Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill (Fifth sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 24th November 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Industry and Investment Security (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Sir George. The clause is a vital part of the Government’s retained EU law reform programme and will make sure that EU rights, obligations and remedies saved by section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 cease to apply in the UK after 31 December 2023.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this morning, Sir George. Members will note that I am a little hoarse —please do not give me a sugar cube. I hope that means I will not be quite as lengthy as I was on Tuesday.

[Hon. Members]

Shame!

[Justin Madders]

We can try.

I want to say a few words about the clause, which will fit in with the discussion we will have on the following clauses. All these clauses pertain to the future of our law after the removal of the legal effects of EU law. I will try not to repeat myself and to focus specifically on the terms of this clause.

I begin by stating the obvious: as we untie ourselves from the European Union, we will clearly need a new settlement of legal principles. Nevertheless, we ought to treat the clause with some scepticism and scrutinise the impact it will have on our country’s legal system. In doing so, we must consider why it was decided to take a snapshot at the end of 2020 in the first place.

When the country entered the transition period for leaving the EU, the potential for a legal vacuum to emerge rapidly became apparent, as the process of preserving EU legislation and EU-derived legislation made under section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972 began. Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 was therefore designed to prevent such a legal vacuum once the 1972 Act was repealed, by catching everything that might have been missed and its legal effects.

I am saying that to highlight an important feature of the 2018 Act, which has been to maintain the smooth operation of our legal system while we formally left the EU. Clearly, it still has importance. Unless the Government are able to use the powers in clauses 12 to 15 to replace the effects of EU law exactly—although it is clear that they do not want to do that—we face the prospect of a legal vacuum.

I have a couple of questions for the Minister. First, does she agree that section 4 of the EU (Withdrawal) Act has provided an important function over the previous years in creating stability and certainty? Secondly, does she recognise the risk of a legal vacuum opening after 2023, and can she provide any assessment the Government have made of that risk?

As a matter of interest, I have just read on the front page of today’s Financial Times that a wide range of groups, from the TUC to the CBI, have written to the Prime Minister requesting that the Bill be withdrawn. One reason they give is that it will create a vacuum and a great amount of legal uncertainty. I suspect that the Minister has not yet had a chance to discuss the contents of that letter with the Prime Minister, but if she has, will she update us? [Interruption.] The Minister’s response suggests that she has not had that opportunity.

Such questions naturally lead us to the identification problem that we discussed on Tuesday. My understanding is that the dashboard sought to capture the examples under section 4 of the 2018 Act on retaining

“rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures”.

Due to the dashboard’s catch-all nature, however, can we be certain that all those have been picked up, given that even the Government admit that not all the regulations have been captured? How on earth can we be certain that serious vacuums will not be left by the removal of section 4 if we cannot be sure that we have identified everything affected by it? That is an important point.

Linking again to our debate on Tuesday about the timeframe in which such legal effects and legislative provisions need to be restated, replaced or revoked under clauses 12 to 15, we must not treat clause 3 in isolation. We must remember that what happens alongside the mountain of other pieces of EU legislation that need to be processed will be key to how the country moves forward. At the very least the Minister must try to offer us some reassurance—or, better yet, a plan that shows—that the Government have the matter in hand and will deal with all the legislative provisions and legal decisions before the 2023 deadline.

Overall, we agree that there has to be an end to EU supremacy in UK law, but we still have concerns about how that will operate in practice. We want to avoid a situation that the Government have known was coming for at least two years. I would be grateful if the Minister could provide some assurances to the Committee that action on the concerns that have been expressed by a wide body of representative groups is in hand.

[Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)]

Good morning, Sir George. I rise to support the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston. I also think that the debate on the clause sums up some of the practical challenges with the legislation. The retained EU law dashboard has identified just 28 pieces of directly effective retained law under section 4 of the EU withdrawal Act—a mere amuse-bouche of laws that will be affected by the Bill overall. Given that the number is so small in comparison with the at least 2,500 that have been identified, and the possible 4,000, why could the Minister not show us what will happen next? After all, our debates on Tuesday were all about what would happen if we deleted every piece of legislation. There are no guarantees about what would happen next. Rather than assuming that all these pieces of legislation should go at the end of 2023, surely Ministers could commit to reviewing the 28 now and showing us the way ahead—whether some will be retained, amended or indeed abolished. Then the clause would not be required.

