Egypt

Kwasi Kwarteng Excerpts

Wednesday 29th January 2014 Westminster Hall

[Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)]

Thank you very much, Mr Havard; it is a pleasure to speak on this subject under your chairmanship. I am also delighted to see several Members of the House here to take part in the debate. Looking around, I can see that a number of people have a considered and well developed interest in the region.

As far as I am concerned, the developments in Egypt are, in terms of the middle east’s long-term history and development, in many ways the most significant. Why do I say that? Egypt is very much at the centre of the Arab world. Ninety million Egyptians reside in the country and a number of other people—from Saudi Arabia, from all around the Gulf, and from across the Arab world—live in Egypt. As a proportion of the Arab world, Egypt represents well over a third of the Arab-speaking peoples. Historically, it has always been a country in which developments are looked to. Culturally, the Egyptian film industry is dominant in the region, and anyone who has travelled in the region will say that the Egyptian dialect is the most widely understood, simply because of wide media outlets and the popularity of Egyptian film. Egypt is absolutely at the centre of developments in the middle east.

Two weeks ago, I returned from a delegation to Egypt organised by the Conservative Middle East Council. It was the fourth delegation of which I have been a member since the revolution in 2011, when General Hosni Mubarak was toppled. It is only really by going back to the country over a number of years that we managed to develop, I think, an interest, expertise and knowledge of what is going on in a fast-moving, complicated situation. Our aim has been to understand better the historic events that are occurring in the country, and we have spoken to many people in the Egyptian political scene.

Unfortunately, as people will know, the Muslim Brotherhood was declared a terrorist organisation at the end of last year and has effectively been outlawed. As a consequence, in our last delegation we were not able to meet members of that organisation, but we have—I can say this openly—met them in the past. We have engaged with many members of the Muslim Brotherhood, with people in the army and the armed forces in Egypt, and with people right across the political spectrum, from the Facebookers, who initiated the first revolution in January and February 2011, to other players in more recent events.

We always thought Egypt was a binary situation—I am talking on behalf of members of the delegation—and felt that the army and the Muslim Brotherhood were by far the two most powerfully organised and structured organisations in the country. It seemed to us at the time—we documented it in our short pamphlet, “Egypt 2011: Revolution and Transition”—that the political future of Egypt would largely be determined by the relationship between the army and the Muslim Brotherhood. We saw, in effect, a temporary resolution to that dialogue in the way in which the army stepped in in the middle of last year.

[Guy Opperman (Hexham) (Con)]

I warmly congratulate my hon. Friend on securing the debate. Unlike him, I was not on that delegation but spent time there recently on my own. Does he accept that although the army and the Muslim Brotherhood are the main players, the vast majority of the population, particularly those outside Cairo, have absolutely no interest in the conflict and are totally committed to a resolution and a cessation of any dispute?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend raises an important point. Naturally when we go on such delegations, we tend to gravitate towards Cairo, which is the centre and capital of Egyptian life. I might add that as a capital, it is very significant. Twenty million Egyptians live in Cairo, which is a high proportion of the total population. However, he is absolutely right that Egyptians across the country are less interested in the power dispute and are more concerned about economic stability and the future for themselves and their families. I will talk about the consequences of the dispute between the Muslim Brotherhood and the army.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

I compliment the hon. Gentleman on securing the debate. He seems reluctant to describe what happened last year in Egypt as a military coup, which, in reality, it was. Is he not concerned that that is a precedent, and that large numbers of opposition people have been arrested in the same way as many were arrested under Morsi? There is a serious denial of many people’s human rights throughout the country at present.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. It is undoubtedly the case that the army has been very heavy-handed in dealing with protesters and dissent. There is a new protest law under which people have been put away for three years simply for protesting and being out on the street. I am tentative about describing what happened as a coup, because the army’s view is very much that it was a popular uprising. The army would suggest that—I heard it many times in Cairo—although the events of February 2011 have been described as a revolution, what it feels was another revolution in June last year has been described as a “coup”. We have to be careful about the language we use.

Clearly, it is true that the army flexed its muscles at the end, but there was popular support, with Tamarod and people on the streets, so to describe what happened as a coup does not perhaps get the right tone. Generally, coups around the developing world are led from the top: a general and a few of his associates might seize power for themselves. The army in Egypt would very much contest whether a coup is an accurate description of what happened last summer and no doubt historians, politicians and diplomats will debate how to describe it for years to come. I am very reluctant to use the word “coup”, even though I appreciate that it has been widely used in the media.

