Jonathan Edwards
Main Page: Jonathan Edwards (Independent - Carmarthen East and Dinefwr)Department Debates - View all Jonathan Edwards's debates with the HM Treasury
(10 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman makes a good point. If we have elections on the same day, we certainly need to ensure that there is clarity about the electoral systems and in the design and printing of the ballot papers, so that it is clear for people not just which parties they might want to vote for, which is a decision for them, but the mechanism by which they can do so. A lot of lessons were learned from that process. We had that in mind when we held the referendum on the parliamentary voting system and we tried to ensure that there was not the level of confusion that there had been in the past.
Amendments 30 and 31 are hopeful amendments. Having considered all the evidence, I think that it makes sense to separate the big elections. I am not sure whether six months is long enough. We decided to shift the elections by an entire year to separate the media coverage and the debates so that people could focus on the important issues. The amendments raise some sensible issues. It makes sense to keep the elections to the primary legislative assemblies in the UK—the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly, the Northern Ireland Assembly and this Parliament—apart. That was the provision that we made in the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011.
I am therefore pleased that the Bill presented by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State permanently makes the terms of the Assembly the same length as those of this House, but offset by a year to keep the elections separate. That will enable a proper debate to take place before elections to this place and will enable Welsh voters to have a proper debate about the issues that the Welsh Assembly and Welsh Assembly Government will focus on.
Finally, if people’s decisions in Welsh elections are indeed made on issues for which the Welsh Assembly and the Welsh Assembly Government are responsible, my reading of the situation, based on how the Welsh Assembly Government are handling the national health service in Wales, which I will not talk about today, but which we will return to on the second day of Committee, is that the Welsh public might reach a different conclusion from that put forward by the hon. Member for Pontypridd. I look forward to their having the opportunity to do so and to the result, because I think that it might shock the hon. Gentleman. He should not be so complacent.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr McCrea, and to speak to amendments 30 and 31, which appear in my name and those of my hon. Friend the Member for Arfon (Hywel Williams) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd). They are both probing amendments and follow the spirit of the contributions by the hon. Members for Pontypridd (Owen Smith) and for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper).
We welcome the fact that we are discussing a piece of Wales-specific legislation. It is only three years since the remarkable referendum in 2011, when the people of Wales voted overwhelmingly in favour of full political sovereignty over the political fields that were devolved to the National Assembly. I have no hesitation in saying that that was one of the proudest days of my political career. The desktop on the computer in my Westminster office has a picture of the referendum count in Carmarthenshire, with the yes votes piled up proudly on the yes table, and a few bundles of no votes on the no table.
Well, apart from the Swans staying up this year—another great achievement, which I know the hon. Member for Pontypridd (Owen Smith) shares with me.
Most striking about the referendum result was that it was matched across every county in Wales—apart from Monmouthshire, which only just voted no. When the history of Wales is written, that result will be recorded very strongly when compared with the referendums of ’79 and ’97. It was an earthquake moment, and I remember the shell-shocked faces of many Unionists down in Westminster the week after that historic occasion.
The nature of the game has therefore changed, and subsequent opinion polling clearly indicates that the people of Wales want greater control over their lives. I think they are far ahead of the political class at the moment, and I even include Plaid Cymru in that context. Today we are discussing in historical terms a further milestone on the path towards Welsh self-government, with, for the first time, a national legislature being empowered to have an element of fiscal powers. Needless to say, the Bill does not go anywhere near as far as my party would want in terms of powers for Wales, but as an historian in a previous life I can safely say that when the history of Wales is written, this period will be seen as one of rapid political development for our nation.
As we celebrate the 20th anniversary of the great indie band from Manchester, Oasis, and its first studio album in ’94, I am reminded of one of its best songs, “Little by Little”. I hope sincerely that when we conclude our Committee deliberations we will not be “looking back in anger”—a reference to another of its great songs. Today is therefore another landmark in the political development of our country.
The context of the Bill is interesting in itself, and I get the impression that the Secretary of State would rather walk through fire than deal with the Bill today. I am sure he sees it as a hospital pass from his predecessor. The Bill results, of course, from the UK Government-sponsored Silk commission, in particular part I, and I pay tribute to Sir Paul and his fellow commissioners for their work on both stages of the report. As I said, as a party our evidence to both parts of the commission called for far greater progress than was finally agreed, but we were prepared to compromise to seek agreement and make progress. It is therefore disappointing that we find ourselves presenting amendments in Committee, and endeavouring to preserve the integrity of the Silk commission.
Unfortunately, the Wales Bill has torpedoed the recommendations of the Silk commission, particularly in relation to the lockstep on the income tax powers, which we will discuss later. Even more regrettably, it seems that Labour’s amendments to the Bill, rather than strengthening it as we seek to do, aim to place further roadblocks and move us even further from what the Silk commission proposed.
The hon. Gentleman is running through the parts of the Bill that he disagrees with, and it is entirely possible that people on both sides of the Committee may disagree because it is a wide-ranging Bill. Does he accept, however, that the Bill makes dramatic progress in that it provides the foundation stones for financial accountability to be vested in the National Assembly for Wales? That is a key step forward that makes the Bill hugely important for the interests of Wales.
As I said, I think the Bill will be viewed as an important milestone in the constitutional development of our country, but it will not surprise the hon. Gentleman to hear that my ambition for Wales is greater than what is set out in the Bill.
A moment ago the hon. Gentleman said that Labour was in some way seeking to undermine the Bill, and I am aware from media reports that that is the line Plaid Cymru is taking in the media. I wish to place on record that that is the opposite of what we are seeking to do. We are probing the Bill today but we will support it. We are looking to strengthen the powers held by the Welsh Assembly in many regards, and we are seeking greater symmetry on tax powers with Scotland. Crucially, we will be tabling amendments to secure fair funding in advance of any of those changes, and looking to ensure that we move to a reserved powers model—all of which I am sure the hon. Gentleman would support.
If that is indeed the hon. Gentleman’s position, I am sure he will join us in the Lobby when we vote on the new clauses later.
The second major context in which this debate takes place is the seismic events happening in Scotland. As I said yesterday in the Welsh Affairs Committee, the second part of the Silk commission’s work will be superseded by the result of the independence referendum, one way or the other. Even the Bill could be superseded by events in Scotland, as its proceedings in the Lords are likely to happen after the people in Scotland have cast their vote in the independence referendum.
Does that really hold good as an argument? The hon. Gentleman will have seen current opinion polls that show that support for independence—as opposed to support for devolution—in Wales is at an all-time low. He has rightly talked about the seminal change in Wales in which the Conservative party has joined other parties to support devolution, but the result of the Scottish debate so far is that support for Welsh independence is lower than ever before.
I do not want to get into a debate about independence, but the most detailed polling ever undertaken on devolutionary attitudes was by the Silk commission in the second part of its work. It suggested that 20% of people in Wales wanted devolved defence and foreign affairs, and those would be the two last powers that would ever be devolved.
Regardless of the result in Scotland, the constitutional landscape of the UK will change considerably. If Scotland votes yes, that will be the end of the British state as we know it. If it votes no, the likelihood is that it will get significantly more powers, with 90% approval ratings for a devolution-max settlement that would devolve everything apart from defence and foreign affairs. Is the hon. Gentleman seriously saying that the people of Wales would accept the settlement in the Bill if Scotland were to get significantly more powers, even in the event of a no vote?
If the vote in Scotland is close but ultimately a victory for no, does the hon. Gentleman anticipate that the SNP will come back for another vote, and another after that, and that it will not be so much a referendum as a neverendum?
As long the people of Scotland have those aspirations and vote for an SNP Government, I imagine that they would want to ask the question on subsequent occasions, but that is a debate for another time. Considering the way in which the opinion polls are moving, it seems that the question might be settled this time.
