Online Safety Bill (Seventh sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 9th June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Maria Miller]

Will the Minister give way?

[Kim Leadbeater (Batley and Spen) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way?

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[Chris Philp]

It is categorically not the Government’s position that this problem is too big to fix. In fact, the whole purpose of this piece of groundbreaking and world-leading legislation is to fix a problem of such magnitude. The point my right hon. Friend was making about the hypothecation of fines to support user advocacy is a somewhat different one, which we will come to in due course, but there is nothing in the Bill to prevent individual groups from assisting individuals with making specific complaints to individual companies, as they are now entitled to do in law under clauses 17 and 18.

The point about an ombudsman is a slightly different one—if an individual complaint is made to a company and the individual complainant is dissatisfied with the outcome of their individual, particular and personal complaint, what should happen? In the case of financial services, if, for example, someone has been mis-sold a mortgage and they have suffered a huge loss, they can go to an ombudsman who will bindingly adjudicate that individual, single, personal case. The point that I am making is that having hundreds of thousands or potentially millions of cases being bindingly adjudicated on a case-by- case basis is not the right way to tackle a problem of this scale. The right way to tackle the problem is to force the social media companies, by law, to systemically deal with all of the problem, not just individual problems that may end up on an ombudsman’s desk.

That is the power in the Bill. It deals at a systems and processes level, it deals on an industry-wide level, and it gives Ofcom incredibly strong enforcement powers to make sure this actually happens. The hon. Member for Pontypridd has repeatedly called for a systems and processes approach. This is the embodiment of such an approach and the only way to fix a problem of such magnitude.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I associate myself with the comments of the right hon. Member for Basingstoke. Surely, if we are saying that this is such a huge problem, that is an argument for greater stringency and having an ombudsman. We cannot say that this is just about systems. Of course it is about systems, but online harms—we have heard some powerful examples of this—are about individuals, and we have to provide redress and support for the damage that online harms do to them. We have to look at systemic issues, as the Minister is rightly doing, but we also have to look at individual cases. The idea of an ombudsman and greater support for charities and those who can support victims of online crime, as mentioned by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, is really important.

[Chris Philp]

I thank the hon. Lady for her thoughtful intervention. There are two separate questions here. One is about user advocacy groups helping individuals to make complaints to the companies. That is a fair point, and no doubt we will debate it later. The ombudsman question is different; it is about whether to have a right of appeal against decisions by social media companies. Our answer is that, rather than having a third-party body—an ombudsman—effectively acting as a court of appeal against individual decisions by the social media firms, because of the scale of the matter, the solution is to compel the firms, using the force of law, to get this right on a systemic and comprehensive basis.

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[Kirsty Blackman]

I would have been quite happy to move the amendment, but I do not think the Opposition would have been terribly pleased with me if I had stolen it. I have got my name on it, and I am keen to support it.

As I have said, I met the NSPCC yesterday, and we discussed how clause 31(3) might work, should the Minister decide to keep it in the Bill and not accept the amendment. There are a number of issues with the clause, which states that the child user condition is met if

“a significant number of children”

are users of the service, or if the service is

“likely to attract a significant number of users who are children”.

I do not understand how that could work. For example, a significant number of people who play Fortnite are adults, but a chunk of people who play it are kids. If some sort of invisible percentage threshold is applied in such circumstances, I do not know whether that threshold will be met. If only 20% of Fortnite users are kids, and that amounts only to half a million children, will that count as enough people to meet the child access assessment threshold?

Fortnite is huge, but an appropriate definition is even more necessary for very small platforms and services. With the very far-right sites that we have mentioned, it may be that only 0.5% of their users are children, and that may amount only to 2,000 children—a very small number. Surely, because of the risk of harm if children access these incredibly damaging and dangerous sites that groom people for terrorism, they should have a duty to meet the child access requirement threshold, if only so that we can tell them that they must have an age verification process—they must be able to say, “We know that none of our users are children because we have gone through an age verification process.” I am keen for children to be able to access the internet and meet their friends online, but I am keen for them to be excluded from these most damaging sites. I appreciate the action that the Government have taken in relation to pornographic content, but I do not think that this clause allows us to go far enough in stopping children accessing the most damaging content that is outwith pornographic content.

The other thing that I want to raise is about how the number of users will be calculated. The Minister made it very clear earlier on, and I thank him for doing so, that an individual does not have to be a registered user to be counted as a user of a site. People can be members of TikTok, for example, only if they are over 13. TikTok has some hoops in place—although they are not perfect—to ensure that its users are over 13, and to be fair, it does proactively remove users that it suspects are under 13, particularly if they are reported. That is a good move.

My child is sent links to TikTok videos through WhatsApp, however. He clicks on the links and is able to watch the videos, which will pop up in the WhatsApp mini-browser thing or in the Safari browser. He can watch the videos without signing up as a registered user of TikTok and without using the platform itself—the videos come through Safari, for example, rather than through the app. Does the Minister expect that platforms will count those people as users? I suggest that the majority of people who watch TikTok by those means are doing so because they do not have a TikTok account. Some will not have accounts because they are under 13 and are not allowed to by TikTok or by the parental controls on their phones.

My concern is that, if the Minister does not provide clarity on this point, platforms will count just the number of registered users, and will say, “It’s too difficult for us to look at the number of unregistered users, so in working out whether we meet the criteria, we are not even going to consider people who do not access our specific app or who are not registered users in some way, shape or form.” I have concerns about the operation of the provisions and about companies using that “get out of jail free” card. I genuinely believe that the majority of those who access TikTok other than through its platform are children and would meet the criteria. If the Minister is determined to keep subsection (3) and not accept the amendment, I feel that he should make it clear that those users must be included in the counting by any provider assessing whether it needs to fulfil the child safety duties.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I agree with thon. Lady’s important point, which feeds into the broader question of volume versus risk—no matter how many children see something that causes harm and damage, one is one too many—and the categorisation of service providers into category 1 to category 2A and category 2B. The depth of the risk is the problem, rather than the number of people who might be affected. The hon. Lady also alluded to age verification—I am sure we will come to that at some point—which is another can of worms. The important point, which she made well, is about volume versus risk. The point is not how many children see something; even if only a small number of children see something, the damage has been done.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I absolutely agree. In fact, I have tabled an amendment to widen category 1 to include sites with the highest risk of harm. The Minister has not said that he agrees with my amendment specifically, but he seems fairly amenable to increasing and widening some duties to include the sites of highest risk. I have also tabled another new clause on similar issues.

I am glad that these clauses are in the Bill—a specific duty in relation to children is important and should happen—but as the shadow Minister said, clause 31(3) is causing difficulty. It is causing difficulty for me and for organisations such as the NSPCC, which is unsure how the provisions will operate and whether they will do so in the way that the Government would like.

I hope the Minister will answer some of our questions when he responds. If he is not willing to accept the amendment, will he give consideration to how the subsection could be amended in the future—we have more stages, including Report and scrutiny in the other place—to ensure that there is clarity and that the intention of the purpose is followed through, rather than being an intention that is not actually translated into law?

Online Safety Bill (Sixth sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Chris Philp]

As I say, clause 10 already references the governance arrangements, but my strong view is that the only thing that will make these companies sit up and take notice—the only thing that will make them actually protect children in a way they are currently not doing—is the threat of billions of pounds of fines and, if they do not comply even after being fined at that level, the threat of their service being disconnected. Ultimately, that is the sanction that will make these companies protect our children.

[Kim Leadbeater (Batley and Spen) (Lab)]

As my hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles South has said, the point here is about cultural change, and the way to do that is through leadership. It is not about shutting the gate after the horse has bolted. Fining the companies might achieve something, but it does not tackle the root of the problem. It is about cultural change and leadership at these organisations. We all agree across the House that they are not doing enough, so how do we change that culture? It has to come from leadership.

[Chris Philp]

Yes, and that is why governance is addressed in the clause as drafted. But the one thing that will really change the way the leadership of these companies thinks about this issue is the one thing they ultimately care about—money. The reason they allow unsafe content to circulate and do not rein in or temper their algorithms, and the reason we are in this situation, which has arisen over the last 10 years or so, is that these companies have consistently prioritised profit over protection. Ultimately, that is the only language they understand—it is that and legal compulsion.

While the Bill rightly addresses governance in clause 10 and in other clauses, as I have said a few times, what has to happen to make this change occur is the compulsion that is inherent in the powers to fine and to deny service—to pull the plug—that the Bill also contains. The thing that will give reassurance to our constituents, and to me as a parent, is knowing that for the first time ever these companies can properly be held to account. They can be fined. They can have their connection pulled out of the wall. Those are the measures that will protect our children.

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Duties to protect content of democratic importance

[Kim Leadbeater]

I beg to move amendment 105, in clause 15, page 14, line 33, after “ensure” insert “the safety of people involved in UK elections and”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 106, in clause 37, page 25, line 31, at end insert—

‘(2A) OFCOM must prepare and issue a code of practice for providers of Category 1 and 2(a) services describing measures recommended for the purpose of compliance with duties set out in section 15 concerning the safety of people taking part in elections.”

[Kim Leadbeater]

I rise to speak to amendments 105 and 106, in my name, on protecting democracy and democratic debate.

Within the Bill, there are significant clauses intended to prevent the spread of harm online, to protect women and girls against violence and to help prevent child sexual exploitation, while at the same time protecting the right of journalists to do their jobs. Although those clauses are not perfect, I welcome them.

The Bill is wide-ranging. The Minister talked on Second Reading about the power in clause 150 to protect another group—those with epilepsy—from being trolled with flashing images. That subject is close to my heart due to the campaign for Zach’s law—Zach is a young boy in my constituency. I know we will return to that important issue later in the Committee, and I thank the Minister for his work on it.

In protecting against online harm while preserving fundamental rights and values, we must also address the threats posed to those involved in the democratic process. Let me be clear: this is not self-serving. It is about not just MPs but all political candidates locally and nationally and those whose jobs facilitate the execution of our democratic process and political life: the people working on elections or for those elected to public office at all levels across the UK. These people must be defended from harm not only for their own protection, but to protect our democracy itself and, with it, the right of all our citizens to a political system capable of delivering on their priorities free from threats and intimidation.

Many other groups in society are also subjected to a disproportionate amount of targeted abuse, but those working in and around politics sadly receive more than almost any other people in this country, with an associated specific set of risks and harms. That does not mean messages gently, or even firmly, requesting us to vote one way or another—a staple of democratic debate—but messages of hate, abuse and threats intended to scare people in public office, grind them down, unfairly influence their voting intentions or do them physical and psychological harm. That simply cannot be an acceptable part of political life.

As I say, we are not looking for sympathy, but we have a duty to our democracy to try to stamp that out from our political discourse. Amendment 105 would not deny anybody the right to tell us firmly where we are going wrong—quite right, too—but it is an opportunity to draw the essential distinction between legitimately holding people in public life to account and illegitimate intimidation and harm.

The statistics regarding the scale of online abuse that MPs receive are shocking. In 2020, a University of Salford study found that MPs received over 7,000 abusive or hate-filled tweets a month. Seven thousand separate messages of harm a month on Twitter alone directed at MPs is far too many, but who in this room does not believe that the figure is almost certainly much higher today? Amnesty conducted a separate study in 2017 looking at the disproportionate amount of abuse that women and BAME MPs faced online, finding that my right hon. Friend the Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) was the recipient of almost a third of all the abusive tweets analysed, as alluded to already by the hon. Member for Edinburgh—

[Kirsty Blackman]

Aberdeen North.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I knew that. [Laughter.]

Five years later, we continue to see significant volumes of racist, sexist and homophobic hate-filled abuse and threats online to politicians of all parties. That is unacceptable in itself, but we must ask whether this toxic environment helps to keep decent people in politics or, indeed, attracts good people into politics, so that our democracy can prosper into the future across the political spectrum. The reality we face is that our democracy is under attack online each and every day, and every day we delay acting is another day on which abuse becomes increasingly normalised or is just seen as part of the job for those who have put themselves forward for public service. This form of abuse harms society as a whole, so it deserves specific consideration in the Bill.

While elected Members and officials are not a special group of people deserving of more legal protections than anyone else, we must be honest that the abuse they face is distinct and specific to those roles and directly affects our democracy itself. It can lead to the most serious physical harm, with two Members of Parliament having been murdered in the last six years, and many others face death threats or threats of sexual or other violence on a daily basis. However, this is not just about harm to elected representatives; online threats are often seen first, and sometimes only, by their members of staff. They may not be the intended target, but they are often the people harmed most. I am sure we all agree that that is unacceptable and cannot continue.

All of us have probably reported messages and threats to social media platforms and the police, with varying degrees of success in terms of having them removed or the individuals prosecuted. Indeed, we sadly heard examples of that from my hon. Friend the shadow Minister. Often we are told that nothing can be done. Currently, the platforms look at their own rules to determine what constitutes freedom of speech or expression and what is hateful speech or harm. That fine line moves. There is no consistency across platforms, and we therefore urgently need more clarity and a legal duty in place to remove that content quickly.

