And the Rhyl Journal, although I am not an avid reader, I must admit.
Most people get their political news from London papers. If we have a Westminster election and an Assembly election in close proximity, there is a great danger that the issues for which the national Assembly is responsible will be dropped completely. The Minister has indicated that there is no intention to bring the elections closer and that there are protections in the Bill to ensure that there will be a gap of at least a year between them, so I am happy not to press my two amendments.
On the Labour amendments, the Electoral Reform Society has lobbied extensively against amendment 9, arguing that
“good governance and greater stability is achieved through fixed terms and this should not be a power that is given to the Executive to decide.”
It points out that, as the electoral system for the Assembly makes coalitions more likely, fixed terms also provide stability and security for parties of government. Two of the four terms in the Assembly have seen coalition Governments, so I agree with that point.
Amendment 10 appears to have been drafted with the aim of ensuring that Assembly and Westminster elections are not held on the same day. I would have been happy to support that if it had been pressed to a vote.
I, too, would like to start by welcoming you to the Chair, Dr McCrea. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I thank hon. Members on both sides of the Committee for their contributions to this early part of the first day of our deliberations.
Amendment 9 would give the Assembly the power to decide, by resolution, when Assembly elections are held, and would remove the Secretary of State’s powers in relation to varying the date of Assembly elections and proposing a date for extraordinary Assembly elections. Amendment 10 would prevent the Assembly from setting a date for an election on a day on which it knows, or reasonably expects, a parliamentary general election to be held. The amendments would permit the Assembly to determine the date of Assembly elections and consequently the length of its own terms. That reflects a recommendation made by the Welsh Affairs Committee arising from its pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Wales Bill.
It is worth pointing out that the Silk commission considered the matter of legislative competence for Assembly elections to be outside its terms of reference and made no recommendations in this regard in its second report. Nevertheless, the Government believe that the devolution of further powers to the Assembly should not be undertaken in a piecemeal fashion, and that the issue would best be considered in the wider context of possible changes to the Welsh devolution settlement arising from the recommendations made by the commission in its second report. The Government made clear, on publication of the report, that recommendations requiring primary legislative change should be a matter for the next Parliament and the next Government, and consequently that they should be for political parties to consider in preparing their election manifestos. We believe the same principle should apply when considering whether legislative competence for Assembly elections should be devolved to the Assembly. It is important that electors are clear on how long they are electing Assembly Members for when they vote in the 2016 Assembly election, and that five-year Assembly terms are in place by then to ensure that Westminster and Assembly elections do not coincide in 2020.
The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 moved this House to a fixed five-year cycle and consequentially provided that the next ordinary general election to the National Assembly for Wales would be moved on a one-off basis by one year from 7 May 2015 to 5 May 2016. This responded to concerns raised by the Assembly that holding general elections to this House and to the Assembly on the same day could lead to the Assembly elections being overshadowed. I am encouraged that Members of all parties seem to be in agreement on the position that we do not want the two elections coinciding. I particularly welcome the Labour party’s support in seeking to minimise the risk of that, which is evident in amendment 10.
Similarly, amendments 30 and 31, tabled by right hon. and hon. Members from Plaid Cymru, are intended to ensure that an ordinary Assembly general election does not take place within six months of a UK general election. I am encouraged that the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards) has been reassured by the debate so far and by our previous discussions, and that he is not going to press his amendments on that basis.
There is cross-party support for the principle that, as far as possible, we should seek to ensure that ordinary general elections to the Assembly and to this House should not coincide. With the next Assembly election scheduled for 2016, if the Assembly remains on a four-year cycle, the two sets of elections would coincide every 20 years, starting in 2020—something that all parties are clearly keen to avoid. Clause 1 makes it far less likely that Assembly elections and parliamentary elections will coincide in future. I therefore ask Opposition Members to support the clause, to consider the further devolution of powers to the Assembly in the context of preparing their own parties’ manifestos and consequently to withdraw or not press the amendments.
I am grateful to the Minister for acknowledging that our amendments reflect the views of the Welsh Affairs Committee and, indeed, as I said earlier, those of the Welsh Government, and that they were tabled in good faith. I am equally pleased to hear that when it comes to looking at the Silk commission part I report or any legislation that might arise from it or be reflected in the manifestos before the next election, the Government will be open to considering whether the Assembly should be responsible for—or at least have the ability to consent to—when the elections should take place. In the light of the Minister’s remarks, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Removal of restriction on standing for election for both constituency and electoral region
The point I was making is very simple and I do not need to embellish it, because I can rely on the evidence provided by the Government’s own impact assessment, which states extremely clearly that the proposal’s objective is to benefit the
“smaller parties in Wales who may have a smaller pool of high quality candidates to represent them in elections.”
Labour Members certainly would not for one moment contest the argument that the smaller parties in Wales—among which I would, unfortunately, count the Conservative party—may have a smaller pool of high-quality candidates to represent them in elections, but I do not believe that that is an adequate reason for seeking to amend legislation with regard to this country’s constitution and elections.
The shadow Secretary of State will know that under the original Government of Wales Act 1998, there was no ban on dual candidacy. At what point did the damascene conversion of the Labour party against the concept of dual candidacy take place?
I am very grateful to the Secretary of State for asking that question, because I think the date was 2 or 3 May 2003. The precise geographical location of that conversion was on a road not to Damascus, but to Ruthin. It was of course during the Clwyd West election—the election to the Assembly in his constituency in north Wales—when we witnessed the extraordinary state of affairs in which Labour quite clearly won the election and the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats and Plaid Cymru lost it, but the Conservative, Liberal Democrat and Plaid Cymru representatives were all returned to the National Assembly for Wales in what any right-thinking individual would think was a complete denial of democracy and natural justice.
I anticipated that the hon. Gentleman might mention the so-called Clwyd West question. Was it not always entirely foreseeable from the moment that devolution was instituted under this system that in some seats a number of representatives would be elected by first past the post, on the list, or both? It was always foreseeable and, frankly, the fact that it was not foreseen seems a large oversight by the Labour party.
That may well have been foreseeable. Labour has acknowledged that it was a mistake to draft the legislation in such a fashion that it became possible for would-be Members of the Assembly to nest like cuckoos in individual constituencies for a period, anticipating their entry to the Assembly via the back door. However, we did not imagine that the measure would be used so shamelessly as it was by parties in the Secretary of State’s Clwyd West constituency.
As all hon. Members do, I talk regularly to colleagues in other parts of Britain, but we are now addressing legislation that relates to Wales. The evidence relating to Wales that is before our eyes—from recent history in the Secretary of State’s own seat—suggests that there is a problem there and that the measure has been abused. As best we understand it, public opinion also supports my contention that the system should be retained and that the proposed ban should not be lifted.