All of this does make a difference. For example, on Tuesday the Government gave their very first commitment on what will happen to one of the 4,000 pieces of legislation—the Bauer and Hampshire judgments about pensions. To remind Government Members, who may well have constituents coming to them about this, those are the requirements—the pieces of case law—that mean that if a company goes bust, people are entitled to at least 50% of their pension fund. The Government committed on Tuesday to abolishing those pieces of legislation, but they are affected by the clause.

The 28 pieces of legislation are not insubstantial; they could be the way forward for the Minister. Instead of requiring the clause, she could say, “We’re going to look at the 28 and tell you what we’re going to do with them,” so that people can have confidence that we have an administrative process for these pieces of legislation and the suggestion that there has been scaremongering can be put aside. She could say, “Here are 28 examples of what we’re going to do, and the fact that they are rights under section 4 of the EU withdrawal Act helps us to contain them as a piece of work.”

The Intellectual Property (Exhaustion of Rights) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 are another of the 28. Given that the Government are getting rid of the Bauer and Hampshire judgments, thereby affecting the pension rights and protections of our constituents, could the Minister set out what might happen on that one? She was very kind on Tuesday to set out an example of what will happen to one of the 28. It would be incredibly helpful for us as a Committee to understand the impact of the legislation and to perhaps start, if not to allay our concerns—I think Opposition Members are concerned when people’s pension protections are being not just watered down but, frankly, abolished—then to understand what the Government’s intentions are in using these powers.

I simply ask the Minister to use the clause stand part debate to explain why the 28 pieces of legislation could not have been dealt with in advance of the Bill, given that they stand on the EU withdrawal Act, and to tell us a bit about what will happen to them, to give us an indication of what horrors are to come or perhaps to reassure us. Government Members want to use the term “scaremongering”. I use the term “accountability”. I am looking forward to what the Minister has to say.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clauses 5 and 6 stand part.

New clause 8—Conditions for bringing sections 3, 4 and 5 into force—

“(1) None of sections 3, 4 or 5 may be brought into force unless all the following conditions have been satisfied.

(2) The first condition is that a Minister of the Crown has, after consulting organisations and persons representative of interests substantially affected by, or with expertise in the likely legal effect of, that section on a draft of that report, laid a report before each House of Parliament setting out, with reasons, the Minister’s view as to the likely advantages and disadvantages of bringing that section into force, setting out in particular the effect of that section on—

(a) the rights of and protections for consumers, workers, and businesses, and protections of the environment and animal welfare;

(b) legal certainty, and the clarity and predictability of the law;

(c) the operation of the Trade and Cooperation agreement between the United Kingdom and the EU, and UK exports of goods and services to the European Economic Area; and

(d) the operation of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the EU withdrawal agreement.

(3) In relation to section 4, that report must take into account any regulation made or likely to be made by a relevant national authority under section 8(1).

(4) The second condition is that a period of sixty days has passed since that report was laid before Parliament, with no account to be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which either House is adjourned for more than four days.

(5) The third condition is that, after the end of that period, both Houses of Parliament have approved a resolution that that section come into force.

(6) If both Houses of Parliament have approved a resolution that that section should not come into force unless it is amended in a way set out in that resolution, then the Minister may by regulation amend that section accordingly, and that section may not be brought into force until that amendment has been made.”

This new clause requires Ministers to analyse, and to explain their analysis of, the effect of the removal of retained EU law rights, the principle of supremacy of EU law, and of the general principles. It also includes opportunity for Parliamentary approval and timeframes for laying reports before both Houses.

[Justin Madders]

I rise to speak to new clause 8, but before that I will address clauses 4, 5 and 6.

Clause 4 is a Ronseal clause: with regard to abolishing the supremacy of the EU, it does exactly what it says on the tin. However, unlike putting a coat of varnish on a fence, it will not be a case of simply walking away once it is done. It is inevitable that courts will need to consider case law that we have previously regarded as settled, because that law was settled when EU law was supreme, and it no longer will be. The reality is that none of us know where this clause is going to take us.

Most lawyers practising today know no other legal environment. The world has moved on in the last 50 years in ways that we could not have foreseen, and the law has moved with it, so any reinterpretation of the law needs to be done carefully. It must strike a balance between making changes where appropriate, based on our new position outside the EU, and maintaining some consistency and predictability for businesses and individuals who are trying to conduct their working and private lives within the ambit of the law. That is why some of our other amendments have attempted to create stability in terms of what the Government can control with these regulations, because we recognise that not even this Government can control the courts and which issues are litigated.