Amendment 105 would explicitly include in the Bill protection and consideration for those involved in UK elections, whether candidates or staff. Amendment 106 would go further and place an obligation on Ofcom to produce a code of practice, to be issued to the platforms. It would define what steps platforms must take to protect those involved in elections and set out what content is acceptable or unacceptable to be directed at them.

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[Kirsty Blackman]

I want to make a few comments on the amendment. As a younger female parliamentarian, I find that I am often asked to speak to young people about becoming an MP or getting involved in politics. I find it difficult to say to young women, “Yes, you should do this,” and most of the reason for that is what people are faced with online. It is because a female MP cannot have a Twitter account without facing abuse. I am sure male MPs do as well, but it tends to be worse for women.

We cannot engage democratically and with constituents on social media platforms without receiving abuse and sometimes threats as well. It is not just an abusive place to be—that does not necessarily meet the threshold for illegality—but it is pretty foul and toxic. There have been times when I have deleted Twitter from my phone because I just need to get away from the vile abuse that is being directed towards me. I want, in good conscience, to be able to make an argument to people that this is a brilliant job, and it is brilliant to represent constituents and to make a difference on their behalf at whatever level of elected politics, but right now I do not feel that I am able to do that.

When my footballing colleague, the hon. Member for Batley and Spen, mentions “UK elections” in the amendment, I assume she means that in the widest possible way—elections at all levels.

[Kim Leadbeater]

indicated assent.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Sometimes we miss out the fact that although MPs face abuse, we have a level of protection as currently elected Members. Even if there were an election coming up, we have a level of security protection and access that is much higher than for anybody else challenging a candidate or standing in a council or a Scottish Parliament election. As sitting MPs, we already have an additional level of protection because of the security services we have in place. We need to remember, and I assume this is why the amendment is drawn in a pretty broad way, that everybody standing for any sort of elected office faces significant risk of harm—again, whether or not that meets the threshold for illegality.

There are specific things that have been mentioned. As has been said, epilepsy is specifically mentioned as a place where specific harm occurs. Given the importance of democracy, which is absolutely vital, we need to have a democratic system where people are able to stand in elections and make their case. Given the importance of democracy, which is absolutely vital, we need to have a democratic system where people are able to stand in elections and make their case. That is why we have election addresses and a system where the election address gets delivered through every single person’s door. There is an understanding and acceptance by people involved in designing democratic processes that the message of all candidates needs to get out there. If the message of all candidates cannot get out there because some people are facing significant levels of abuse online, then democracy is not acting in the way that it should be. These amendments are fair and make a huge amount of sense. They are protecting the most important tenets of democracy and democratic engagement.

I want to say something about my own specific experiences. We have reported people to the police and have had people in court over the messages they have sent, largely by email, which would not be included in the Bill, but there have also been some pretty creepy ones on social media that have not necessarily met the threshold. As has been said, it is my staff who have had to go to court and stand in the witness box to explain the shock and terror they have felt on seeing the email or the communication that has come in, so I think any provision should include that.

Finally, we have seen situations where people working in elections—this is not an airy-fairy notion, but something that genuinely happened—have been photographed and those pictures have been shared on social media, and they have then been abused as a result. They are just doing their job, handing out ballot papers or standing up and announcing the results on the stage, and they have to abide by the processes that are in place now. In order for us to have free and fair elections that are run properly and that people want to work at and support, we need to have that additional level of protection. The hon. Member for Batley and Spen made a very reasonable argument and I hope the Minister listened to it carefully.

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[Kim Leadbeater]

The Minister makes a really valid point and is right about the impact on the individual. The point I am trying to make with the amendments is that this is about the impact on the democratic process, which is why I think it fits in with clause 15. It is not about how individuals feel; it is about the impact that that has on behaviours, and about putting the emphasis and onus on platforms to decide what is of democratic importance. In the evidence we had two weeks ago, the witnesses certainly did not feel comfortable with putting the onus on platforms. If we were to have a code of practice, we would at least give them something to work with on the issue of what is of democratic importance. It is about the impact on democracy, not just the harm to the individual involved.

[Chris Philp]

Clearly, if a communication is sufficiently offensive that it meets the criminal threshold, it is covered, and that would obviously harm the democratic process as well. If a communication was sufficiently offensive that it breached the harmful communication offence in clause 150, it would also, by definition, harm the democratic process, so communications that are damaging to democracy would axiomatically be caught by one thing or the other. I find it difficult to imagine a communication that might be considered damaging to democracy but that would not meet one of those two criteria, so that it was not illegal and would not meet the definition of a harmful communication.

My main point is that the existing provisions in the Bill address the kinds of behaviours that were described in those two speeches—the illegal content provisions, and the new harmful communication offence in clause 150. On that basis, I hope the hon. Member for Batley and Spen will withdraw the amendment, safe in the knowledge that the Bill addresses the issue that she rightly and reasonably raises.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Online Safety Bill (Fifth sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Kirsty Blackman]

rose—

[Kim Leadbeater (Batley and Spen) (Lab)]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Kirsty Blackman]

Absolutely.

[Kim Leadbeater]

You are making some really important points about the world of the internet and online gaming for children and young people. That is where we need some serious consideration about obligations on providers about media literacy for both children and grown-ups. Many people with children know that this is a really dangerous space for young people, but we are not quite sure we have enough information to understand what the threats, risks and harms are. That point about media literacy, particularly in regard to the gaming world, is really important.

[The Chair]

Order. Before we proceed, the same rules apply in Committee as on the Floor of the House to this extent: the Chair is “you”, and you speak through the Chair, so it is “the hon. Lady”. [Interruption.] One moment.

While I am on my feet, I should perhaps have said earlier, and will now say for clarification, that interventions are permitted in exactly the same way as they are on the Floor of the House. In exactly the same way, it is up to the Member who has the Floor to decide whether to give way or not. The difference between these debates and those on the Floor of the House is of course that on the Floor of the House a Member can speak only once, whereas in Committee you have the opportunity to come back and speak again if you choose to do so. Once the Minister is winding up, that is the end of the debate. The Chair would not normally admit, except under exceptional circumstances, any further speech, as opposed to an intervention.

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[Chris Philp]

To reassure the hon. Member on the point about doing the risk assessment, all the companies have to do the risk assessment. That obligation is there. Ofcom can request any risk assessment. I would expect, and I think Parliament would expect, it to request risk assessments either where it is concerned about risk or where the platform is particularly large and has a very high reach—I am thinking of Facebook and companies like that. But hon. Members are talking here about requiring Ofcom to receive and, one therefore assumes, to consider, because what is the point of receiving an assessment unless it considers it? Receiving it and just putting it on a shelf without looking at it would be pointless, obviously. Requiring Ofcom to receive and look at potentially 25,000 risk assessments strikes me as a disproportionate burden. We should be concentrating Ofcom’s resources—and it should concentrate its activity, I submit—on those companies that pose a significant risk and those companies that have a very high reach and large numbers of users. I suggest that, if we imposed an obligation on it to receive and to consider risk assessments for tiny companies that pose no risk, that would not be the best use of its resources, and it would take away resources that could otherwise be used on those companies that do pose risk and that have larger numbers of users.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Just to be clear, we are saying that the only reason why we should not be encouraging the companies to do the risk assessment is that Ofcom might not be able to cope with dealing with all the risk assessments. But surely that is not a reason not to do it. The risk assessment is a fundamental part of this legislation. We have to be clear that there is no point in the companies having those risk assessments if they are not visible and transparent.

[Chris Philp]

All the companies have to do the risk assessment, for example for the “illegal” duties, where they are required to by the Bill. For the “illegal” duties, that is all of them; they have to do those risk assessments. The question is whether they have to send them to Ofcom—all of them—even if they are very low risk or have very low user numbers, and whether Ofcom, by implication, then has to consider them, because it would be pointless to require them to be sent if they were not then looked at. We want to ensure that Ofcom’s resources are pointed at the areas where the risks arise. Ofcom can request any of these. If Ofcom is concerned—even a bit concerned—it can request them.

Hon. Members are then making a slightly adjacent point about transparency—about whether the risk assessments should be made, essentially, publicly available. In relation to comprehensive public disclosure, there are legitimate questions about public disclosure and about getting to the heart of what is going on in these companies in the way in which Frances Haugen’s whistleblower disclosures did. But we also need to be mindful of what we might call malign actors—people who are trying to circumvent the provisions of the Bill—in relation to some of the “illegal” provisions, for example. We do not want to give them so much information that they know how they can circumvent the rules. Again, there is a balance to strike between ensuring that the rules are properly enforced and having such a high level of disclosure that people seeking to circumvent the rules are able to work out how to do so.

Online Safety Bill (Fourth sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate - 4th sitting
Thursday 26th May 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Mrs Miller]

Q Working closely with Ofcom is really good, but do you think there needs to be a duty to co-operate with Ofcom, or indeed with other regulators—to be specified in the Bill—in case relations become more tense in future?

Stephen Almond: The Bill has, in my view, been designed to work closely alongside data protection law. It supports effective co-operation between us and Ofcom by requiring and setting out a series of duties for Ofcom to consult with the ICO on the development of any codes of practice or formal guidance with an impact on privacy. With that framework in mind, I do not think there is a case to instil further co-operation duties in that way. I hope I can give you confidence that we and Ofcom will be working tirelessly together to promote the safety and privacy of citizens online. It is firmly in our interests and in the interest of society as a whole to do so.

[Kim Leadbeater (Batley and Spen) (Lab)]

Q Thank you for joining us, Mr Almond. You stated the aim of making the UK the

“safest place in the world to be online”.

In your view, what needs to be added or taken away from the Bill to achieve that?

Stephen Almond: I am not best placed to comment on the questions of online safety and online harms. You will speak to a variety of different experts who can comment on that point. From my perspective as a digital regulator, one of the most important things will be ensuring that the Bill is responsive to future challenges. The digital world is rapidly evolving, and we cannot necessarily envisage all the developments in technology that will come, or the emergence of new harms. The data protection regime is a principles-based piece of legislation. That gives us a great degree of flexibility and discretion to adapt to novel forms of technology and to provide appropriate guidance as challenges emerge. I really recommend retaining that risk-based, principles-based approach to regulation that is envisaged currently in the Online Safety Bill.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q There has been much talk about trying to future-proof the Bill. Is there anything you could recommend that should be in the Bill to try to help with that?

Stephen Almond: Again, I would say that the most important thing I can recommend around this is to retain that flexibility within the Bill. I know that a temptation will emerge to offer prescription, whether for the purpose of giving companies clarity today or for addressing present harms, but it is going to be really important to make sure that there is due flexibility to enable the legislation to be responsive to future harms.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Under clause 40, the Secretary of State can modify codes of practice to reflect public policy. How do you respond to criticism that this provision risks undermining the independence of the regulator?

Stephen Almond: Ultimately, it is for Ofcom to raise any concerns about the impact of the regime, as set out by its ability to apply its duties appropriately, independently and with due accountability to Parliament and the public. As a regulator, I would say that it is important to have a proper and proportionate degree of independence, so that businesses and the public can have trust in how regulation is carried out. Ultimately though, it is for Government and Parliament to determine what the right level of independence is.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q You have no concerns about that.

Stephen Almond: No.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Chris Philp)]

Q Mr Almond, welcome to the Committee. Thank you for joining us this afternoon. Can I start with co-operation? You mentioned a moment ago in answer to Maria Miller that co-operation between regulators, particularly in this context the ICO and Ofcom, was going to be very important. Would you describe the co-operative work that is happening already and that you will be undertaking in the future, and comment on the role that the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum has in facilitating that?

Stephen Almond: Thank you very much. I will start by explaining the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum. It is a voluntary, not statutory, forum that brings together ourselves, Ofcom, the Competition and Markets Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority—some of the regulators with the greatest interest in digital regulation—to make sure that we have a coherent approach to the regulation of digital services in the interests of the public and indeed the economy.

We are brought together through our common interest. We do not require a series of duties or statutory frameworks to make us co-operate, because the case for co-operation is very, very clear. We will deliver better outcomes by working together and by joining up where our powers align. I think that is what you are seeing in practice in some of the work we have done jointly—for example, around the implementation of the children’s code alongside Ofcom’s implementation of the video-sharing platform regime. A joined-up approach to questions about, for example, how you assure the age of children online is really important. That gives me real confidence in reassuring the Committee that the ICO, Ofcom and other digital regulators will be able to take a very joined-up approach to regulating in the context of the new online safety regime.

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[Kirsty Blackman]

Q In terms of online gaming, and predators moving children from more mainstream to less regulated platforms, do you think there are improvements in the Bill that relate to that, or do you think more can be done?