The hon. Gentleman has twice used the word “abused” in the context of Clwyd West. Will he please explain what he means by abuse in that context?
Because that was quite clearly the system in place at the time. However, as I have acknowledged—my right hon. Friend the Member for Neath (Mr Hain) of course acknowledged it when he amended the law in 2006—we admitted that it was a mistake to allow people to abuse the system in such a fashion.
I hesitate to steal the thunder of my right hon. Friend, who referred to this matter so eloquently on Second Reading, but if we want evidence of the potential abuse of the system whereby an Assembly Member nests in a constituency that they subsequently want to seek election to through first past the post, we need look no further than the leader of Plaid Cymru, Leanne Wood. She published a memo to her members in an e-mail which provided what can only be described as a route map for such abuse. I did not intend to quote extensively from it, but as I have been provoked, perhaps I ought to remind the Committee of the details. She instructed her party:
“We need to be thinking much more creatively as to how we better use staff budgets for furthering the aims of the party.”
She went on:
“Regional AMs are in a unique position. They are paid to work full-time in politics and have considerable budgets at their disposal.”
She said:
“Consideration should be given to the location of their office—where would it be best for the region? Are there any target seats…within the region?”
She went on:
“They need not be constrained by constituency casework and events, and can be more choosy about their engagements, only attending events which further the party’s cause. This can be achieved by following one simple golden rule: On receipt of every invitation, ask ‘How can my attendance at this event further the aims of Plaid Cymru?’ If the answer is ‘very little’ or ‘not at all’, then a pro forma letter of decline should be in order.”
I do not think that we need any further evidence of the potential abuse to which I am referring.
Is the hon. Gentleman’s criticism not of Leanne Wood, who I agree behaved wholly disgracefully? Is he not overlooking the many regional Members who were elected and behaved entirely properly? His criticism is not of the system, but of an individual who behaved reprehensibly.
The Secretary of State might be right that some regional Members behaved perfectly appropriately. I agree with him that Leanne Wood did not behave appropriately in instructing her colleagues to respond in that way. The point that I am making is that the system as it was constituted, and as he proposes to reconstitute it, was open to such abuses. That is why we suggest that the current system, which we put in place when in office, should be retained.
The hon. Gentleman is being extremely generous in giving way again. Surely these issues could be resolved by a change in the standing orders of the Assembly, rather than by changing the legislation. Does not the Assembly have the power to regulate itself? The hon. Gentleman looks puzzled. I would have thought that he would recognise that the Assembly is in a position to regulate the conduct of its Members through its standing orders.
I am merely quoting from the Government’s own impact assessment, which clearly states that this is for the benefit of the smaller parties in Wales, among which we count the Conservative party.
Public attitudes to this issue are relatively clear and there have been several reports. Most importantly, the Bevan Foundation—which is non-aligned although splendidly named after my great hero—conducted an analysis and a large survey to consider all these issues. It found that
“dual candidacy was unfair compared with those who felt candidates should be free to stand in both.”
As a reference to the detail included in that survey, I quote a respondent from Llanelli who asked:
“How can it be right that you vote one way and then the person who loses can still find a way to get elected?”
Someone from Swansea East said:
“I think it is unfair … It’s like people can sneak in the back door.”
and another said:
“It does seem unfair in a way, surely if they weren’t popular enough they shouldn’t be able to get in.”
Another respondent said:
“I don’t think some should have the added advantage of standing in both—it seems unfair really.”
and someone else from Llanelli said:
“You don’t have two bites of the cherry.”
Will the hon. Gentleman clarify whether the survey he refers to is the one that was commissioned by his hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David), and although he refers to a large number of respondents, is it the case that there were precisely 47?
It was indeed commissioned by my dear and hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David), but the Bevan Foundation, as the Secretary of State will know, is a non-aligned charitable foundation. It would surely contest quite vigorously the implication—which I am sure he does not mean to make—that it is in any way aligned to the Labour party.
Of course, it is not just evidence from the Bevan Foundation that is important. International evidence suggests that this form of gerrymandering is not supported by the public. In New Zealand, for example, public opinion research conducted by the independent review committee, which is part of its Parliament and appointed to examine the electoral system, found that one key criticism was that it was possible for MPs to be defeated in an electoral contest but returned to the House through their position on the list—clear evidence that it is not just in Wales that people are concerned about that.
In fact, it is not just in New Zealand that there are concerns. In New Brunswick in Canada, an independent commission endorsed the ban on dual candidacy stating:
“The Commission heard that in some jurisdictions where candidates are able to run simultaneously on both ballots, voters are displeased with the case where a candidate is not successful in a single member constituency, but is elected anyway by virtue of being placed on the top of a party’s list.”
Evidence from two notable democracies—Canada and New Zealand—shows that it is not just those in the Labour party and in Wales who are worried about that process.
Of course, it is not just Labour Members who have been concerned about this issue: it used to be a concern of Members on both sides of the House. For example, Lord Crickhowell, a former Conservative Secretary of State for Wales, has said that the arrangements were “really pretty indefensible”. I would have thought that was a clear statement, but the current Secretary of State clearly does not agree.
Perhaps Liberal Democrat Members agree with the Chief Secretary to the Treasury who said when we last debated this in 2006:
“I should also point out that the Secretary of State for Wales has said that if the Commission had considered what he called the systematic abuses carried out by list members in Wales”—
which I have described here today—
“he would have reached the same conclusion that we have”—
“we” in that case being of course the Liberal Democrats—
“namely that a ban on dual candidacy is the only effective solution.”
We therefore have many examples from across the world, from Wales and from across the House of people’s concerns about the way in which the system has been abused.
I entirely agree. We all make personal calculations in our political lives: we decide where we should stand, where we have connections and where we should cast our lot and go for it. However, the proposed system—this is the exact situation in the Rhondda—amounts to, “Well, I’m really going to go for this, but if all else fails there’s something I can fall back on.” My gut instinct is that that is not right and it does not feel right to many voters either.
The Bevan Foundation has been criticised, but it is a left-of-centre think tank—that is what it does. It is scandalous to say that it is simply an arm of the Labour party. If Members look at the work it has done on welfare issues, unemployment and economic incapacity in the valleys, they will see that some of it has been critical of the Labour party as well. When my hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David) was looking for someone to do a report, my guess is that the Institute of Economic Affairs and others were not available or did not have the knowledge of Wales to do it.
The majority of people canvassed were very concerned. I will not repeat the quotes, but people from across all parts of south and west Wales said that they could not understand how people who had clearly been defeated could then pop up. Of course, that was reiterated by the Government’s own impact assessment, to which I am sure the Secretary of Sate will refer when he explains why he is jettisoning its findings.
