Debates between Kevan Jones and Matt Warman during the 2019 Parliament

Tue 26th Jan 2021
Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Eighth sitting)
Public Bill Committees

Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Tue 26th Jan 2021
Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Seventh sitting)
Public Bill Committees

Committee stage: 7th sitting & Committee Debate: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Tue 26th Jan 2021
Thu 21st Jan 2021
Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Sixth sitting)
Public Bill Committees

Committee stage: 6th sitting & Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Thu 21st Jan 2021
Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Fifth sitting)
Public Bill Committees

Committee stage: 5th sitting & Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Tue 19th Jan 2021
Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Third sitting)
Public Bill Committees

Committee Debate: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Mon 30th Nov 2020
Telecommunications (Security) Bill
Commons Chamber

2nd reading & 2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons & Carry-over motion & Carry-over motion: House of Commons & Money resolution & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion & Programme motion: House of Commons & Ways and Means resolution & Ways and Means resolution: House of Commons & 2nd reading & Programme motion & Money resolution & Ways and Means resolution & Carry-over motion
Mon 27th Jan 2020

Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Kevan Jones and Matt Warman
Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Ultimately, a mechanism already exists by which Parliament is able to scrutinise Ofcom’s resourcing. Ofcom is required under the Office of Communications Act 2002 to publish an annual report on its financial position and other relevant matters. That report, which is published every March—I am sure the hon. Gentleman is waiting with bated breath for the next one—includes detail on Ofcom’s strategic priorities as well as its finances, and details about issues such as its hiring policies.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

I am intrigued. The Minister says Ofcom already has over 900 people, and it is obviously going to have to grow. How big is DCMS? We basically have a mini-Department here.

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The right hon. Gentleman asks me a question that I may be able to answer in a moment, depending on a number of factors. As for the thrust of his question, Ofcom is ultimately a serious regulator that has the resourcing to do a serious job. The right hon. Gentleman would be criticising us if it had fewer people, so he cannot have his cake and eat it by criticising the fact it has enough to do the job—but I think he is going to have a go.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

Quite the opposite. This just reinforces my point about quangos. If we reach a situation where quangos are bigger than the sponsoring Department it is perhaps best to keep things in-house rather than having arm’s length quangos and the nonsense behind which we hide in this country about so-called independence.

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The reality is that the relationship between Government Departments and regulators is very often incredibly close, but independence is an important part of regulation. Although the right hon. Gentleman makes a reasonable point about the optimal size for in-house expertise versus external expertise, it is getting the balance right between Ofcom, the National Cyber Security Centre and DCMS that this Government and the reporting measures we already have are fundamentally committed to providing.

The right hon. Gentleman talked about Ofcom’s resourcing. Ofcom will not be making decisions on national security matters, as we have said repeatedly, but it will to be responsible for the regulation around these issues. As the right hon. Gentleman said, the Intelligence and Security Committee has shown great interest in how Ofcom is preparing for its new role.

As for the point about disclosure and resources, I would be happy to write to the ISC to provide further details in the appropriate forum about Ofcom resourcing and security arrangements. This could include information that cannot be provided publicly, including information about staffing, IT arrangements and security clearances of the sort that we have discussed. I hope that Opposition Members understand that that is the appropriate forum to provide reassurance and to satisfy the legitimate requirements of public scrutiny on this issue.

--- Later in debate ---
Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. I hope that now that I have given those various reassurances, hon. Members are appropriately comforted.

Everyone is waiting for the headcount of DCMS; I am assured that it is 1,304 people, some 300 more than that of Ofcom. I do not know whether that makes the right hon. Member for North Durham happier or more sad.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

According to the website that I have looked at, the figure is 1,170, so it has obviously increased slightly. Still, it makes Ofcom with its new responsibilities nearly as big as, if not bigger than, the sponsoring Department.

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We can discuss the optimal sizes of quangos and Departments outside this room. However, the right hon. Gentleman is obviously right that Government Departments and regulators need the resources they require to do their job properly. I hope that by describing the various mechanisms I have provided hon. Members with the reassurances they need to withdraw the new clause.

--- Later in debate ---
Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I think an organisation of 937 people can cope with 13 priorities. On one level, however the hon. Lady makes a reasonable point, and it is not one that we disagree with. Security has to be absolutely central to the work that Ofcom will do.

I will not restate the points I have made about how seriously we take the Intelligence and Security Committee and how seriously we will continue to take it. We will continue to write to the Committee on topics of interest as they arise and we are happy to continue to co-operate in the way that I have done; however, as I said in the debate on amendment 9, the primary focus of the ISC is to oversee the work of the security and intelligence agencies, and its remit is defined in the Justice and Security Act 2013. Amending the Bill to require regular reporting to the ISC, as proposed by the new clause, would risk the statutory basis of the ISC being set out across a range of different pieces of legislation.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

Will the Minister give way?

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Earlier, the right hon. Gentleman was suggesting that it was the memorandum of understanding that he would like to see amended. Now he seems to be suggesting that we should insert the new clause, which will not change the memorandum of understanding.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

No, I said in an earlier contribution that if it were done by the memorandum of understanding, I would be quite happy. I know the Minister is limited in the number of civil servants he has beneath him compared with Ofcom, but will he go away and read the Justice and Security Act 2013? It talks about Departments, but it also talks about intelligence more broadly, which is covered by the memorandum of understanding. I do not know why he is pushing back on this issue; it may be because of the Cabinet Office, which has more civil servants than he has. I suggest that we will win this one eventually.

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That may well be the case, but the right hon. Gentleman is not going to win it here—that is the important point to make. It is right not to try to address this issue in the new clause, but the Government will continue to take very seriously the work of the ISC, as he would expect.

Additionally, the new clause is designed to require Ofcom to provide annual reports to the ISC, which would, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, be particularly unusual in the context of the work of the Committee, as Ofcom will not be making judgments about the interests of national security under the Bill, or as part of its wider function. Ofcom’s role as regulator seems not to be something that comes under the purview of the ISC, even if I understand the broader point. As I said earlier, however, the NCSC is very much under the purview of the ISC, and there are plenty of opportunities for the Committee to interrogate the work of that excellent agency. I am sure the Committee will continue to take up such opportunities with vigour, but as I have said before, it would not be right to seek to reframe the remit of the ISC through the new clause. I ask the Opposition to withdraw it.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Kevan Jones and Matt Warman
Tuesday 26th January 2021

(3 years, 2 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts

The Secretary of State should have access directly to the security information and should not have to go through the filter of the Cabinet Office or Ofcom. I accept the assurances that the Minister gave about Ofcom’s ability to give advice and work closely with the security services, and these are probing amendments. I am interested in what he says about how we can ensure that when the Secretary of State takes a decision, national security is at its heart, and that he or she got it straight from the horse’s mouth—in other words, from the security services—rather than its being filtered through the membrane that sometimes exists in Whitehall.

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his contribution to the debate. He has talked so much about my impermanence that I felt lucky to come back today, never mind any time in the future. He makes a reasonable point, with which I broadly sympathise. As this is a broad grouping that covers clauses 15 and 16 and the amendments to clauses 15, 16 and 17, I will discuss the policy intention behind the clauses in sequence, and address the amendments.

As the right hon. Gentleman said, it is obviously an opportune moment to pay tribute to the heroic work of our national security services. The Bill emphasises the importance of their advice, and it empowers the Government to manage the presence of high-risk vendors in our networks. The report to which he refers is important, but it is also important to say that it was published, as he said, in 2013. It related almost entirely to events that took place under Labour, and it predates the existence of the National Cyber Security Centre, so we are dealing to some extent with a different world. I will go into a bit of detail on that.

As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the Government announced in January last year that new restrictions should be placed on the use of high-risk vendors in the UK’s 5G and full-fibre networks. In July 2010, the Government worked with the NCSC to update the guidance following action taken by the US Government in relation to Huawei. Clauses 15 to 17 provide the principal powers that the Government need to manage the risks posed by high-risk vendors. Without such powers, the guidance issued to industry will remain unenforceable and therefore present a risk to national security.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

I accept what the Minister says about the report, but its key point was that civil servants basically decided not to tell Ministers. On his explanation and the way forward, or what has changed since, how can we avoid a situation whereby Cabinet Office civil servants take the decision not to tell Ministers? How can we ensure that that will not happen again?