Lynn Perry: Grooming does happen within gaming, and we know that online video games offer some user-to-user interaction. Users sometimes have the ability to create content within platforms, which is in scope for the Bill. The important thing will be enforcement and compliance in relation to those provisions. We work with lots of children and young people who have been sexually exploited and abused, and who have had contact through gaming sites. It is crucial that this area is in focus from the perspective of building in, by design, safety measures that stop perpetrators being able to communicate directly with children.

Private messaging is another area for focus. We also consider it important for Ofcom to have regulatory powers to compel firms to use technology that could identify child abuse and grooming.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q If I could address one question to each witness, that would be fantastic. I do a lot of work with women in sport, including football. Obviously, we have the Women’s Euros coming up, and I have my Panini sticker album at the ready. Do you think the Bill could do more to address the pervasive issue of online threats of violence and abuse against women and girls, including those directed at women in sport, be they players, officials or journalists?

Sanjay Bhandari: I can see that there is something specific in the communications offences and that first limb around threatening communications, which will cover a lot of the things we see directed at female football pundits, like rape threats. It looks as though it would come under that. With our colleagues in other civil society organisations, particularly Carnegie UK Trust, we are looking at whether more should be done specifically about tackling misogyny and violence against women and girls. It is something that we are looking at, and we will also work with our colleagues in other organisations.

[The Chair]

Q Ms Perry, do you want to add anything to that?

Lynn Perry: When we were looking at children and young people’s access to harmful pornographic content, one thing we were particularly concerned about related to seeing extreme harmful and violent content, often perpetrated towards women. In respect of younger children, violence against women and girls and gender-based violence considerations, it is something that we are concerned about in that context.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Do you have any thoughts on the Bill committing to a statutory user advocacy body representing the interests of children? If you do, how do you think that that could be funded?

Lynn Perry: I am sorry—that was a question about advocacy, I think.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Yes, the idea of having a statutory user advocacy body that would represent the interests of children. This is something that has been talked about. Is that something you have any thoughts about?

Lynn Perry: We certainly have a lot of representation from children and young people directly. Last year, we worked with more than 380,000 children and young people. We think that advocacy and representation on behalf of children and young people can be used to powerful effect. Making sure that the voices of children and young people, their views, wishes and experiences, are heard and influence legislation that could safeguard and protect them effectively is something that we are supportive of.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Should the Bill commit to that?

Lynn Perry: As a recommendation, we think that could only strengthen the protections of children.

[Chris Philp]

Q Picking up that last point about representation for particular groups of users including children, Ms Perry, do you agree that the ability to designate organisations that can make super-complaints might be an extremely valuable avenue, in particular for organisations that represent user groups such as children? Organisations such as yours could get designated and then speak on behalf of children in a formal context. You could raise super-complaints with the regulator on behalf of the children you speak for. Is that something to welcome? Would it address the point made by my colleague, Kim Leadbetter, a moment ago?

Lynn Perry: We would welcome provision to be able to bring particularly significant evidence of concern. That is certainly something that organisations, large charities in the sector and those responsible for representing the rights of children and young people would welcome. On some of these issues, we work in coalition to make representations on behalf of children and young people, as well as of parents and carers, who also raise some concerns. The ability to do that and to strengthen the response is something that would be welcomed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Caroline Ansell]

Q Eva, there is just one reference to anonymity in the Bill currently. Do you think there is an opportunity to express a fuller, more settled opinion and potentially expand on that juxtaposition?

Eva Hartshorn-Sanders: I heard the advice that the representative of the Information Commissioner’s Office gave earlier—he feels that the balance is right at the moment. It is important to incorporate freedom of speech and privacy within this framework in a democratic country. I do not think we need to add anything more than that.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Thank you to the witnesses for joining us this afternoon. May I ask for your views on the clauses on journalistic content exemption and democratic content exemption? Do you think that these measures are likely to be effective?

Poppy Wood: I know you have spoken a lot about this over the past few days, but the content of democratic importance clause is a layer of the Bill that makes the Bill very complicated and hard to implement. My concern about these layers of free speech—whether it is the journalistic exemption, the news media exemption or the content of democratic importance clause—is that, as you heard from the tech companies, they just do not really know what to do with it. What we need is a Bill that can be implemented, so I would definitely err on the side of paring back the Bill so that it is easy to understand and clear. We should revisit anything that causes confusion or is obscure.

The clause on content of democratic importance is highly problematic—not just because it makes the Bill hard to implement and we are asking the platforms to decide what democratic speech is, but because I think it will become a gateway for the sorts of co-ordinated disinformation that we spoke about earlier. Covid disinformation for the past two years would easily have been a matter of public policy, and I think the platforms, because of this clause, would have said, “Well, if someone’s telling you to drink hydroxychloroquine as a cure for covid, we can’t touch that now, because it’s content of democratic importance.”

I have another example. In 2018, Facebook said that it had identified and taken down a Facebook page called “Free Scotland 2014”. In 2018—four years later—Facebook identified it. It was a Russian/Iranian-backed page that was promoting falsehoods in support of Scottish independence using fake news websites, with articles about the Queen and Prince Philip wanting to give themselves a pay rise by stealing from the poor. It was total nonsense, but that is easily content of democratic importance. Even though it was backed by fake actors—as we have said, I do not think there is anything in the Bill to preclude that at the moment, or at least to get the companies to focus on it—in 2014, that content would have been content of democratic importance, and the platforms took four years to take it down.

I think this clause would mean that that stuff became legitimate. It would be a major loophole for hate and disinformation. The best thing to do is to take that clause out completely. Clause 15(3) talks about content of democratic importance applying to speech across a diverse range of political opinion. Take that line in that subsection and put it in the freedom of expression clause—clause 19. What you then have is a really beefed-up freedom of expression clause that talks about political diversity, but you do not have layers on top of it that mean bad actors can promote hate and disinformation. I would say that is a solution, and that will make the Bill much easier to implement.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Thank you, Poppy. Eva?

Eva Hartshorn-Sanders: I think the principle behind the duty is correct and that they should consider the democratic importance of content when they are making moderation decisions, but what we know from our work is that misinformation and disinformation on social media poses a real threat to elections and democracies around the world. As an international organisation, we have studied the real harms caused by online election disinformation in countries like the US. We saw websites like The Gateway Pundit profit from Google ads to the tune of over $1 million while spreading election disinformation. That has led to real-world death threats sent to election officials and contributed to the events of 6 January. It is not something we want to see replicated in the UK.

The problem with the democratic importance duty is that it is framed negatively about preventing platforms from removing content, rather than positively about addressing content that undermines elections. That is concerning because it is the latter that has proved to be damaging in the real world. I think where we are getting to is that there should be a positive duty on platforms to act on content that is designed and intended to undermine our democracy and our elections.

To add to that, the Joint Committee on the draft Bill looked specifically at having misinformation and disinformation on elections and public health on the face of the Bill rather than leaving it to secondary legislation. That is a position that we would support. The type of harm we have seen over the last couple of years through covid is a known harm and it is one that we should be addressing. It has led to the deaths of millions of people around the world.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q That is really helpful; thank you. You raised the point about the abuse that was directed at election officials in America. Do you think it should almost be a stand-alone offence to send harmful or threatening communications to elected people—MPs, councillors, mayors or police and crime commissioners—or possibly even election officials, the people who are involved in the democratic process, because of the risk that that abuse and threats could have on democracy?

Eva Hartshorn-Sanders: Obviously abuse is unacceptable, and there have been real issues with that globally and I know in the UK from the work we have done with MPs here, including through the misogyny research. I guess this is the balance—if people have concerns about legitimate political decisions that are being made—but that is why you have an independent regulator who can assess that content.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Poppy, do you have any thoughts on that?

Poppy Wood: We are seeing people who put themselves forward in public life receiving all sorts of horrible abuse, which was cited as a big reason for women and people of colour removing themselves from public life in recent elections. My understanding is that the threatening communications offences brought in under the illegal duties will probably cover quite a lot of that. The idea that Eva just gave of an election risk assessment or something might, coupled with the threatening communications offences, mean that you are accounting for how your platform promotes that sort of hate.

One of the things that you would want to try to avoid is making better protections for politicians than for everyone else, but I think that threatening communications already covers some of that stuff. Coupled with an elections risk assessment, that would hopefully mean that there are mitigating effects on the risks identified in those risk assessments to tackle the sorts of things that you were just talking about.

Eva Hartshorn-Sanders: Just to add to that, from our work on “Don’t Feed the Trolls”, we know that a lot of these hate campaigns are quite co-ordinated. There is a whole lot of supporting evidence behind that. They will often target people who raise themselves up in whatever position, whether elected or a different type. The misogyny report we have just done had a mix of women who were celebrities or just had a profile and a large Instagram following and who were, again, subject to that abuse.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Should there be more in the Bill with a specific reference to violence against women and girls, abuse and threats, and misogyny?

Eva Hartshorn-Sanders: There are definitely parts of the Bill that could be strengthened in that area. Part of that relates to incels and how they are treated, or not, as a terrorist organisation; or how small sites might be treated under the Bill. I can elaborate on that if you like.

[The Chair]

Thank you. Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Kim Leadbeater?

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Thank you, Chair, and thank you to the witnesses. I just want to clarify something. We were talking about the journalistic content definition as it is. You are saying that you do not think it is reasonable to expect service providers to identify journalistic content using the definition contained in the Bill. Do you think the Bill should be clearer about what it means by journalistic content and journalism?

Matt Rogerson: My point is that for news publishers there is a lack of definition in the journalistic content exemption, and that platforms without the exemption would have to identify whether every piece of content on their platform was journalism, so it would be very difficult for the platforms to implement. That is why for trusted news brands such as the BBC, The Times, and The Guardian, the news media exemption is really important.

What we do not know, and what Gavin Millar suggested in his paper to Index on Censorship, is how that journalistic content exemption will be interpreted by the platforms. His fear in the paper is that the current definition means that the content has to be UK-linked. It could mean, for example, that a blog or a journalist that talks about issues in the Gulf or Ukraine would not be seen as journalistic content and therefore would not be able to take advantage of the systems that the platforms put in place. I think his view is that it should be in line with the article 10 definition of journalistic content, which would seem to make sense.

Owen Meredith: If I could add to that, speaking from my members’ perspective, they would all fall under the recognised news publisher definition. I think that is why it is an important definition. It is not an easy thing to get right, and I think the Department has done a good job in drafting the Bill. I think it captures everyone we would expect it to capture. I think actually it does set a relatively high bar for anyone else who is seeking to use that. I do not think it is possible for someone to simply claim that they are a recognised news publisher if they are operating in a way that we would not expect of such a person or entity. I think it is very important that that definition is clear. I think it is clear and workable.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q I suppose there are two separate clauses there. There is the news publisher clause and the journalistic content clause. Just so I am clear, you are happy with the news publisher clause?

Owen Meredith: Yes.

Matt Rogerson: Yes.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q What about the journalistic content clause? This is an expression that was new to me—this idea of a citizen journalist. I do not even know what that means. Are we confident that this clause, which talks about journalistic content, is the worrying one?

Owen Meredith: Matt spoke to this a little bit, but from my perspective, my focus has been on making sure that the recognised news publisher clause is right, because everything that my members publish is journalistic content. Therefore, the bulk of journalistic content that is out there will be covered by that. I think where there are elements of what else could be considered journalistic content, the journalistic content clause will pick those up.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q As journalists, does that worry you?

Matt Rogerson: I wish I was a journalist.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Sorry, as representatives of journalists.

Matt Rogerson: It worries me in the sense that we want a plural media ecosystem in this country, and we want individuals who are journalists to have their content published on platforms, so that it can be read by the 50% of the UK population that get their news from Facebook. I think it is potentially problematic that they won’t be able to publish on that platform if they talk about issues that are in the “legal but harmful” bucket of harms, as defined after the Bill is passed. I think there is concern for those groups.

There are suggestions for how you could change the clause to enable them to have more protection. As I say, Gavin Millar has outlined that in his paper. Even then, once you have got that in place, if you have a series of legal but harmful harms that are relatively unclear, the challenge for the platforms will be interpreting that and interpreting it against the journalistic content clause.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q My only concern is that someone who just decides to call themselves a journalist will be able to say what they want.

Owen Meredith: I do not think that would be allowable under the Bill, because of the distinction between a recognised news publisher publishing what we would all recognise as journalistic content, versus the journalistic content exemption. I think that is why they are treated differently.

[Chris Philp]

Q Can I start by clarifying a comment that Owen Meredith made at the very beginning? You were commenting on where you would like the Bill to go further in protecting media organisations, and you said that you wanted there to be a wholesale exemption for recognised news publishers. I think there already is a wholesale exemption for recognised news publishers. The area where the Government have said they are looking at going further is in relation to what some people call a temporary “must carry” provision, or a mandatory right of appeal for recognised news publishers. Can I just clarify that that is what you meant?