After the first set of Assembly elections, it is not just the Labour party that underwent a damascene conversion, as it has been called, but the Tories and Lib Dems. Lord Crickhowell, who has already been mentioned, is categorically opposed to dual candidacy and said back in 2005:
“The present arrangements are really pretty indefensible”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 15 June 2005; Vol. 672, c. 1216.]
The current Chief Secretary to the Treasury made exactly the same point. It was not just us or members of the public who were saying it at the time; other politicians also said, “We made a genuine mistake.”
As I said at the beginning, we can have discussions about closed and open lists in terms of proportionality and whether there is a different way of doing it, but I say adamantly to the Secretary of State that to reverse the system again, for whatever reason, is not the way to go. It does not work and it has been proven that it does not hold the confidence of people on the ground in Wales. Let us have the wider debate on the way forward, but simply to chop and change, particularly against the recommendations of the Electoral Commission, is no way to make Acts of Parliament.
I, of course, share the general delight at serving under your chairmanship, Mr Chope.
This has been an interesting and very forthright debate. Clause 2—it seems unnecessary to say—will overturn the ban on dual candidacy introduced by the Government of Wales Act 2006. Under its provisions, candidates at an Assembly election cannot stand both in a constituency and on a regional list. Before 2006, candidates could of course stand in both.
Amendment 15, which was moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper), would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review of the possible effects of dual candidacy on the effectiveness of the National Assembly for Wales and to lay the findings before both Houses within nine months of Royal Assent. I fully understand his intention in tabling the amendment and to a certain extent I empathise with him. I welcome the opportunity to debate further the merits of removing the current unfair ban. My hon. Friend has highlighted the need for independent evidence on the effects of dual candidacy, which is of course important, but the fact is that ample evidence from independent bodies shows that dual candidacy is part and parcel of similar systems across the world.
The previous Labour Government justified imposing the ban on dual candidacy on the grounds that they said there was “considerable dissatisfaction” with the system, although they provided little evidence to support that position. Frankly, having listened to the debate, I have to say that I have heard little more evidence this afternoon. We have of course had the Bevan Foundation—
Will the Secretary of State not confirm to the House that his own consultation for the Bill showed that the majority of respondents were in favour of retaining the current system?
It is fair to say that there was a majority of one, but frankly most of the respondents were Labour Assembly Members. As I will mention later, the letters written by those Assembly Members bore a suspicious similarity to one another. It might almost have been that a template was provided for them.
The ban was introduced despite opposition from other parties in the House, academics and even the Electoral Commission. I know that several Labour Members served on the Welsh Affairs Committee before the passage of the 2006 Act, and I am sure that they recall the evidence of Dr Richard Wyn Jones, Dr Roger Scully and Glyn Mathias, the Electoral Commissioner for Wales, who all highlighted the potentially partisan nature of the changes. Professor Alan Trench of the constitution unit at University college London, who is currently a special adviser to the Select Committee, said in November 2011 that it was
“a pretty blatantly partisan manipulation of the electoral system”.
In 2005, 29 Labour MPs out of the 40 MPs in Wales were elected on a manifesto commitment to discard dual candidacy. In 2010, eight Conservative MPs out of the 40 MPs were elected with no mandate to introduce dual candidacy, but the Secretary of State is now introducing it. Will he help me with that contradiction?
It is perfectly clear that the Conservative party’s position was amply stated in the debate in 2006. That position was supported by parties other than the Labour party. It is absolutely clear that we have justice on our side in overturning a fairly straightforward partisan measure introduced by the Labour party.
No, I will make some progress. [Interruption.] I will give way in a moment.
In its evidence to the Welsh Affairs Committee in 2005—I do not think the hon. Member for Wrexham (Ian Lucas) was a member of that Committee—the Electoral Commission stated that it did not believe that the case had been made and that it would
“caution against any change that is perceived to be partisan and could add to a prevailing distrust of politicians”.
The Electoral Commission saw no evidence in favour of the ban during the passage of the Government of Wales Act 2006. During the pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill, it reaffirmed that position. Even the Arbuthnott commission, which the last Labour Government set up to consider the electoral arrangements in Scotland, made it clear that
“dual candidacy is a common feature of mixed member proportional systems across the world”.
I am grateful for that clarification. Is he therefore saying that the Conservative party in Wales struggles to field high quality candidates?
I do not think that we have had that difficulty in the past.
The Opposition have pointed to the fact that a majority of respondents to the Government’s Green Paper consultation were in favour of retaining the ban as further evidence in support of it. However, if one takes away the many Labour Assembly Members, who responded in a strikingly similar way, that would no longer be the case. The simple fact is that the ban was introduced to benefit one party, the Labour party, in one part of the United Kingdom, Wales, and in not Scotland or London.
In his evidence to the Welsh Affairs Committee during its pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill, Professor Scully said that the claims that are made about dual candidacy, which have been repeated again and again by Labour Members,
“remain wholly unsupported by solid evidence”.
I repeat that the simple fact is that the ban was introduced as a partisan act that affects smaller parties disproportionately and ensures that good quality candidates are lost to the Assembly.
Lord Bourne, who was my friend and fellow academic at Swansea Institute of Higher Education—that great factory of political candidates—is often cited as someone who lost out, did not have the list to fall back on and hence went into other occupations. However, does the Secretary of State accept that if a candidate who, for very good reasons, was wholly objectionable to the electorate—not a Lord Bourne, but somebody wholly objectionable—was No. 1 on a closed list because of the party selection, Conservative, Liberal or Plaid Cymru voters would have no choice but to vote for them? That is one of the big problems with the reversal that he is proposing.
Absolutely not. Electors may cast their votes in any way they wish for whichever candidates they wish. That argument is wholly facile.
The right hon. Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy) seemed to criticise the whole concept of a top-up list. As somebody who is far more supportive of the first-past-the-post system, I have considerable sympathy for that point of view on the basis that one lives by the sword or dies by the sword. However, every party in this House supports some form of proportional election to the Assembly, as he accepted. It seemed to me that his criticisms, and those of the right hon. Member for Neath (Mr Hain), were aimed more at the consequences of the proportional representation system than at dual candidacy. Therefore, we are now legislating to remove that unfair prohibition and to reintroduce the system that was in place and worked well between 1998 and 2006.
The amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean also proposes that his review would consider the implications of removing the prohibition on dual candidacy for the desirable total number of Assembly Members; the ratio of Assembly Members elected by constituency and from the regional list; and the merits of an all-Wales list, rather than lists in five separate regions.
On the implications for the desirable number of Assembly Members, we set out in the Green Paper on future electoral arrangements that we believe 60 Assembly Members is the right number, and we continue to hold that view. I note that the First Minister said in his oral evidence to the Welsh Affairs Committee during pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill that the Assembly could “undoubtedly” cope with its new powers without changing the number of Assembly Members.