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

In short, the right hon. Gentleman is challenging the fundamental effectiveness of Government and the judgments that were made by officials at the time. I simply say that it is the duty of Government to ensure that such errors are not made in future. That cannot be done solely by legislative means; it must be done by custom and practice. The right hon. Gentleman understands, through his work on the ISC, that the role of those close working relationships is in some ways far more important in the day-to-day security issues that we are dealing with. Perhaps we can return to that point later.

The Bill will allow the Secretary of State to issue designated vendor directions, imposing controls on the use of goods, services or facilities that are supplied, provided or made available by designated vendors. The Secretary of State may issue such directions only where it is necessary to do so in the interests of national security and proportionate to the aims sought to be achieved.

Amendment 16, which would amend clause 15, seeks to place a statutory requirement on the Secretary of State to take into account advice from our intelligence services when considering whether to issue a designated vendor direction. Amendment 17, which would amend clause 16, seeks to place a similar requirement when considering a designation notice.

I should reassure hon. Members that the Secretary of State, as the right hon. Member for North Durham knows, has every intention of seeking the advice of our security and intelligence services, as would any Secretary of State, in particular the NCSC, when considering whether to issue a designated vendor direction or designation notice.

It is also worth saying, from a scrutiny point of view, that the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport maintains an excellent relationship with the NCSC. We are scrutinised by the Select Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and I have appeared before the Intelligence and Security Committee, as the right hon. Gentleman knows. There are many examples in the Bill where the NCSC’s expert advice has been taken into account.

The UK telecoms supply chain review, on which the Bill is based, was the product of the close working relationship between the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and the NCSC. In a sense, that close working relationship demonstrates that matters have moved on substantively since 2013.

I draw hon. Members’ attention to the illustrative notices that we published in November last year. The NCSC was closely involved in the drafting of those illustrative notices. It will also be involved in the drafting of direction and designation notices once the Bill has been enacted . Given the demonstrable success of our collaboration with the NCSC thus far, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will be satisfied with that explanation, although I appreciate that he introduced a probing amendment.

Clause 15 would create the new power for the Secretary of State to issue designated vendor directions to public communications providers, in the interests of national security. Although clauses 15 and 16 are distinct, they are complementary. Directions cannot be issued without identification of a designated vendor and designations have no effect unless directions are given to public communications providers. Clause 15 inserts new sections 105Z1 to 105Z7 into the Communications Act 2003 and amends section 151 for that purpose.

The clause will enable the Government’s announcements in 2020 on the use of high-risk vendors to be given legal effect. Those announcements include advice that require a public telecoms provider to exclude Huawei from their 5G networks by 2027, and stop installing new Huawei goods, services or facilities in 5G networks from September 2021. It will also enable the Government to address risks that might be posed by future high-risk vendors, helping to ensure our telecoms networks are safe and secure.

Proposed new section 105Z1 sets out the direction power. It would allow the Secretary of State to give a designated vendor direction to a provider, imposing requirements on their use of goods, services or facilities supplied by a specified designated vendor. Proposed new section 105Z2 provides further details on the types of requirements that may be imposed in a designated vendor direction. Proposed new section 105Z3 sets out the consultation requirements and expectations for public communications providers. Proposed new section 105Z4 sets out a requirement for the Secretary of State to provide a copy of a direction to the designated vendor or vendors, specified in a direction and, hence, affected by it. Proposed new sections 105Z5 and 105Z6 set out when and how the Secretary of State may vary or revoke a direction. Lastly, 105Z7 enables the Secretary of State to require a public communications provider to provide a plan setting out the steps that it intends to take to comply with any requirements set out in a direction and the timings of those steps.

Although the Government have made specific announcements on Huawei, the high-risk vendor policy has not been designed around one company, country or threat. The designated vendor direction power, as set out in these provisions, is intended to be an enduring and flexible power, enabling the Government to manage the risks posed to telecoms networks both now and in the future.

Clause 16 includes a non-exhaustive list of matters to which the Secretary of State may have regard when considering whether to issue a designation notice. Amendment 18 seeks to amend that clause by adding a person’s control of data flows to the list of matters to which the Secretary of State may have regard. However, nothing in the clause prevents the Secretary of State from considering control of data flows before issuing a designation notice already, if the matter were deemed relevant to the assessment of national security. It is already covered and so is not required as a stand-alone measure.

The clause creates a power for the Secretary of State to issue a designation notice, which designates a vendor for the purposes of issuing a designated vendor direction. Proposed new section 105Z8 is the principal measure of the clause, and sets out the power for the Secretary of State to designate specific vendors where necessary in the interests of national security. A designation notice must specify the reasons for designation unless the Secretary of State considers that doing so would be contrary to the interests of national security. The proposed new section also lists the primary factors that may be taken into account by the Secretary of State when considering whether to designate a vendor on national security grounds.

Finally in this group, amendment 19 would require the Secretary of State, when laying a designation noticed before Parliament, also to lay before Parliament a report detailing the impact that the designation notice might have on the diversity of the UK’s telecoms supply chain. The effect of the amendment would be to require the Secretary of State to lay a report purely on the impact of the designation notice, but a designation notice simply notifies vendors that the Government consider them a risk to national security.

Only when the designation notice is issued alongside a designated vendor direction are controls placed on the use of a designated vendor’s goods, services and facilities by public communication providers, so it is those controls that might have an impact on the diversity of the supply chain. I can reassure the Committee that the Government will consider the diversity of the supply chain before issuing designation notices and designated vendor directions. A lack of diversity is in itself a risk to the security of a network. I hope that answers the question that the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central asked in regard to an earlier amendment. It is right that the Government consider that risk before deciding whether to issue designation notices and designated vendor directions.

To conclude, clauses 15 and 16 provide us with the ability to improve the security of our telecommunications networks and to manage the risks relating to high-risk vendors, both now and in the future.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for his reply. I do not question his commitment to ensuring that we have security at the heart of the Bill, and I do not intend to press my amendments to a vote.

--- Later in debate ---
Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Lady is not wrong, obviously, in the sense that there is a potential conversation to be had about when a cloud provider is a telecoms provider and vice versa, if I can put it like that, although it is not the most elegant way of doing so. However, the point is that the reason we have comprehensive coverage of the landscape is because we have both the National Security and Investment Bill, which she debated recently, and this Bill. The broad powers that she described are intended to provide precisely that sort of coverage.

Similarly, the hon. Lady referred to the length of the list in clause 16 of matters that can be taken into consideration. That relates to the point I made previously, namely that the sorts of issues that she is talking about, such as data flows, are already covered in the long list. The list is as long as it is because it is intended to look to the future. Therefore, being prescriptive in the way that she describes is fundamentally unnecessary. We are not excluding what she wants to be on the list. A matter is already very much there if it is pertinent to national security. For that reason, I do not think there is a compelling case to add that single topic to the list, both because it is already there and because if we start going down that route, we could make the case for adding a host of other things that are already covered but that people might want to be mentioned specifically.

As I said earlier on the convergence of the two sectors, the point is that we have comprehensive coverage through both Bills. It will be for the NCSC, Ofcom and the Government to make a judgment as to whether any consolidation in a sector poses a national security risk.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Laying before Parliament

--- Later in debate ---
Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I welcome the second salvo in the campaign to address this matter by the right hon. Member for North Durham. He said it would be an ongoing campaign.

This group of amendments would require the Secretary of State to provide information relating to a designated vendor direction or designation notice to the ISC. The amendments would require the Secretary of State to do this only where directions and designation notices had not been laid before Parliament, whether in full or in part, as a result of the national security exemptions in clause 17. It will not surprise the right hon. Member for North Durham or other Opposition Members that some of these short remarks will overlap with the conversation that we had earlier on a similar matter.

