast crackdown could have taken place at the initiative of the lower ranks of the Bahraini Government alone. The report categorically states:

“In many cases, the security services of the GoB resorted to the use of unnecessary and excessive force, terror-inspiring behaviour and unnecessary damage to property. The fact that a systematic pattern of behaviour existed indicates that this is how these security forces were trained and were expected to behave.”

It goes on to say that there is

“a culture of impunity, whereby security officials have few incentives to avoid mistreatment of prisoners or to take action to prevent mistreatment by other officials.”

Some months ago, before the summer recess, I, on behalf of the all-party group on human rights, and Lord Avebury, the vice-chair, went to see the ambassador of Bahrain at the embassy in London. He was Mr al-Khalifa, a member of the royal family, and Eric Avebury, in particular, had detailed knowledge of the complaints made by some of the medical personnel—he knew some of the doctors personally. He was very specific when we put those accusations to the then ambassador, who said that he knew nothing about it but that he would come back to us with a detailed explanation of all the allegations. We heard not one word from the ambassador and surprisingly—or perhaps not—two weeks later, he was gone from the embassy, never to return. He was replaced by another ambassador, who did not give us any more information.

I remain concerned about the trials of doctors and nurses in military courts and the harsh sentences handed down. Although the King subsequently intervened and most of the health workers are now under house arrest awaiting trial in civil courts, the report’s findings on the brutal manner in which people were arrested and detained prompts the question of whether any subsequent trials can be fair and whether there is any justification for those people being held at all.

--- Later in debate ---

[Daniel Kawczynski (Shrewsbury and Atcham) (Con)]

As chairman of the all-party group on Libya, I have campaigned for many years on that country, particularly with regard to human rights there. I was invited to visit Benghazi this week by the national transitional council, but I politely declined that invitation because I am very concerned that the people of Libya have not been consulted about the sort of constitutional make-up their country should have.

If we bear in mind the 42 years of brutal tyrannical oppression that Libya went through, it is not unreasonable for the authorities to ask the people of Libya for their opinion as to how their country should be formed and what constitution they should have. The NTC has decided that there will be a presidential type of system, yet many friends of mine in Libya talk of growing public demonstrations throughout that country in support of Crown Prince Muhammad, the exiled crown prince of Libya who has lived in London since Colonel Gaddafi expelled him and his father.

I declare an interest. I have got to know Crown Prince Muhammad very well over a certain period of time. He is a close personal friend of mine. I believe him to be a man of great integrity and honour. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) indicated, many of the monarchies throughout the Arab world have not had the levels of instability that other Arab countries have had. The monarch is very important in this regard.

We must not forget that 30,000 people died in Libya—some estimates put the figure as high as 35,000 or 40,000—to liberate their country from the despot.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend raises the issue of the Libyan monarchy. How likely is it, in his opinion, that the institution of monarchy will be resurrected in Libya? He refers to his friends, but does he really think that is a plausible outcome?

[Daniel Kawczynski]

Only two countries in the world have gone back to having a monarchy—I am sure that my hon. Friend knows which. One is Spain, as you rightly mouthed just now, Mr Deputy Speaker, and the other is Cambodia, as my hon. Friend the Member for South Thanet (Laura Sandys) indicates.

--- Later in debate ---

[Daniel Kawczynski]

The hon. Gentleman will be pleased to hear that there are more women going on the trip than men, which is a specific wish of mine. [Interruption] No, not for that reason. We will certainly be meeting various organisations that deal with women’s rights in the kingdom. I will send the hon. Gentleman a copy of the report after the visit, if he wishes.

There is tremendous anger and hostility towards Saudi Arabia in this country. On one occasion I was sitting in the Smoking Room waiting for a vote, and I asked 15 Tory MPs what their views were on Saudi Arabia, and every single one made very hostile statements about the country. That really upset me, and I did not understand it. I think we have a Guardian-reading liberal elite who want to denigrate Saudi Arabia at every opportunity. The BBC, with its left-wing bias and determination not to report anything positive from Saudi Arabia, also contributes to the extraordinary drip, drip effect of negative press that it gets in this country.

Of course there are huge problems in Saudi Arabia, and of course there are things that we in the United Kingdom disagree with and want changing, but there has been progress, slow though it is. It is extremely important that people like me and others who are interested in Saudi Arabia engage with the country and, specifically, with people who are trying to reform it, who are democrats, and who are passionate about making sure that it improves its human rights.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

Is my hon. Friend conscious of any attempts on the part of the Saudi Government to reform, if only at their own pace, and to bring in a more liberal regime, which we all hope for?