The Government also believe that under existing arrangements, the current ratio of constituency and regional Assembly Members is right. The Green Paper set out our belief that an all-Wales national list was not desirable as it would place more distance between regional Members and their constituents than the existing five regions—a view that I think is shared across the Committee —and again, our view has not changed.
New clause 4, tabled by right hon. and hon. Members from Plaid Cymru, seeks to establish a mechanism through an Order in Council by which competence could be devolved to the Assembly to determine its size. In a similar vein, new clause 6 would enable devolution to the Welsh Government—I think it actually means the Welsh Assembly—of the power to determine the system by which Members are elected.
Although the Silk commission made no recommendations about the electoral system, it did recommend that the size of the Assembly should be increased so that it might better fulfil its scrutiny role, and new clause 4 would pre-empt that. The commission also acknowledged the practical implications of its recommendation on the electoral system and the need for further consideration. The Government have made it clear in responding to publication of the commission’s report that any recommendation such as that requiring primary legislation should be for the next Parliament, and therefore for political parties to consider when preparing their manifestos for the 2015 general election. Of course, the commission also recommended that consideration be given to increasing capacity in the Assembly in the short term.
Earlier this year an Electoral Reform Society report found that 79% of Assembly Members surveyed believed that plenary time could be used more efficiently and effectively, and in the same survey, 90% of Assembly Members supported a comprehensive review of Assembly procedures. The Assembly and the Welsh Government have the power to change those things through Standing Orders, and I call on them to consider carefully how the Assembly could make better use of its time and the resources already available to it.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean for his amendment, which has enabled a full and extensive debate this afternoon on the merits of removing the ban on dual candidacy. I hope I have been able to reassure him, at least, and I ask him to withdraw his amendment accordingly. I also urge right hon. and hon. Members from Plaid Cymru not to press new clauses 4 and 6 to a vote.
I am always glad to have facilitated a wide-ranging debate in Committee, as is proper, and to fully air these issues. My right hon. Friend’s explanation has been sufficient, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this we may take new clause 5—The National Assembly for Wales—
‘The Government of Wales Act 2006 is amended by adding at the end of section 1 (The Assembly)—
(a) The Assembly may change its name by means of a resolution agreed to by a simple majority;
(b) on the first occasion a resolution under subsection (6)(a) is passed, the expression “National Assembly for Wales” shall be replaced wherever it occurs in the GOWA 2006 by the name contained in that resolution;
(c) on any subsequent occasion, the name contained in a resolution under the terms of subsection (6)(a) shall replace the previous name in the same manner;
(d) unless the context requires otherwise, in any enactment, instrument of other document passed or made before this subsection comes into force any reference to the National Assembly for Wales is to be read as, or as including, a reference to the Assembly as renamed.”.’.
Let me begin, Mr Chope, by welcoming you to the Chair. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship.
Following the 2011 Assembly election, the First Minister of Wales announced that the Welsh Assembly Government wished to be known instead as the Welsh Government. That change was made in order to make clearer the respective roles of the Welsh Government and the National Assembly for Wales following the devolution of full law-making powers. Since then, the term “Welsh Government” has increasingly been used by people throughout Wales, and it is now the commonly used term for the Executive. However, “Welsh Government” remains an informal moniker, and “Welsh Assembly Government” is still the formal legal name in statute.
In recognition of the widespread use of “Welsh Government” as the generally accepted term, and following the request from the First Minister, clause 4 provides for the name of the Executive to be changed formally. That will mean that, for the first time, the new title can be used in formal legal documents, in keeping with common parlance. The clause provides that any reference to “Welsh Assembly Government” in existing legislation should be read as a reference to the “Welsh Government”, unless the specific context requires the former name to be used.
As usual, Plaid Cymru Members wish to go even further and have tabled new clause 5, which seeks to devolve to the National Assembly for Wales the power to change its name through a resolution passed by a simple majority. In renaming the Welsh Assembly Government we are simply reflecting what the Executive are now commonly known as. The same is not the case in respect of the National Assembly; people within and outside Wales know the legislature as the “National Assembly” or the “Welsh Assembly”, and I detect no popular clamour in my constituency or any other part of Wales I visit for a change in the name of Wales’s legislature.
Is the Minister aware that the leader of the Conservative party in the National Assembly has made a manifesto pledge to change the name of the Assembly and make it a Parliament?
I am aware of all kinds of views from individuals across Wales on what the name of the legislature should or could be. I also recognise that the Silk commission recommended that if the Assembly wishes to change its name to the Welsh Parliament, that should be respected. However in tabling new clause 5 and other amendments Plaid Cymru seems to be doing exactly what it has wrongly accused this Government of doing: cherry-picking the Silk recommendations for implementation through this Bill.
The Secretary of State’s written statement on 3 March made the Government’s view clear: we do not regard this Bill as an appropriate vehicle for implementing Silk II recommendations, that those recommendations requiring primary legislation should be matters for the “next Government and Parliament” and, as such, they are for political parties to consider in preparing their election manifestos. That remains this Government’s approach, so I urge Plaid Cymru Members not to press their new clause to a vote.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Chope.
I rise to speak in favour of new clause 5, which stands in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends. We will not be pushing it to a vote, because we want to save time and to have a discussion on income tax powers, which is what we really want to discuss in detail. However, I say to the Minister that, regardless of his opening remarks, our new clause is in the spirit of clause 4, which he has just presented. I hope the Government will see sense in due course, either in the later stages of the Bill’s progress in this House or in the other place.
New clause 5 would give powers to the National Assembly to change its name to the “National Parliament” or to any other name should it so decide. I stress that the new clause does not call for the institution’s name to be changed in this Bill, but rather that the power to take this decision should be granted to the National Assembly, as proposed in the Silk II recommendations. The Minister was being somewhat mischievous in saying that we were cherry-picking from the Silk recommendations, because our new clause is in line with the Silk II recommendations, in that it is a matter for the National Assembly if it wishes to change the name of the legislature. The new clause would empower it to make that decision rather than having to make a request to the UK Government of the day, as it has done for the name of the Executive.
The new clause would mean that the National Assembly would be able to change its name by means of a resolution agreed by a simple majority. It is gratifying that clause 4 officially changes the name of the Executive to the “Welsh Government”, a title that has been used widely for practical purposes since the 2011 election. There was a Scottish precedent for this change of title in 2007, when the “Scottish Executive” were renamed the “Scottish Government”. There has been broad agreement that the term “Welsh Assembly Government”, which had been in use since 2002, had been confusing and anachronistic after the separation of the Executive and legislative functions of the Assembly in 2007. It also gave rise to the unfortunate acronym WAG—being given the same label as a premiership footballer’s better half has done little for the democracy of our country. I have never used the term since I was elected, instead always using “Welsh Government”, so I was delighted that following the 2011 election the First Minister made the case that the Executive would be known as the “Welsh Government” thereafter. So I fully support clause 4, which makes that name official in legislation.