Amendment 20 would require designated vendor directions or designation notices to be provided to the ISC. Amendments 22 to 25 would require the Secretary of State also to provide the ISC with copies of any notifications of contraventions, confirmation decisions and so on. Although I recognise some Members’ desire for the ISC to play a greater role in the oversight of national security decision making across government, including in relation to this Bill, the amendments would, as the right hon. Member for North Durham knows, extend the ISC’s role in an unprecedented way. None the less, I thank his welcome for my unprecedented appearance.

As I said in the debate on amendment 9, the ISC’s primary focus is to oversee the work of the security and intelligence agencies. Its remit is clearly defined in the Justice and Security Act 2013, and the accompanying statutory memorandum of understanding, to which the right hon. Gentleman referred. I do not think he thinks it is my place to take a view on that role, and I do not think this Bill is the place to have that debate.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

Yes, but I would ask the Minister’s civil servants to read the Act before they write this stuff for him. The Act refers to “intelligence”. Our remit is not fixed by a Department. I know the Minister sympathises with this and that we will get there eventually, but I say to his civil servants, please read the Act.

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will come on to that. Accepting any of these unilateral amendments to this Bill is not the appropriate place to achieve an overall enhanced role for the ISC—

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

I am sorry to say to the Minister that it is not looking for an enhanced role at all. It is actually doing what it says in the Justice and Security Act 2013. It is about scrutinising intelligence. A lot of the information, which will be used by him and others in these orders, will be derived from the same decisions that we oversee .

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Absolutely. Members of the Committee should note that in exercising the powers created by this Bill, the Secretary of State will be advised by the NCSC on relevant technical and national security matters. The NCSC’s work already falls within the Intelligence and Security Committee’s remit, so the right hon. Gentleman has found his own salvation.

In that context, the amendment seems to duplicate that existing power, while also seeking to do something that is better done in reform of a different Act, if that is what the right hon. Gentleman seeks. I am sorry to disappoint him again. I think he knew already that I would do that, but I look forward to his third, fourth and fifth salvos in his ongoing campaign.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Kevan Jones and Matt Warman
Committee stage & Committee Debate: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 26th January 2021

(3 years, 2 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 View all Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 26 January 2021 - (26 Jan 2021)
Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his contribution to the debate. He has talked so much about my impermanence that I felt lucky to come back today, never mind any time in the future. He makes a reasonable point, with which I broadly sympathise. As this is a broad grouping that covers clauses 15 and 16 and the amendments to clauses 15, 16 and 17, I will discuss the policy intention behind the clauses in sequence, and address the amendments.

As the right hon. Gentleman said, it is obviously an opportune moment to pay tribute to the heroic work of our national security services. The Bill emphasises the importance of their advice, and it empowers the Government to manage the presence of high-risk vendors in our networks. The report to which he refers is important, but it is also important to say that it was published, as he said, in 2013. It related almost entirely to events that took place under Labour, and it predates the existence of the National Cyber Security Centre, so we are dealing to some extent with a different world. I will go into a bit of detail on that.

As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the Government announced in January last year that new restrictions should be placed on the use of high-risk vendors in the UK’s 5G and full-fibre networks. In July 2020, the Government worked with the NCSC to update the guidance following action taken by the US Government in relation to Huawei. Clauses 15 to 17 provide the principal powers that the Government need to manage the risks posed by high-risk vendors. Without such powers, the guidance issued to industry will remain unenforceable and therefore present a risk to national security.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

I accept what the Minister says about the report, but its key point was that civil servants basically decided not to tell Ministers. On his explanation and the way forward, or what has changed since, how can we avoid a situation whereby Cabinet Office civil servants take the decision not to tell Ministers? How can we ensure that that will not happen again?

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

In short, the right hon. Gentleman is challenging the fundamental effectiveness of Government and the judgments that were made by officials at the time. I simply say that it is the duty of Government to ensure that such errors are not made in future. That cannot be done solely by legislative means; it must be done by custom and practice. The right hon. Gentleman understands, through his work on the ISC, that the role of those close working relationships is in some ways far more important in the day-to-day security issues that we are dealing with. Perhaps we can return to that point later.

The Bill will allow the Secretary of State to issue designated vendor directions, imposing controls on the use of goods, services or facilities that are supplied, provided or made available by designated vendors. The Secretary of State may issue such directions only where it is necessary to do so in the interests of national security and proportionate to the aims sought to be achieved.

Amendment 16, which would amend clause 15, seeks to place a statutory requirement on the Secretary of State to take into account advice from our intelligence services when considering whether to issue a designated vendor direction. Amendment 17, which would amend clause 16, seeks to place a similar requirement when considering a designation notice.

I should reassure hon. Members that the Secretary of State, as the right hon. Member for North Durham knows, has every intention of seeking the advice of our security and intelligence services, as would any Secretary of State, in particular the NCSC, when considering whether to issue a designated vendor direction or designation notice.

It is also worth saying, from a scrutiny point of view, that the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport maintains an excellent relationship with the NCSC. We are scrutinised by the Select Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and I have appeared before the Intelligence and Security Committee, as the right hon. Gentleman knows. There are many examples in the Bill where the NCSC’s expert advice has been taken into account.

The UK telecoms supply chain review, on which the Bill is based, was the product of the close working relationship between the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and the NCSC. In a sense, that close working relationship demonstrates that matters have moved on substantively since 2013.

I draw hon. Members’ attention to the illustrative notices that we published in November last year. The NCSC was closely involved in the drafting of those illustrative notices. It will also be involved in the drafting of direction and designation notices once the Bill has been enacted . Given the demonstrable success of our collaboration with the NCSC thus far, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will be satisfied with that explanation, although I appreciate that he introduced a probing amendment.

Clause 15 would create the new power for the Secretary of State to issue designated vendor directions to public communications providers, in the interests of national security. Although clauses 15 and 16 are distinct, they are complementary. Directions cannot be issued without identification of a designated vendor and designations have no effect unless directions are given to public communications providers. Clause 15 inserts new sections 105Z1 to 105Z7 into the Communications Act 2003 and amends section 151 for that purpose.

The clause will enable the Government’s announcements in 2020 on the use of high-risk vendors to be given legal effect. Those announcements include advice that require a public telecoms provider to exclude Huawei from their 5G networks by 2027, and stop installing new Huawei goods, services or facilities in 5G networks from September 2021. It will also enable the Government to address risks that might be posed by future high-risk vendors, helping to ensure our telecoms networks are safe and secure.

Proposed new section 105Z1 sets out the direction power. It would allow the Secretary of State to give a designated vendor direction to a provider, imposing requirements on their use of goods, services or facilities supplied by a specified designated vendor. Proposed new section 105Z2 provides further details on the types of requirements that may be imposed in a designated vendor direction. Proposed new section 105Z3 sets out the consultation requirements and expectations for public communications providers. Proposed new section 105Z4 sets out a requirement for the Secretary of State to provide a copy of a direction to the designated vendor or vendors, specified in a direction and, hence, affected by it. Proposed new sections 105Z5 and 105Z6 set out when and how the Secretary of State may vary or revoke a direction. Lastly, 105Z7 enables the Secretary of State to require a public communications provider to provide a plan setting out the steps that it intends to take to comply with any requirements set out in a direction and the timings of those steps.

Although the Government have made specific announcements on Huawei, the high-risk vendor policy has not been designed around one company, country or threat. The designated vendor direction power, as set out in these provisions, is intended to be an enduring and flexible power, enabling the Government to manage the risks posed to telecoms networks both now and in the future.

Clause 16 includes a non-exhaustive list of matters to which the Secretary of State may have regard when considering whether to issue a designation notice. Amendment 18 seeks to amend that clause by adding a person’s control of data flows to the list of matters to which the Secretary of State may have regard. However, nothing in the clause prevents the Secretary of State from considering control of data flows before issuing a designation notice already, if the matter were deemed relevant to the assessment of national security. It is already covered and so is not required as a stand-alone measure.

The clause creates a power for the Secretary of State to issue a designation notice, which designates a vendor for the purposes of issuing a designated vendor direction. Proposed new section 105Z8 is the principal measure of the clause, and sets out the power for the Secretary of State to designate specific vendors where necessary in the interests of national security. A designation notice must specify the reasons for designation unless the Secretary of State considers that doing so would be contrary to the interests of national security. The proposed new section also lists the primary factors that may be taken into account by the Secretary of State when considering whether to designate a vendor on national security grounds.