I remind the House that the Prime Minister said a few months ago to the people of Scotland that, whatever happens, devo-max is on offer to them. My hon. Friend is right to say that that means that the constitutional set-up of the UK will have to change, come what may.
As ever, I am very grateful to my right hon. Friend for his valid and expert intervention. Whatever happens in Scotland, it will completely change the political landscape and supersede Silk and even perhaps what we are discussing today.
With the Scottish question in mind, I believe that the UK Government have missed an opportunity to bring forward a settlement that would have helped them to develop a narrative in Scotland in which the Westminster elite recognised the national aspirations of the people of the nations of the state, and were happy to reform the relations between the nations of these isles to preserve the future of the state. One obvious measure would have been to devolve income tax powers to Wales in the Bill without the Scottish lockstep model. We will debate that issue in greater detail, but suffice it to say at this point that the unambitious nature of the Bill leaves the people of Scotland in little doubt that the referendum is a straight choice between more powers with yes and the status quo with no.
Amendments 30 and 31 would ensure that the poll for an ordinary general election to the National Assembly could not be held within six months of a general election for the UK Parliament. I am reassured by the discussion I had with the Minister before the debate. That, and the comments by the former constitutional Minister, the hon. Member for Forest of Dean, is why I am probing rather than pressing the amendments to a vote. When he took the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill through the House, he did a lot of work to ensure that there would be no coterminosity between the Assembly and the general election. That would have presented a great danger to our democracy in Wales.
And the Rhyl Journal, although I am not an avid reader, I must admit.
Most people get their political news from London papers. If we have a Westminster election and an Assembly election in close proximity, there is a great danger that the issues for which the national Assembly is responsible will be dropped completely. The Minister has indicated that there is no intention to bring the elections closer and that there are protections in the Bill to ensure that there will be a gap of at least a year between them, so I am happy not to press my two amendments.
On the Labour amendments, the Electoral Reform Society has lobbied extensively against amendment 9, arguing that
“good governance and greater stability is achieved through fixed terms and this should not be a power that is given to the Executive to decide.”
It points out that, as the electoral system for the Assembly makes coalitions more likely, fixed terms also provide stability and security for parties of government. Two of the four terms in the Assembly have seen coalition Governments, so I agree with that point.
Amendment 10 appears to have been drafted with the aim of ensuring that Assembly and Westminster elections are not held on the same day. I would have been happy to support that if it had been pressed to a vote.
I, too, would like to start by welcoming you to the Chair, Dr McCrea. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I thank hon. Members on both sides of the Committee for their contributions to this early part of the first day of our deliberations.
Amendment 9 would give the Assembly the power to decide, by resolution, when Assembly elections are held, and would remove the Secretary of State’s powers in relation to varying the date of Assembly elections and proposing a date for extraordinary Assembly elections. Amendment 10 would prevent the Assembly from setting a date for an election on a day on which it knows, or reasonably expects, a parliamentary general election to be held. The amendments would permit the Assembly to determine the date of Assembly elections and consequently the length of its own terms. That reflects a recommendation made by the Welsh Affairs Committee arising from its pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Wales Bill.
It is worth pointing out that the Silk commission considered the matter of legislative competence for Assembly elections to be outside its terms of reference and made no recommendations in this regard in its second report. Nevertheless, the Government believe that the devolution of further powers to the Assembly should not be undertaken in a piecemeal fashion, and that the issue would best be considered in the wider context of possible changes to the Welsh devolution settlement arising from the recommendations made by the commission in its second report. The Government made clear, on publication of the report, that recommendations requiring primary legislative change should be a matter for the next Parliament and the next Government, and consequently that they should be for political parties to consider in preparing their election manifestos. We believe the same principle should apply when considering whether legislative competence for Assembly elections should be devolved to the Assembly. It is important that electors are clear on how long they are electing Assembly Members for when they vote in the 2016 Assembly election, and that five-year Assembly terms are in place by then to ensure that Westminster and Assembly elections do not coincide in 2020.
The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 moved this House to a fixed five-year cycle and consequentially provided that the next ordinary general election to the National Assembly for Wales would be moved on a one-off basis by one year from 7 May 2015 to 5 May 2016. This responded to concerns raised by the Assembly that holding general elections to this House and to the Assembly on the same day could lead to the Assembly elections being overshadowed. I am encouraged that Members of all parties seem to be in agreement on the position that we do not want the two elections coinciding. I particularly welcome the Labour party’s support in seeking to minimise the risk of that, which is evident in amendment 10.
Similarly, amendments 30 and 31, tabled by right hon. and hon. Members from Plaid Cymru, are intended to ensure that an ordinary Assembly general election does not take place within six months of a UK general election. I am encouraged that the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards) has been reassured by the debate so far and by our previous discussions, and that he is not going to press his amendments on that basis.
There is cross-party support for the principle that, as far as possible, we should seek to ensure that ordinary general elections to the Assembly and to this House should not coincide. With the next Assembly election scheduled for 2016, if the Assembly remains on a four-year cycle, the two sets of elections would coincide every 20 years, starting in 2020—something that all parties are clearly keen to avoid. Clause 1 makes it far less likely that Assembly elections and parliamentary elections will coincide in future. I therefore ask Opposition Members to support the clause, to consider the further devolution of powers to the Assembly in the context of preparing their own parties’ manifestos and consequently to withdraw or not press the amendments.
Those are all perfectly valid criticisms of list systems where voters are presented with a party choice, rather than list systems where votes have the ability to order the candidates. The hon. Lady’s point on whether people have proper choices is a valid criticism of every list system in which the voter can vote only for the party and has no ability to rank candidates, because in such systems whoever is at the top of the list will almost certainly get elected regardless of whether voters think highly of their personal qualities, but I do not think it is a valid criticism of the changes in the Bill we are considering today.
Finally—[Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] Opposition Members groan, but I have been generous in taking interventions. Had I simply spoken and taken no interventions, I would have been finished some time ago, but that would not have been the right nature of a debate in Committee on an important Bill, so perhaps we could have a little less chuntering from the Opposition parties.
I want to ask a question about new clauses 4 and 6, which were tabled by Plaid Cymru. I was a little confused, because new clause 4 states:
“Her Majesty may by Order in Council provide for the transfer of responsibility for setting the number of Assembly Members to the”
Assembly, which is consistent with the points made by the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards) in his earlier remarks on clause 1 about giving the Assembly more control, but new clause 6 would give
“responsibility for determining the system of election of members”
not to the National Assembly but to the Welsh Government. It is almost certainly the case that that is not what was intended and that it was intended to give responsibility to the Welsh Assembly.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way and for giving me the opportunity to respond. We understood from the Clerks that, for drafting reasons, they would prefer to use “Welsh Government” in the Bill, but he is right that the intention is to devolve responsibility to the National Assembly.
I am glad that the hon. Gentleman said that, because although it may be the case that a party with a majority is in effect the Government and can get the Assembly to do what it wants, there is a difference in giving Ministers executive powers to make changes to electoral systems. Systems of election should at least be determined by the Assembly. I have not made a decision on whether responsibility should lie with the Assembly or remain with Parliament, but it certainly should not become an executive decision of the Welsh Government. It was not the intention, but a combination of new clauses 4 and 6 and amendment 9, which was not moved, would have given the First Minister the power not to have any elections at all. If there were elections, he could have decided the system of election and put himself into a powerful position. I am glad that we have discovered that that is the intention neither of the Labour party nor of the hon. Gentleman.
In conclusion, I shall listen carefully to the Minister, but amendment 15 is probing. I strongly support clause 2 and will vote for it to remain part of the Bill. I am grateful for the clarification that the hon. Gentleman has provided on new clauses 4 and 6.
It is a pleasure to speak to new clauses 4 and 6, which are in my name and those of my hon. and right hon. Friends. We intend to press new clause 4 to a vote, but new clause 6 is probing.