Now that the National Assembly is able to pass its own laws, it should be called a Parliament. However, I appreciate that others hold a different view, and that in the European tradition, the meeting place of a legislature is generally termed an Assembly. In France, for instance, the national legislature is called the Assemblée Nationale—if my memory of international rugby trips to Paris serves me correctly. Surely it should be a matter for the democratically elected Members of the national legislature of Wales to determine the name of the legislature in which they serve. That is what we are trying to achieve in new clause 5, but I will not press the matter to a vote. I expect there to be greater deliberations on this topic when the Bill reaches the other place.
I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr Chope. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship.
We support clause 4, which renames the Welsh Assembly Government. That is what the Welsh Assembly has long said that it would like to happen and it reflects normal custom and practice across Wales, so we are pleased that the Government have decided to change things and use the term Welsh Government in future.
On new clause 5, we accept that there is a debate to be had about the name. Silk part II refers to the prospect of a Welsh Parliament and it is ironic that the leader of the Conservative party in Wales holds that view. I admire the chutzpah with which the Under-Secretary glossed over that, as it is an irony that the Opposition see clearly. However, this is an area of debate that ought properly to be dealt with in any legislation that reflects Silk part II rather than under this Bill, which properly reflects the preponderance of Silk part I. For that reason, even if the new clause were pressed to a vote, we probably would not support it.
I agree very much with the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper). There are two elements to the debate. The first is about what we call the legislature and the second is about where the decision is taken. As for the first, there is an emerging debate in Wales about what we should call the National Assembly and whether it should have its name changed. The leader of my party’s group in the Assembly has a view that I fully respect. He is an excellent colleague and I am sorry if I gave the impression that I was glossing over his views, but I still maintain the position that the debate is emerging and has not yet engaged with the public consciousness. Until we get to that point, it is probably a debate that will not be resolved.
As for the second part of the debate, the Silk commission referred to the decision on where the decision should be made in part II of its recommendations. We have been clear and consistent all along that decisions about the Silk part II recommendations are not for this Bill but for a future Parliament and a future Government and for the parties to consider in their manifestos. I stand by my earlier remarks and ask the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards) not to press his new clause to a vote.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 4
National Assembly to set number of AMs
‘Her Majesty may by Order in Council provide for the transfer of responsibility for setting the number of Assembly Members to the National Assembly for Wales.’.—(Jonathan Edwards.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move amendment 21, page 8, leave out line 23 and insert—
‘(1) Part 4A of GOWA 2006 (as inserted by section 6) is amended as follows.
(2) In section 116A(1) (overview), after “Part” insert “—
(a) Chapter 2 confers on the Assembly power to set a rate of income tax to be paid by Welsh taxpayers, and
(b) ”.
(3) After Chapter 1 insert—’.
This amendment and amendment 19 ensure that the overview provision in new section 116A(1) of GOWA 2006 relating to the Assembly power to set a rate of income tax can only come into force, like the other provisions relating to that power, following a yes vote in a referendum.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 2, page 8, line 36, leave out ‘only’ and insert ‘more than’.
Amendment 3, page 8, line 36, leave out ‘only one rate’ and insert ‘up to three rates’.
This amendment is proposed to implement the recommendations of the Silk Commission that the Welsh Government have the power to set different rates of tax for different income bands.
Government amendments 22 to 28.
Amendment 16, page 12, line 34, after ‘Assembly’, insert
‘and each House of Parliament’.
Amendment 6, page 12, line 37, at end add—
‘(2) The Secretary of State shall review the impact on the Exchequer effects of the provisions in this section on residents who live within 50 miles of the Wales/England border and the impact on the prospects for tax competition within the UK, and place a copy of the review in the Library of the House of Commons.’.
Clause stand part.
Amendment 41, in clause 9, page 13, line 8, leave out ‘10’ and insert ‘15’.
Clause 9 stand part.
Amendment 1, in clause 11, page 16, line 20, leave out from ‘Wales’ to end and add
‘where a Welsh rate resolution specifies more than one rate of income tax.’.
Government amendment 19.
Amendment 38, in clause 28, page 29, line 34, after ‘except’, insert
‘sections 8 and 9 and’.
Amendment 39, page 29, line 36, at end insert—
‘(2A) Sections 8 and 9 shall not come into force until a Welsh Government Minister has laid a report before the National Assembly for Wales containing a statement to the effect that the Welsh Government, with regard to the Statement of Funding Policy, is content with the fairness of the arrangements for allocating funding from the UK Government to Wales.
(2B) Sections 8 and 9 shall be suspended following any substantive reform, amendment or other alteration of the arrangements mentioned in subsection (2A), until the process under subsection (2A) has been repeated.’.
Amendment 4, in title, line 3, leave out ‘a rate’ and insert ‘rates’.
On a point of order, Mr Chope. If the four people who voted in favour of new clause 4 want to express an opinion on one side of the argument or the other later this evening, is there not a case that you should weigh the voices?
That could be considered. I have always been keen that we should allow the minority to express their opinion in the Chamber without having it suppressed.
It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this evening, Mr Chope, and to set out the Government’s position on clauses 8 and 9 and the Government amendments. I will also take the opportunity to comment on the amendments tabled by others and will have the chance to debate taxation powers with the shadow Secretary of State for Wales, which I am sure will bring back many happy memories for him of serving on Finance Bills.
Subject to the outcome of a referendum, clause 8 amends the Government of Wales Act 2006 to introduce a Welsh rate of income tax to be paid by those defined as Welsh taxpayers. Clause 9 amends the Income Tax Act 2007 to set out how the Welsh rate of income tax determines the Welsh basic, higher and additional rates of income tax. It also defines the income that will be taxed at those rates.
I shall start with Government amendments 19 and 21. The income tax provisions in clause 8 form part of a new part 4A of the 2006 Act, which is introduced by clause 6. Part 4A’s introductory section includes a reference to the income tax provisions in chapter 2. The provisions in clause 6 will come into force two months after this Bill receives Royal Assent. However, the income tax provisions in clause 8 and 9 can of course be brought into force only following a yes vote in a referendum. Amendment 19 therefore removes the reference to chapter 2 from clause 6, and amendment 21 reinserts the reference into clause 8, bringing the commencement of the reference into line with the rest of the income tax provisions. That will ensure that the amended Act accurately reflects the legislative competence of the Assembly at a given point.