Finally in this group, amendment 19 would require the Secretary of State, when laying a designation noticed before Parliament, also to lay before Parliament a report detailing the impact that the designation notice might have on the diversity of the UK’s telecoms supply chain. The effect of the amendment would be to require the Secretary of State to lay a report purely on the impact of the designation notice, but a designation notice simply notifies vendors that the Government consider them a risk to national security.

Only when the designation notice is issued alongside a designated vendor direction are controls placed on the use of a designated vendor’s goods, services and facilities by public communication providers, so it is those controls that might have an impact on the diversity of the supply chain. I can reassure the Committee that the Government will consider the diversity of the supply chain before issuing designation notices and designated vendor directions. A lack of diversity is in itself a risk to the security of a network. I hope that answers the question that the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central asked in regard to an earlier amendment. It is right that the Government consider that risk before deciding whether to issue designation notices and designated vendor directions.

To conclude, clauses 15 and 16 provide us with the ability to improve the security of our telecommunications networks and to manage the risks relating to high-risk vendors, both now and in the future.

--- Later in debate ---
Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Lady is not wrong, obviously, in the sense that there is a potential conversation to be had about when a cloud provider is a telecoms provider and vice versa, if I can put it like that, although it is not the most elegant way of doing so. However, the point is that the reason we have comprehensive coverage of the landscape is because we have both the National Security and Investment Bill, which she debated recently, and this Bill. The broad powers that she described are intended to provide precisely that sort of coverage.

Similarly, the hon. Lady referred to the length of the list in clause 16 of matters that can be taken into consideration. That relates to the point I made previously, namely that the sorts of issues that she is talking about, such as data flows, are already covered in the long list. The list is as long as it is because it is intended to look to the future. Therefore, being prescriptive in the way that she describes is fundamentally unnecessary. We are not excluding what she wants to be on the list. A matter is already very much there if it is pertinent to national security. For that reason, I do not think there is a compelling case to add that single topic to the list, both because it is already there and because if we start going down that route, we could make the case for adding a host of other things that are already covered but that people might want to be mentioned specifically.

As I said earlier on the convergence of the two sectors, the point is that we have comprehensive coverage through both Bills. It will be for the NCSC, Ofcom and the Government to make a judgment as to whether any consolidation in a sector poses a national security risk.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Laying before Parliament

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Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I welcome the second salvo in the campaign to address this matter by the right hon. Member for North Durham. He said it would be an ongoing campaign.

This group of amendments would require the Secretary of State to provide information relating to a designated vendor direction or designation notice to the ISC. The amendments would require the Secretary of State to do this only where directions and designation notices had not been laid before Parliament, whether in full or in part, as a result of the national security exemptions in clause 17. It will not surprise the right hon. Member for North Durham or other Opposition Members that some of these short remarks will overlap with the conversation that we had earlier on a similar matter.

Amendment 20 would require designated vendor directions or designation notices to be provided to the ISC. Amendments 22 to 25 would require the Secretary of State also to provide the ISC with copies of any notifications of contraventions, confirmation decisions and so on. Although I recognise some Members’ desire for the ISC to play a greater role in the oversight of national security decision making across government, including in relation to this Bill, the amendments would, as the right hon. Member for North Durham knows, extend the ISC’s role in an unprecedented way. None the less, I thank his welcome for my unprecedented appearance.

As I said in the debate on amendment 9, the ISC’s primary focus is to oversee the work of the security and intelligence agencies. Its remit is clearly defined in the Justice and Security Act 2013, and the accompanying statutory memorandum of understanding, to which the right hon. Gentleman referred. I do not think he thinks it is my place to take a view on that role, and I do not think this Bill is the place to have that debate.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

Yes, but I would ask the Minister’s civil servants to read the Act before they write this stuff for him. The Act refers to “intelligence”. Our remit is not fixed by a Department. I know the Minister sympathises with this and that we will get there eventually, but I say to his civil servants, please read the Act.

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will come on to that. Accepting any of these unilateral amendments to this Bill is not the appropriate place to achieve an overall enhanced role for the ISC—

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

I am sorry to say to the Minister that it is not looking for an enhanced role at all. It is actually doing what it says in the Justice and Security Act 2013. It is about scrutinising intelligence. A lot of the information, which will be used by him and others in these orders, will be derived from the same decisions that we oversee .

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Absolutely. Members of the Committee should note that in exercising the powers created by this Bill, the Secretary of State will be advised by the NCSC on relevant technical and national security matters. The NCSC’s work already falls within the Intelligence and Security Committee’s remit, so the right hon. Gentleman has found his own salvation.

In that context, the amendment seems to duplicate that existing power, while also seeking to do something that is better done in reform of a different Act, if that is what the right hon. Gentleman seeks. I am sorry to disappoint him again. I think he knew already that I would do that, but I look forward to his third, fourth and fifth salvos in his ongoing campaign.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Kevan Jones and Matt Warman
Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Ultimately, a mechanism already exists by which Parliament is able to scrutinise Ofcom’s resourcing. Ofcom is required under the Office of Communications Act 2002 to publish an annual report on its financial position and other relevant matters. That report, which is published every March—I am sure the hon. Gentleman is waiting with bated breath for the next one—includes detail on Ofcom’s strategic priorities as well as its finances, and details about issues such as its hiring policies.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

I am intrigued. The Minister says Ofcom already has over 900 people, and it is obviously going to have to grow. How big is DCMS? We basically have a mini-Department here.

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The right hon. Gentleman asks me a question that I may be able to answer in a moment, depending on a number of factors. As for the thrust of his question, Ofcom is ultimately a serious regulator that has the resourcing to do a serious job. The right hon. Gentleman would be criticising us if it had fewer people, so he cannot have his cake and eat it by criticising the fact it has enough to do the job—but I think he is going to have a go.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

Quite the opposite. This just reinforces my point about quangos. If we reach a situation where quangos are bigger than the sponsoring Department it is perhaps best to keep things in-house rather than having arm’s length quangos and the nonsense behind which we hide in this country about so-called independence.

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The reality is that the relationship between Government Departments and regulators is very often incredibly close, but independence is an important part of regulation. Although the right hon. Gentleman makes a reasonable point about the optimal size for in-house expertise versus external expertise, it is getting the balance right between Ofcom, the National Cyber Security Centre and DCMS that this Government and the reporting measures we already have are fundamentally committed to providing.

The right hon. Gentleman talked about Ofcom’s resourcing. Ofcom will not be making decisions on national security matters, as we have said repeatedly, but it will to be responsible for the regulation around these issues. As the right hon. Gentleman said, the Intelligence and Security Committee has shown great interest in how Ofcom is preparing for its new role.

As for the point about disclosure and resources, I would be happy to write to the ISC to provide further details in the appropriate forum about Ofcom resourcing and security arrangements. This could include information that cannot be provided publicly, including information about staffing, IT arrangements and security clearances of the sort that we have discussed. I hope that Opposition Members understand that that is the appropriate forum to provide reassurance and to satisfy the legitimate requirements of public scrutiny on this issue.

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Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. I hope that now that I have given those various reassurances, hon. Members are appropriately comforted.

Everyone is waiting for the headcount of DCMS; I am assured that it is 1,304 people, some 300 more than that of Ofcom. I do not know whether that makes the right hon. Member for North Durham happier or more sad.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

According to the website that I have looked at, the figure is 1,170, so it has obviously increased slightly. Still, it makes Ofcom with its new responsibilities nearly as big as, if not bigger than, the sponsoring Department.

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We can discuss the optimal sizes of quangos and Departments outside this room. However, the right hon. Gentleman is obviously right that Government Departments and regulators need the resources they require to do their job properly. I hope that by describing the various mechanisms I have provided hon. Members with the reassurances they need to withdraw the new clause.

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Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I think an organisation of 937 people can cope with 13 priorities. On one level, however the hon. Lady makes a reasonable point, and it is not one that we disagree with. Security has to be absolutely central to the work that Ofcom will do.