If passed, new clause 4 would transfer responsibility for deciding the number of Assembly Members to the National Assembly, as explained by the hon. Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper) on my behalf. At present, the National Assembly has 60 Assembly Members, which is same as when it was established in 1999. The Scottish Parliament has well over 100 Members, and I am sure, Dr McCrea, that you could inform me that the number in that fine building in Stormont, which I have visited many times, in Northern Ireland is also above 100. Since 1999, the institution’s legislative competence has grown considerably, particularly after the 2011 referendum, which I referred to in my earlier contribution, resulting in full law-making powers in devolved areas being given to the National Assembly. Common sense would dictate that the Assembly, working with the Boundary Commission for Wales, should now determine the number of Members necessary to ensure its smooth running. I take the point made by the hon. Member for Ogmore (Huw Irranca-Davies) in his intervention on the hon. Member for Forest of Dean, but new clause 4’s intention is that, should the discussions be concluded, it would be a matter for the Assembly to determine rather than this House of Commons.
Increasing the number of Assembly Members has been endorsed by the Electoral Reform Society Cymru, as well as the 2004 Richard commission, which was commissioned by the Welsh Government of the time. The present Presiding Officer of the Assembly, Rosemary Butler AM, has also argued that the institution should have 80 members. The second report of the Silk commission, published in March, argued for the same and stated:
“The size of the National Assembly should be increased, and…most analysis suggests that it should comprise at least eighty Members.”
In October 2013, the Electoral Reform Society Cymru and the UK’s Changing Union project published a report, “Size Matters”, that went further by arguing for an increase in the number of AMs to 100. It based its findings on an evidence-based examination of legislatures across Europe and further afield. It concluded that, as the Assembly now controls a budget of nearly £15 billion and can pass laws on education, health and transport, a larger legislative body is needed to ensure that the law-making is done thoroughly and is not rushed.
I am listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman. One of his arguments for having a larger number of Assembly Members is that the Assembly will need more of them as its responsibilities grow and cover more areas. Given that those powers and responsibilities have effectively been transferred from the UK Government and therefore relate to policy areas that no longer need to be scrutinised in this House, does he think that it follows that increasing the size of the Assembly because of its increasing powers and work load means that there should be fewer Members in this House representing Wales to reflect the smaller work load and lower level of responsibility here?
That relates to some of the points the hon. Member for Ogmore made earlier. My position has always been that any reduction in the number of Members of Parliament must be complemented with the transfer of significant further fields of power to the National Assembly, as happened in Scotland. Perhaps a more interesting context is the Williams commission, which has been set up by the Welsh Government to consider public service governance and delivery across Wales and, in particular, the number of local authorities. There seems to be a move towards reducing the number of councils and, therefore, councillors. Perhaps that might provide a better context for the debate on the number of AMs in Wales, rather than the number of MPs.
Given the timing of the Williams commission’s discussions on local government reform, does the hon. Gentleman not think that the amendment would be better placed in our manifestos—my party has already signed up to the reforms recommended in part II of the Silk commission—and debated at that time, rather than now?
The Minister made that point to me before the debate, but this legislation provides an opportunity now. Rather than making the case either for more Assembly Members or for fewer, the new clause essentially states that when the time comes to make that decision, it should be made by the National Assembly, not the House of Commons. It is a point of principle about where power lies in these matters. Given the shadow Secretary of State’s comments when he intervened on me earlier, I look forward to the Labour party’s support when we vote later—[Interruption.] Well, that is exactly the point.
I am disappointed by that sedentary intervention from the Opposition Front Bench. In our view it is the Assembly that should decide, because we see the people of Wales as sovereign, not this place.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention, which highlights the key political difference between Plaid Cymru and our Unionist opponents.
Assembly Members are expected to be members of more than one Select Committee. Indeed, the Committees have a dual role, as they perform scrutiny and legislative functions. That means Members are under tremendous pressure, especially if they serve on more than one Committee, as many do. If more AMs were elected, some would be able to specialise in certain areas, and the burgeoning expertise would ensure that democracy in Wales is better informed. In any case, surely it should be for the National Assembly to determine its membership, not the House of Commons. We will therefore be pushing new clause 4 to a vote. We look forward to the support of like-minded individuals, even those on the Government Benches.
The motivation behind new clause 6 is straightforward. As we have been instructed to draft it by the Clerks, it proposes that the Welsh Government, rather than the UK Government, should have responsibility for determining the system used for elections to the National Assembly. Transferring this responsibility would streamline the election process and bring decisions relating to the democratic make-up of the National Assembly closer to the people it serves. It could also, I hope, lead to a more proportional system being used by that institution. Plaid Cymru’s preference would be for a move towards a more proportional system that reflected the wishes of voters more fairly.
Even with the top-up, the current system is extremely biased towards the Labour party. In the last election, Labour polled 40% yet got 50% of the seats. In elections before then, it has had 50% of the seats, and more, on 30% of the vote. We therefore argue that proportional representation would provide a better reflection of how people vote in National Assembly elections.
Does the hon. Gentleman accept that his new clause could produce the opposite outcome? He may wish for a proportional system, but his proposal might take us back to first past the post, under which, at the last election, the Labour party got 36% of the vote and 65% of the seats.
I am grateful for that intervention. I had been minded to include provisions whereby the Assembly would be allowed to determine its own system but not to move to a less proportional system such as that advocated by the Labour party with its double constituency system. That would be completely non-proportional, with Labour perhaps receiving 70% of the seats on 30% of the vote, as the hon. Gentleman suggested. However, as a democrat, I believe that these matters should be devolved to the National Assembly. Parties would then fight the Assembly elections on manifesto commitments, and if people decided to vote for a party that wanted an undemocratic political system and one-party rule, that would be a matter for them.
Since the hon. Gentleman is a democrat, he will know that there was a democratic referendum. In that referendum, where I argued for a no vote, we lost the vote, but only by a tiny margin. The electoral system was part of what was voted on when the Assembly was set up. Therefore, surely, if we become less proportional, that should not be in circumstances where there is not at least referendum approval for the electoral system.
That is an interesting intervention. Clearly, it would be a matter for parties standing for the Assembly on manifesto commitments whether they determined to put their preference to a referendum. The hon. Gentleman makes a valid suggestion, and it could well be the case. However, the basic point of what we are trying to achieve is that that power should reside at National Assembly level rather than with this Parliament here in London.
The purpose of the new clause is not to change the electoral system in and of itself, but merely to transfer responsibility to the National Assembly so that it can change the system should it so wish. Who can forget—this goes back to the point made by the hon. Member for Cardiff North (Jonathan Evans)—the manner in which the Labour party used the Government of Wales Act 2006 to gerrymander the electoral system by banning dual candidacy and imposing on Wales an electoral system that is used only in Ukraine? I am glad that through this Bill, the UK Government will rectify that disgraceful decision made through the 2006 Act.
Any decision by this Parliament on the electoral system of the sovereign Welsh national legislature will always be met with concerns that the UK Government of the day are seeking political advantage. The simplest way to address those concerns would be to devolve responsibility to the National Assembly so that it is responsible for determining its own electoral system. The current situation is tantamount to the European Parliament legislating on the electoral system used to elect Members of this House. Surely, after a decade and a half, it should be a matter for the National Assembly to determine its own preferred electoral system. It does not need Big Brother Westminster determining these matters. London needs to let go and treat the National Assembly with some respect.
I am grateful, Dr McCrea, for the opportunity to contribute to this debate. I know that a number of colleagues want to speak, so I will endeavour to limit my remarks to the matter that causes me most concern—new clause 6 and its proposition that the voting system for the Assembly might be changed by the Assembly itself.