[Daniel Kawczynski]

Yes, and we will be discussing that with them.

A delegation of members of the Shura Council recently visited us and spent a whole week here trying to find out how our Parliament works, how our Select Committees work, and how we hold Ministers to account. They talked to me about their desire for reform within the Shura Council and their determination that there should be elections to that body instead of its members being appointed by the King. Because they are very interested in learning from our experience of democracy, they insisted on spending the day with me in my constituency and finding out how the Member of Parliament is held to account by his constituents, how he interacts with the local council, and so on.

The Minister will know that the Foreign Secretary has described Saudi Arabia as a strategic ally of the United Kingdom and that our relations will be cemented and even further prioritised. I hope that he will confirm that.

The Prime Minister and the European Union talked about a Marshall aid package for Tunisia and Egypt following the revolutions in those countries. I have not heard much subsequently about that huge plan, which apparently involved up to €1 billion. I hope that it will be extended to Libya. I would like to hear what progress there is on that. I hope that some of the money will be used to facilitate British companies in trading with the region.

My hon. Friend the Member for North Thanet (Mr Gale) is the chairman of the all-party group on Tunisia. He cannot be here, so he asked me to raise the importance of tourism to these countries. I hope that the Minister will agree that we should encourage citizens to visit Tunisia at the earliest opportunity, because it depends so much on tourism.

I will finish by saying that on Wednesday I will be hosting a reception in the House of Commons for the fifth birthday of al-Jazeera English. It is a broadcaster of immense pedigree. I trust al-Jazeera far more than the BBC, regrettably, for impartiality and objective broadcasting. More than 160 people are coming to the event. Because of the strike, I will be pouring the tea and serving the cake myself as we cannot get any catering staff to do so. Hon. Members are very welcome to join us on the Terrace on Wednesday.

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Parker, who came to see me, said that when he was chief of staff in Basra, they were watching al-Jazeera on television and it was the only broadcaster that was broadcasting from Basra. They saw a report on al-Jazeera which said that some of the British shelling was hitting civilians in a residential area. As a result of watching that broadcast, the artillery was stopped and innocent civilian lives were saved. We have a lot to thank al-Jazeera for.

I shall leave it at that.

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[Mrs Louise Ellman (Liverpool, Riverside) (Lab/Co-op)]

I certainly hope that the aspirations of the people of the region that have been raised by the Arab spring are realised and that the lives of people throughout that region, and, indeed, beyond it, are improved. It is significant to note that before the Arab spring took place, there was very little, if any, coverage in the national media of the atrocities and lack of democracy that were a reality in those countries. Indeed, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights failed to condemn what was happening in those countries, which perhaps places a big question mark over the efficiency of the United Nations Human Rights Committee.

This is a wide-ranging debate, and I would like to comment on a number of areas. First, the Foreign Secretary mentioned the situation in Yemen. I know that the commitments made by the President to take action to bring democracy to the country are doubted by many people. I hope that the British Government will do all they can to ensure that the promises materialise and that the current regime will be replaced by a democratic one that reflects the interests of the people of Yemen.

Iran—not, of course, an Arab country—has been mentioned as an important player a number of times in this debate. I urge our Government to look at the plight of the Baha’i people in Iran and to note the continued persecution and new wave of arrests of the Baha’i minority. It is wrong that what is happening to that minority group is ignored by far too much of the world. I ask Ministers to make a statement about what they going to do to try to ensure that the Baha’i people are not intimidated or persecuted as they are now.

I shall also comment on the Palestinian-Israeli dispute and how I hope matters might be pressed so that justice can be achieved. The context of everything I want to say is that I firmly believe that the only way in which justice can be brought both to Palestinians and Israelis is to have two states of Israel and Palestine with negotiated borders, with an agreed settlement on refugees and an agreed sharing of Jerusalem. These objectives are not as far away as many people may believe. Indeed, a number of significant negotiations have come very close indeed to finding resolutions to those difficult issues. As I say, those issues will be resolved only by detailed negotiations between the parties concerned. It is right that the Quartet and others try to assist the negotiations, but a lasting solution can be brought about only by agreement between those two main parties. Calls for boycotts, sanctions and disinvestment will not bring peace and will not bring security. Direct negotiations are the only way.