I will not restate the points I have made about how seriously we take the Intelligence and Security Committee and how seriously we will continue to take it. We will continue to write to the Committee on topics of interest as they arise and we are happy to continue to co-operate in the way that I have done; however, as I said in the debate on amendment 9, the primary focus of the ISC is to oversee the work of the security and intelligence agencies, and its remit is defined in the Justice and Security Act 2013. Amending the Bill to require regular reporting to the ISC, as proposed by the new clause, would risk the statutory basis of the ISC being set out across a range of different pieces of legislation.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

Will the Minister give way?

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Earlier, the right hon. Gentleman was suggesting that it was the memorandum of understanding that he would like to see amended. Now he seems to be suggesting that we should insert the new clause, which will not change the memorandum of understanding.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

No, I said in an earlier contribution that if it were done by the memorandum of understanding, I would be quite happy. I know the Minister is limited in the number of civil servants he has beneath him compared with Ofcom, but will he go away and read the Justice and Security Act 2013? It talks about Departments, but it also talks about intelligence more broadly, which is covered by the memorandum of understanding. I do not know why he is pushing back on this issue; it may be because of the Cabinet Office, which has more civil servants than he has. I suggest that we will win this one eventually.

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That may well be the case, but the right hon. Gentleman is not going to win it here—that is the important point to make. It is right not to try to address this issue in the new clause, but the Government will continue to take very seriously the work of the ISC, as he would expect.

Additionally, the new clause is designed to require Ofcom to provide annual reports to the ISC, which would, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, be particularly unusual in the context of the work of the Committee, as Ofcom will not be making judgments about the interests of national security under the Bill, or as part of its wider function. Ofcom’s role as regulator seems not to be something that comes under the purview of the ISC, even if I understand the broader point. As I said earlier, however, the NCSC is very much under the purview of the ISC, and there are plenty of opportunities for the Committee to interrogate the work of that excellent agency. I am sure the Committee will continue to take up such opportunities with vigour, but as I have said before, it would not be right to seek to reframe the remit of the ISC through the new clause. I ask the Opposition to withdraw it.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Kevan Jones and Matt Warman
Committee stage & Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 21st January 2021

(3 years, 2 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
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Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

My hon. Friend makes the point precisely: the way in which telecoms have developed in this country has been piecemeal, only developing now into the four main operators. I hope we will try to get others into the market.

We are to blame for that, as consumers, because we have demanded ever lower prices for our mobile services. Does that suggest that the operators have taken shortcuts? No, I am not suggesting that, but consumer preferences have driven down price, and therefore the costs of what those operators provide in delivering the services that we all take for granted. Let us be honest: the Chinese saw the opening door for Huawei—that is why they bought into and flooded the market, putting Government loans behind it. Can we blame the operators for saying, “Well, actually, this is a good deal—we can get good deals”? But they cannot.

I am interested to know from the Minister how, looking forward, we are going to do that. I accept that something will be done under the regulations that the Government will put out, but how will we look backwards as well? As my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central said, there is a lot of legacy equipment there, and it is important for Ofcom to have a clear understanding of what is in the networks.

Matt Warman Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe.

We are redefining UK telecoms security, but I worry that we are also redefining the aspiration of the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central to crack on, so I will try to be brief. The good news that I can deliver, briefly, is how the aspirations of both the hon. Lady and the right hon. Member for North Durham are met in the legislation, and how we envisage those aspirations’ being implemented.As the Committee is aware, the Government have published an early draft of the security regulations. Certain draft requirements are relevant to the aims that we have talked about today. If hon. Members look at regulation 3(3)(a), with which they will be familiar if they are insomniacs, they will see a duty for network providers

“to identify, record and reduce the risks of security compromises to which the entire network and each particular function… of the network may be exposed”.

That is already there and key to the issues that hon. Members have been talking about.

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Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I understand the hon. Lady’s point, and I will come to something that I think will address it in a moment. Before I do, I will speak to amendments 6 and 10, as they would be functionally identical amendments to new section 105F in clause 3.

New section 105F sets out the process for issuing a code of practice. It requires a statutory consultation on a draft code of practice with the providers to whom the code would apply, Ofcom and other persons such as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. The amendments would apply an additional requirement to formally consult the NCSC when publishing a draft code of practice. I can reassure the Committee that we will continue to work closely with technical experts at the NCSC, as we have done over a number of years.

The telecoms supply chain review demonstrated the Department’s capability to work with our intelligence and security experts to produce sound recommendations, backed by the extensive and detailed security analysis that I know Members of all parties would like to see. That initiated the next phase of the collaborative work that culminated in the introduction of the Bill, and the codes of practice continue that theme. The purpose of such codes is to provide technical security guidance on the detailed measures that certain public telecoms providers should take to meet their legal obligations.

We have already been clear that NCSC guidance will form the basis of an initial DCMS-issued code of practice. The NCSC has already developed a set of technical measures that is in the process of being tested with the industry, and those technical measures have been refined and improved over the last two years. The NCSC will continue to update the measures to reflect any changes in the landscape of threats, as the right hon. Member for North Durham described, and the relationship between the work of the DCMS and that of the NCSC means that such changes would be reflected in the code of practice. Alongside the DCMS and Ofcom, the NCSC will play a key role in advising public telecoms providers on how to implement detailed codes of practice.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

I agree with the Minister, in the sense that I think he and the Secretary of State at the DCMS are committed to there being very close working, but as I said, he ain’t gonna last forever. An issue will come up —in fact, it came up last night on the National Security and Investment Bill—when operators and others say, “Actually, from a commercial point of view, this is more paramount,” or, “This is what we should be doing.” The Secretary of State will come under a lot of pressure to perhaps look at prosperity issues rather than security issues. I just wonder whether, without the relevant provision in this Bill, a future Secretary of State could say, “Well, I’m going to ignore that issue, because I want to pander to”—well, not pander to—“accept the commercial and prosperity arguments.”

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The right hon. Gentleman keeps going on about ministerial impermanence, but I will not take it personally.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

I talked about promotion.

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Too kind! The key part to this is that, obviously, Ofcom remains an independent regulator and will be working closely with others. The right hon. Gentleman makes a fair point about the inevitable balance between national security and a whole host of other issues, but ultimately that independence is absolutely essential. In the light of our long-standing and established working relationships across the DCMS, NCSC and Ofcom, it seems reasonable to say that there is a track record demonstrating what he has asked for. But given the Committee’s interest in the role of the NCSC in this regime, I will just make one last point. Its role is not explicitly described in the Bill, as the NCSC already has a statutory remit, as part of GCHQ, to provide technical security advice and to receive information on telecoms security for the purpose of exercising that function.

The NCSC and Ofcom will very soon publish a statement setting out how they will work together. I think that addresses some of what the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central mentioned; I believe she has some familiarity with Ofcom. I think it is right, because they are independent, that that statement comes from them, as well as the Government expressing a view on this. The statement will include information on their respective roles and their approach to sharing information on telecoms security, and it should provide greater clarity, which hon. Members are entirely legitimately asking for, about the NCSC’s role, including how it will support Ofcom’s monitoring, assessment and enforcement of the new security framework.

I hope that the sorts of matters that I have talked about provide the kind of reassurance that Members have asked for.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

A statement is a welcome step forward, but—the Minister can write to me on this; he need not respond to me today—what is its legal weight? Again, I am not wanting to consider the Minister’s demise, but I would like to know that future Secretaries of State and Ministers will use it as the template and will not be able to say, “Well, we are going to ignore that statement.” That would be very welcome, because it would bind the two organisations together, which is important, and ensure that the security aspects were taken into consideration, but will the Minister just write to me, saying what weight the statement would have? I have to say that I sympathise; I do not like Christmas tree Bills that start having things added on. If it could be done in a complete way, I would be quite happy with that. The only thing that I want to know is, basically, what its status will be in future. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Committee has already heard me talk about some of this, but I think it important to provide a little more detail. The code of practice, which we have discussed, is a fundamental building block of the regime and will contain more specific information on how telecoms providers can meet their legal duties. It will provide guidance on how, and to what timescale, certain public telecoms providers should comply with their legal obligations, and will be based on technical analysis by the NCSC. Individual measures will therefore reflect the best protections against the most pressing threats to network security. The code will, for example, set out the detailed technical measures that should be taken to segregate and control access to the areas of networks that process and manage customers’ data.