Let me set out my rather unusual position as a Conservative speaking from the Government Benches. Many of my colleagues will know that for more than 30 years I have been a supporter of proportional representation, and that at almost every Conservative party conference that has been held, I have hosted the Electoral Reform Society discussion. Having been elected to the European Parliament on a proportional system, I have no compunction or concerns about such a system. During the passage of the legislation through the House, I was one of only 17 Members to go through the Lobby in support of the amendment to introduce proportional representation.
I remind the Opposition of the debate that took place at the time of the referendum that was held to create the Assembly. That referendum was held after a general election which left my party with no parliamentary representation at all in Wales. I had served as a Welsh Office Minister until 1997. As my election result was declared in the middle of the afternoon on the Friday, I probably had the distinction at that time of being the last Conservative MP to have lost his seat, but my party had 20% of the vote. We have heard a lot about minority parties, Dr McCrea. Between 1992 and 1997 we served together in this House. I suppose it might have been said that your party was a minority party. It would not be said in Northern Ireland nowadays that your party is a minority party, so a little caution on the part of the Opposition might be in order.
When the debate took place on whether the Assembly should be created, the complex system of individual constituencies, then regions in which people are elected on the proportional system, was designed to reassure the people of Wales that we were not going to end up with one-party government—that we would not have a situation whereby a fifth of the people in Wales could vote for a political party and end up with no representation at all. There should be no doubt about that.
I was appointed by my then party leader, the present Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond (Yorks) (Mr Hague), to speak for the Conservative party at the time those debates took place. I remember the debates I had at that time with the Labour Secretary of State for Wales. We discussed the voting system, and he said that proportional representation was an integral part of the settlement to be put before the people of Wales. Bearing in mind the outcome of the referendum at that stage, the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards) made it clear that in the more recent referendum there was significant support—transformed support—but also, I would argue, support from across the political spectrum.
My party was identified in the past as arguing against devolution. From the time that the vote took place, my party accepted the outcome of that vote. I remember, as the chief Conservative spokesman for Wales, speaking at that time to the shadow Cabinet and making the point that it did not matter whether the votes were in the hundreds or the low thousands: we as democrats had to accept the outcome of the vote.
I also put that argument to those who now say they want to change the voting system. We know already that those propositions have been put forward. New clause 6 would permit that change to take place. I agree with the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr. I am a democrat. I might be against his clause, but the aspect of it to which I have the strongest objection is that there is no fail-safe to make it possible to go back to the voters of Wales and ask, “Do you want to have a less proportionate system?” Whether by accident or not, to say within the terms of the clause, “Let the Welsh Assembly Government propose something”, is an open invitation for an outcome that I believe is fundamentally anti-democratic. It is no less anti-democratic because it is a decision made in Cardiff, rather than here in Westminster.
I accept the outcome of the devolution vote. Throughout my political life since that vote, I have supported the National Assembly for Wales, but I remember as well what the basis of the settlement is. I am concerned that the terms of the clause present an opportunity to undermine that settlement. That, in my judgment, would let down the people of Wales.
That is as may be. I merely say once more that this is not a straightforward, open-and-shut case, as it has been presented by the Government. We know otherwise—from the evidence of Clwyd West and other seats in Wales, from public opinion and, frankly, from what our constituents tell us about their dissatisfaction, which extends to the broader issue of the list and first-past-the-post system. We know that the public do not understand candidates being rejected under first past the post and then sneaking into the Assembly by the back door.
The hon. Gentleman says that he has been inundated by representations from constituents on this matter. I have to be honest and say that I have never had any discussion with a constituent on this issue. How many of the good people of Pontypridd have been on the phone to him?
I am tempted to say that very few of my constituents—or, I suspect, those from any constituency in Wales—ever want to talk to me about the constitution, which seems to exercise Plaid Cymru all the time. Most people in Wales do not want to talk about the constitution: they want to talk about the cost of living crisis and the other problems that we have in Britain.
In conclusion, the evidence of the recent past in Wales suggests that the previous system was being abused. We have made a clear, principled non-partisan argument that the current system should be retained as it is. In so doing, we are striking a chord with the views of the Welsh Affairs Committee, which did not come to a final conclusion but did say, as a point of principle:
“we consider it unadvisable for electoral systems to be changed frequently. Successive changes to electoral systems risk being perceived as partisan by the public.”
This is clearly a partisan change. The public will see it for what it is and I am sure they would support us when, later this evening, we vote against clause 2 standing part of the Bill.
I would like to make a bit more progress, because although the hon. Gentleman was generous in taking interventions, his contribution lasted 40 minutes. I would prefer to be a bit briefer, and I normally am very generous.
The fact that, nevertheless, Scotland has retained dual candidature, in defiance of Lord Steel’s advice, is no reason for Wales to do the same. The Government simply will not acknowledge the fundamental democratic abuse of dual candidacy, which is that losers become winners, and that voters are second-guessed and contradicted by the system, their choices denied. The second significant measure the Scottish Parliament adopted after Arbuthnott tried to increase the accountability of regional MSPs to the electorate by changing the voting system and introducing an open list for regional candidates—not something this Bill provides—to give some measure of control for Scottish voters. That was done because the Scottish social attitudes survey 2003 found a high degree of opposition to the party control inherent in the list system. Voters in Wales enjoy no such privilege and the Government are not proposing to give it to us.
On the issue of dual candidacy, two different paths were followed: in Scotland it was through greater clarification of the roles of Members and by turning to open lists; and in Wales we felt that the ban was the right solution to dual candidacy abuse. Nearly a decade on from the Government of Wales Act 2006 I feel that we made the right choice, but much more must be done to give regional Assembly Members more accountability to the electorate. On candidacy, this Bill does nothing to further the evolution of Welsh democracy—indeed it puts it into reverse.
Over the past 15 years, the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly have both evolved in different ways to better suit the needs of their individual electorates. As the Government’s proposal stands, we will return to some of the absurd anomalies we saw in 1999 and 2003. As has been mentioned, in Clwyd West in 2003 every one of the three losing party candidates nevertheless won. Let us also consider the following cases from the 1999 elections, when 17 out of the 20 regional Assembly Members elected lost constituency elections. Thus, more than three quarters of the regional AMs did not have a democratic mandate to represent people—voters had not voted for them—and 15 of these 20 had offices in the constituencies they failed to be elected in.
In the Conwy constituency the Lib Dem AM Christine Humphreys came fourth in the popular vote—she had less than 10% of the vote in Conwy—yet still became an AM for the North Wales region. In Wrexham the Plaid Cymru AM Janet Ryder came last in the constituency, with 2,659 votes—the constituency AM had 9,239 votes—and yet still became an AM through the back door. In Ynys Môn the Tory AM Peter Rogers won 6,031 votes, which put him third on the constituency list—the Plaid Cymru AM who won a majority had more than 16,000 votes—yet he still became an AM for the North Wales region. It is not a partisan argument but simply a truth to state that those results are fundamentally undemocratic.
In the 1999 election more than 215,000 Welsh men and women voted in the North Wales region. Were we to look at every individual who ran as a constituency candidate in that election and collate their votes, we would find that Christine Humphreys, Janet Ryder and Peter Rogers polled less than 6% of the total regional vote and yet still became AMs for that very same region. After two Assembly elections where this was a regular occurrence, and with almost half the population saying in 2006 that they did not understand how their electoral system worked, we sought to remedy confusion over how AMs could still get in through the back door. The ban on dual candidature was the right choice then and remains so now. We introduced the ban in 2006 to stop these anomalies and the confusion they produced in voters’ minds, but now the Government are proposing to start this all over again.
In 2006, Victoria Winckler, director of the Bevan Foundation, conducted a survey, which found broad support for the ban on dual candidacy. Her report also highlighted the need for greater education and understanding among the general public. This report qualified the findings of previous research into dual candidacy. It said that none of it had been sufficient to make a substantial case on whether or not the public were for or against it in elections, but that it did discover considerable public disquiet on the issue with broad support in favour of the ban.