It is a common call for there to be an end of the occupation to resolve this dispute. Indeed, I am opposed to occupation—the occupation of one people by another has to be bad both for the occupied as well as the occupiers—but too often ignored in debates on this issue is the fact that Israel has withdrawn from lands it occupied in its defensive war in 1967, when its existence was threatened by the armies of Arab states around it. Israel has withdrawn from territories it occupied, in response to offers of peace. Perhaps the best example was in 1979, when Israel withdrew from the whole of Sinai as part of a negotiated agreement with Egypt. Until now—and, we hope, in the future, although sadly there seems to be a question mark over this—there has been peace between Egypt and Israel. It has often been described as a cold peace, but it is nevertheless a peace. In 1994, Israel reached agreement with Jordan, which has also continued. Israel has withdrawn from territories occupied when threats were made to its very existence and peace has resulted from it. It is also the case that Israel has withdrawn from other territories it occupied as a result of attacks, but peace has not been the result.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

Given what is happening in Egypt at the moment, what is the hon. Lady’s sense of the Israeli position regarding the peace treaty and what might happen in Egypt? Given her extensive knowledge, will she inform us of her opinion on this issue?

[Mrs Ellman]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments. I understand that Israel fervently wishes to maintain its peace treaty with Egypt. However, it is concerned about statements that have been made by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt which suggest that it would like to review or, indeed, drop the treaty. Israel wishes to maintain it, and I hope that that can be achieved.

Israel has withdrawn from territories that it has occupied as a result of attacks on it, and the consequence of that withdrawal has not been peace. In 2000, Israel correctly withdrew completely from south Lebanon. The consequence of that was the occupation of the area by the Iran-backed Hezbollah, followed by attacks on Israeli citizens. Although it was a correct withdrawal from occupied territory, it did not lead to peace.

More recently, in 2005, the Israelis correctly withdraw all their 8,000 settlers and military personnel from Gaza. As we all know only too well, the result of that was not peace but the election of Hamas—refusing to recognise Israel’s existence—and the firing of thousands of rockets and other missiles on Israeli civilians in Sderot, Be’er Sheva, Ashkelon and Ashdod. The withdrawal of the Israelis from Gaza, which I fully support, did not lead to peace.

People talk as though withdrawal and the end of occupation inevitably lead to peace. I stress again that I am against occupation, but in those two instances at least, when Israel has withdrawn from lands that it has occupied as a result of attacks on it, peace has not been automatic. Moreover, when people advocate the withdrawal of Israelis from occupied lands, it is not always clear exactly which occupied lands they are talking about. Are they talking about 1967 or about 1948? Here in London a few months ago, on al-Quds day, it was evident what was meant by many of the campaigners against Israel’s policies and against Israel itself. One illustration of that was a big placard held up by a young child, bearing the unfortunate words “For world peace, Israel must be destroyed”. That is hardly conducive to efforts to find a solution.

I also note that the Palestine Solidarity Campaign’s logo features a map that does not depict Israel as existing at all. When I hear calls from that organisation for Israel to end its occupation, I question what it really means. Is it talking about a negotiated solution to the problem of land that is occupied as a result of attacks on Israel in 1967, or is it talking about there being no Israel at all? We must know what people mean, in what context they are speaking and where they are coming from if we are to assess the validity of the criticisms that they are making at any given time.

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[Mrs Ellman]

The state of Israel exists, and has every right to exist. Indeed, I know of no other country in the world in respect of which when its future is discussed questions are raised about the existence of the state itself. I agree that the state of Palestine, which does not exist at present, ought to be set up, but it can only be set up side by side with Israel on the basis of detailed negotiations about borders, refugees and Jerusalem.

Discussions have taken place, following past negotiations which ultimately failed, about the issue of Palestinian refugees. The solution to that problem can only come about by agreement between the parties, and on the basis that Palestinian refugees are to be able to return to a Palestinian state and, by agreement, to Israel and in agreed numbers, with compensation to be offered. I note that the critics of Israel often talk about the right of return of all Palestinian refugees to Israel, rather than to Palestine. That, of course, is simply code for the destruction of the state of Israel, but that distinction is seldom recognised.

