Egypt

Guy Opperman Excerpts

Wednesday 29th January 2014 Westminster Hall

[Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)]

Thank you very much, Mr Havard; it is a pleasure to speak on this subject under your chairmanship. I am also delighted to see several Members of the House here to take part in the debate. Looking around, I can see that a number of people have a considered and well developed interest in the region.

As far as I am concerned, the developments in Egypt are, in terms of the middle east’s long-term history and development, in many ways the most significant. Why do I say that? Egypt is very much at the centre of the Arab world. Ninety million Egyptians reside in the country and a number of other people—from Saudi Arabia, from all around the Gulf, and from across the Arab world—live in Egypt. As a proportion of the Arab world, Egypt represents well over a third of the Arab-speaking peoples. Historically, it has always been a country in which developments are looked to. Culturally, the Egyptian film industry is dominant in the region, and anyone who has travelled in the region will say that the Egyptian dialect is the most widely understood, simply because of wide media outlets and the popularity of Egyptian film. Egypt is absolutely at the centre of developments in the middle east.

Two weeks ago, I returned from a delegation to Egypt organised by the Conservative Middle East Council. It was the fourth delegation of which I have been a member since the revolution in 2011, when General Hosni Mubarak was toppled. It is only really by going back to the country over a number of years that we managed to develop, I think, an interest, expertise and knowledge of what is going on in a fast-moving, complicated situation. Our aim has been to understand better the historic events that are occurring in the country, and we have spoken to many people in the Egyptian political scene.

Unfortunately, as people will know, the Muslim Brotherhood was declared a terrorist organisation at the end of last year and has effectively been outlawed. As a consequence, in our last delegation we were not able to meet members of that organisation, but we have—I can say this openly—met them in the past. We have engaged with many members of the Muslim Brotherhood, with people in the army and the armed forces in Egypt, and with people right across the political spectrum, from the Facebookers, who initiated the first revolution in January and February 2011, to other players in more recent events.

We always thought Egypt was a binary situation—I am talking on behalf of members of the delegation—and felt that the army and the Muslim Brotherhood were by far the two most powerfully organised and structured organisations in the country. It seemed to us at the time—we documented it in our short pamphlet, “Egypt 2011: Revolution and Transition”—that the political future of Egypt would largely be determined by the relationship between the army and the Muslim Brotherhood. We saw, in effect, a temporary resolution to that dialogue in the way in which the army stepped in in the middle of last year.

[Guy Opperman (Hexham) (Con)]

I warmly congratulate my hon. Friend on securing the debate. Unlike him, I was not on that delegation but spent time there recently on my own. Does he accept that although the army and the Muslim Brotherhood are the main players, the vast majority of the population, particularly those outside Cairo, have absolutely no interest in the conflict and are totally committed to a resolution and a cessation of any dispute?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend raises an important point. Naturally when we go on such delegations, we tend to gravitate towards Cairo, which is the centre and capital of Egyptian life. I might add that as a capital, it is very significant. Twenty million Egyptians live in Cairo, which is a high proportion of the total population. However, he is absolutely right that Egyptians across the country are less interested in the power dispute and are more concerned about economic stability and the future for themselves and their families. I will talk about the consequences of the dispute between the Muslim Brotherhood and the army.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. It is undoubtedly the case that the army has been very heavy-handed in dealing with protesters and dissent. There is a new protest law under which people have been put away for three years simply for protesting and being out on the street. I am tentative about describing what happened as a coup, because the army’s view is very much that it was a popular uprising. The army would suggest that—I heard it many times in Cairo—although the events of February 2011 have been described as a revolution, what it feels was another revolution in June last year has been described as a “coup”. We have to be careful about the language we use.

Clearly, it is true that the army flexed its muscles at the end, but there was popular support, with Tamarod and people on the streets, so to describe what happened as a coup does not perhaps get the right tone. Generally, coups around the developing world are led from the top: a general and a few of his associates might seize power for themselves. The army in Egypt would very much contest whether a coup is an accurate description of what happened last summer and no doubt historians, politicians and diplomats will debate how to describe it for years to come. I am very reluctant to use the word “coup”, even though I appreciate that it has been widely used in the media.

The big question at the moment is how to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood. Clearly the army has gone down one route, which is heavy-handed—really the iron fist. Our perception was certainly that the army was willing and ready to deal with, in an uncompromising fashion, any attempts on the part of political Islamists to use violence. It was expressing the view that it had had enough of the Muslim Brotherhood and of trying to accommodate them, and that it would handle any threats from that quarter with a great deal of repression. Those were not the words that the army used, but that was very much the indication that it gave us. There is clearly a massive problem with that, potentially, because—

[Guy Opperman]

My hon. Friend is leading on to the point about the co-existence of the two particular factions. Does he also accept the point that was stressed to me on my visit, that the vast majority of all faiths peacefully co-exist, are friends with one another and have no dispute with one another, and that it is only the more extreme elements—for example, of the Muslim Brotherhood—that are necessarily pushing the dispute and the aggression towards the army and towards the alternatives?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The two broad groups that I have characterised—I will talk about secular parties later—are the two most powerful groups, and of course within those groups there is a wide range of views and dispositions. There are extremist elements in the Muslim Brotherhood. There are also some quite extreme repressive elements in the army. My hon. Friend is right again to say that the majority of people are trapped in the middle of those two contending and powerful forces, but I must stress that the fundamental problem with Egypt at the moment, as I see it, is that one side is simply unwilling to reach any kind of accommodation with the other.

Let us look at the elections that have taken place in the past three or four years. The one fact that has come out starkly and undeniably is the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood. I can say, as a member of the delegation that has travelled to Egypt over three or four years, that each time we asked, “How popular is the Muslim Brotherhood?” its support was underestimated; it was never overestimated. People always said 15% to 20%, but then in the elections it always performed much better than anyone had anticipated. Equally surprising was the strength of the Salafis, who got one quarter of the parliamentary seats. Political Islam in Egypt is a powerful force. What I think should draw the attention of this House and Members of Parliament is the fact that the army’s attempt to sideline political Islam is fraught with danger. That is potentially one of the fundamental causes of stress and conflict in the years ahead.

The big question is how the army will deal with acts of terror in the future. Clearly, in the past two weeks we have seen an intolerable level of violence in Cairo. We have also seen sporadic terrorist bombings. Added to that is military repression. We are entering on a particularly vicious cycle, and everyone in the west—politicians, diplomats and everyone else in the outside world—will have to take a view on that. It is obvious to me and to members of our delegation that the army is determined to impose itself as the central player in Egyptian politics. Anyone who doubts that need only look at the referendum that took place two weeks ago.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

Absolutely, but 38% is not a disgracefully low turnout. That is quite a large turnout. In our local elections, we would be quite happy to get 38%. That does not invalidate them as exercises in local democracy, so I do not think that the turnout was particularly depressing. It was a reasonable turnout, but the 98% of the 38% does raise legitimate questions.

[Guy Opperman]

I promise that this is the last time I will intervene. Is not the endorsement not necessarily of the constitution but, in particular, of the desire for stability and a path back to some degree of economic prosperity?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend has made a number of very pertinent interventions, all of which I agree with. It is absolutely the case that what he refers to is what this whole issue is about, but what we have to consider—I want to deal with this in my closing remarks—is our relationship to incipient democracies, if we want to call them that, and to political governance in the Arab world.