If dual candidacy is so objectionable to the right hon. Gentleman’s party, will he explain why, when it was in power in Westminster in 2010, it did not ban it in Scotland or for the Assembly in London?
I have already dealt with that matter, but I will, if I may, correct the hon. Gentleman. It is not objectionable to my party; it is objectionable to voters. That is the point about this, and we are representing the voters’ will.
Perhaps the great irony of the Government’s proposals is that when they released their Green Paper in 2011, they found what was described as a
“small majority of people opposed to the Government’s proposal to lift the ban”,
and yet they still carried on. The Government, who themselves have a small majority, now seek to overturn a small majority. A former Liberal Democrat leader and a Conservative Secretary of State backed my 2006 ban, as did the chairman of the Richard commission. The commission reported in 2004, recommending extra powers for the Assembly, which my 2006 Act delivered. Lord Richard told the Welsh Affairs Committee:
“There is something wrong in a situation in which five people can stand in Clwyd, none of them can be elected, and then they all get into the Assembly. On the face of it that does not make sense. I think a lot of people in Wales find that it does not.”
The eminent Welsh academic, Dr Denis Balsom, said in his evidence to the Richard commission:
“Candidates use the list as an insurance against failing to win a constituency contest. This dual candidacy can also confuse the electorate, who may wish to consciously reject a particular candidate only to find them elected via the list. It should remain a basic democratic right not to elect a particular candidate or to be able to vote a Member out.”
—is it the hon. Gentleman’s view that if there were a decision in future to change the electoral system in its entirety rather than the minor change proposed in the Bill, it should be for the Assembly to make that decision, rather than the House of Commons?
That is a good discussion to have and it will flow from part II of the Silk commission, which we will debate in the Chamber. It is a worthwhile debate to have in the present situation, where Parliament still has sovereign powers and still in essence passes to the Assembly the ability to do certain things, bearing in mind the commitment from our Front Bench in principle that we look favourably upon the idea of reversing the current position, where it is only the delegated powers that the Assembly can legislate on. That debate is not for today, but the time will come.
The explanatory notes, which Ministers seek to use to justify the reversal, say in paragraph 12 that the concern expressed by many people
“has been refuted in studies by the Electoral Commission and others which have demonstrated that the prohibition”
that is currently in place—the ban—
“has a disproportionate impact on smaller parties who have a smaller pool of potential candidates to draw upon.”
I am genuinely bemused by that. In my own constituency, which is a strong Labour constituency, not only are there Tory voters, but there are Tory elected representatives, a Plaid Cymru representative, and others. I cannot believe that they do not have a sufficient number of alternative candidates to put on a regional list.
All we are talking about is a handful—four candidates—appearing on a regional rather than first-past-the-post list. If they do not have the numbers, that is a real signal of a lack of confidence in the capacity of what have today been termed “minority parties” in the regions. I simply do not believe it—there are people who will and should come forward. Equally, we would have to do the same in the regions. There is an onus on the party to bring people forward in the valleys, the vale, west Wales and elsewhere. The argument that each region would not have four candidates who can be put on the list just does not hold water.
Let me begin, Mr Chope, by welcoming you to the Chair. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship.
Following the 2011 Assembly election, the First Minister of Wales announced that the Welsh Assembly Government wished to be known instead as the Welsh Government. That change was made in order to make clearer the respective roles of the Welsh Government and the National Assembly for Wales following the devolution of full law-making powers. Since then, the term “Welsh Government” has increasingly been used by people throughout Wales, and it is now the commonly used term for the Executive. However, “Welsh Government” remains an informal moniker, and “Welsh Assembly Government” is still the formal legal name in statute.
In recognition of the widespread use of “Welsh Government” as the generally accepted term, and following the request from the First Minister, clause 4 provides for the name of the Executive to be changed formally. That will mean that, for the first time, the new title can be used in formal legal documents, in keeping with common parlance. The clause provides that any reference to “Welsh Assembly Government” in existing legislation should be read as a reference to the “Welsh Government”, unless the specific context requires the former name to be used.
As usual, Plaid Cymru Members wish to go even further and have tabled new clause 5, which seeks to devolve to the National Assembly for Wales the power to change its name through a resolution passed by a simple majority. In renaming the Welsh Assembly Government we are simply reflecting what the Executive are now commonly known as. The same is not the case in respect of the National Assembly; people within and outside Wales know the legislature as the “National Assembly” or the “Welsh Assembly”, and I detect no popular clamour in my constituency or any other part of Wales I visit for a change in the name of Wales’s legislature.
Is the Minister aware that the leader of the Conservative party in the National Assembly has made a manifesto pledge to change the name of the Assembly and make it a Parliament?
I am aware of all kinds of views from individuals across Wales on what the name of the legislature should or could be. I also recognise that the Silk commission recommended that if the Assembly wishes to change its name to the Welsh Parliament, that should be respected. However in tabling new clause 5 and other amendments Plaid Cymru seems to be doing exactly what it has wrongly accused this Government of doing: cherry-picking the Silk recommendations for implementation through this Bill.
The Secretary of State’s written statement on 3 March made the Government’s view clear: we do not regard this Bill as an appropriate vehicle for implementing Silk II recommendations, that those recommendations requiring primary legislation should be matters for the “next Government and Parliament” and, as such, they are for political parties to consider in preparing their election manifestos. That remains this Government’s approach, so I urge Plaid Cymru Members not to press their new clause to a vote.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Chope.
I rise to speak in favour of new clause 5, which stands in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends. We will not be pushing it to a vote, because we want to save time and to have a discussion on income tax powers, which is what we really want to discuss in detail. However, I say to the Minister that, regardless of his opening remarks, our new clause is in the spirit of clause 4, which he has just presented. I hope the Government will see sense in due course, either in the later stages of the Bill’s progress in this House or in the other place.
New clause 5 would give powers to the National Assembly to change its name to the “National Parliament” or to any other name should it so decide. I stress that the new clause does not call for the institution’s name to be changed in this Bill, but rather that the power to take this decision should be granted to the National Assembly, as proposed in the Silk II recommendations. The Minister was being somewhat mischievous in saying that we were cherry-picking from the Silk recommendations, because our new clause is in line with the Silk II recommendations, in that it is a matter for the National Assembly if it wishes to change the name of the legislature. The new clause would empower it to make that decision rather than having to make a request to the UK Government of the day, as it has done for the name of the Executive.
The new clause would mean that the National Assembly would be able to change its name by means of a resolution agreed by a simple majority. It is gratifying that clause 4 officially changes the name of the Executive to the “Welsh Government”, a title that has been used widely for practical purposes since the 2011 election. There was a Scottish precedent for this change of title in 2007, when the “Scottish Executive” were renamed the “Scottish Government”. There has been broad agreement that the term “Welsh Assembly Government”, which had been in use since 2002, had been confusing and anachronistic after the separation of the Executive and legislative functions of the Assembly in 2007. It also gave rise to the unfortunate acronym WAG—being given the same label as a premiership footballer’s better half has done little for the democracy of our country. I have never used the term since I was elected, instead always using “Welsh Government”, so I was delighted that following the 2011 election the First Minister made the case that the Executive would be known as the “Welsh Government” thereafter. So I fully support clause 4, which makes that name official in legislation.
Now that the National Assembly is able to pass its own laws, it should be called a Parliament. However, I appreciate that others hold a different view, and that in the European tradition, the meeting place of a legislature is generally termed an Assembly. In France, for instance, the national legislature is called the Assemblée Nationale—if my memory of international rugby trips to Paris serves me correctly. Surely it should be a matter for the democratically elected Members of the national legislature of Wales to determine the name of the legislature in which they serve. That is what we are trying to achieve in new clause 5, but I will not press the matter to a vote. I expect there to be greater deliberations on this topic when the Bill reaches the other place.