There is a lack of balance in discussions on this issue. I am, for instance, increasingly concerned about the attempts to demonise and delegitimise the state of Israel. The term “Zionism” is now used as a term of abuse, which is wholly unacceptable. Zionism is the national movement of the Jewish people for a homeland in the state of Israel. Like all national movements, it contains a range of individuals and parties with very different views. Zionism is not a term of abuse, and when it is used as such, that illustrates the demonisation of the state of Israel itself.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

The hon. Lady mentions Zionism in the context of the creation of the state of Israel, but does she recognise that that term does not quite mean support for the state of Israel in today’s political context?

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[Mrs Ellman]

I thank my hon. Friend for his comments and agree with what he said.

I am also increasingly concerned about the loose use of language, which is leading to a creeping anti-Semitism in this country and elsewhere, causing increasing concern among the Jewish community. I was extremely concerned to see on the website of the Liverpool Friends of Palestine a cartoon—this was viewed on 9 September—headed “The power of Zionists”. It depicts a stereotypical Jewish man—a man with a large hook nose holding a Jewish emblem in his hand—pointing to an American soldier under the heading, “Join the United States army” and at the bottom it says “and fight for Israel”. That cartoon could have come out of Nazi literature, given the depiction and the heading “The power of Zionists”. I was appalled to see that and although it has now been removed from the Liverpool Friends of Palestine website, I must ask how it came to be there and what kind of thought was behind it. I gather that it is not a solitary example of what is happening on websites of similar groups.

Some years ago, the New Statesman had a front cover with the big headline “A Kosher Conspiracy?” Underneath that headline was a cartoon depiction of a Jewish symbol—an Israeli Magen David—piercing the British Union Jack, among other things, thus raising the old anti-Semitic allegation that Jewish people are not sincere citizens of their country. After considerable controversy, and some weeks later, the editor said that he had no understanding of what he was doing when that was published, that he did not mean it to be done in the way it was done and that he did not know it was reminiscent of Nazi literature and old stereotypes, and he apologised for it. That occurred some years ago, but this loose language is now going rather further.

I read with increasing concern an article by Deborah Orr in The Guardian on 19 October about the release of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit from his captivity with Hamas. After long, hard bargaining, the Israeli Government eventually decided that the only way they could secure his release was by accepting the proposed deal from Hamas that more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners should be released. The fact that the Israeli Government accepted that has been controversial in Israel for a lot of reasons, including the fact that among those 1,000 Palestinian prisoners released in exchange were extremely serious terrorists and murderers, including those who sent the bombs to the young people in the pizza parlours of Jerusalem and to the old people at the Passover service at the Park hotel in Netanya, and those responsible for many other atrocities. The Israeli Government felt that they should strike that deal because they felt that realistically it was the only way in which Gilad Shalit would be released.

I was appalled when I read Deborah Orr’s article in The Guardian, which was entitled “Is an Israeli life really more important than a Palestinian’s?” When talking about the background to the situation, she said:

“At the same time…there is something abject in their”—

the Israelis’—

“eagerness to accept a transfer that tacitly acknowledges what so many Zionists believe—that the lives of the chosen are of hugely greater consequence than those of their unfortunate neighbours.”

That is basic anti-Semitism.

I am sure that Deborah Orr is not anti-Semitic, and indeed, she later published an apology of sorts, in which she stated:

“Last week, I upset a lot of people by suggesting Zionists saw themselves as ‘chosen’. My words were badly chosen and poorly used, and I’m sorry for it.”

Deborah Orr did say that, but just as I was concerned a number of years ago when the New Statesman felt that it was perfectly in order to have the sort of front page it had—one headlined “A Kosher Conspiracy?” and questioning Jewish people’s loyalty to their country, the United Kingdom—I am concerned that Deborah Orr, not an anti-Semite, thought it was all right to write about Zionists in terms of the word “chosen” in that derogatory manner, when the Israeli Government had done all they could do to secure the release of a soldier. The conditions came from Hamas, not from the Israelis. These are all great warning signs that loose language is now causing more anti-Semitism to be around and to cause disquiet within British society.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

The hon. Lady has alluded to references in sections of the British media. My concern is ensuring that she would not besmirch the entire range of British media with the accusation of anti-Semitism, because that is a grave charge. I just wanted clarification on that.

[Mrs Ellman]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments. I do not refer to the whole of the British media. I made my comments in relation to one instance in the New Statesman and I referred to Deborah Orr’s article in The Guardian. I also note that the editor of its readers’ section has recently acknowledged that the way in which The Guardian has used these words has helped to encourage the growth of anti-Semitism. My comments are very specific: they related to the journals and articles that I mentioned. This is not about the British media as a whole, which do not all share this weakness and looseness of language.