The provisions in clause 9 concerning the Welsh rate have been revised since the draft Bill. That necessitated changes to the power to allow for further consequential changes to be made under secondary legislation introduced by clause 8 in new section 116I of the 2006 Act to ensure that it continued to work as intended. Government amendments 22, 27 and 28 make further technical changes to that power in order to clarify that proposed new section 11B does not impose a charge to income tax. Rather, the effect of the new section 11B is to apply the Welsh rates of income tax to a Welsh taxpayer’s non-savings income.
On Government amendments 23 to 26, the power in new section 116I also allows an order to be made to ensure that HMRC can continue to operate the PAYE system effectively in the event that the Assembly passes a Welsh rate resolution at a late stage in the preceding tax year. Such an order would require employers to continue to operate PAYE on the basis of the information issued by HMRC, rather than the correct tax position for a specified period. The tax position of employees would ultimately be correct over the course of the tax year.
The scenario I have set out would also apply if, for whatever reason, the Assembly did not pass a rate-setting resolution at all, assuming that that had not previously been announced by the Welsh Government. Although I accept that that is unlikely to arise in practice, it is important to recognise that the Assembly has the option not to pass a rate if it so chooses. Amendments 23 to 26 therefore extend the order-making power to cover that scenario. I hope that hon. Members will support those amendments and Government amendments 19, 21, 27 and 28.
In amendment 41, I was pleased to see an amendment from the hon. Members for Pontypridd (Owen Smith) and for Llanelli (Nia Griffith) that supports the principle of income tax devolution, although I note that their latest approach would not provide Wales with quite the same outcome that they have now proposed for Scotland. None the less, it is progress. Although I confess to not having previously studied the issue very closely, I was not sure whether the Labour party opposed income tax devolution or thought that there was not enough of it. No doubt we will receive an explanation later.
I am grateful to the Exchequer Secretary, and this of course brings back warm memories of time spent debating Finance Bills. He failed to mention our amendments 38 and 39—I presume he will do so in due course—which seek to give symmetry between Scotland and Wales in relation to tax powers. While I am on my feet, may I ask him to return to what he said earlier about Welsh taxpayers under this legislation? Will he confirm for the House that that would designate all MEPs in Wales as Welsh taxpayers, including Kay Swinburne, a Conservative, who does not live in Wales?
All Welsh MEPs will be Welsh taxpayers. I will deal with the amendments the hon. Gentleman mentions, although I do not think that they would achieve symmetry. I note that he was not very clear in responding to my point that only a little while ago he said that devolution of income tax to Wales was a Tory trap, or something of the sort. Now he proposes that devolving 10p is insufficient and that it should be 15p. I do not know whether he holds both views at the moment, or just one. I will certainly give way if he can provide some clarity on that point.
Of course, they are entirely reconcilable, as I shall explain later. However, I did not hear an answer from the Exchequer Secretary on whether Kay Swinburne, the Conservative MEP for Wales, who still lives in Ledbury in England, would be designated as a Welsh taxpayer under the terms of the Bill. That strikes me as an extraordinary oversight by a Conservative Minister.
I will repeat what I said: Welsh MEPs will be Welsh taxpayers. I am not sure that I can be any clearer.
On the extent of income tax devolution, there is a careful judgment to be made. Devolving an element of income tax increases the financial accountability of the Assembly and the Welsh Government in three important ways. First, it will enable the Assembly to fund more of the spending for which it is responsible. Secondly, the Welsh Government will be able to vary the levels of tax and spending in Wales. Thirdly, while the Welsh Government currently control many key levers to generate economic growth in Wales such as education, skills, housing and planning, the resulting economic performance currently has no impact on their budget. Devolving an element of income tax will directly link the Welsh Government’s budget to their economic decisions.
What will happen to the people residing in England who, as the Minister’s hon. Friends have said, already use services in Wales such as the health service? Many people on the border who live in England use health and education services in Wales. Is it equitable that they do not pay the level of tax that might be levied by the Welsh Assembly in future?
As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the question of who is a Welsh taxpayer is dependent on who resides in Wales. I take it from what he says that he is opposed in principle to the devolution of income tax. He is nodding his head as if to say yes. He will be aware that his party has tabled an amendment suggesting that 15p, not 10p, should be devolved to the Welsh Government. I do not know how he reconciles his view with that of his Front Benchers.
I support my hon. Friends’ amendment to look at how this impacts across the board. The Exchequer Secretary must accept that there are people in Shrewsbury, Herefordshire and Worcestershire who use services in Wales. Would he support—I am not saying that I support this—a Welsh Assembly Government charging for services used in Wales and paid for by Welsh taxpayers but also used by English people who do not contribute to the Welsh tax burden for those services?
This is not about charging for public services. We have devolution of income tax in Scotland, where the issues that the right hon. Gentleman has mentioned may arise. I am surprised that, as a distinguished shadow Minister, he appears to be taking a position at odds with his own Front Benchers.
There is absolutely no contradiction on our part. The Minister has come very late to the debate; I do not know why the Secretary of State does not feel able to answer these questions, but that is for him to respond to. We have said throughout that we have never thought that income tax devolution to Wales was a priority. We do not think there is a significant appetite for it in Wales, and we consider that it creates a Tory trap in two respects. The Conservative party is committed, in Wales and across the rest of the UK, to cutting taxes further for the wealthiest people. The Secretary of State has said that he wants to do that. He has further said that he favours tax competition, with Wales able to undercut England. We are not in favour of that. However, given that in the Bill the Secretary of State has drawn a clear line between the quantum of income tax that is nominally to be devolved to Wales and the amount of borrowing that will be afforded to the Welsh Government, and given that £1.7 billion has been cut out of the Welsh budget, particularly in capital, we are in favour of increasing the amount of money that they might borrow. Our 10p to 15p change would achieve that, if the Welsh people agreed to it in a referendum.
I am grateful for that lengthy speech. I may have come late to the debate, but it is perfectly clear that Labour has been all over the place on this matter. I come back to what I said about the advantages of devolving income tax. One of those, very significantly, is that there is much greater accountability for the Welsh Government, because if they are able effectively to use the powers that they currently have to get the Welsh economy to grow, they will benefit from that as a consequence of increased revenues.
Perhaps I can help to answer the question asked by the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson). First, my constituents who have to use the NHS in Wales do not want to, would love not to and would like to use the NHS in England. Working with the Secretary of State for Health, I hope we will be able to put that in place by the end of this year, as he has pledged in the House.
Secondly, all UK taxpayers make a contribution to the Exchequer, which supplies the block grant to Wales that, of course, part-funds public services. Given that we are talking about a partial devolution, there is still quite a lot of money coming from the block grant and any of my constituents who are using public services will, of course, have paid their fair share.
The Minister has made the case that, if the Welsh economy expands relative to the English economy, the new regime—the Welsh Exchequer, as it were—would gain. However, the corollary of that, of course, is that if the English economy grows faster than the Welsh economy as a result of the current Government generating growth through a London housing bubble, Wales will lose out. Why is the Minister putting only one half of the argument when this could in fact be a hidden trap?