I fully support clause 4, but I want to touch briefly on new clause 5, about which the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards) has just been talking. I do not support new clause 5, and I am glad that he is not going to press it to a vote. Although he makes the point that the text of the new clause does not pick a particular name, there is a bit of a hint in the title about where he is going. It is, I think, a qualitative difference. The Minister, in setting out the Government’s position, made it clear that the renaming of the Welsh Assembly Government to the Welsh Government is following public opinion and public usage, and simply therefore reflecting the reality of the situation. What the hon. Gentleman and his party are trying to do is the opposite. They are trying to push for changing the name of the Assembly in order to change the nature of the Assembly. Calling it the National Parliament for Wales, which implies a single institution, is clearly part of their campaign to move to a position where Wales ceases to be part of the United Kingdom and becomes an independent country. That is not something I support, which is why I do not support the new clause and why I think it is qualitatively different from clause 4.
I was anxious not to get involved in a debate about the actual name, but the hon. Gentleman will be aware that, in the UK’s tradition, Scotland became a law-making Parliament and was named as such. That is why I make the case for using the term “Parliament”. However, there are individuals, including those in my own party, who would prefer to keep the term the National Assembly. We want to empower the National Assembly to make that decision rather than the House of Commons.
I see that point, but the danger is that the name change becomes part of the campaign to change the nature not just of the institution but of the relationship between Wales and the United Kingdom. That is why I think that the approach the Government are taking in clause 4, which is effectively to reflect popular usage of the term Welsh Government for the Welsh Assembly Government, is perfectly straightforward and sensible. Moreover, that is done through primary legislation and therefore keeps that decision for this House. I do not support new clause 5, which would give that power to the National Assembly.
It would be wrong to describe this as some sort of partisan nationalist plot to change the name of the National Assembly. As I have already said to the Under-Secretary of State, the position of the Tory leader in the Assembly group is to change the name to a National Parliament. Indeed it is even the position of the Presiding Officer of the National Assembly who is, of course, a Labour party Member.
I take that point. I would oppose new clause 5 whoever drafted it, because the whole concept of changing the name to achieve a political outcome is not something that I support. We can have a debate about independence and whether the Welsh Assembly should turn into a Parliament of an independent Wales, but we should have it openly. We should not use changing the name as a surreptitious way of moving along the debate and hope that nobody notices. The hon. Gentleman has cunningly designed the new clause so that it does not say anywhere what the National Assembly should be called, but, as I have said, it is given away in the title as a little hint about where he wants to go. It is whatever the parliamentary equivalent of a Freudian slip is, which gives it away.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend because he takes me neatly on to the next line of my speech.
Amendments 1 to 4, which were tabled by Plaid Cymru, relate to the single Welsh rate of income tax—the so-called lockstep system. Fundamentally, income tax devolution must work within the integrated UK-wide income tax system. It must work for Wales by increasing the accountability of the Assembly and the Welsh Government, and it must work for the UK by maintaining the stability of the tax system.
Following a thorough and robust assessment of the Silk commission recommendations, we have determined that that would be most effectively achieved through a single Welsh rate of income tax that applied to all bands. There are two main reasons for that. First, the pooling and redistribution of tax revenues is a key feature of our fiscal model and ensures that wealth is shared among the regions and countries of the UK. The income tax structure is a key mechanism for achieving wealth redistribution. It is surely right, therefore, that UK-wide redistribution is decided at the UK level. The lockstep ensures that that will continue to be the case.
Secondly, although there are many benefits of tax devolution, it is not without risk. Specifically, we need to minimise the potential for harmful tax competition, increased opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion, and higher administrative burdens. It is therefore crucial that when we devolve taxes, we do so in a way that minimises those risks. In particular, the Government have consistently been clear that tax devolution should not benefit one part of the UK to the detriment of another. Tax devolution is not about moving economic activity from one area to another, but about empowering the devolved Administrations to generate additional growth and increasing their accountability by linking their budgets to their decisions. That incentivises the devolved Administrations and increases their accountability to the people, in this case in Wales.
Without the lockstep, the Welsh Government could substantially lower the rates of tax for the upper bands in Wales without making any change to the basic rate. That would be a considerable incentive for high earners to move across the border, which would benefit Wales, but would be to the detriment of the UK as a whole. Instead, the lockstep system will enable the Welsh Government to vary the levels of tax and spending in Wales, but the size of any differences will be unlikely to lead to tax competition. For example, they would be similar to the existing differences between the levels of council tax in neighbouring local authorities in Wales.
Devolving an element of income tax is therefore best achieved using the lockstep system. That will enable us to deliver substantial benefits to Wales, while continuing to redistribute wealth throughout the income tax system and minimise the risk of tax competition. I hope that I have helped hon. Members to understand our rationale for the lockstep system. I therefore ask them not to press amendments 1 to 4.
Does the hon. Gentleman not understand that he has contradicted himself? Indeed, the whole Wales Bill is contradictory. He is arguing that the powers are needed to incentivise the Welsh Government to develop economic growth, but he is placing a lockstep on those powers, making it impossible to use them. It is essentially a handcuff on those powers. There is a huge contradiction in what he is saying.
I do not accept that the powers are impossible to use. One can debate whether the rates should be varied, but the fact that there will be greater accountability will benefit Wales as a whole. We must balance the improvement in accountability in Wales with the difficulties that might arise with tax competition in the higher rates, which would be likely to damage the tax base in the UK as a whole. That is why we proceeded with a lockstep.
On amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Member for Pontypridd, I assure the Committee that the Government always consider the impacts of potential policy options and keep policies under review. An assessment of the potential impacts of devolving elements of income tax to the Welsh Assembly is summarised in the documents accompanying the introduction of the Wales Bill, in particular the Command Paper and the impact assessment. That assessment explains how the proposed system of income tax devolution achieves the key benefits identified by the Silk commission, increasing the accountability of the Assembly and Welsh Government and providing flexibility over the levels of tax and spending in Wales, while also minimising the risks of tax competition in the UK whereby significantly different tax rates could affect the behaviour of people living close to the border.
The Government’s assessment of the Silk commission’s proposals look closely at the potential for harmful tax competition in the UK, particularly given the populous border between England and Wales. As a result of that work, the Government rejected a system of three independent Welsh rates of income tax, instead proposing the lockstep system. As I have previously explained, that system specifically helps to minimise the risk of harmful tax competition in the UK. I hope hon. Members agree that the assessment we have undertaken is suitably robust, and that they are reassured by our commitment to keep the policy under review. Clause 22 requires the Government to report annually on the implementation and operation of the finance provisions of the Bill, so we will keep Parliament informed in that regard. On that basis I hope that hon. Members will not press amendment 6.
Amendment 16 was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper) as recommended in the Silk commission’s report of November 2012, and clause 8 provides for the Comptroller and Auditor General to report directly to the National Assembly for Wales on HMRC’s administration of the Welsh rate of income tax. That will provide independent assurance to the Assembly on HMRC’s performance in administering this tax. The Comptroller and Auditor General currently reports to Parliament on HMRC’s administration of its business, including the operation of the UK’s income tax system. Should the Welsh rate of income tax be introduced, it will be operated as part of the UK income tax system. The NAO would therefore be able to report to Parliament in relation to the Welsh rate as part of its existing remit, and clause 8 ensures that reporting to the Welsh Assembly on the Welsh rate will additionally fall within the NAO’s remit.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that point and I hope I can reassure him. There already exist mechanisms for scrutiny in relation to the Welsh rate by Parliament through existing vires. HMRC’s accounts would contain specific information on the Welsh rate, and they will continue to be laid before Parliament. Hon. Members will be presented with the levels of spending incurred by HMRC in administering the Welsh rate and the amounts of revenue collected. I believe that those existing channels provide an appropriate level of scrutiny for hon. Members in relation to the Welsh rate, and I hope that addresses my hon. Friend’s point.