What matters most is that there should be a resolution to the long-standing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. I reiterate what I said at the beginning of my contribution, which is that the only way to bring that about, on the basis of two states living side by side in security and peace, is through a resumption of direct negotiations. I hope that our Government will continue to do all they can to ensure that that comes about.

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Con)]

How very jealous George Canning would have been in 1823 to see the scope and ambition of this debate. Triumphant from Waterloo and Trafalgar, with the greatest economy and Navy in the world, he hesitated to get involved in affairs in France and Spain, whereas we have skipped in this debate from toxic waste in Somalia to minorities in Sudan, the situation in Yemen and the Baha’is in Iran. We have touched elegantly on the military in Syria and in Egypt, on elections in Morocco, on Islamists in Libya and in Tunisia, on refugees in Niger and on the fishermen of Mauritania. How jealous he would have been.

Given that we can pack the House for a debate on the fair fuel tariff, one would imagine that we would now find the journalists leaning over the railings, the Gallery packed and the House stuffed, with everyone desperate to get involved at this moment of deep crisis when the middle east and north Africa are teetering on the edge, and Europe is in trouble—but no. Why not? It is because at the heart of our problems in the middle east and north Africa is the situation of Britain for the past few decades. As our relative economic power declines, our ambitions become ever greater and our rhetoric becomes ever more inflated. We wish to get involved in countries that would have been obscure to us at the time of our greatest power, yet at the same time we hollow out the institutions on which we depend to deliver our policy.

Let us consider the middle east and north Africa and what we have done in this Arab spring. On Tunisia, the reality is that we had abandoned not just Mauritania but Tunisia itself to French diplomacy and French policy. In Libya, we contented ourselves with kissing Gaddafi on the cheeks and handing out a doctorate to his son at the London School of Economics and our connection with Egypt was contained to snorkelling as guests of Mubarak in Sharm el Sheikh.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

I am particularly grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way—

[Bob Stewart]

Were you there snorkelling, too?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

This is not a point about snorkelling. My hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart) is making an impassioned and eloquent speech, but surely he must recognise that the reason why we are more committed to intervention in such areas—more so than in imperial times—is that we are part of a wider comity of nations. We are part of the UN and of NATO and as part of that joint venture we are committing and projecting ourselves in the region. In imperial times, such circumstances did not prevail. We acted unilaterally and, as he is right to say, in many instances we chose not to intervene and interfere in the internal politics of other countries.

[Rory Stewart]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point, but the problem is not our desire or our commitment to the multilateral system but our capacity and what we can actually do. Our engagement with the United Nations and NATO and our various grand views about globalisation and economics lead us to believe that we should be involved in all those areas, but what capacity do we have to deliver, what understanding do we have of those specific countries and what power do we have in our hands to do one half of the things that have been discussed in the Chamber today?

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[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend knows, probably better than anyone in this House, the extent to which modern media and modern technology have completely revolutionised the way in which we gather information and deploy our authority. I have listened to the debate for a number of hours now and I was intrigued to discover that people were harking back to colonial times, the empire and that sort of thing. They had nothing like the technology we have today and although I completely agree with my hon. Friend about the need for languages and cultural expertise in the Foreign Office, it is not remotely apparent to me that we should have exactly the same infrastructure today as we had in 1930 or 1880. That model is completely false in today’s environment.

[Rory Stewart]

This is a very tantalising and attractive argument and I can see exactly why it is made. Of course, we should not have the same structure as we had in 1880 or 1930—and nor do we—but the notion that technology and the related aspects of the 21st century have somehow transformed our relationship with a country such as Afghanistan is fundamentally misguided. In the recent Helmand police intake, eight out of 100 people could write their name or recognise numbers up to 10. There is no electricity between Herat and Kandahar. The notion of a Facebook revolution in Afghanistan, Somalia or South Sudan is a distant fantasy. The fact that in the British embassy in Kabul two years ago, there were exactly two people who had passed a Dari exam at an operational level and that there was not a single Pashto speaker is testimony to the fact that we believe we live in a globalised world in which it is unnecessary for us to study other people’s languages or understand their culture.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

With respect to my hon. Friend and the House, I have always said in relation to these issues that linguistic competence is absolutely vital, and it is a scandal that the Foreign Office should have turned its back on that. He must acknowledge, as I think he is doing, that the technological environment in which we operate allows us to have certain levers and information that we did not have 15 or 20 years ago.