Owen Meredith: Yes. I think the issue is how that exemption will work in practice. I think that what the Government have said they are looking at and will bring forward does address the operating in practice.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Mr Lewis, you were nodding.

Martin Lewis: I was nodding—I was smiling and thinking, “If it makes you feel any better, Tim, I have pictures of me that tell people to invest money that are clearly fake, because I don’t do any adverts, and it still is an absolute pain in the backside for me to get them taken down, having sued Facebook.” So, if your members want to feel any sense of comradeship, they are not alone in this; it is very difficult.

I think the interesting thing is about that volumetric algorithm. Of course, we go back to the fact that these big companies like to err on the side of making money and err away from the side of protecting consumers, because those two, when it comes to scams, are diametrically opposed. The sooner we tidy it up, the better. You could have a process where once there has been a certain number of reports—I absolutely get Tim’s point that in certain cases there is not a big enough volume—the advert is taken down and then the company has to proactively decide to put it back up and effectively say, “We believe this is a valid advert.” Then the system would certainly work better, especially if you bring down the required number of reports. At the moment, I think, there tends to be an erring on the side of, “Keep it up as long as it’s making us money, unless it absolutely goes over the top.”

Many tech experts have shown me adverts with my face in on various social media platforms. They say it would take them less than five minutes to write a program to screen them out, but those adverts continue to appear. We just have to be conscious here that—there is often a move towards self-regulation. Let me be plain, as I am giving evidence. I do not trust any of these companies to have the user and the consumer interest at heart when it comes to their advertising; what they have at heart is their own profits, so if we want to stop them, we have to make this Bill robust enough to stop them, because that is the only way it will stop. Do not rely on them trying to do good, because they are trying to make profit and they will err on the side of that over the side of protecting individuals from scam adverts.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q I thank the witnesses for coming. In terms of regulation, I was going to ask whether you believe that Ofcom is the most suitable regulator to operate in this area. You have almost alluded to the fact that you might not. On that basis, should we specify in the Bill a duty for Ofcom to co-operate with other regulators—for example, the Competition and Markets Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority, Action Fraud or whoever else?

Tim Fassam: I believe that would be helpful. I think Ofcom is the right organisation to manage the relationship with the platforms, because it is going to be much broader than the topics we are talking about in our session, but we do think the FCA, Action Fraud and potentially the CMA should be able to direct, and be very clear with Ofcom, that action needs to be taken. Ofcom should have the ability to ask for things to be reviewed to see whether they break the rules.

The other area where we think action probably needs to be taken is where firms are under investigation, because the Bill assumes it is clear cut whether something is fraud, a scam, a breach of the regulations or not. In some circumstances, that can take six months or a year to establish through investigation. We believe that if, for example, the FCA feels that something is high risk, it should be able to ask Ofcom to suspend an advert, or a firm from advertising, pending an investigation to assess whether it is a breach of the regulation.

Rocio Concha: I agree that Ofcom is the right regulator, the main regulator, but it needs to work with the other regulators—with the FCA, ASA and CMA—to enforce the Bill effectively. There is another area. Basically, we need to make sure that Ofcom and all the regulators involved have the right resources. When the initial version of the Bill was published, Ofcom got additional resources to enable it to enforce the Bill. But the Bill has increased in scope, because now it includes fraud and fraudulent advertising. We need to make sure that Ofcom has the right resources to enforce the full Bill effectively. That is something that the Government really need to consider.

Martin Lewis: I was going to make exactly that point, but it has just been made brilliantly so I will not waste your time.

[Chris Philp]

Q I thank the witnesses for joining us this afternoon, and particularly Martin Lewis for his campaigning in this area.

I will start by agreeing with the point that Martin Lewis made a minute or two ago—that we cannot trust these companies to work on their own. Mr Lewis, I am not sure whether you have had a chance to go through clause 34, which we inserted into the Bill following your evidence to the Joint Committee last year. It imposes a duty on these companies to take steps and implement systems to

“prevent individuals from encountering content consisting of fraudulent advertisements”.

There is a clear duty to stop them from doing this, rather as you were asking a minute ago when you described the presentation. Does that strong requirement in clause 34, to stop individuals from encountering fraudulent advertisement content, meet the objective that you were asking for last year?

Martin Lewis: Let me start by saying that I am very grateful that you have put it in there and thankful that the Government have listened to our campaign. What I am about to say is not intended as criticism.

It is very difficult to know how this will work in practice. The issue is all about thresholds. How many scam adverts can we stomach? I still have, daily—even from the platform that I sued, never mind the others—tens of reports directly to me of scam adverts with my face on. Even though there is a promise that we will try to mitigate that, the companies are not doing it. We have to have a legitimate understanding that we are not going to have zero scam adverts on these platforms; unless they were to pre-vet, which I do not think they will, the way they operate means that will not happen.

I am not a lawyer but my concern is that the Bill should make it clear, and that any interpretation of the Bill from Ofcom should be clear, about exactly what threshold of scam adverts is acceptable—we know that they are going to happen—and what threshold is not acceptable. I do not have the expertise to answer your question; I have to rely on your expertise to do that. But I ask the Committee to think properly about what the threshold level should be.

What is and is not acceptable? What counts as “doing everything they can”? They are going to get big lawyers involved if you say there must be zero scam adverts—that is not going to happen. How many scam adverts are acceptable and how many are not? I am so sorry to throw that back as a question when I am a witness, but I do not have the expertise to answer. But that is my concern: I am not 100% convinced of the threshold level that you are setting.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs Miller]

Specifically for children.

Frances Haugen: I will give you an example. Facebook has estimated ages for every single person on the platform, because the reality is that lots of adults also lie about their ages when they join, and advertisers want to target very specific demographics—for example, if you are selling a kit for a 40th birthday, you do not want to mis-target that by 10 years. Facebook has estimated ages for everyone on the platform. It could be required to publish every year, so that we could say, “Hey, there are four kids on the platform who you currently believe, using your estimated ages, are 14 years old—based not on how old they say they are, but on your estimate that this person is 14 years old. When did they join the platform? What fraction of your 14-year-olds have been on the platform since they were 10?” That is a vital statistic.

If the platforms were required to publish that every single quarter, we could say, “Wow! You were doing really badly four years ago, and you need to get a lot better.” Those kinds of lagging metrics are a way of allowing the public to grade Facebook’s homework, instead of just trusting Facebook to do a good job.

Facebook already does analyses like this today. They already know that on Facebook Blue, for example, for some age cohorts, 20% of 11-year-olds were on the platform—and back then, not that many kids were online. Today, I would guess a much larger fraction of 11-year-olds are on Instagram. We need to have transparency into how badly they are doing their jobs.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Frances, do you think that the Bill needs to set statutory minimum standards for things such as risk assessments and codes of practice? What will a company such as Facebook do without a minimum standard to go by?

Frances Haugen: It is vital to get into the statute minimum standards for things such as risk assessments and codes of conduct. Facebook has demonstrated time and again—the reality is that other social media platforms have too—that it does the bare minimum to avoid really egregious reputational damage. It does not ensure the level of quality needed for public safety. If you do not put that into the Bill, I worry that it will be watered down by the mountains of lobbyists that Facebook will throw at this problem.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Thank you. You alluded earlier to the fact that the Bill contains duties to protect content of democratic importance and journalistic content. What is your view on those measures and their likely effectiveness?

Frances Haugen: I want to reiterate that AI struggles to do even really basic tasks. For example, Facebook’s own document said that it only took down 0.8% of violence-inciting content. Let us look at a much broader category, such as content of democratic importance—if you include that in the Bill, I guarantee you that the platforms will come back to you and say that they have no idea how to implement the Bill. There is no chance that AI will do a good job of identifying content of democratic importance at any point in the next 30 years.

The second question is about carve-outs for media. At a minimum, we need to greatly tighten the standards for what counts as a publication. Right now, I could get together with a friend and start a blog and, as citizen journalists, get the exact same protections as an established, thoughtful, well-staffed publication with an editorial board and other forms of accountability. Time and again, we have seen countries such as Russia use small media outlets as part of their misinformation and disinformation strategies. At a minimum, we need to really tighten that standard.

We have even seen situations where they will use very established publications, such as CNN. They will take an article that says, “Ukrainians destroyed a bunch of Russian tanks,” and intentionally have their bot networks spread that out. They will just paste the link and say, “Russia destroyed a bunch of tanks.” People briefly glance at the snippet, they see the picture of the tank, they see “CNN”, and they think, “Ah, Russia is winning.” We need to remember that even real media outlets can be abused by our enemies to manipulate the public.

[Caroline Ansell]

Q Good afternoon, Frances. I want to ask you about anonymity and striking a balance. We have heard variously that anonymity affords some users safe engagement and actually reduces harm, while for others anonymity has been seen to fuel abuse. How do you see the balance, and how do you see the Bill striving to achieve that?

Frances Haugen: It is important for people to understand what anonymity really is and what it would really mean to have confirmed identities. Platforms already have a huge amount of data on their users. We bleed information about ourselves on to these platforms. It is not about whether the platforms could identify people to the authorities; it is that they choose not to do that.

Secondly, if we did, say, mandate IDs, platforms would have two choices. The first would be to require IDs, so that every single user on their platform would have to have an ID that is verifiable via a computer database—you would have to show your ID and the platform would confirm it off the computer. Platforms would suddenly lose users in many countries around the world that do not have well-integrated computerised databases. The platforms will come back to you and say that they cannot lose a third or half of their users. As long as they are allowed to have users from countries that do not have those levels of sophisticated systems, users in the UK will just use VPNs—a kind of software that allows you to kind of teleport to a different place in the world—and pretend to be users from those other places. Things such as ID identification are not very effective.

Lastly, we need to remember that there is a lot of nuance in things like encryption and anonymity. As a whistleblower, I believe there is a vital need for having access to private communications, but I believe we need to view these things in context. There is a huge difference between, say, Signal, which is open source and anyone in the world can read the code for it—the US Department of Defence only endorses Signal for its employees, because it knows exactly what is being used—and something like Messenger. Messenger is very different, because we have no idea how it actually works. Facebook says, “We use this protocol,” but we cannot see the code; we have no idea. It is the same for Telegram; it is a private company with dubious connections.

If people think that they are safe and anonymous, but they are not actually anonymous, they can put themselves at a lot of risk. The secondary thing is that when we have anonymity in context with more sensitive data—for example, Instagram and Facebook act like directories for finding children—that is a very different context for having anonymity and privacy from something like Signal, where you have to know someone’s phone number in order to contact them.

These things are not cut-and-dried, black-or-white issues. I think it is difficult to have mandatory identity. I think it is really important to have privacy. We have to view them in context.

Online Safety Bill (Third sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate - 3rd sitting
Thursday 26th May 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Mrs Miller]

Q Can I bring Lorna in here? We are talking about moving from content to the drivers of harm. Where would you suggest that should be achieved within the Bill?

Professor Lorna Woods: I think by an overarching risk assessment rather than one that is broken down into the different types of content, because that, in a way, assumes a certain knowledge of the type of content before you can do a risk assessment, so you are into a certain circular mode there. Rather than prejudging types of content, I think it would be more helpful to look at what is there and what the system is doing. Then we could look at what a proportionate response would be—looking, as people have said, at the design and the features. Rather than waiting for content to be created and then trying to deal with it, we could look at more friction at an earlier stage.

If I may add a technical point, I think there is a gap relating to search engines. The draft Bill excluded paid-for content advertising. It seems that, for user-to-user content, this is now in the Bill, bringing it more into line with the current standards for children under the video-sharing platform provisions. That does not apply to search. Search engines have duties only in relation to search content, and search content excludes advertising. That means, as I read it, that search engines would have absolutely no duties to children under their children safety duty in relation to advertising content. You could, for example, target a child with pornography and it would fall outside the regime. I think that is a bit of a gap.

[Kim Leadbeater (Batley and Spen) (Lab)]

Q Thank you, witnesses, for your time this morning. I am going to focus initially on journalistic content. Is it fair that the platforms themselves are having to try to define what journalistic content is and, by default, what a journalist is? Do you see a way around this?

William Moy: No, no, yes. First, no, it is not fair to put that all on the platforms, particularly because—I think this a crucial thing for the Committee across the Bill as a whole—for anything to be done at internet scale, it has to be able to be done by dumb robots. Whatever the internet companies tell you about the abilities of their technology, it is not magic, and it is highly error-prone. For this duty to be meaningful, it has to be essentially exercised in machine learning. That is really important to bear in mind. Therefore, being clear about what it is going to tackle in a way that can be operationalised is important.