I also think it right for additional insurance to be provided to the Assembly via the Comptroller and Auditor General’s report, and we anticipate that that report would be produced to a timetable similar to that of the wider report to Parliament on HMRC’s accounts. No doubt my hon. Friend will shortly contribute to the debate, but I have set out the existing mechanisms for scrutiny that will be available to Members of this Parliament, and I hope he is reassured.
On amendments 38 and 39, we have been working closely with the Welsh Government on Welsh funding. In particular, the Government recognise there has been convergence between the levels of funding in Wales and England since devolution, and that this is a significant concern in Wales. As a result, in October 2012 we agreed to implement a joint process to review the levels of funding in Wales and England in advance of the spending review. If convergence is forecast to occur over the course of the spending review period, options will be discussed to address the issue in a fair and affordable manner, based on a shared understanding of all the available evidence.
In advance of the 2013 spending round, a joint review was therefore undertaken by the two Governments and the outcome set out in a written ministerial statement. The review determined that funding levels are not expected to converge during the period to 2015-16, and in fact an element of divergence is forecast to occur. The review also determined that relative funding levels in Wales are within the range recommended by the Holtham commission.
These arrangements assure that we have a shared understanding of funding levels in Wales and a process is in place to consider options should convergence be forecast to resume. In no way would the devolution of income tax have any impact on these arrangements, and it is certainly not the case that income tax devolution would lock in the current level of funding. These arrangements therefore provide a firm basis for proceeding with the new financial powers in the Bill, and I hope that hon. Members will therefore not press amendments 38 and 39. I hope that my comments have been of assistance to the Committee, and that clauses 8 and 9 and the Government amendments will be added to the Bill this evening.
I wish to speak to amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4, in my name and the names of my colleagues in Plaid Cymru. We intend to press amendment 1 to a Division at the appropriate time.
The lockstep income tax power that is on offer in this Bill is not the one recommended by the Silk commission. We see two ways forward to preserve the integrity of the original Silk proposals. Either the lockstep income tax power should proceed without a referendum, which amendment 1 would achieve, or the Bill should be amended as per the Silk commission recommendation on income tax, which amendments 2, 3 and 4 seek to do, thereby restoring the need for a referendum, as Silk envisaged, on an income tax sharing arrangement without a lockstep.
I remind hon. Members that their parties, through their representatives on the commission, agreed to the Silk recommendations. Indeed, the Labour party’s representative on the commission was the esteemed former Assembly Member, Sue Essex, who is of course a former Finance Minister in the Welsh Government. The purpose of amendment 1 is to ensure that the referendum is on the ability of Wales to vary each income tax band individually, rather than the lockstep that is proposed in the Bill.
I believe that we should not have a referendum on these powers. The borrowing powers that will accompany the income tax powers would be essential to move the economy forward. Capacity will increase with the income tax powers. However, I accept the position of my party that a referendum should be held on the original Silk recommendations. In my view, the principle of fiscal devolution has already been conceded in this Bill—we will discuss the minor taxes next week—so the case for a referendum is not very strong.
Amendments 2, 3 and 4 would alter the Bill so that the lockstep is removed from the income tax power, giving Wales the ability to vary income tax band rates independently of each other, subject to a referendum, as per the original recommendation of the Silk commission. As the Bill stands, the lockstep on the ability to vary income tax in Wales means that all three bands can be moved up or down only in tandem, as is the case in Scotland. I hesitate to point out that those powers have never been used in Scotland, even though they have been available since devolution in 1999. Of course, the Silk recommendation was for the power to vary income tax band rates independently of each other. In reality the lockstep kills the ability to vary income tax at all, which strengthens the argument that I put to the Minister in an intervention—the lockstep hinders what the Government claim to be trying to achieve in the Bill, which is to incentivise the Welsh Government to develop their economy. Without the ability to introduce innovative income tax policy, how are they meant to achieve that?
Does my hon. Friend find it peculiar that Labour’s position is to allow an increase in taxes in Wales, thereby handing a tax advantage to England? Its only policy on tax competition is to move it in favour of our friends in England.
That is an important intervention. The Labour party’s position is that it is worried about tax competition, yet, based on its tax policy, the only tax competition that could happen would favour England and other parts of the British state.
Let us be absolutely clear: Labour has not argued, and is not arguing, for a tax increase in Wales. We know that the Conservative party is saying that it wants to cut taxes for the wealthiest in Wales. We are seeking to future-proof the legislation so that a Labour Government in Wales would be able to mitigate against further Tory tax cuts for the wealthiest, and introduce tax justice in Wales.
That is the crux of the argument, and the division between the Labour party and my party. My view is that we should empower the National Assembly and have a mature debate in Wales about what the level of taxation should be. I think the hon. Gentleman is aware of where my political conscience lies—I tabled an amendment to the Finance Bill to reinstate the top rate to 50p. Let us have the debate. Let us trust our Assembly Members to have the debate and let us see the National Assembly mature. The one thing that devolving responsibility for these powers will do is lead to the maturing of the Assembly. Hopefully, we will see the growth and development of our democracy in Wales.
When the Welsh Affairs Committee carried out the pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill, we had independent witness after witness—I hasten to add that my hon. Friend the Member for Arfon (Hywel Williams) had taken over my role in the Committee for that period, as I was enjoying my paternity leave with my son Llywelyn—giving evidence, except of course the Secretary of State and Treasury Ministers, arguing that the lockstep should be removed. Those giving evidence included the leaders of all the parties in the Assembly, not least the leader of the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives in Wales. Several distinguished economists, academics and experts, as well as the Chair of the Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform, also gave evidence. When the Welsh Affairs Committee visited Scotland following the initial Silk report, there was much excitement about its proposals. Academics, economists, civil servants, Ministers and Back Benchers in the Scottish Parliament were all in favour of Silk’s proposals for Wales, as opposed to what they have in the Scotland Act 2012.
I need not remind Labour Members present that the Labour First Minister, Carwyn Jones, said that the lockstep is a “Tory trap” and that it should be removed. He said the lockstep was “a long way short” of what was considered to be good for Wales, adding that
“binding the rates together is not right for Wales”.
That is a clear indication of the need to remove the lockstep on income tax varying powers.
We in Plaid Cymru are seeking, through amendment 21 and several other amendments, to maintain the integrity of the original cross-party Silk commission recommendations. We believe that the Welsh economy needs that sensible package of reforms in order to increase its ability to bring about economic growth and create jobs. We believe that it is a necessary tool, which will help us to begin to rebalance the economy of the British state by giving greater power to the nations and regions, and will help Wales to begin to lift itself from the bottom of the UK economic league table.
In its present form, the Bill requires Wales to hold a referendum on the lockstep model of income tax and win it in order to gain access to the higher limit applying to borrowing to fund investment. We believe that Wales needs access to that money in order to invest sensibly in infrastructure, secure a good return on its investment, and provide jobs that will have a beneficial effect on the state of the Welsh economy. We are all mindful of the huge cuts in its capital budget that the National Assembly has suffered under the coalition Government.
Given that the lockstep was not the compromise agreed by the parties during the Silk commission’s deliberations, it would surely make more sense to devolve the model without the need for a costly referendum. It is simply an income tax sharing model, with a 90-10 split between the United Kingdom and Welsh Governments. Giving the Welsh Government the ability to vary tax is a theoretical exercise that, as the Treasury well knows, cannot become reality with a lockstep—hence the strings that are attached in the Bill. The big prize of what we propose would be the increased borrowing capacity that I believe is required to help the Welsh economy to regenerate and renew itself.