[Rory Stewart]

I could not agree more—it certainly allows us to have a great deal of information. However, at the fundamental core of the Foreign Office’s work, which concerns politics and power, there appears to be a problem. The same problem was apparent when nobody challenged the Government’s policy on Iraq, which is the single most humiliating mess into which the British Government have got themselves since Suez. Not a single senior British diplomat publicly or even privately challenged the Prime Minister on that issue. Why? Because at the same time as we imagine that everything is manipulable through technocratic processes and technology, the knowledge and the confidence that came from country immersion and language is lacking, as is the confidence that would allow one to challenge power.

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[Rory Stewart]

This is fundamental because we live in a world in which there is not enough challenge in the system. There are not enough checks or balances. I have mentioned that our newspapers have fewer and fewer foreign correspondents. The quality of foreign reporting in Britain is not as good today as it was 20 years ago because we simply are not investing as much in foreign reporting. At the same time, the military is increasingly preponderant in the United States, and brings with it the inherent optimism and determination to say, “We’ve inherited a dismal situation but we have the resources and the mission to deliver a decisive year,” pushing aside the civilian advice. We are flattered by English-speaking, upper-class Afghans, Iraqis and Libyans who feed our fantasies and tell us what we want to hear.

In that context, and in the context of the temptation across Europe and the United States to have more and more centralised power, we need our Foreign Office to act as a check and balance. We need it to challenge policy and to speak truth to power. Above all, we need it to say not just what the UK interest is, what our ethical limits are or what we are not prepared to do morally, but, most fundamentally of all, what we cannot do. When somebody comes forward and says, in country X, “In this failed state, we will create governance, the rule of law and civil society,” it should be the job of our Foreign Office to ask “How?”, “With whom?” and “With what money?” It should ask, “What possible reason have you to believe that you can achieve this grandiloquent objective you have established?”

We also need to explain matters to the public, because this entire rhetoric is the rhetoric of a poker game. It is the rhetoric, perpetually, of “raise” or “fold”, and of driving people to ask, “Have you met your $3 billion objective on trade this year?” or “Have you or have you not set up the rule of law and civil society?” and if not, “Why have we got an embassy in Mongolia? Why have we got to bother having any representation in Peru? Why don’t we drag it all back to London and do it down the internet?” The way to cease that is to be honest—not just internally but with the British public as well.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend raises a particularly pertinent point about the operations of the Foreign Office. He will remember that in times gone by, that was the Foreign Office’s job and it consistently said no. If we are to believe the memoirs of politicians, it consistently set itself as a roadblock to ministerial action and said, “No you can’t do that,” to Ministers who wanted to intervene or act purposively. He will also remember that a former Conservative Prime Minister once commented that she understood that the Agriculture Department looked after farmers, that the Labour Department looked after workers and that the Foreign Office looked after foreigners. It is well known that the Foreign Office has been the check that my hon. Friend describes.

[Rory Stewart]

The Foreign Office has a very distinguished tradition of doing that. With many of the things it challenged, it did so correctly. It challenged Lord Salisbury’s insane idea of launching an invasion into Afghanistan in 1879, it challenged Lord Grey’s absurd ideas about secret treaties with France in 1912 and 1913, and it challenged the absurdity of Suez. In all those ways it acted responsibly, but increasingly it is no longer performing that role.

Of course the politicians can, when they want, overwhelm the Foreign Office, push it aside and push ahead, and that is fine, but—on this, I think, we should conclude—we are now in a very strange position in this country. We are hollowed out. We are facing an enormous crisis. Europe is teetering on the edge. The German Chancellor is invoking ghosts of European destruction. The middle east and north Africa have seen more tottering regimes and dynasties than in any period since the end of the first world war. At this time we need to remember that that very modest investment in the Foreign Office—only £1 billion a year on its core costs, if we exclude the British Council and the World Service—is an extremely wise insurance and investment.

We need to remember at times like this how vital is the ability to set out our limits, to set out a strategy and vision, to explain exactly, as this Government are doing, and to continue to explain more clearly to the public, exactly what Britain believes and what our strategy is—that peculiar mixture of pragmatism and belief in rights, a belief not just in ideals but in common sense, expressed in a world that understands that today of all times a residence can be much more powerful than a regiment, a Tuareg specialist than a Tornado, an Arabist than an aircraft carrier, and that the Foreign Office is our strength, our nation, and our defence.