The big question at the moment is how to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood. Clearly the army has gone down one route, which is heavy-handed—really the iron fist. Our perception was certainly that the army was willing and ready to deal with, in an uncompromising fashion, any attempts on the part of political Islamists to use violence. It was expressing the view that it had had enough of the Muslim Brotherhood and of trying to accommodate them, and that it would handle any threats from that quarter with a great deal of repression. Those were not the words that the army used, but that was very much the indication that it gave us. There is clearly a massive problem with that, potentially, because—

[Guy Opperman]

My hon. Friend is leading on to the point about the co-existence of the two particular factions. Does he also accept the point that was stressed to me on my visit, that the vast majority of all faiths peacefully co-exist, are friends with one another and have no dispute with one another, and that it is only the more extreme elements—for example, of the Muslim Brotherhood—that are necessarily pushing the dispute and the aggression towards the army and towards the alternatives?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The two broad groups that I have characterised—I will talk about secular parties later—are the two most powerful groups, and of course within those groups there is a wide range of views and dispositions. There are extremist elements in the Muslim Brotherhood. There are also some quite extreme repressive elements in the army. My hon. Friend is right again to say that the majority of people are trapped in the middle of those two contending and powerful forces, but I must stress that the fundamental problem with Egypt at the moment, as I see it, is that one side is simply unwilling to reach any kind of accommodation with the other.

Let us look at the elections that have taken place in the past three or four years. The one fact that has come out starkly and undeniably is the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood. I can say, as a member of the delegation that has travelled to Egypt over three or four years, that each time we asked, “How popular is the Muslim Brotherhood?” its support was underestimated; it was never overestimated. People always said 15% to 20%, but then in the elections it always performed much better than anyone had anticipated. Equally surprising was the strength of the Salafis, who got one quarter of the parliamentary seats. Political Islam in Egypt is a powerful force. What I think should draw the attention of this House and Members of Parliament is the fact that the army’s attempt to sideline political Islam is fraught with danger. That is potentially one of the fundamental causes of stress and conflict in the years ahead.

The big question is how the army will deal with acts of terror in the future. Clearly, in the past two weeks we have seen an intolerable level of violence in Cairo. We have also seen sporadic terrorist bombings. Added to that is military repression. We are entering on a particularly vicious cycle, and everyone in the west—politicians, diplomats and everyone else in the outside world—will have to take a view on that. It is obvious to me and to members of our delegation that the army is determined to impose itself as the central player in Egyptian politics. Anyone who doubts that need only look at the referendum that took place two weeks ago.

[Mr Iain McKenzie (Inverclyde) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing the debate. He says that the military are imposing themselves as the dominant power in Egyptian politics. Does he not agree that they are putting themselves forward as the only power in Egypt’s politics? Now it looks very much as though the general who led the coup will put himself forward for the presidency, putting the country back into a situation in which the military are in charge.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

Yes, that is a broad characterisation of where we are. However, we have to accept that the army is supported by a large number of people. That is why I am always hesitant to talk about coups and all that sort of thing. There is popular support for the army, and it is unrealistic and perhaps rather naive of us to think otherwise. It is not a military junta that has suddenly emerged out of nowhere and is seeking to dominate the country. There is a groundswell of support for the army. How big that is and whether it constitutes a majority, no one knows.

However, this is a much more nuanced situation than one in which a bunch of generals have decided to claim power for themselves. If we look at the economic conditions in which Egypt has suffered for the past three or four years—the total collapse of tourism, which constituted between 15% and 25%, depending on different estimates, of the economy—we see that there is a massive and pressing need for stability, and it was in that cauldron that that military regime, if we want to call it that, emerged. That has happened across modern history. Across the world, we have seen situations in which there is a cry for stability and then someone emerges, often from a military background, to try to impose order. That is a very similar situation to the one that we find in Egypt.

The leading indication, the most obvious example, of the army’s determination was the result of the referendum: 98.1% of people voted for the constitution. Those of us who live in democratic countries such as Britain will know that there is not a single issue on which 98% of people would vote one way. I even suggested to one of my researchers that if there was a referendum on what day of the week it was—on a point of fact—we would not see 98% of people agreeing to that. We might see 90%, but there would still be dissent on what is a very palpable and obvious question, so the 98.1% does arouse suspicions about the transparency, openness and fairness of the process. If we look for other examples in the Arab world of 98% mandates—actually, I was told that Saddam Hussein used to get 100% in his elections—we find that there are not that many other examples of people getting 98%.

[Mr McKenzie]

The hon. Gentleman is very kind to give way again. On those statistics, does he agree that that 98% was based on a 38% turnout?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

Absolutely, but 38% is not a disgracefully low turnout. That is quite a large turnout. In our local elections, we would be quite happy to get 38%. That does not invalidate them as exercises in local democracy, so I do not think that the turnout was particularly depressing. It was a reasonable turnout, but the 98% of the 38% does raise legitimate questions.