We recognise of course that different companies have different ways of setting up and running their networks, and because our telecoms market is dynamic and competitive, providers range in scale from multinational giants such as Vodafone down to innovative local start-ups. We want therefore to ensure that the code of practice is proportionate, and that public telecoms providers take appropriate security measures.

I will touch as briefly as I can on how we intend to achieve that proportionality through a tiered system. Tier 1 will contain the largest national-scale public telecoms providers. Should any of those providers have a significant security incident, it could bring down services to people and business across the UK. Those operators will have the greatest level of oversight and monitoring from Ofcom. Tier 2 will contain medium-sized public telecoms providers. Those providers may not be as large, but in many cases they are critical to regions and to business connectivity. They are expected to have more time to implement the security measures set out in the code of practice.

Tier 3 will contain the smallest public telecoms providers, including small businesses and micro-enterprises, which, of course, must also comply with the law. They are not anticipated to be subject to the measures in the code of practice, but will need to comply with their legal duties as set out in new sections 105A and 105C, and in any regulations. Our expectation is that Ofcom would regulate those providers more reactively.

New section 105F describes the process for issuing a code of practice. When the Government publish a draft code of practice, we will consult with industry, Ofcom and any other appropriate persons. Specifically, publishing the first code of practice will include consulting on the thresholds of each of the tiers that I have described and on the timings for their implementation. Following the consultation period, and once the code is finalised, it will be published and a copy will be laid before Parliament.

New section 105G gives the Secretary of State the power to withdraw a code of practice. Again, that will follow consultation with industry and Ofcom. A notice of withdrawal will be laid before Parliament. The legal effects of the code of practice are described in new section 105H. To be clear, the code of practice is guidance only; it is an important tool that operators should use to comply with their legal duties.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

Is the Minister saying that the code of practice is the standard that providers are expected to meet? Is it the legal bare minimum or do we expect them to do more than what is set out in the code of practice? What is the direction of travel?

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The legislation places a duty on providers. Meeting the strictures of the code of practice would be the way of demonstrating that they were meeting that duty as an initial step, but of course, we see individual companies making decisions, for a host of reasons, to exceed codes of practice in every area of regulated life,

and I would expect that to continue in the area in question as well.

Where relevant, provisions in a code could be taken into account in legal proceedings before courts or tribunals, which I think gives some sense of their status. That would include any appeals against Ofcom’s regulatory decisions heard by the Competition Appeal Tribunal. Ofcom will take account of the code of practice when carrying out its functions as required in new section 105H(3) in relation to telecoms security, as I have just described.

Under new section 105I, if Ofcom has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a telecoms provider is failing, or has failed, to act in accordance with a code, it can ask public telecoms providers to explain either how they meet the code of practice or, if they do not meet it, why. For example, if the network set-up of a particular telecoms provider meant that it could achieve a level of security equivalent to that in the code by other means, it could explain that in its statement responding to Ofcom. In such a case Ofcom might be satisfied that the provider was complying with its security details, but hon. Members will see that we are again trying to ensure a proportionate approach to the relevant part of the framework.

We believe that the code of practice will provide an appropriately flexible framework, which will be able to change as new security threats evolve, providing clarity for telecoms operators on what is required of them by this new telecoms security framework.

--- Later in debate ---
Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Obviously, there could be an overlap in those notification requirements, but our expectation would not be that anyone would receive multiple notifications. That is why there is an emphasis on the nature of communications being clear and obvious to laypeople.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

Speaking gives me an opportunity to take my face mask off. I will make a few points about clause 4, which is broadly welcome because it clarifies for operators what their responsibilities are, not just from a national security point of view but from a consumer point of view. I think there is an issue, though, which my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central raised.

Again, I do not want the Minister to respond now, but I think the crossover with the Information Commissioner might be one area that we need some clarity on. Is there an example of this? Yes—the TalkTalk case. People might look at this Bill and think national security is about the Russians or the Chinese hacking, but that was a criminal act that led to a lot of people’s data being compromised. From a constituency point of view, as any Member of the House at that time will know, trying to get TalkTalk to do anything about that, in terms of the losses that people incurred, was virtually impossible. That is why these clauses are so important.

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Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We are cracking on at such a pace that I lost my place somewhat. I had forgotten that we are now discussing clause 4. My apologies, Mr McCabe.

My right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham has already addressed some of the points that I wanted to make, but let me say that we welcome the duty being placed on providers to report security incidents. I have long campaigned, in relation to cases such as the TalkTalk incident, to make that duty clearer and more comprehensive regarding the information that needs to be shared with users and those who are affected, and for them to have some kind of right of redress, which is effectively part of the Bill.

I welcome the requirement in clause 4 to inform others of security compromises, but will the Minister provide more clarity? There is some indication of the range of actors that the providers and Ofcom must inform, but I do not feel that there is an understanding of the level of information that will be shared with different actors. For example, if the public are to be informed of a security breach, compared with the requirement from the Information Commissioner’s Office, which, as I said, actually goes far enough, what level of information might be shared with other actors, such as other networks? My right hon. Friend talked about who else might be informed. It is also clear that the sharing of information will probably need to evolve over time, as the nature of compromises and their potential reach changes. I wonder how these requirements might be adapted to reflect that.

I will just say a little about the sharing of information with overseas regulators. If that is clearly set out in the Bill, I am unable to find it. Presumably, such data sharing will still have to conform with the requirements of our data protection legislation. Will it also reflect international data-sharing gateways for criminal prosecution purposes?

Those are just some general comments. We welcome the clause.

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will reply briefly. On the point about compensation, essentially new section 105W of the Communications Act 2003, which is inserted by clause 8, covers the civil liability point, which I think opens the door that the right hon. Member for North Durham seeks to open. Then there are the notifications to industry of what is essentially best practice and recent threats. Of course, as he implied, there is a balance to be struck with the existing work of all those involved, but ultimately it would feed into the codes of practice, so there is both an informal and a formal mechanism, if I can put it like that.

On the hon. Lady’s final point about the international sharing of information, it would depend on the nature of the information, as she implied. Some of it would pertain to national security, and some of it would pertain to the kind of criminality that she has spoken about about, where there are existing provisions as well. In that sense, of course, it is all covered by our own data protection regime, which has the sorts of carve-outs I have just described but operates in that holistic framework.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

Will the Minister write to us on the issue of data and the link to the Information Commissioner?

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am not sure I fully understand the right hon. Gentleman’s point.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

I raised the point, as did my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, that we are asking operators to inform individuals about data compromises. That is welcome, but as my hon. Friend said, there might also be a breach of the Information Commissioner’s regulations, and we just wanted to get some idea of how the two would mesh together. I do not expect the Minister to know now, but could he write to us to say how the two would interact?

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As I said in response to the hon. Lady, there is obviously a potential overlap. The focus of this Bill is on clarity of communication to the consumer, but I am very happy to write to the right hon. Gentleman or the Committee with further details of that potential overlap.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Kevan Jones and Matt Warman
Committee stage & Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 21st January 2021

(3 years, 2 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 View all Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 21 January 2021 - (21 Jan 2021)
Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
- Hansard - -

I agree. The issue with both Ericsson and Nokia is that they will have Chinese components in their hardware. This is an incredibly complex situation, as my hon. Friend said: we are talking about not just one piece of kit that most of us have in our pockets, but hundreds of thousands of components, pieces of software and other things. What I am trying to put on the record, and what I want the Minister to respond to, is the question of how we get an understanding of any risks that are involved in that, and how the regulator and the Government are going to look at ways in which national security could be compromised, not by the main company being owned by a Chinese state entity, a Russian state entity or any actor that we feel is a threat to us, but by a key component.