To your second point, it is really important in this day and age to question whether journalistic content and journalists equate to one another. I think this has come up in a previous session. Nowadays, journalism, or what we used to think of as journalism, is done by all kinds of people. That includes the same function of scrutiny and informing others and so on. It is that function that we care about—the passing of information between people in a democracy. We need to protect that public interest function. I think it is really important to get at that. I am sure there are better ways of protecting the public interest in this Bill by targeted protections or specifically protecting freedom of expression in specific ways, rather than these very broad, vague and general duties.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Is there a body that sets out a framework around journalistic standards that the Bill could possibly refer to?

William Moy: No.

William Perrin: At Carnegie, in our earliest work on this in 2018, we were very clear that this Bill should not be a route to regulating the press and media beyond what the social settlement was. Many people are grumpy about that settlement, and many people are happy with it, but it is a classic system intention. We welcome the Government’s attempt to carve journalism out one way or another, but there is still a great problem in defining journalists and journalism.

I think some of the issues around news provider organisations do give a sense in the Bill of a heavy-duty organisation, not some fly-by-night thing that has been set up to evade the rules. As Will was pointing out, the issue then comes down to individual journalists, who are applying their trade in new ways that the new media allows them to do. I remember many years ago, when I ran a media business, having a surreal meeting at DCMS during Leveson, where I had to explain to them what a blogger was. Sadly, we have not quite yet got that precision of how one achieves the intended effect around, in particular, individual journalists.

Professor Lorna Woods: I emphasise what Mr Moy said about the fact that this is going to have to be a system. It is not a decision on every individual item of content, and it is not about a decision on individual speakers. It is going to be about how the characteristics that we care about—the function of journalism—are recognised in an automated systems.

On the drafting of the Bill, I wonder whether there is any overlap between the user-generated content and citizen journalism in clause 16 and the recognition in clause 15 of user-generated content in relation to democratic speech. I am not sure whether one is not a subset of the other.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q What would you change about clauses 15 and 16? Is there an argument that they should not be there at all?

Professor Lorna Woods: I have to confess that I have not really looked at them in great detail, although I have read them. I do not think they work, but I have not got to a solution because that is actually quite a difficult thing to define.

William Moy: I should declare an interest in clause 15 and the news publisher content exemption, because Full Fact would be covered by that exemption. I do not welcome that; I find it very awkward that we could be fact-checking things and some of the people we are fact-checking would not be covered by the exemption.

It is regrettable that we are asking for those exemptions in the Bill. The Bill should protect freedom of expression for everyone. Given the political reality of that clause, it does not do the job that it tries to do. The reason why is essentially because you can set yourself up to pass the test in that clause very easily. The Minister asked about that in a previous session and recognised that there is probably room to tighten the drafting, and I am very happy to work with his officials and talk about how, if that is Parliament’s political intention, we can do it in as practical a way as possible.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Thank you. How could the Bill protect people who are involved in elections, be they parliamentary candidates, people standing in local elections, staff, or election officers? Could that be worked on, and where would it go in the Bill?

William Perrin: The Bill is a risk-management regime. As part of a risk-management regime, one should routinely identify people who are at high risk and high-risk events, where they intersect and how you assess and mitigate that risk. As someone who was a civil servant for 15 years and has worked in public policy since, I hugely respect the functioning of the election process. At the very extreme end, we have seen hideous events occur in recent years, but there is also the routine abuse of politicians and, to some extent, an attempt to terrorise women politicians off certain platforms, which has been quite grotesque.

I feel that there is a space, within the spirit of the Bill as a risk-management regime, to draw out the particular risks faced by people who participate in elections. They are not just candidates and office holders, as you say, but the staff who administer elections—we saw the terrible abuse heaped on them in recent American elections; let us hope that that does not come across here—and possibly even journalists, who do the difficult job of reporting on elections, which is a fundamental part of democracy.

The best way to address those issues might be to require Ofcom to produce a straightforward code of practice—particularly for large, category 1 platforms—so that platforms regard elections and the people who take part in them as high-risk events and high-harm individuals, and take appropriate steps. One appropriate step would be to do a forward look at what the risks might be and when they might arise. Every year, the BBC produces an elections forward look to help it manage the particular risks of public service broadcasting around elections. Could a platform be asked to produce and publish an elections forward look, discussing with people who take part in elections their experience of the risks that they face and how best to mitigate them in a risk-management regime? That could also involve the National Police Chiefs’ Council, which already produces guidance at each election.

We are sitting here having this discussion in a highly fortified, bomb-proof building surrounded by heavily armed police. I do not think any member of the public would begrudge Members of Parliament and the people who come here that sort of protection. We sometimes hear the argument that MPs should not be recognised as special or get special protection. I do not buy that; no one begrudges the security here. It is a simple step to ask platforms to do a risk assessment that involves potential victims of harm, and to publish it and have a dialogue with those who take part, to ensure that the platforms are safe places for democratic discussion.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Thank you. Just to finish, you are right that the point people have made is, “Why should MPs or elected officials be any different from anybody else?” I understand that. What worries me, from some of the work I have done, is that this is about not just the safety of human beings but the impact on democracy. Threatening and abusive behaviour directed at elected politicians can affect the way they feel about doing their job, and that worries me. Do you think it should be a specific stand-alone offence to send harmful or threatening communications to elected people—MPs, councillors, Mayors or police and crime commissioners? Do you think that warrants a separate, stand-alone offence?

William Perrin: The Government have, to their credit, introduced in this Bill offences of sending messages with the intent to harm, but it will take many years for them to work their way through CPS guidance and to establish a body of case law so that it is understood how they are applied. Of course, these cases are heard in magistrates courts, so they do not get reported very well.

One of the reasons we are here discussing this is that the criminal law has failed to provide adequate measures of public protection across social media. If the criminal law and the operation of the police and the CPS worked, we would not need to have this discussion. This discussion is about a civil regulatory regime to make up for the inadequacies in the working of the criminal law, and about making it work a little smoother. We see that in many areas of regulated activity. I would rather get a quicker start by doing some risk assessment and risk mitigation before, in many years’ time, one gets to an effective operational criminal offence. I note that the Government suggested such an offence a few years ago, but I am not quite clear where it got to.

William Moy: To echo Ms Leadbeater’s call for a holistic approach to this, treating as criminal some of the abuse that MPs receive is entirely appropriate. The cost to all of us of women and people of colour being deterred from public life is real and serious. There is also the point that the Bill deals only with personal harms, and a lot of the risk to elections is risk to the democratic system as a whole. You are absolutely right to highlight that that is a gap in what the Bill is doing. We think, certainly from a misinformation point of view, that you cannot adequately address the predictable misinformation and disinformation campaigns around elections simply by focusing on personal harm.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Thank you.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Chris Philp)]

Q Thank you to the witnesses for joining us and giving us such thorough and clear responses to the various questions. I want to start on a topic that William Perrin and William Moy touched on—the exemption for recognised news publishers, set out in clause 50. You both said you have some views on how that is drafted. As you said, I asked questions on Tuesday about whether there are ways in which it could be improved to avoid loopholes—not that I am suggesting there are any, by the way. Mr Perrin and Mr Moy, could you elaborate on the specific areas where you think it might be improved?

William Moy: Essentially, the tests are such that almost anyone could pass them. Without opening the Bill, you have to have a standards code, which you can make up for yourself, a registered office in the UK and so on. It is not very difficult for a deliberate disinformation actor to pass the set of tests in clause 50 as they currently stand.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Q Thank you. The Antisemitism Policy Trust has made the case that search services should be eligible for inclusion as a high-risk category. Is that still your position? What is the danger, currently, of excluding them from that provision?

Danny Stone: Very much so. You heard earlier about the problems with advertising. I recognise that search services are not the same as user-to-user services, so there does need to be some different thinking. However, at present, they are not required to address legal harms, and the harms are there.

I appeared before the Joint Committee on the draft Bill and talked about Microsoft Bing, which, in its search bar, was prompting people with “Jews are” and then a rude word. You look at “Gays are”, today, and it is prompting people with “Gays are using windmills to waft homosexual mists into your home”. That is from the search bar. The first return is a harmful article. Do the same in Google, for what it’s worth, and you get “10 anti-gay myths debunked.” They have seen this stuff. I have talked to them about it. They are not doing the work to try to address it.

Last night, using Amazon Alexa, I searched “Is George Soros evil?” and the response, was “Yes, he is. According to an Alexa Answers contributor, every corrupt political event.” “Are the White Helmets fake?” “Yes, they are set up by an ex-intelligence officer.” The problem with that is that the search prompts—the things that you are being directed to; the systems here—are problematic, because one person could give an answer to Amazon and that prompts the response. The second one, about the White Helmets, was a comment on a website that led Alexa to give that answer.

Search returns are not necessarily covered because, as I say, they are not the responsibility of the internet companies, but the systems that they design as to how those things are indexed and the systems to prevent them going to harmful sites by default are their responsibility, and at present the Bill does not address that. Something that forces those search companies to have appropriate risk assessments in place for the priority harms that Parliament sets, and to enforce those terms and conditions consistently, would be very wise.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Thank you to the witnesses for joining us today. The Bill contains duties to protect content of “democratic importance” and “journalistic content”. What is your view of these measures and their likely effectiveness?

Liron Velleman: These are both pretty dangerous clauses. We are very concerned about what I would probably be kind and call their unintended consequences. They are loopholes that could allow some of the most harmful and hateful actors to spread harm on social media. I will take “journalistic” first and then move on to “democratic”.

A number of companies mentioned in the previous evidence session are outlets that could be media publications just by adding a complaints system to their website. There is a far-right outlet called Urban Scoop that is run by Tommy Robinson. They just need to add a complaints system to their website and then they would be included as a journalist. There are a number of citizen journalists who specifically go to our borders to harass people who are seeking refuge in this country. They call themselves journalists; Tommy Robinson himself calls himself a journalist. These people have been specifically taken off platforms because they have repeatedly broken the terms of service of those platforms, and we see this as a potential avenue for them to make the case that they should return.

We also see mainstream publications falling foul of the terms of service of social media companies. If I take the example of the Christchurch massacre, social media companies spent a lot of time trying to take down both the livestream of the attack in New Zealand and the manifesto of the terrorist, but the manifesto was then put on the Daily Mail website—you could download the manifesto straight from the Daily Mail website—and the livestream was on the Daily Mirror and The Sun’s websites. We would be in a situation where social media companies could take that down from anyone else, but they would not be able to take it down from those news media organisations. I do not see why we should allow harmful content to exist on the platform just because it comes from a journalist.

On “democratic”, it is still pretty unclear what the definition of democratic speech is within the Bill. If we take it to be pretty narrow and just talk about elected officials and candidates, we know that far-right organisations that have been de-platformed from social media companies for repeatedly breaking the terms of service—groups such as Britain First and, again, Tommy Robinson—are registered with the Electoral Commission. Britain First ran candidates in the local elections in 2022 and they are running in the Wakefield by-election, so, by any measure, they are potentially of “democratic importance”, but I do not see why they should be allowed to break terms of service just because they happen to have candidates in elections.

If we take it on a wider scale and say that it is anything of “democratic importance”, anyone who is looking to cause harm could say, “A live political issue is hatred of the Muslim community.” Someone could argue that that or the political debate around the trans community in the UK is a live political debate, and that would allow anyone to go on the platform and say, “I’ve got 60 users and I’ve got something to say on this live political issue, and therefore I should be on the platform,” in order to cause that harm. To us, that is unacceptable and should be removed from the Bill. We do not want a two-tier internet where some people have the right to be racist online, so we think those two clauses should be removed.

Stephen Kinsella: At Clean up the Internet this is not our focus, although the proposals we have made, which we have been very pleased to see taken up in the Bill, will certainly introduce friction. We keep coming back to friction being one of the solutions. I am not wearing this hat today, but I am on the board of Hacked Off, and if Hacked Off were here, I think they would say that the solution—although not a perfect solution—might be to say that a journalist, or a journalistic outlet, will be one that has subjected itself to proper press regulation by a recognised press regulator. We could then possibly take quite a lot of this out of the scope of social media regulation and leave it where I think it might belong, with proper, responsible press regulation. That would, though, lead on to a different conversation about whether we have independent press regulation at the moment.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q I think someone has alluded to this already, but should the comments section on news publisher platforms be included in the scope of the Bill?

Danny Stone: I feel quite strongly that they should. I think this is about clauses 39(2) and (5). When they had an exemption last time, we were told they were already regulated, because various newspapers have their own systems, because of IPSO or whatever it might be. There was a written question in the House from Emma Hardy, and the Government responded that they had no data—no assessment of moderator system effectiveness or the harms caused. The Secretary of State said to the DCMS Select Committee that he was confident that these platforms have appropriate moderation policies in place, but was deeply sceptical about IPSO involvement. The Law Commission said that it was not going to give legal exemption to comments boards because they host an abundance of harmful material and abuse, and there are articles in, say, The Times:

“Pro-Kremlin trolls have infiltrated the reader comments on the websites of news organisations, including The Times, the Daily Mail and Fox News, as part of a ‘major influence operation’”.