Section 5(2) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 stated that the principle of the supremacy of EU law will continue to apply

“so far as relevant to the interpretation, disapplication or quashing of any enactment...passed or made before exit day.”

That means that retained EU regulations would take precedence over pre-existing domestic legislation that is inconsistent with them. It also makes it clear that this does not apply to anything passed after 31 December 2020, so to some extent, supremacy of EU law has already entered history. What analysis has been done on the legal consequences of retrospectively altering the relationship between retained EU law and domestic legislation passed before 31 December 2020? Have the Government have done any analysis of this, and can they anticipate which areas will be prone to more legal challenge on the issue of supremacy?

I suspect that it will be impossible for any of us to say whether the consequences of removing the principle of supremacy would reduce the clarity of the law or change its effect in any particular case. However, the overall effect is that there will be a reduction in certainty and a risk of unpredicted—and perhaps entirely undesirable and unjust—consequences. What assessment has been made of the impact of the new level of uncertainty on business investment?

--- Later in debate ---

[Ms Ghani]

This is turning into a very interesting morning indeed, Chairman.

I rise to resist new clause 8. This new clause seeks to set conditions on the commencement of clauses 3, 4 and 5 of the Bill. I will explain to the right hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston why we are making the changes in these clauses.

Each clause is vital to this Government’s programme to reform retained EU law. That there are still circumstances where retained EU law takes precedence over UK law is not consistent with our status as an independent nation. The principle of EU supremacy must be ended without delay. These amendments would add further delay by requiring the Government to write reports on items to which we have already committed. As set out already, the Government have committed to ensuring that the necessary legislation is in place to uphold the UK’s international obligations, which includes maintaining the UK’s obligations under the trade and co-operation agreement or the Northern Ireland protocol. We will come on to consider an amendment that will allow us to spend more time discussing that issue.

This Bill will not lead to legal uncertainty—to have perfect legal certainty would mean that we would forever keep the same laws. Our approach is to improve accessibility and legal clarity by codifying, where necessary, rights and principles expressly into domestic statute.

With regard to the delegated powers in the Bill, the Government are committed to ensuring robust scrutiny for the secondary legislation made under these powers while ensuring the most effective use of Parliamentary time; I believe, Chairman, that we spent many hours discussing this issue just on Tuesday. This means that legislation made using the delegated powers in the Bill will be subject to either the negative or draft affirmative procedure, depending on the legislation that is being amended and the power used. A sifting procedure will also apply to regulations to be made under the power to restate, which affords additional scrutiny of the use of power.

Clause 4 ends the principle of supremacy of retained EU law in so far as it applies to pre-2021 legislation. The clause establishes a new priority rule, which ensures domestic legislation prevails over retained direct EU legislation where there is a conflict. Thanks to the clause, an Act of Parliament will once again be the foremost law in the land. Clause 5 ensures general principles of EU law will no longer be part of the UK statute book from the end of 2023. Clause 6 establishes that after the end of 2023 all retained EU law preserved from the sunset provisions will be known as “assimilated law”.

In response to some of the questions raised, I put on the record once again that the rulebook does not seek to remove rights. In most instances, those rights already operate and are available in domestic legislation. The rulebook contains provisions to enable the UK Government and the devolved Administrations to safeguard the rights and protections of citizens of the United Kingdom. The Bill includes a restatement power so that Departments can codify rights into domestic legislation.

On Tuesday, we spoke at length about scrutiny, the sifting process and the role that Parliament will play, so I am not sure what further response I can make today. That programme has been made clear. The Government recognise Parliament’s significant role in scrutinising statutory instruments to date and are committed to ensure appropriate scrutiny of any secondary legislation made under the Bill’s delegated powers.

Changes in the law can give rise to litigation—that is normal—but we would never change the law if people wanted no change whatsoever. The risk will be mitigated in areas where Departments use the Bill’s powers to maintain the effect of our current law, if necessary, for desired policy outcomes. In other cases, proactive management of the removal of retained EU law will allow a controlled and positive introduction of a new legal regime that seeks to mitigate any risks posed by increases in litigation. For instance, the Bill contains powers allowing the Government to retain the current legislative hierarchy between specified pieces of legislation. The effects of repealing supremacy will only be considered relevant to matters arising after the enactment of policy. The change is not retrospective, and cases that have already been concluded will not reopen. Upon finding that pre-2021 domestic law is incompatible with retained EU law, courts may place conditions in the incompatibility order to mitigate the effect of that finding.