I have not yet really understood how the regulator will look at that issue further down the supply chain, and whether it will ask a supplier of kit to the telecoms network, “What is the level of threshold or security that you need?” That is hard enough with hardware, but with open RAN and software—we are talking about bits of code—it is going to be incredibly difficult. One of the issues is around vulnerabilities, and various things have been said about the vulnerability that Huawei poses to our telecoms network. However, I suggest people read the Huawei assessment centre’s annual reports—I am rather sad, because I read such documents. One thing sticks out every single year, and it is not that the Chinese are doing anything nefarious. The reports are highly critical of Huawei for its shoddy workmanship and engineering, but that type of shoddy engineering and a lack of attention to security will lead to security concerns in our telecoms network.

Amendment 7 is designed to tease out from the Government their thinking about the supply chain. We do not want to be over-burdensome on it, because we want to get innovation in the supply chain. We do not want to suddenly give researchers and other people in the supply chain huge regulatory hurdles to jump over, because that would stifle the development that we are looking for. It is about how individual components and the overview of the supply chain will be regulated. I have tabled a later amendment about Ofcom, but again it comes back to the point I made yesterday about the National Security and Infrastructure Bill. What has to be at the heart of it all, every single time, is not to stifle innovation and prosperity, but what has to come first every time is national security.

As I say, amendment 7 is a probing amendment, and I want to understand where the Government are at in terms of the supply chain, the security they feel they need over the supply chain and, more importantly, the visibility of the supply chain.

Matt Warman Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)
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It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. I echo the thanks of the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central to you and the House staff for facilitating this Public Bill Committee. I also echo her praise for the temperature of the room and especially her commitment to crack on and not fill it with further hot air. That is to be welcomed.

Like the hon. Lady, I will briefly talk about the broader context of the Bill before I directly address this group of amendments. As we all know, security should be the first priority for any Government, and the Bill demonstrates this Government’s commitment to securing the UK’s telecoms networks.

Clauses 1 to 14 raise the bar for security across the whole telecoms sector, and the subsequent clauses—15 to 23— provide the mechanism for the Secretary of State to manage the role of high-risk vendors. The part that telecoms plays in our security is undeniable and has become even more evident in the midst of this global pandemic. At present, the internet provides absolutely everything for workplaces, schools, families and friends, and the Government are committed to improving that through our gigabit programme. New technologies have the potential to be transformative, but they have the opportunity to reach their full potential only if they are secure, and the Bill will ensure that.

Before I explain the Government’s response to amendments 7 and 8, it is necessary to explain briefly how they would interact with clause 1. New section 105A in clause 1 places a duty on providers to take “appropriate and proportionate” measures. Those measures oblige providers to identify and reduce the risks of security compromises and require them to prepare appropriately for those risks. New section 105A also addresses the interaction between the duty and the national security and law enforcement activity, such that these activities are appropriately excluded from the definition of a security compromise. I will return to new section 105A later—I know that will excite the Committee.

Alongside the overarching security duty in new section 105A, new section 105B gives the Secretary of State the powers to make regulations that impose duties to take specific security measures. Clause 1 creates a duty for providers to take “appropriate and proportionate” measures to protect their networks and services from security compromises. “Security compromise” is then defined in new section 105A.

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Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
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I would, and this is really a probing amendment to get an understanding of what the Government think, but may I ask the Minister a direct question about the national security bodies—GCHQ and others? If they came across a component or something that a supplier was producing that raised concerns, how would their concerns be translated into saying that a red warning should be put on a certain component in a supply chain?

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
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I simply say that, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, the NCSC and others already work very closely with the networks. What he seems to be talking about, in some ways, is a very day-to-day way of talking about security concerns. That happens a lot already, and what the codes of practice and other documents will do is set up the framework by which that is formalised. As he knows, that process of very quick action being taken as soon as something is spotted, both by the networks themselves and by our agencies, is already well established, and the Bill gives considerably greater force to it.

As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the Bill is aimed at ensuring that providers take responsibility for the security of their networks and services in a way that has not happened, in legislative terms, in the past, and it then provides the Government with the powers that we need to enforce that. In so far as any supply chain components give rise to risks to the security of a network or service, new section 105A already requires providers to take appropriate action and proportionate measures to identify those risks. I appreciate that this is a probing amendment, but in a sense what the right hon. Gentleman is seeking to do through it is already there, and it will be enforced in the documents, such as the code of practice, that I have mentioned.

Furthermore, the addition of the presence of a supply chain component as a security compromise would not be consistent with the security framework’s definition of a security compromise, but I do not think that we need to get into too much detail about that in the context of a probing amendment. The concept of a security compromise is used in other provisions in the Bill, and it is important that we are consistent.

More fundamentally, the right hon. Gentleman’s amendment would put the onus on providers, rather than the Government, to determine a national security risk, but, as he implied, it is absolutely down to the NCSC and, ultimately, the Government and agencies to make that definition. Placing the responsibility for determining what does and does not constitute a threat to national security on the shoulders of all individual providers is not the right thing to do, and I think, to be fair, the right hon. Gentleman is not really suggesting that it is, either.

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Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
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Clearly NCSC does a tremendous job in terms of education of members of the public and companies —as the Minister outlined, that is a key part of its role. Does he see, therefore, a role for Ofcom as part of that, in terms of ensuring that the supply chain and operators are aware of their responsibility not only under the Bill, but to ask the right questions about supply chains from what might be deemed as high-risk vendors?

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
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In so far as codes of practice will be published by Ofcom, the answer to the right hon. Gentleman’s question is yes. The more nuanced answer is that it is a co-production between Ofcom, the Government, NCSC and others.

To conclude, the Government are immensely sympathetic to the issues that the right hon. Gentleman and the hon. Lady seek to probe, but we take the view that this amendment would do something that is, ultimately, already covered in the Bill. I hope that, in that spirit, she will withdraw the amendment.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I thank the Minister for his response. I am concerned that there is not greater clarity on the role of the supply chain components and the supply chain more generally. We will come to that in further amendments. Given where we are and how we got here, we must take a forward-looking approach to future risks and vectors for risks. This amendment is important in probing that, but I do not seek to put it to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

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Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
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I start by acknowledging the incredibly important work that the ISC does. Its role in overseeing the work of the UK intelligence community is vital to maintaining public trust, as the right hon. Member for North Durham described, and its members make important contributions to public debates on national security matters of all kinds. The right hon. Gentleman has done that for a number of years. Because he is a member of the ISC, he will know that I have proactively engaged with it on the substance of the Bill. I did so enthusiastically—if any Minister can ever regard a Select Committee appearance enthusiastically—and in recognition of the interest that I knew that Committee would have in the Bill. I will be writing again to the ISC on a number of matters raised in the Bill, and I have instructed officials from my Department to continue to engage with the ISC as the Bill proceeds through Parliament, building on the work that it has already done and on the transparency that we have already demonstrated by publishing the draft of the security framework regulations on 13 January, copies of which have been provided to the members of the ISC and a number of other interested Committees. I hope that all that demonstrates the Department’s commitment to working constructively with the ISC, despite the fact that, as the right hon. Gentleman said, DDCMS does not normally fall within the ISC’s formal remit.

It is none the less important to acknowledge that the ISC is not the only legitimate avenue to scrutinise this framework. We fully intend to make use of all the appropriate parliamentary procedures.

The regulations and the explanatory memorandum accompanying them will all be there for the ISC to scrutinise. There is also further guidance to providers in connection with the measures specified in the regulations that can be provided in the code of practice, which must be published, with a copy laid before Parliament. Also, beyond the usual arrangements for secondary legislation, new section 105Z of the Communications Act 2003 provides for Ofcom to produce security reports. Clause 11 of the Bill enables those reports to be published by the Secretary of State, and clause 13 provides for a review of the effectiveness of the framework, including any regulations, after five years.

It is in that context that I point to the enthusiasm with which we have engaged with the ISC. We will continue to do so and ultimately—this is perhaps the reason why the right hon. Gentleman described this process as an ongoing campaign, rather than something that we should address piecemeal—the ISC is clearly defined in the Justice and Security Act 2013. I do not think it would be right to address the memorandum of understanding that he referred during our consideration of the Bill. We should not go at it in piecemeal fashion. The role of the ISC as set out in that MOU is to oversee the work of the security agencies, to provide oversight of certain intelligence or security matters within Government. Ultimately, if the right hon. Gentleman wants to change the MOU, that is a broader issue for him to take up. I note that he is not the only Member of this House to have made that point, but it is not my place to take a view on the role of the ISC; that should be for the ISC itself.