A number of years ago, we worked—through the all-party parliamentary group against antisemitism, to which we provide the secretariat—on a piece with the Society of Editors on comment moderation on websites, so there have been efforts in the past, but this is a place where there is serious harm caused. You can go on The Sun or wherever now and find comments that will potentially be read by millions of people, so having some kind of appropriate risk assessment, minimum standard or quality assurance in respect of comments boards would seem to be a reasonable step. If it does not get into the Bill, I would in any event urge the Minister to develop some guidance or work with the industry to ensure they have some of those standards in place, but ideally, you would want to lose that carve-out in the Bill.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Thank you. Stephen, just to finish—

[The Chair]

Just a short question.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Yes, sorry. Is there a body that sets a framework around journalistic standards that the Bill could refer to?

Stephen Kinsella: Obviously, there are the regulators. There is IMPRESS and IPSO, at the very least. I am afraid that I do not know the answer; there must also be journalistic trade bodies, but the regulators would probably be the first port of call for me.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Thank you.

[Caroline Ansell (Eastbourne) (Con)]

Q May I ask about anonymity? It is mentioned in the Bill, but only once. Do you think there is a need for more expansive coverage of this issue? Do you think people should be able to use the internet while remaining anonymous, and if not, to whom would users disclose their identity? Would it be to the platform, or would it be more publicly than that?

Stephen Kinsella: There are a few questions there, obviously. I should say that we are happy with the approach in the Bill. We always felt that focusing on anonymity was the wrong place to start. Instead, we thought that a positive right to be verified, and then a right to screen out replies and posts from unverified accounts, was the way to go.

In terms of who one should make the disclosure to, or who would provide the verification, our concern was always that we did not want to provide another trove of data that the platforms could use to target us with adverts and otherwise monetise. While we have tried to be agnostic on the solution—again, we welcome the approach in the Bill, which is more about principles and systems than trying to pick outcomes—there are third-party providers out there that could provide one-stop verification. Some of them, for instance, rely on the open banking principles. The good thing about the banks is that under law, under the payment services directive and others, we are the owners of our own data. It is a much greyer area whether we are the owners of the data that the social media platforms hold on us, so using that data that the banks have—there is a solution called One ID, for instance—they will provide verification, and you could then use that to open your social media accounts without having to give that data to the platforms.

I saw in the evidence given to you on Tuesday that it was claimed that 80% of users are reluctant to give their data to platforms. We were surprised by that, and so we looked at it. They chose their words carefully. They said users were reluctant to give their data to “certain websites”. What they meant was porn sites. In the polling they were referring to, the question was specifically about willingness to share data with porn sites, and people are, understandably, reluctant to do that. When using open banking or other systems, there are good third-party providers, I would suggest, for verification.

Online Safety Bill (Second sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 24th May 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Okay. Kim Leadbetter, one very quick question. We must move on—I am sorry.

[Kim Leadbeater (Batley and Spen) (Lab)]

Q Okay, I will try to be very quick. The draft Bill contained a proposed new media literacy duty. That seems to have now disappeared. What are your digital media literacy strategies?

Becky Foreman: We have a range of strategies. One thing I would point to is research that we conduct every year and have done for a number of years called the digital civility index. It is a set of research that speaks to teens and adults in a number of countries around the world to understand what harms they are concerned about online and to ascertain whether those harms are increasing or decreasing and how they vary between different geographies. That is one way in which we are trying to make more data and information available to the general public about the type of harms they might come across online and whether they are increasing or decreasing.

Richard Earley: We have a range of different organisations that we work with in the UK and internationally. One that I would like to draw attention to is the Economist Educational Foundation’s Burnet News Club. We have supported them to increase their funding to be able to aim to reach 10% of all state schools with a really incredibly immersive and impressive programme that enables young people to understand digital literacy and digital numeracy and the media. We are also members of the media literacy taskforce of the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport at the moment, which has been working to build on the strategy that the Government published.

Overall, there is a really important role for us as platforms to play here. We regularly commission and start new programmes in this space. What is also really important is to have more guidance from Government and civil society organisations that we work with on what is effective, so that we can know where we can put our resources and boost the greatest work.

Katie O'Donovan: Thank you for the question. It is really important. We were disappointed to see the literacy focus lost in the Bill.

We really take the issue seriously. We know there is an absolute responsibility for us when it comes to product, and an absolute responsibility when it comes to policy. Even within the safest products and with the most impressive and on-it parents, people can be exposed in content in ways that are surprising and shocking. That is why you need this holistic approach. We have long invested in a programme that we run with the non-governmental organisation Parent Zone called “Be internet legends”. When we developed that, we did it with the PSHE Association to make sure it was totally compliant with the national curriculum. We regularly review that to check that it is actually making a difference. We did some recent research with MORI and got some really good results back.

We used to deliver that programme face to face in schools up and down the country. Obviously, the pandemic stopped that. We went online and while we did not enjoy it quite as much, we were able to reach real scale and it was really effective. Along with doing the assemblies, which are now back in person, we deliver a pack for teachers so they can also take that up at scale. We run similar programmes through YouTube with teenagers. It is absolutely incumbent on us to do more, but it must be part of the debate, because if you rely just on technological solutions, you will end up reducing access to lawful information, with some of the harms still being prevalent and people not having the skills to navigate them.

[The Chair]

I am sorry, but I must move on. Minister, I am afraid you only have five minutes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q If someone has consented to take part in pornography and they later change their mind and would like it to be taken down, do you think they should have the right to ask a porn website, for example, to take it down?

Professor Clare McGlynn: That is quite challenging not only for pornography platforms but for sex workers, in that if you could participate in pornography but at any time thereafter withdraw your consent, it is difficult to understand how a pornography company and the sex worker would be able to make a significant amount of money. The company would be reluctant to invest because it might have to withdraw the material at any time. In my view, that is a quite a challenge. I would not go down that route, because what it highlights is that the industry can be exploitative and that is where the concern comes from. I think there are other ways to deal with an exploitative porn industry and other ways to ensure that the material online has the full consent of participants. You could put some of those provisions into the Bill—for example, making the porn companies verify the age and consent of those who are participating in the videos for them to be uploaded. I think that is a better way to deal with that, and it would ensure that sex workers themselves can still contract to perform in porn and sustain their way of life.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Thank you very much—this is extremely interesting and helpful. You have covered a lot of ground already, but I wonder whether there is anything specific you think the Bill should be doing more about, to protect girls—under-18s or under-16s—in particular?

Janaya Walker: A lot of what we have discussed in terms of naming violence against women and girls on the face of the Bill includes children. We know that four in five offences of sexual communications with a child involved girls, and a lot of child abuse material is targeted at girls specifically. The Bill as a whole takes a very gender-neutral approach, which we do not think is helpful; in fact, we think it is quite harmful to trying to reduce the harm that girls face online.

This goes against the approach taken in the Home Office violence against women and girls strategy and its domestic abuse plan, as well as the gold-standard treaties the UK has signed up to, such as the Istanbul convention, which we signed and have recently committed to ratifying. The convention states explicitly that domestic laws, including on violence against women and girls online, need to take a very gendered approach. Currently, it is almost implied, with references to specific characteristics. We think that in addressing the abuse that girls, specifically, experience, we need to name girls. To clarify, the words “women”, “girls”, “gender” and “sex” do not appear in the Bill, and that is a problem.

Jessica Eagelton: May I add a point that is slightly broader than your question? Another thing that the Bill does not do at the moment is provide for specialist victim support for girls who are experiencing online abuse. There has been some discussion about taking a “polluter pays” approach; where platforms are not compliant with the duties, for example, a percentage of the funds that go to the regulator could go towards victim support services, such as the revenge porn helpline and Refuge’s tech abuse team, that provide support to victims of abuse later on.

Professor Clare McGlynn: I can speak to pornography. Do you want to cover that separately, or shall I do that now?

[Kim Leadbeater]

That is fine.

Professor Clare McGlynn: I know that there was a discussion this morning about age assurance, which obviously targets children’s access to pornography. I would emphasise that age assurance is not a panacea for the problems with pornography. We are so worried about age assurance only because of the content that is available online. The pornography industry is quite happy with age verification measures. It is a win-win for them: they get public credibility by saying they will adopt it; they can monetise it, because they are going to get more data—especially if they are encouraged to develop age verification measures, which of course they have been; that really is putting the fox in charge of the henhouse—and they know that it will be easily evaded.

One of the most recent surveys of young people in the UK was of 16 and 17-year-olds: 50% of them had used a VPN, which avoids age verification controls, and 25% more knew about that, so 75% of those older children knew how to evade age assurance. This is why the companies are quite happy—they are going to make money. It will stop some people stumbling across it, but it will not stop most older children accessing pornography. We need to focus on the content, and when we do that, we have to go beyond age assurance.

You have just heard Google talking about how it takes safety very seriously. Rape porn and incest porn are one click away on Google. They are freely and easily accessible. There are swathes of that material on Google. Twitter is hiding in plain sight, too. I know that you had a discussion about Twitter this morning. I, like many, thought, “Yes, I know there is porn on Twitter,” but I must confess that until doing some prep over the last few weeks, I did not know the nature of that porn. For example, “Kidnapped in the wood”; “Daddy’s little girl comes home from school; let’s now cheer her up”; “Raped behind the bin”—this is the material that is on Twitter. We know there is a problem with Pornhub, but this is what is on Twitter as well.

As the Minister mentioned this morning, Twitter says you have to be 13, and you have to be 18 to try to access much of this content, but you just put in whatever date of birth is necessary—it is that easy—and you can get all this material. It is freely and easily accessible. Those companies are hiding in plain sight in that sense. The age verification and age assurance provisions, and the safety duties, need to be toughened up.

To an extent, I think this will come down to the regulator. Is the regulator going to accept Google’s SafeSearch as satisfying the safety duties? I am not convinced, because of the easy accessibility of the rape and incest porn I have just talked about. I emphasise that incest porn is not classed as extreme pornography, so it is not a priority offence, but there are swathes of that material on Pornhub as well. In one of the studies that I did, we found that one in eight titles on the mainstream pornography sites described sexually violent material, and the incest material was the highest category in that. There is a lot of that around.

[Barbara Keeley]

Q We are talking here about pornography when it is hosted on mainstream websites, as opposed to pornographic websites. Could I ask you to confirm what more, specifically, you think the Bill should do to tackle pornography on mainstream websites, as you have just been describing with Twitter? What should the Bill be doing here?

Professor Clare McGlynn: In many ways, it is going to be up to the regulator. Is the regulator going to deem that things such as SafeSearch, or Twitter’s current rules about sensitive information—which rely on the host to identify their material as sensitive—satisfy their obligations to minimise and mitigate the risk? That is, in essence, what it will all come down to.

Are they going to take the terms and conditions of Twitter, for example, at face value? Twitter’s terms and conditions do say that they do not want sexually violent material on there, and they even say that it is because they know it glorifies violence against women and girls, but this material is there and does not appear to get swiftly and easily taken down. Even when you try to block it—I tried to block some cartoon child sexual abuse images, which are easily available on there; you do not have to search for them very hard, it literally comes up when you search for porn—it brings you up five or six other options in case you want to report them as well, so you are viewing them as well. Just on the cartoon child sexual abuse images, before anyone asks, they are very clever, because they are just under the radar of what is actually a prohibited offence.

It is not necessarily that there is more that the Bill itself could do, although the code of practice would ensure that they have to think about these things more. They have to report on their transparency and their risk assessments: for example, what type of content are they taking down? Who is making the reports, and how many are they upholding? But it is then on the regulator as to what they are going to accept as acceptable, frankly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs Miller]

Q Ian, how do you drive a culture change in the sector?

Ian Stevenson: I think you have to look at the change you are trying to effect. For many people in the sector, there is a lack of awareness about what happens when the need to consider safety in building features is not put first. Even when you realise how many bad things can happen online, if you do not know what to do about it, you tend not to be able to do anything about it.

If we want to change culture—it is the same for individual organisations as for the sector as a whole—we have to educate people on what the problem is and give them the tools to feel empowered to do something about it. If you educate and empower people, you remove the barrier to change. In some places, an extremely ethical people-centric and safety-focused culture very naturally emerges, but in others, less so. That is precisely where making it a first-class citizen in terms of risk assessment for boards and management becomes so important. When people see management caring about things, that gets pushed out through the organisations.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q In your view, what needs to be added or taken away from the Bill to help it achieve the Government’s aim of making the UK

“the safest place in the world to be online”?

Lulu Freemont: First, I want to outline that there are some strong parts in the Bill that the sector really supports. I think the majority of stakeholders would agree that the objectives are the right ones. The Bill tries to strike a balance between safety, free speech and encouraging innovation and investment in the UK’s digital economy. The approach—risk-based, systems-led and proportionate—is the right one for the 25,000 companies that are in scope. As it does not focus on individual pieces of content, it has the potential to be future-proof and to achieve longer-term outcomes.