It is clear that all the other parties are now putting narrow self-interest ahead of the Welsh economy by attaching conditions and caveats to Wales’s gaining of greater fiscal and financial powers. The Tories and Liberal Democrats have their condition of the lockstep, while Labour has its caveat in regard to reform of the Barnett formula, on which its members continue to contort and refuse to commit themselves despite citing it as a precondition for greater financial powers for Wales.
As for the debate in Wales, Andrew R. T. Davies and Kirsty Williams have announced some exciting tax policies that they wish to pursue in relation to the ability to vary taxes. Unfortunately, their colleagues down here in London are completely undermining what they have pledged to the people of Wales in various policy announcements. That is a big hit to their credibility, which may be why the Secretary of State introduced the lockstep: perhaps he wanted to undermine Andrew R. T. Davies.
There has already been much public debate in Welsh civil society about the issue of the lockstep and the power to vary income tax bands individually in Wales. There has been controversy as the lockstep row has engulfed the Conservatives. The Welsh Secretary has claimed that the mechanism would not prevent Welsh Ministers from using the powers—although they have not been used in Scotland since 1999—and has suggested that a 1p cut across all three bands would increase Wales’s competitiveness, a claim which, according to the Welsh Government, would cost £200 million a year. Meanwhile, the leader of the Conservatives in the Assembly rejected the lockstep in his submission to the Welsh Affairs Committee hearing on the powers, prompting a damaging fall-out with the Secretary of State. All the Tory Assembly Members were seconded down here to No. 10 Downing street to try to repair some of the damage.
We are often given the impression that it is the Treasury that does the overruling in all these matters. If Scotland does not have it, Wales surely cannot have it. However, the ability to vary income tax bands individually, as per Silk, would truly allow for the ability actually to vary income tax in Wales, and would be a significant step in the maturing of our democracy. As I said in our first debate this afternoon, it would provide a very positive narrative for the Westminster parties in relation to Scotland, demonstrating that they were serious about reforming the settlement of the UK and going beyond what Scotland has at present.
As the hon. Gentleman knows, I have a great deal of sympathy with him in regard to the lockstep, and, indeed, with one of his Select Committee colleagues who voted to remove it from the Bill. However, he is ending his speech—I think it is coming to an end: I think he has reached the last sheet—on an incredibly negative note. Does he accept that, in ensuring that our National Assembly has fiscal accountability, the Bill still represents a huge advance on the status quo? I sincerely hope that he will support it on Third Reading for that reason, whatever happens to his amendment this evening.
Of course the hon. Gentleman is right. We do support the Bill, but we want to use the opportunities provided by the Committee stage to strengthen and improve it. In my view, the lockstep is one provision that needs urgently to be removed. If the United Kingdom Government are determined to introduce it, let us devolve it in the Bill and then have a referendum on its removal. Why have a referendum on the lockstep mechanism?
The Secretary of State has spoken before of his belief that Wales needs the ability to vary income tax in order to be competitive—spoken as a true Conservative—but then does not offer a power that actually allows for any variation in income tax. That is the huge contradiction in the Bill as it stands. It is time for him and his Government to put their money where their mouth is and support our amendments—I am not holding out much hope—and for the Labour Members present to support what their party in Wales is saying by supporting us in the Lobby later.
This is a very important debate. The Bill is incredibly wide ranging and has lots of aspects to it, but the one issue that dominates it, as much the most important aspect, is the devolution of meaningful tax-raising powers to the National Assembly for Wales, and that involves a significant part of income tax. In doing that, the Bill will deliver financial accountability to the Welsh Government, which has been lacking since the National Assembly for Wales was established.
Let me give some context by saying something about my own background. In 1997, I was opposed to the establishment of the National Assembly for Wales, because I thought we were considering setting up a body that was not meaningful. I recall being at the count in Llandrindod Wells when the result for Carmarthenshire came through, and there were great celebrations because a yes vote had been snatched from defeat at the last minute. I recall driving home and thinking to myself that that was a key moment, and from then on I have taken the view that the National Assembly for Wales should have law-making powers and meaningful tax-raising powers. If we did not have those two powers, we were creating something that was simply not worth while. That is why this Bill is particularly important and we are dealing here with the key part.
It does not make any sense to have a Welsh Government who claim credit and say how good they are whenever they do something the people of Wales approve of but whenever something is done that the people of Wales do not approve of say, “We cannot do that because we do not have enough money from Westminster.” They transfer the blame, and they do not become a meaningful body until they are responsible for raising their own taxation. All of us know that from other things we might have done in our lives. When I was chair of Berriew community council, a very small village council, the biggest debate we had in the year was about whether we should levy 1p on the rates, just as a precept. It was much the biggest debate because it involved balancing what we wanted to spend with the demands on the ratepayers and it made us think clearly about the decisions we were taking. The same thing applied when I was the finance chairman of Montgomeryshire district council. We had an all-day debate every year about 1p on the rates, because again it was about balancing what the council wanted to spend against what we wanted to raise. That is what has always been lacking in the National Assembly.
I was a Member of the Assembly for eight years, at one stage being the finance spokesman, and I would never use the term “budget” as to my mind it was always an annual spending plan. It was not a genuine budget because it was not informing the people that it wanted money from them and that a balance was being struck between spending and demanding money from the ratepayers. So I am strongly in favour of the income tax proposal, because it is hugely important and it is why I really welcome the Bill. There are other parts of the Bill where my support is at varying levels, but the income tax proposal will be crucial.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will know that I have always had some doubts about the need for a referendum. If we believe passionately that a body must have tax-raising powers to be a viable parliamentary body, we should commit ourselves in our manifestos to going forward with this proposal and then delivering it afterwards. I have come to accept that for two reasons, one of which is that there is a general expectation because of the referendum in Scotland that there will be a referendum on income tax-raising powers in Wales.
The second reason is that I want to stay as true as I can to the Silk commission report, which recommended a referendum, and all parties signed up to that. In pursuing this issue, I think I have to accept that there will be a referendum.
There has been a lot of discussion about the lockstep and the lack of freedom for the Welsh Government to vary individual rates. There will be different views on that, but I perfectly accept the rationale of the argument of the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards). I must say though that it diverts us from the huge step forward that the Bill represents.
The Exchequer Secretary can continue to attempt to suggest that I do not understand the Bill, but I understand it perfectly. I understand perfectly how lockstep works, but equally understand that this Government have cut taxes for the wealthiest in Britain. They have exclusively cut the additional 50p rate to 45p. I also know that his party in Wales has proposed that it would like to go further with Wales, so he will forgive us if we are suspicious of the “tax cuts for the wealthy” motives of the Conservative party. I think we will continue to be suspicious. Unless he would like to get to his feet and tell us that he does not intend that his colleagues in Wales should cut taxes for the wealthiest, I suspect that he will not wish to intervene further.
On the subject of the complexity and cost of the Bill, the Exchequer Secretary left us entirely without answers about how it will work. In order to illustrate its complexity, I highlighted that he has today moved a poorly drafted clause that will see a Welsh Tory Member of the European Parliament who does not live in Wales and who does not have a residence of any description in Wales, but who lives in England, designated as a Welsh taxpayer. The logic of that is entirely lost on me, but I should have thought that he would want to check who his European Members are in Wales and where they lived before he determined that they would get a tax break—in her case, a £700 tax break—were his Government to do what the Secretary of State for Wales has suggested and cut all the tax bands in lockstep by 1%. That is the tax cut that she would get in Wales, despite the fact that she does not actually live in Wales.
The hon. Gentleman’s point about Kay Swinburne is an interesting one. Based on that, where does he expect that Stephen Kinnock will pay taxes should he be successful in winning Aberavon? Would it be in Aberavon, in Copenhagen or where he pays tax at the moment, in a tax haven in Switzerland?