I am confident that we will continue to engage with the ISC; I personally will certainly do so. I know that the DCMS Committee will continue to take an interest, and I will simply say that we will co-operate as fully as possible. I will set out more in the letter I mentioned, and I look forward to the future salvos in the right hon. Gentleman’s campaign.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
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I make no criticism of the Minister, because he has been very proactive, as has his Secretary of State. The problem is this: we have two pieces of legislation going through Parliament. We do not have security Bills very often in this place, and now we have two in a very short period of time. Both make eminent sense and I support them, but this is not something that comes up regularly.

In terms of the Minister’s co-operation, I have no complaints about the way he has operated, but he is not going to be there forever and neither is his Secretary of State, so we need to put in place something that will weather the passage of time, and create an arrangement whereby it will be seen that Parliament is scrutinising these measures. I do not know why the Government—I am sure it is not the Minister, or even his Secretary of State—are resisting this. Frankly, I am not really bothered whether it goes on the face of the Bill or in the MOU, but the Justice and Security Act 2013 is very clear that as a Committee, the ISC has the ability to look at this.

I accept that it would be wrong to get into issues around this Bill that are quite rightly, as the Minister said, for the relevant Select Committee—the Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport—to deal with. We would never do that, so I will withdraw this probing amendment, but we will come back to this issue. I am not usually a betting man, but I suspect that by the time this Bill and the other Bill go through, we will have got to where both I and the Minister—I think, privately—think we should be. I therefore ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Kevan Jones and Matt Warman
Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
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I am, of course, talking about co-operation between NCSC and Ofcom.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
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Q Can I just come back on that? I agree with you that GCHQ has difficulty in retaining staff, as you quite rightly say, Dr Drew, when they get to a certain senior level. I think it is about more than that; it is about culture, as well. Ofcom has a wide number of responsibilities in this sector. Would it not be better, for the security element of this, to give that to the National Cyber Security Centre and GCHQ, rather than leaving it to an organisation, which—we have been told—even if it got the culture right, would take a long time to get there?

I think the Minister is relying on good co-operation between the two organisations, but it is clear from the 2013 ISC report on critical national infrastructure and Huawei that civil servants with a bent for looking at economic development did not have their eye on the ball in terms of security, and they did not even tell Ministers about security concerns that were clear then.

Dr Drew: That is a fantastic question. The best way for me to phrase this is that I believe there is an imbalance that is natural to those who have a particular role within Government or the civil service. Those with responsibility for economic advancement will have a different take on the same issue from those of their colleagues with a security bent to their work.

I find this is a complex topic that needs to be balanced across those different interests. That is why I would generally lean towards co-operation between these groups as opposed to others. I also suspect—although, due to the nature of their work, I cannot be certain—that GCHQ and the NCSC have significant work already, which is only likely to increase. Although they might have the technical capability that Ofcom lacks, I am not sure they have the capacity to take on the sheer volume of work that this is likely to create. I would argue that, actually, more resourcing in general is required for whatever co-operative body is created to carry out the actions of this Bill and other Bills attached to it. That is needed.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Debate between Kevan Jones and Matt Warman
2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons & Carry-over motion & Carry-over motion: House of Commons & Money resolution & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion & Programme motion: House of Commons & Ways and Means resolution & Ways and Means resolution: House of Commons
Monday 30th November 2020

(3 years, 3 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
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We do not anticipate legislation as a direct result of the diversification strategy, but of course there are other important avenues to explore as part of the broader industrial strategy. A lot of what is in the diversification strategy does not need to be delayed by the legislative programme, and I think my right hon. Friend would welcome that.

A number of Members raised the role of Ofcom. Ofcom will monitor, assess and enforce compliance with the new telecoms security framework that will be established by the Bill. It will report on compliance to the Secretary of State alongside publishing the annual reports that he mentioned on the state of the telecoms security sector. I want to be absolutely clear: we have had productive conversations with Ofcom already. Ofcom will continue to have the resources it needs. We appreciate that those needs will be affected by the changes that we are bringing in today, and we will agree their precise nature with Ofcom. We will make sure that Ofcom has all the security clearance that it needs to do the job, and all the resources, external or otherwise, to do the job, because this is an important new power.

Ofcom may also play a role in gathering and providing information relevant to the Secretary of State’s assessment of a provider’s compliance with a designated vendor direction, and it may also be directed to gather further information to comply with the requirements specified in a direction. The Bill already enables Ofcom to require information from providers and, in some circumstances, to carry out inspection of the provider’s premises or to view relevant documents. Ofcom’s annual budget, as I say, will be adjusted to take account of the increased costs it will incur due to its enhanced security role.

Let me turn to a couple of issues raised by the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central. We will of course be working with local authorities and with networks to minimise any disruption, but we do not anticipate that the decisions that we have made over the past few months will have a direct impact on existing commercial decisions. As the Secretary of State said, we do not expect the two to three-year delay to be extended by what we have said today, but we will keep in close contact with the networks and continue to make sure that we do everything we can to remove the barriers to the roll-out of the networks as far as we possibly can. I do, however, expect companies to do as much as they can to minimise the effects. These are commercial decisions that have been made by companies over a number of years. We have already seen, as a result of the Government’s approach over the past few months, significant changes to decisions. I welcome the neutrORAN project that my right hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Glamorgan mentioned, as well as a number of others that have been taken by networks that already see important changes to how they procure their networks.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Kevan Jones
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The Minister has introduced the September 2021 date after which no new Huawei or high- risk vendor equipment can go into the networks. What will happen to those companies that perhaps have stock of Huawei equipment or entered into contracts thinking that they could implement them before September 2021 and will now have to be told that they cannot? Would they actually lose a lot of money?

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
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Those decisions, as I said, were taken in the context of the environment that people were already well aware of, and they are taken at a degree of commercial risk. However, we have worked closely with the networks to ensure that there will be no additional delays as a result of this decision. I think it is the right thing that puts national security at the absolute heart of our programme, but it also does that in the context of not jeopardising the clear economic benefits and the clear practical benefits of improving connectivity across the country that we would all like to see.

On the emergency services network, we anticipate that these announcements concerning Huawei will have a very low impact on the emergency services network. We do not anticipate any impact on the programme schedules. There is some Huawei equipment in the EE part of the emergency services dedicated core network that EE is already working towards removing.

Let me cover one other aspect raised by the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis). I look forward—maybe that is not quite the right phrase—to appearing before the ISC in the next few days. We will always co-operate with it, and I am very happy to work with it on the best way to balance the obvious requirement between transparency and national security, although we would always seek to be as transparent as we possibly can be within those important bounds.

5G Network and Huawei

Debate between Kevan Jones and Matt Warman
Monday 27th January 2020

(4 years, 2 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
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My hon. Friend invites me to stray perhaps further than my DCMS brief and into global geopolitics. However, he is right to say that we should make this decision with an eye on what our allies have advised us as well as what our agencies suggest, and of course on the global situation.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
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As a member of the ISC up to the last general election, I can say that the Committee has looked at this. Unfortunately, the ISC is not in being at the moment; it is up to the Prime Minister to call and set up the new Committee? My personal point of view, from the briefings and information that I have seen, is that any risks can be mitigated by our current services. The bigger issue however, which I think does need addressing, is around sovereign capability. In the new defence and security review, what emphasis will be put on sovereign capability, not just in this area, but in a host of other areas? To date, this Government have not been good at investing in sovereign capability. That should be considered rather than simply looking at price as a factor in making decisions.

Matt Warman Portrait Matt Warman
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The right hon. Gentleman is right to highlight the evidence to which the ISC has pointed, and of which I hope the House will take note. When it comes to sovereign powers, when we assess our national security, there are of course some industries that we should consider of strategic importance. We do that in some areas; I suspect that in future we will consider whether we should do it in others.