The second area in the Bill that we think is strong is the prioritisation of illegal content. We very much welcome the clear definitions of illegal content on the face of the Bill, which are incredibly useful for businesses as they start to think about preparing for their risk assessment on illegal content. We really support Ofcom as the appropriate regulator.

There are some parts of the Bill that need specific focus and, potentially, amendments, to enable it to deliver on those objectives without unintended consequences. I have already mentioned a few of those areas. The first is defining harmful content in primary legislation. We can leave it to codes to identify the interpretations around that, but we need definitions of harmful content so that businesses can start to understand what they need to do.

Secondly, we need clarity that businesses will not be required to monitor every piece of content as a result of the Bill. General monitoring is prohibited in other regions, and we have concerns that the Online Safety Bill is drifting away from those norms. The challenges of general monitoring are well known: it encroaches on individual rights and could result in the over-removal of content. Again, we do not think that the intention is to require companies of all sizes to look at every piece of content on their site, but it might be one of the unintended consequences, so we would like an explicit prohibition of general monitoring on the face of the Bill.

We would like to remove the far-reaching amendment powers of the Secretary of State. We understand the need for technical powers, which are best practised within regulation, but taking those further so that the Secretary of State can amend the regime in such an extreme way to align with public policy is of real concern, particularly to smaller businesses looking to confidently put in place systems and processes. We would like some consideration of keeping senior management liability as it is. Extending that further is only going to increase the chilling impact that it is having and the environment it is creating within UK investment. The final area, which I have just spoken about, is clarifying the scope. The business-to-business companies in our membership need clarity that they are not in scope and for that intention to be made clear on the face of the Bill.

We really support the Bill. We think it has the potential to deliver. There are just a few key areas that need to be changed or amended slightly to provide businesses with clarity and reassurances that the policy intentions are being delivered on.

Adam Hildreth: To add to that—Lulu has covered absolutely everything, and I agree—the critical bit is not monitoring individual pieces of content. Once you have done your risk assessment and put in place your systems, processes, people and technology, that is what people are signing up for. They are not signing up for this end assessment where, because you find that one piece of harmful content exists, or maybe many, you have failed to abide by what you are really signing up to.

That is the worry from my perspective: that people do a full risk assessment, implement all the systems, put in place all the people, technology and processes that they need, do the best job they can and have understood what investment they are putting in, and someone comes along and makes a report to a regulator—Ofcom, in this sense—and says, “I found this piece of content there.” That may expose weaknesses, but the very best risk assessments are ongoing ones anyway, where you do not just put it away in a filing cabinet somewhere and say, “That’s done.” The definitions of online harms and harmful content change on a daily basis, even for the biggest social media platforms; they change all the time. There was talk earlier about child sexual abuse material that appears as cartoons, which would not necessarily be defined by certain legislation as illegal. Hopefully the legislation will catch up, but that is where that risk assessment needs to be made again, and policies may need to be changed and everything else. I just hope we do not get to the point where the individual monitoring of content, or content misses, is the goal of the Bill—that the approach taken to online safety is this overall one.

[The Chair]

Thank you. I call the Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q Finally, do you think it would be desirable for Ofcom to consider a system with more consistency in parental controls, so that parents can always ensure that their children cannot talk to anybody outside their circle? Would that be helpful?

Dr Rachel O'Connell: There is a history of parental controls, and only 36% of parents use them. Ofcom research consistently says that it is 70%, but in reality, it is lower. When using age verification, the parents are removing the ability to watch everything. It is a platform; they are providing the digital playground. In the same way, when you go on swings and slides, there is bouncy tarmac because you know the kids are going to use them. It is like creating that health and safety environment in a digital playground.

When parents receive a notification that their child wants to access something, there could be a colour-coded nutrition-style thing for social media, livestreaming and so on, and the parents could make an informed choice. It is then up to the platform to maintain that digital playground and run those kinds of detection systems to see if there are any bad actors in there. That is better than parental controls because the parent is consenting and it is the responsibility of the platform to create the safer environment. It is not the responsibility of the parent to look over the child’s shoulder 24/7 when they are online.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q The age verification stuff is really interesting, so thank you to our witnesses. On violence against women and girls, clauses 150 to 155 set out three new communications offences. Do you think those offences will protect women from receiving offensive comments, trolling and threats online? What will the Bill mean for changing the way you manage those risks on your platforms?

Jared Sine: I do not know the specific provisions but I am familiar with the general concept of them. Any time you put something in law, it can either be criminalised or have enforcement behind it, and I think that helps. Ultimately, it will be up to the platforms to come up with innovative technologies or systems such as “Are You Sure?” and “Does This Bother You?” which say that although the law says x, we are going to go beyond that to find tools and systems that make it happen on our platform. Although I think it is clearly a benefit to have those types of provisions in law, it will really come down to the platforms taking those extra steps in the future. We work with our own advisory council, which includes the founder of the #MeToo movement, REIGN and others, who advise us on how to make platforms safer for those things. That is where the real bread gets buttered, so to speak.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Do you think that is consistent across your industry? It sounds like you are taking a very proactive approach to it.

Jared Sine: We are proactive about it, and I know our colleagues and friends over at Bumble are proactive about it as well. Our heads of trust and safety both came from the same company—Uber—before coming to us, so I know that they compare notes quite regularly. Because of the way the legislation is set up, there can be codes of conduct applying specifically to online dating, and to the extent that that technology exists, you need to deploy it.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Thank you. One question from Kim Leadbeater.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Thank you for your very powerful testimony, Rhiannon. I appreciate that could not have been easy. Going back to the digital literacy piece, it feels like we were talking about digital literacy in the Bill when it started coming through, and that has been removed now. How important do you think it is that we have a digital literacy strategy, and that we hold social media providers in particular to having a strategy on digital education for young people?

Rhiannon-Faye McDonald: It is incredibly important that we have this education piece. Like Susie said, we cannot rely on technology or any single part of this to solve child sexual abuse, and we cannot rely on the police to arrest their way out of the problem. Education really is the key. That is education in all areas—educating the child in an appropriate way and educating parents. We hold parenting workshops. Parents are terrified; they do not know what to do, what platforms are doing what, or what to do when things go wrong. They do not even know how to talk to children about the issue; it is embarrassing for them and they cannot bring it up. Educating parents is a huge thing. Companies have a big responsibility there. They should have key strategies in place on how they are going to improve education.

[Chris Philp]

Q Can I start by thanking both Rhiannon-Faye and Susie for coming and giving evidence, and for all the work they are doing in this area? I know it has been done over many years in both cases.

I would like to pick up on a point that has arisen in the discussion so far—the point that Susie raised about the risks posed by Meta introducing end-to-end encryption, particularly on the Facebook Messenger service. You have referenced the fact that huge numbers of child sexual exploitation images are identified by scanning those communications, leading to the arrests of thousands of paedophiles each year. You also referenced the fact that when this was temporarily turned off in Europe owing to the privacy laws there—briefly, thankfully—there was a huge loss of information. We will come on to the Bill in a minute, but as technology stands now, if Meta did proceed with end-to-end encryption, would that scanning ability be lost?

Susie Hargreaves: Yes. It would not affect the Internet Watch Foundation, but it would affect the National Centre for Missing and Exploited Children. Facebook, as a US company, has a responsibility to do mandatory reporting to NCMEC, which will be brought in with the Bill in this country. Those millions of images would be lost, as of today, if they brought end-to-end encryption in now.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We are playing “Beat the clock”. I am going to ask for brief answers and brief questions, please. I will take one question from Kim Leadbeater and one from Barbara Keeley.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Gosh, right. I think we are clear that your view is that these two exceptions could potentially do more harm than good. The ideal scenario from your perspective would be to remove them, but again, the challenge is how we balance the freedom of speech issue with protecting the rights of people online who are vulnerable to abuse and harassment. How would you respond to those who say that the Bill risks setting an unwitting precedent for non-democratic countries that would seek to restrict the freedom of expression of their citizens?

Ellen Judson: There is absolutely a risk of over-moderation, and of the Bill incentivising over-moderation, particularly because of the very heavy content focus. Even with illegal content, there is a very broad range of content that companies are expected proactively to monitor for, even when the technical systems to identify that content reliably at scale are perhaps not in place. I absolutely understand and share the concern about over-moderation.

Our response would be that we should look to strengthen the freedom of expression duties currently in the Bill. At the moment, there is a quite vague duty to have regard to the importance of freedom of expression, but it is not at all clear what that would actually mean, and what would be expected from the platforms. One change we would want would be for rights—including freedom of expression and privacy—to be included in the online safety objectives, and to establish that part of the purpose of this regime is to ensure that services are being designed to protect and promote human rights, including freedom of expression. We think that would be a way to bring freedom of expression much more into the centre of the regime and the focus of the Bill, without having to have those add-on exemptions after the fact.

Kyle Taylor: And it creates a level playing field—it says, “These rules apply to everyone equally.”

On the second point, authoritarian—absolutely—but the other area that is really important is fragile democracies. For example, if you look at Hungary, just last week Viktor Orbán said, “You know what you need? Your own media.” If we are setting a standard that says it is totally fine to exempt people in politics and media, then for those fragile democracies that control most aspects of information sharing, we are explicitly saying that it is okay to privilege them over others. That is a very dangerous precedent to set when we have the opportunity to set best global standards here with the Bill.

[The Chair]

Barbara Keeley?

Online Safety Bill (First sitting)

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 24th May 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q My last question is about future-proofing the Bill. Obviously, an awful lot of things will happen in the online world that do not currently happen there, and some of those we cannot foresee. Do you think the Bill is wide enough and flexible enough to allow changes to be made so that new and emerging platforms can be regulated?

Kevin Bakhurst: Overall, we feel that it is. By and large, the balance between certainty and flexibility in the Bill is probably about right and will allow some flexibility in future, but it is very hard to predict what other harms may emerge. We will remain as flexible as possible.

Richard Wronka: There are some really important updating tools in the Bill. The ability for the Secretary of State to introduce new priority harms or offences—with the approval of Parliament, of course—is really important.

[Kim Leadbeater (Batley and Spen) (Lab)]

Q Ofcom is required to produce certain codes, for example on terrorism, but others that were floated in the Green Paper are no longer in the Bill. Are you working on such codes, for example on hate crime and wider harm, and if not, what happens in the meantime? I guess that links to my concerns about the democratic importance and journalistic content provisions in the Bill, to which you have alluded. They are very vague protections and I am concerned that they could be exploited by extremists who suddenly want to identify as a journalist or a political candidate. Could you say a little about the codes and about those two particular clauses and what more you think we could do to help you with those?

Richard Wronka: I will cover the codes first. You are absolutely right that the Bill requires Ofcom to publish codes of practice, particularly on CSEA and on terror, as well as on fraudulent advertising and other areas. We are doing the work right now so that we are ready to progress with that process as soon as we get powers and duties, because it is really important that we are ready to move as quickly as possible. We will set out further detail on exactly how we plan to do that in a roadmap document that we are looking to publish before the summer break, so that will provide some of the detail.

A really important point here is that the Bill quite rightly covers a wide set of harms. We are mindful of the fact that the temptation of having a code that covers every single harm could be counterproductive and confusing for platforms, even for those that want to comply and do the right thing. One of the balancing acts for us as we produce that code framework will be to get the right coverage for all the issues that everyone is rightly concerned about, but doing that in a way that is streamlined and efficient, so that services can apply the provisions of those codes.

Richard Wronka: Shall I pick up on the second bit very quickly? I think you are right; this is one of our central concerns about the definitions. As far as possible, this should be a matter for Parliament. It is really important that to know Parliament has a view on this. Ultimately, the regulator will take a view based on what Parliament says. We have some experience in this area, but as Richard said, we recognise the challenge—it is extremely complex. We can see the policy intent of doing it, quite rightly, and the importance of enshrining freedom of expression as far as possible, but Parliament can help to add clarity and, as you rightly say, be aware of some of the potential loopholes. At the moment, someone could describe themselves as a citizen journalist; where does that leave us? I am not quite sure. Parliament could help to clarify that, and we would be grateful.

[Dean Russell]

Q Do the powers in the Bill cover enough to ensure that people will not be sent flashing images if they have photosensitive epilepsy?

Richard Wronka: This picks up the point we discussed earlier, which is that I understand that the Government are considering proposals from the Law Commission to criminalise the sending of those kinds of images. It would not be covered by the illegal content duties as things stand, but if the Government conclude that it is right to criminalise those issues, it would automatically be picked up by the Bill.

Even so, the regime is not, on the whole, going to be able to pick up every instance of harm. It is about making sure that platforms have the right systems and processes. Where there is clear harm to individuals, we would expect those processes to be robust. We know there is work going on in the industry on that particular issue to try and drive forward those processes.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I will bring in Kim Leadbeater and then Maria Miller and Kirsty Blackman, but I will definitely bring in the Minister at 10.45 am.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Thank you, Ms Rees, and thank you to the witnesses. Many websites host pornography without necessarily being pornographic websites, meaning that children can easily stumble across it. Does the Bill do enough to tackle pornography when it is hosted on mainstream websites?