[Guy Opperman]

I promise that this is the last time I will intervene. Is not the endorsement not necessarily of the constitution but, in particular, of the desire for stability and a path back to some degree of economic prosperity?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend has made a number of very pertinent interventions, all of which I agree with. It is absolutely the case that what he refers to is what this whole issue is about, but what we have to consider—I want to deal with this in my closing remarks—is our relationship to incipient democracies, if we want to call them that, and to political governance in the Arab world.

[Mr Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP)]

I, too, congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing this important debate. Before he goes on to the other issue, may I put this to him? He mentions the constitution, which has increased provision for religious freedom compared with what there has been recently. However, in relation to ethnic and religious minorities, particularly Christians and Copts, does he not agree that words are fine—the constitution may make provision in certain areas—but the issue is the enforcement of and the abiding by those provisions and the human rights afforded to religious minorities in particular? How does he see the role of our Government in ensuring that those minorities are properly protected?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My right hon. Friend the Minister can speak with more authority than I can on this, but our Government have been absolutely clear about our commitment to human rights and to religious freedoms in Egypt. What the right hon. Gentleman should be aware of is that the Copts—we talked about a coup last year—were very much in favour of the military stepping in. They saw the Muslim Brotherhood as no particular friends to them. Indeed, they felt that the incidence of religious violence and of terror against their community increased dramatically in the brief period of Muslim Brotherhood rule.

There are many conflicting issues that we have to deal with. On one side is the protection of minority rights; on the other is the democratic will as expressed by the majority. Often in these cases in the Arab world, those two things are in conflict. One justification for military involvement was on precisely this issue. The army would say—it did say to us—that the Muslim Brotherhood did not look after the human rights of all Egyptians; it was sectional, and it looked merely to its own. In that context, the army has taken on itself the role of guardian of minority rights.

Egypt’s parlous economic situation is the context in which that military strongman, for want of a better term, may well emerge. The budget deficit has risen to $34.8 billion, which is 14% of GDP. To put that in context, our deficit was 12% of GDP in 2010, which was the highest proportion it had been in our peacetime history. Public debt in Egypt is running at about 90% of GDP. Clearly, there has been a massive economic crisis and the country is under a lot of pressure. There are also problems with terrorism and the rule of law. When we first arrived in Egypt in 2010, we managed to drive through the Sinai peninsula on our way to Gaza, but the presence of armed militias and armed forces in the Sinai peninsula, and the battles that rage there, make such a trip impossible today. The country suffers under massive economic pressure and the spectre of renewed terrorism.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

The hon. Gentleman is being most generous in giving way. Does he concede that the new Government have displayed a disappointing attitude by not opening up the Rafah crossing, which has created further problems and tensions in Gaza? I recognise what he says about the journey across the Sinai; that is a fair point.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

In the Sinai peninsula, which has generally been, for the past 40 years, under Egyptian control, the situation is one of relative anarchy. In that context, it would be asking a lot to expect any Egyptian Government to open the border. I cannot see such a development taking place, given where we are today. The army has a real job on its hands in trying to introduce some element of rule of law in the Sinai peninsula.

I conclude by making one or two remarks about our response. We went to our embassy in Cairo, where we received generous hospitality, and we encountered some hard-working and committed diplomats. The feeling that we received from people to whom we spoke in Egypt, at all levels, was that the west had failed Egypt and that we, as one of Egypt’s longest-standing partners, had not fully grasped the nature of the situation. That might be a misrepresentation, but I can only report what I was told. There was a perception that we had been slightly wrong-footed by events. In a fast-changing environment it is easy to back the wrong horse and then find that the winning horse is suspicious of people who have not fully supported it.

For decades to come, we will have to question the operation of the multi-party system. Over the past four years, secular parties have not emerged. The two power blocs of the army and the Muslim Brotherhood are the dominant forces in Egypt, and they may well be for some time to come. The Al-Nour party, which won a quarter of the parliamentary seats, is a Salafist party inspired by political Islam. It is difficult to see how a multi-party secular democracy can emerge in a country in which the army and political Islam, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, play such dominant roles.

In Westminster and across western capitals, we will have to come to terms with that. We will have to reassess the somewhat naive idea that Egypt might become a multi-party system like Australia, for example. If anyone thought in 2011 that that might happen, it was a rather naive assumption. We simply have to describe what we see on the ground and how popular will is expressed. Secular parties have not developed as many of us anticipated, and it is an open question whether we should try to encourage their growth or simply focus our attention on the humanitarian and economic situation in Egypt.

I am grateful for the care and attention with which Members of the House have listened to my remarks, and I look forward to listening to and participating in the subsequent debate.