One of the attributes of devolving an element of income tax is that it will ensure that the Welsh Government have the incentives to grow the economy as strongly as possible. I am rather surprised that the hon. Gentleman has so little faith in the Welsh Government that he does not want to encourage this opportunity and that he does not have the confidence that, by pursuing the right policies, the Welsh economy can grow significantly. I would have thought that that is what he wanted.
The Minister knows that investment and economic development in Wales would deliver jobs and that that would reduce social security costs and increase income tax. There is no proposition for social security to be devolved, so a lot of the benefits will be in England. What is more, with this new manifestation of the policy—this half-cocked version—there is a real danger that, if a London-centric recovery occurs, Wales will lose out.
Order. Only one person can speak at a time.
I continue to touch a nerve with the hon. Gentleman. If tax receipts grow in Wales as a consequence of greater economic growth—after all, the Welsh Government have powers over education, skills, housing and planning—it will be to the advantage of Wales and the Welsh Government. I have no doubt that it is the desire of the Welsh Government to do the best for the Welsh economy. This is an opportunity to benefit from growth and increased tax receipts.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way; he is being very generous with his time. This is like all our yesterdays, in that we are debating, by implication at least, the Laffer curve. He said a moment ago that if Wales were to pursue the right policies, it would see economic growth by deploying these new powers. Does he mean by that that taxes in Wales should be cut, as the Secretary of State has said he would do? If so, which taxes does the Exchequer Secretary propose to cut and by how much?
That is a matter for the Welsh Government. They might want to pursue tax policies, but I repeat that policies on education, skills, housing and planning all contribute towards economic growth. The situation at the moment is that the Welsh Government control many of the key levers to generate economic growth, but do not currently benefit from any resulting economic performance through the impact on its budget. This devolution of tax will address that situation. Equally, to go back to the point made by the hon. Member for Swansea West (Geraint Davies), it means that if bad policies are pursued and they damage growth, that will have a consequence for the Welsh economy. I am sure that he is not suggesting that the Welsh Government will pursue growth-damaging policies.
Does the Minister accept that although some powers to effect economic performance are in Wales, the mass of powers are in this place in terms of the Exchequer, our relationship with the Bank of England and macro-economic policies across the United Kingdom? With the budget that it has, Wales alone cannot determine its economic future. To say so is simply misleading, and he should withdraw it. It is a disgrace.
The hon. Gentleman may say that the mass of powers are here, but we are talking about a relative test involving Wales versus the rest of the United Kingdom. United Kingdom policies apply across the United Kingdom; the specific policy of the Welsh Government may result in changes in growth in the economy and the impact of that on the budget.
Order. The Minister is not giving way to the hon. Member for Swansea West (Geraint Davies). We must have some order. There are not many Members in the Chamber, but they seem to be making a mockery of the rules of order. I think that the Minister is giving way to the hon. Member for Pontypridd (Owen Smith).
I merely wanted to ask whether, while talking about good and bad policies, the Minister would care to congratulate the Welsh Government on the good policy of Jobs Growth Wales. The policy has been seven times more effective than the Work programme in Wales, and has resulted in Wales having higher growth and, indeed, better unemployment figures than anywhere else in the UK.
It is worth pointing out that 12,000 new jobs, as I understand it, have been created under the Work programme in Wales, but I think that I should make a little progress, Mr Chope.
The change involves creating incentives for the Welsh Government, which of course means transferring some risks to them. Specifically, the Welsh Government’s budget will benefit if the income tax base grows faster in Wales than the UK average, but it will be adversely affected if growth in Wales is slower. Crucially, the larger the proportion of income tax that we devolve, the greater the potential impact on the Welsh Government’s budget. Devolving 15p of income tax would increase the size of the impacts by 50% compared with devolving 10p. There is a balance to be found between risks and rewards, and at this stage we see no evidence to suggest that we should move away from the Silk commission’s assessment, which resulted in the recommendation to devolve 10p of income tax. That recommendation is now reflected in the Bill.
I aim to entertain and to scrutinise legislation properly. Simply on the question of risk, will the Exchequer Secretary tell us what risk the Welsh Government will bear in relation to the potential costs of the change? We know that it will cost between £40 million and £42 million to do it in Scotland. Will it be more or less for Wales? How much will it be?
At this point, it is not possible to say what the cost will be. I must say that, with the gain in greater accountability and the greater devolution of powers, hon. Members should welcome the change. The hon. Gentleman is aware that the issue is one for a future referendum. Whether the Welsh people want to go down such a route is a question for them, and such matters will clearly be relevant to that debate. However, on having a 10p rate rather than a 15p rate, I hear the arguments in favour of essentially no devolution whatsoever and those for having a larger sum, but we believe that we have got the balance right. I hope that hon. Members will accept the balance achieved by the Silk commission recommendation, and that the hon. Gentleman will not persist with amendment 41.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend because he takes me neatly on to the next line of my speech.
Amendments 1 to 4, which were tabled by Plaid Cymru, relate to the single Welsh rate of income tax—the so-called lockstep system. Fundamentally, income tax devolution must work within the integrated UK-wide income tax system. It must work for Wales by increasing the accountability of the Assembly and the Welsh Government, and it must work for the UK by maintaining the stability of the tax system.
Following a thorough and robust assessment of the Silk commission recommendations, we have determined that that would be most effectively achieved through a single Welsh rate of income tax that applied to all bands. There are two main reasons for that. First, the pooling and redistribution of tax revenues is a key feature of our fiscal model and ensures that wealth is shared among the regions and countries of the UK. The income tax structure is a key mechanism for achieving wealth redistribution. It is surely right, therefore, that UK-wide redistribution is decided at the UK level. The lockstep ensures that that will continue to be the case.
Secondly, although there are many benefits of tax devolution, it is not without risk. Specifically, we need to minimise the potential for harmful tax competition, increased opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion, and higher administrative burdens. It is therefore crucial that when we devolve taxes, we do so in a way that minimises those risks. In particular, the Government have consistently been clear that tax devolution should not benefit one part of the UK to the detriment of another. Tax devolution is not about moving economic activity from one area to another, but about empowering the devolved Administrations to generate additional growth and increasing their accountability by linking their budgets to their decisions. That incentivises the devolved Administrations and increases their accountability to the people, in this case in Wales.
Without the lockstep, the Welsh Government could substantially lower the rates of tax for the upper bands in Wales without making any change to the basic rate. That would be a considerable incentive for high earners to move across the border, which would benefit Wales, but would be to the detriment of the UK as a whole. Instead, the lockstep system will enable the Welsh Government to vary the levels of tax and spending in Wales, but the size of any differences will be unlikely to lead to tax competition. For example, they would be similar to the existing differences between the levels of council tax in neighbouring local authorities in Wales.