[Justin Madders]

I did posit in my opening remarks the principles of EU law that will be jettisoned. In the example of legal certainty and equal treatment, does the Minister consider that those principles should no longer be part of UK law?

[Ms Ghani]

That assumes that we would not be treating people equally and fairly, and that is not the case when we legislate in the UK. I do not buy the idea that without EU law we are incapable of governing fairly in the UK. We are all elected to Parliament to represent our constituents, and we want to go home and tell our constituents, regardless of who they are and where they are from, that we are legislating fairly for everybody.

Why are we removing the principle of EU supremacy? That principle means that pre-2021 domestic law must give way to some pieces of retained EU law when the two conflict. That ensured legal continuity at the end of the transition period, but it is constitutionally anomalous and inappropriate, as some domestic laws, including Acts of Parliament, are subordinate to some pieces of retained law. That is the nub of the issue. We either accept the supremacy of the EU or accept the supremacy of this place. We can go round and round, but only one can prevail, and the Government believe that this Parliament should be supreme.

On the protection of fundamental rights and the equality principle, the principle of fundamental rights is generally not the exclusive preserve of the EU. We are proud of the history of the UK legal systems in which common law principles and legislation are well established to protect fundamental rights. For example, the principle of equality before the law is rooted deeply in British law. It was in 1215 that Magna Carta first acknowledged that British people had legal rights and that laws could apply to kings and queens too. The Equality Act 2010 has, to date, brought together more than 116 pieces of legislation into a single Act—a streamlined legal framework to protect the rights of individuals and to advance equality of opportunity for all. There is no equivalent to that Act in EU law, which shows how important it is that we are able to express principles such as equality before the law in a UK statute rather than relying on principles of EU law.

[Ms Ghani]

Exactly. My right hon. Friend is incredibly knowledgeable on all those issues, and I am more than happy to defer to him; he is absolutely right. We reject new clause 8.

[Justin Madders]

I will first address the intervention of the right hon. Member for Clwyd West. The point of clause 4 is that it removes the ability of the courts to refer to precedents from any decisions that have been taken in accordance with EU law, so it is worrying that the right hon. Member makes such comments.

The Minister said that we must decide whether we accept the supremacy of Parliament. We absolutely do, which is why so many of the amendments that we have tabled are about giving Parliament back control, not handing power to Ministers or, in the case of this clause, handing power to lawyers and judges to decide how our law moves forward.

I thank the Minister for promoting me to a right hon. Member—that was very kind of her. She also said that new clause 8 would delay matters. It will not. If the Government are on top of things, which I would like to think they were, they should be doing this work anyway. They should be doing this analysis in a way that enables Parliament to scrutinise the effect of the Bill.

[Stella Creasy]

Does my hon. Friend recognise that the Minister did not utter the words “Northern Ireland”, and did not at all address the question of how supremacy will be resolved in Northern Ireland, which follows both EU and UK legislation? I see that she is being given a note, so perhaps she can do us the courtesy of responding to that question.

[Ms Ghani]

rose—

[Justin Madders]

I can allow the Minister to intervene on me.

[Ms Ghani]

On a point of order, Sir George.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I am grateful to the Minister for the clarification.

[Justin Madders]

We will be returning to Northern Ireland, as the Minister says. She said that the Bill will not add legal uncertainty. I am afraid that that is exactly what it will do, and it is exactly what the bulk of evidence from every legal representative who has contacted the Committee shows. By abolishing principles that have been in formation for half a century, we will be in a new era and will have to develop new legal principles. That can only create uncertainty.

It is worth reflecting on the letter to which I referred earlier, which is reported in the Financial Times today. It was sent by about a dozen organisations, including the Trades Union Congress and the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, that have a huge interest in ensuring that the law is fair and certain. The letter warns that the Bill

“would upend ‘decades-worth of case law’ and create ‘a huge risk of poor or potentially detrimental law entering the statute book’”.

We should be listening to these people; they know what they are talking about. They have looked at the effect of the Bill and believe it will not do what some think it will. It will not be a rerun of 2019, although the Conservatives would like us to go back to 2019, because they were ahead in the polls then. We have left the EU. This legislation is about how we move forward, but I am afraid that there has been a complete failure to address the consequences of its provisions. We will be coming back to the issue for years to come, because there has been a shocking lack of forethought about the Bill’s implications. I will press new clause 8 to a vote.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 5 and 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Role of courts