[Mr Dai Havard (in the Chair)]

Four Members have indicated that they wish to speak, and I want to start the wind-ups at about 10.30 am. About 15 minutes from each speaker with interventions will probably take us there.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I pay tribute to both previous speakers and, despite the friendly sedentary intervention of my friend, the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), I intend to follow in their footsteps. I congratulate in particular my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Kwasi Kwarteng) on introducing such an important subject. I am pleased that people have not gone automatically into a mode of suggesting that all the good is on one side and all the evil on the other. In Egypt, we are confronted with a choice of which is the lesser evil. I agree with the hon. Member for Inverclyde (Mr McKenzie) that the correct course to follow is not to rush to endorse what has happened in Egypt. We should ensure that we maintain pressure on whatever Administration or regime emerges to follow a path back to constitutional democracy at the earliest opportunity.

It sometimes bothers me that people think that when a dramatic development occurs, it is automatically to be interpreted in the context of what we have experienced in recent European history. I felt the very coinage of the term “Arab spring” to be inappropriate. I did not feel that the spate of revolutions that took place in one middle eastern country after another should be compared to the attempt by central and eastern European countries, which had been well set on the path to constitutional democracy before they were hijacked by the Soviet empire, to go back to the democratic path. There was no direct comparison between those European countries asserting their right to return to democracy and what was happening in at least some of the middle eastern countries.

In 1941, Churchill was famously teased by one of his left-wing opponents when he spoke up for Russia after it was invaded by the Nazis. After all, Churchill was the architect of British intervention in the Russian civil war, and he famously wanted to “strangle Bolshevism at birth”. He had the right answer to his critic: he said that if Hitler invaded hell, he would at least have a good word to say for the devil in the House of Commons. In other words, he recognised that it was a choice between evils.

It is often thought that when a totalitarian regime emerges, based on a totalitarian ideology, it does so in a coup, with no popular support at all. That is not necessarily the case; in fact, I would say that it is not usually the case. There was certainly popular support for the Nazis, as well as for the communists in many cases where they succeeded in coming to power. The paradox in trying to deal with such situations was that there was a degree of democratic legitimacy to the initial taking over of the country, but once that had happened, the regimes proceeded to dismantle the very framework of democracy—however great or limited it was at the time—that had enabled them to come to power on the basis of some form of popular support. Such popular support was often allied to a specific type of devious perversion of political language when the regime was consolidating its grip on power.

The question that must be faced by democracies looking on as such situations develop is what we do when a group of people come to power, initially with a greater or lesser degree of democratic legitimacy, and proceed to subvert the system so that they will never again have to submit themselves to democratic elections. I suggest that what was happening in Egypt was a movement in that sort of direction. The country was faced with the choice of whether it wished to see Islamism take control, as it has done following what I prefer to call the Arab uprisings, to the disappointment of many of us who were hoping to see constitutional democracies emerge in other middle eastern countries. The issue is what we do about that. Do we simply rush to condemn the fact that Islamists have been ejected from power in Egypt, or do we recognise the real difficulty of the choice that Egyptians have had to make between one extreme situation and another?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

The situation in Egypt was even more extreme than that, in terms of the groundwork laid for political Islam. In the parliamentary elections, 50% of the seats were won by the Muslim Brotherhood and 25% by Salafis, so 75% of the seats were won by parties that openly supported political Islam. There was no room for an alternative in that system.

[Dr Lewis]

That is absolutely correct. My hon. Friend will put me right if I am mistaken, but I recall that part of the deal at the outset was that the Muslim Brotherhood undertook not to run for the presidency—I think that I am right in saying that. That promise was very promptly broken.

In my time trying to comment as best I can on defence and security-related subjects in Parliament, not too many months—certainly not too many years—go by when I do not have recourse to mentioning one of my favourite political quotations from the late, great, Sir Karl Popper in his famous book, “The Open Society and Its Enemies”. I have quoted it before and I suspect that circumstances will require me to quote it again. The paradox of tolerance is that in a free society, people must tolerate all but the intolerant, because if you tolerate the intolerant, the conditions for toleration disappear and the tolerant go with them. I am sure that this is what the people who ousted the Islamists in Egypt would argue was their justification. Although I said earlier that one must not make simplistic comparisons, I am now probably about to do just that. Those people would probably point to the situation in Germany in the 1930s and say, “Wouldn’t it have been better if the army had thrown the Nazis out, once it became clear that they were going to rip up the constitution and remove any chance of a democratic future, and when it saw what the Hitlerites were trying to do to the German system—which had more or less democratically elected them to power in the first place—using the techniques that we are so familiar with in totalitarian takeovers, to get an iron and irreversible grip on the society?” How would we feel now if the army had stepped in then?

I worry when I hear people use phrases such as moderate Islamism. The description of Islamism is the description of an extreme, intolerant ideology; there is no moderate Islamism, any more than there is moderate totalitarianism or moderate extremism. The reality is that there was a choice in Egypt between an Islamist takeover and the ejection of a group of people bent on destroying any sort of emergent democracy in that country and making a terrible mess of running it in the process.