Dame Rachel de Souza: I have argued hard to get pornographic sites brought into the Bill. That is something very positive about the Bill, and I was really pleased to see that. Why? I have surveyed more than half a million children in my Big Ask survey and spoken recently to 2,000 children specifically about this issue. They are seeing pornography, mainly on social media sites—Twitter and other sites. We know the negative effects of that, and it is a major concern.

I am pleased to see that age assurance is in the Bill. We need to challenge the social media companies—I pull them together and meet them every six months—on getting this stuff off their sites and making sure that under-age children are not on their sites seeing some of these things. You cannot go hard enough in challenging the social media companies to get pornography off their sites and away from children.

Andy Burrows: Just to add to that, I would absolutely echo that we are delighted that part 5 of the Bill, with measures around commercial pornography, has been introduced. One of our outstanding areas of concern, which applies to pornography but also more broadly, is around clause 26, the children’s access assessment, where the child safety duties will apply not to all services but to services where there is a significant number of child users or children comprise a significant part of the user base. That would seem to open the door to some small and also problematic services being out of scope. We have expressed concerns previously about whether OnlyFans, for example, which is a very significant problem as a user-generated site with adult content, could be out of scope. Those are concerns that I know the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee has recognised as well. We would very much like to see clause 26 removed from the Bill, which would ensure that we have a really comprehensive package in this legislation that tackles both commercial pornography and user-generated material.

[The Chair]

I think Lynn Perry is back. Are you with us, Lynn? [Interruption.] No—okay. We will move on to Maria Miller.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q Just one more question. We know that women and minorities face more abuse online than men do. Is that something that you have found in your experience, particularly Twitter? What are you doing to ensure that the intersectionality of harms is considered in the work that you are doing to either remove or downgrade content?

Katy Minshall: That is absolutely the case and it has been documented by numerous organisations and research. Social media mirrors society and society has the problems you have just described. In terms of how we ensure intersectionality in our policies and approaches, we are guided by our trust and safety council, which is a network of dozens of organisations around the world, 10 of which are here in the UK, and which represents different communities and different online harms issues. Alongside our research and engagement, the council ensures that when it comes to specific policies, we are constantly considering a range of viewpoints as we develop our safety solutions.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Q Thank you, Chair, and thank you to the witnesses. I share your concerns about the lack of clarity regarding the journalistic content and democratic content exemptions. Do you think those exemptions should be removed entirely, or can you suggest what we might do to make them clearer in the Bill?

Katy Minshall: At the very least, there must be tighter definitions. I am especially concerned when it comes to the news publisher exemption. The Secretary of State has indicated an amendment that would mean that services like Twitter would have to leave such content up while an appeals process is ongoing. There is no timeline given. The definition in the Bill of a news publisher is, again, fairly vague. If Ben and I were to set up a news website, nominally have some standards and an email address where people could send complaints, that would enable it to be considered a news publisher under the Bill. If we think about some of the accounts that have been suspended from social media over the years, you can absolutely see them creating a news website and saying, “I have a case to come back on,” to Twitter or TikTok or wherever it maybe.

Ben Bradley: We share those concerns. There are already duties to protect freedom of expression in clause 19. Those are welcome. It is the breadth of the definition of journalistic and democratic content that is a concern for us, particularly when it comes to things like the expediated and dedicated appeals mechanism, which those people would be able to claim if their content was removed. We have already seen people like Tommy Robinson on the far right present themselves as journalists or citizen journalists. Giving them access to a dedicated and expediated appeals mechanism is an area of concern.

There are different ways you could address that, such as greater clarity in those definitions and removing subjective elements. At the minute, it is whether or not a user considers their content to be journalistic; that it is not an objective criterion but about their belief about their content.

Also, if you look at something like the dedicated and expediated appeals mechanism, could you hold that in reserve so that if a platform were found to be failing in its duties to journalistic content or in its freedom of expression duties, Ofcom could say, like it can in other areas of the Bill, “Okay, we believe that you need to create this dedicated mechanism, because you have failed to protect those duties.”? That would, I think, minimise the risk for exploitation of that mechanism.

[Kim Leadbeater]

That is really helpful, thank you. A quick question—

[The Chair]

I am sorry, I have to interrupt because of time. Maria Miller.

Football Governance

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Monday 25th April 2022 Commons Chamber

[Nigel Huddleston]

I agree with my hon. Friend, and we have sent that message. I am not sure I agree that there are no football pundits in this House, however; I think there are quite a few sitting just a few feet from me.

[Kim Leadbeater (Batley and Spen) (Lab)]

I am very happy Huddersfield Town fan today, following our latest victory, but I hope the Minister will join me in also congratulating Liversedge football club in my constituency, who were crowned league champions at the weekend. It is a fine example of a community club doing lots of good things in the constituency.

Having recently joined the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Tracey Crouch) on the pitch against the Afghan women’s football team, may I say what a great team player she is, and praise her for her excellent report? I support the report’s call for a new code for football club governance. Will the Minister ensure that such a code will apply to all clubs and include additional minimum requirements relating to directors, equality and diversity, fan engagement, welfare, and stewardship?

[Nigel Huddleston]

The hon. Lady raises many points. I also had the pleasure of meeting the Afghan team the other day, and I am glad to hear her highlight the importance of clubs in our communities. Further details on the White Paper are coming. I am glad that she mentioned equality, diversity and inclusion, because they were part of the report, and we will look at ensuring that EDI plans are in place. More information is coming; look out for it in the White Paper.

Online Safety Bill

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 19th April 2022 Commons Chamber

[Dean Russell (Watford) (Con)]

I had the great privilege of sitting on the Joint Committee on the draft Bill before Christmas and working with the Chair, my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Damian Collins), fantastic Members from across both Houses and amazing witnesses.

We heard repeated stories of platforms profiting from pain and prejudice. One story that really affected me was that of Zach Eagling, a heroic young boy who has cerebral palsy and epilepsy and who was targeted with flashing images by cruel trolls to trigger seizures. Those seizures have been triggered for other people with epilepsy, affecting their lives and risking not just harm, but potentially death, depending on their situation. That is why I and my hon. Friend the Member for Stourbridge (Suzanne Webb)—and all members of the Joint Committee, actually, because this was in our report—backed Zach’s law.

[Kim Leadbeater (Batley and Spen) (Lab)]

Ten-year-old Zach is a child in my constituency who has, as the hon. Member said, cerebral palsy and epilepsy, and he has been subjected to horrendous online abuse. I hope that the Minister can provide clarity tonight and confirm that Zach’s law—which shows that not just psychological harm and distress, but physical harm can be created as a result of online abuse and trolling—will be covered in the Bill.

[Dean Russell]

My understanding—hopefully this will be confirmed from the Dispatch Box—is that Zach’s law will be covered by clause 150 in part 10, on communications offences, but I urge the Ministry of Justice to firm that up further.

One thing that really came through for me was the role of algorithms. The only analogy that I can find in the real world for the danger of algorithms is narcotics. This is about organisations that focused on and targeted harmful content to people to get them to be more addicted to harm and to harmful content. By doing that, they numbed the senses of people who were using technology and social media, so that they engaged in practices that did them harm, turning them against not only others, but themselves. We heard awful stories about people doing such things as barcoding—about young girls cutting themselves—which was the most vile thing to hear, especially as a parent myself. There was also the idea that it was okay to be abusive to other people and the fact that it became normalised to hurt oneself, including in ways that can be undoable in future.

That leads on to a point about numbing the senses. I am really pleased that in debating the Bill today we have talked about the metaverse, because the metaverse is not just some random technology that we might talk about; it is about numbing the senses. It is about people putting on virtual reality headsets and living in a world that is not reality, even if it is for a matter of minutes or hours. As we look at these technologies and at virtual reality, my concern is that children and young people will be encouraged to spend more time in worlds that are not real and that could include more harmful content. Such worlds are increasingly accurate in their reality, in the impact that they can have and in their capability for user-to-user engagement.

I therefore think that although at the moment the Bill includes Meta and the metaverse, we need to look at it almost as a tech platform in its own right. We will not get everything right at first; I fully support the Bill as it stands, but as we move forward we will need to continue to improve it, test it and adapt it as new technologies come out. That is why I very much support the idea of a continuing Joint Committee specifically on online safety, so that as time goes by the issues can be scrutinised and we can look at whether Ofcom is delivering in its role. Ultimately, we need to use the Bill as a starting point to prevent harm now and for decades to come.

Women’s Football

Kim Leadbeater Excerpts

Wednesday 26th January 2022 Westminster Hall

[Kim Leadbeater (Batley and Spen) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central (Julie Elliott) on securing this important debate on the experiences of women in football. It is a real honour to follow the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Tracey Crouch). I start by declaring an interest as a proud new member of the cross-party parliamentary women’s football team.

Many of us in the team are not experienced footballers and, as someone who has played hockey for 30 years, I still spend most of my time trying to put my feet in the way rather than getting them out the way. The team brings together female MPs, peers, staff and journalists from across the parliamentary family and political spectrum. We are an excellent example of the power of sport, and specifically football, in bringing people together and bridging any differences we may have.

I have a background as a lecturer in sport and physical activity and as a group exercise instructor. Alongside my own adventures on the hockey pitch, I have worked with many female clients and students over the past 20 years to create and facilitate positive experiences of sport and physical activity for women, to enhance physical and mental health and wellbeing, to provide positive social interactions and to develop friendships and support networks for busy women who far too often put themselves at the bottom of their list of priorities and responsibilities.

However, I know that this positive experience is sadly not shared by many women across the country, who face a number of barriers to getting into sport, a lack of support once there or, worse still, totally unacceptable discrimination, sexism and abuse. I am keen to use my role in Parliament to be an advocate for all women who face such challenges, which is why I was keen to take part in the debate. I recently with Sport England to discuss women in sport, and just this week I spoke to Sam Keighley, strategic director of the Yorkshire Sport Foundation, who gave me a comprehensive overview of the issues faced by women when playing, spectating, refereeing and coaching football. Sadly, there are too many to mention, but I will share some of the highlights, or should I say lowlights, with hon. Members.

On playing, there is a lack of access to facilities for women’s teams. Poor pitches are often used for boys’ or men’s games prior to the female game taking place and they are left in a terrible state. Female footballers feel that sometimes they are treated as second-class citizens. Female football is always second to male football in funding, access to training, pitches and media coverage. Girls’ and women’s teams often get given second-hand equipment after the boys’ have finished with it.

There are fewer opportunities, with fewer teams, and there are fewer opportunities to progress. Often teams have to travel further distances, which is difficult for those girls without parental support or access to transport. There is still far too much, “Girls don’t play football,” with people not talking to girls about what they actually want to do. There is little use of female role models in football, and any prizes or match tickets given out tend to relate to the men’s teams, with no effort to link to the local women’s teams.

With regards to coaching, coaching courses are male dominated, and there are still only a handful of female coaches and managers. Sadly, research shows that few junior boys’ teams would welcome a female coach. There is abuse of coaches from parents and spectators during competitive matches, and there is a lack of opportunities for female coaches to develop. In terms of female referees, they sadly experience significant abuse. They experience sexist attitudes at clubs, such as, “Why have we got you refereeing?”, “Are you even qualified?”, and, “What do you know about football?”—some of the cleaner versions of comments made. The situation is improving, but it is a real issue and will continue to put females off officiating.

In terms of spectating, female spectators feel uncomfortable and are on constant edge when watching games with a female referee, waiting for the abuse to start once someone disagrees with a decision. Opinions and comments of female fans are often dismissed, to then be repeated by someone—a man—a minute later. This has happened to me on numerous occasions. There are even reports of a female physio in the professional game getting wolf-whistled every time she comes on to the pitch.

To conclude, I am sure we can all agree that football, and sport generally, play a crucial part in bringing people together, keeping us fit and healthy, both physically and mentally, and providing fun and entertainment for millions and sports clubs that are often at the heart of our communities. As has been said, women’s football is growing at an incredible speed, with the women’s World cup, the women’s super league and the women’s FA cup, and that should be celebrated. While there has been progress over the last 30 years, it is too slow. Before we can secure football as a sport that girls can play and get involved with as easily and comfortably as boys can, and before the women’s game is treated with the same level of respect, funding and resources as the men’s game, there is work to be done. We must get the grassroots and lower league stages firmly established. We must have a fully informed strategy to stamp out the abuse and sexism that are all too common.

I could talk about the broader issues around the importance of physical education in the curriculum and about many other subjects associated with women and girls in sport and physical activity, but I will conclude by saying what a pleasure it has been to take part in today’s debate with some well-respected colleagues.