Devolving an element of income tax is therefore best achieved using the lockstep system. That will enable us to deliver substantial benefits to Wales, while continuing to redistribute wealth throughout the income tax system and minimise the risk of tax competition. I hope that I have helped hon. Members to understand our rationale for the lockstep system. I therefore ask them not to press amendments 1 to 4.
Does the hon. Gentleman not understand that he has contradicted himself? Indeed, the whole Wales Bill is contradictory. He is arguing that the powers are needed to incentivise the Welsh Government to develop economic growth, but he is placing a lockstep on those powers, making it impossible to use them. It is essentially a handcuff on those powers. There is a huge contradiction in what he is saying.
I do not accept that the powers are impossible to use. One can debate whether the rates should be varied, but the fact that there will be greater accountability will benefit Wales as a whole. We must balance the improvement in accountability in Wales with the difficulties that might arise with tax competition in the higher rates, which would be likely to damage the tax base in the UK as a whole. That is why we proceeded with a lockstep.
On amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Member for Pontypridd, I assure the Committee that the Government always consider the impacts of potential policy options and keep policies under review. An assessment of the potential impacts of devolving elements of income tax to the Welsh Assembly is summarised in the documents accompanying the introduction of the Wales Bill, in particular the Command Paper and the impact assessment. That assessment explains how the proposed system of income tax devolution achieves the key benefits identified by the Silk commission, increasing the accountability of the Assembly and Welsh Government and providing flexibility over the levels of tax and spending in Wales, while also minimising the risks of tax competition in the UK whereby significantly different tax rates could affect the behaviour of people living close to the border.
The Government’s assessment of the Silk commission’s proposals look closely at the potential for harmful tax competition in the UK, particularly given the populous border between England and Wales. As a result of that work, the Government rejected a system of three independent Welsh rates of income tax, instead proposing the lockstep system. As I have previously explained, that system specifically helps to minimise the risk of harmful tax competition in the UK. I hope hon. Members agree that the assessment we have undertaken is suitably robust, and that they are reassured by our commitment to keep the policy under review. Clause 22 requires the Government to report annually on the implementation and operation of the finance provisions of the Bill, so we will keep Parliament informed in that regard. On that basis I hope that hon. Members will not press amendment 6.
Amendment 16 was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper) as recommended in the Silk commission’s report of November 2012, and clause 8 provides for the Comptroller and Auditor General to report directly to the National Assembly for Wales on HMRC’s administration of the Welsh rate of income tax. That will provide independent assurance to the Assembly on HMRC’s performance in administering this tax. The Comptroller and Auditor General currently reports to Parliament on HMRC’s administration of its business, including the operation of the UK’s income tax system. Should the Welsh rate of income tax be introduced, it will be operated as part of the UK income tax system. The NAO would therefore be able to report to Parliament in relation to the Welsh rate as part of its existing remit, and clause 8 ensures that reporting to the Welsh Assembly on the Welsh rate will additionally fall within the NAO’s remit.
My hon. Friend will know from Second Reading that my concern is about companies based in my constituency that employ people, some of whom are resident in England and some in Wales, because there would be an administrative burden on those companies should there be a Welsh rate of income tax. I think the Minister has addressed this point, but will he confirm whether that burden—to the extent that it exists—will effectively be reported not just to the Welsh Assembly but also to this House? Members who represent English residents have a legitimate interest in how that complexity will hit local firms. If the Minister could be absolutely clear on that, there will be no need to press the amendment to a vote.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that point and I hope I can reassure him. There already exist mechanisms for scrutiny in relation to the Welsh rate by Parliament through existing vires. HMRC’s accounts would contain specific information on the Welsh rate, and they will continue to be laid before Parliament. Hon. Members will be presented with the levels of spending incurred by HMRC in administering the Welsh rate and the amounts of revenue collected. I believe that those existing channels provide an appropriate level of scrutiny for hon. Members in relation to the Welsh rate, and I hope that addresses my hon. Friend’s point.
I also think it right for additional insurance to be provided to the Assembly via the Comptroller and Auditor General’s report, and we anticipate that that report would be produced to a timetable similar to that of the wider report to Parliament on HMRC’s accounts. No doubt my hon. Friend will shortly contribute to the debate, but I have set out the existing mechanisms for scrutiny that will be available to Members of this Parliament, and I hope he is reassured.
On amendments 38 and 39, we have been working closely with the Welsh Government on Welsh funding. In particular, the Government recognise there has been convergence between the levels of funding in Wales and England since devolution, and that this is a significant concern in Wales. As a result, in October 2012 we agreed to implement a joint process to review the levels of funding in Wales and England in advance of the spending review. If convergence is forecast to occur over the course of the spending review period, options will be discussed to address the issue in a fair and affordable manner, based on a shared understanding of all the available evidence.
In advance of the 2013 spending round, a joint review was therefore undertaken by the two Governments and the outcome set out in a written ministerial statement. The review determined that funding levels are not expected to converge during the period to 2015-16, and in fact an element of divergence is forecast to occur. The review also determined that relative funding levels in Wales are within the range recommended by the Holtham commission.
These arrangements assure that we have a shared understanding of funding levels in Wales and a process is in place to consider options should convergence be forecast to resume. In no way would the devolution of income tax have any impact on these arrangements, and it is certainly not the case that income tax devolution would lock in the current level of funding. These arrangements therefore provide a firm basis for proceeding with the new financial powers in the Bill, and I hope that hon. Members will therefore not press amendments 38 and 39. I hope that my comments have been of assistance to the Committee, and that clauses 8 and 9 and the Government amendments will be added to the Bill this evening.
I wish to speak to amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4, in my name and the names of my colleagues in Plaid Cymru. We intend to press amendment 1 to a Division at the appropriate time.
The lockstep income tax power that is on offer in this Bill is not the one recommended by the Silk commission. We see two ways forward to preserve the integrity of the original Silk proposals. Either the lockstep income tax power should proceed without a referendum, which amendment 1 would achieve, or the Bill should be amended as per the Silk commission recommendation on income tax, which amendments 2, 3 and 4 seek to do, thereby restoring the need for a referendum, as Silk envisaged, on an income tax sharing arrangement without a lockstep.
I remind hon. Members that their parties, through their representatives on the commission, agreed to the Silk recommendations. Indeed, the Labour party’s representative on the commission was the esteemed former Assembly Member, Sue Essex, who is of course a former Finance Minister in the Welsh Government. The purpose of amendment 1 is to ensure that the referendum is on the ability of Wales to vary each income tax band individually, rather than the lockstep that is proposed in the Bill.
I believe that we should not have a referendum on these powers. The borrowing powers that will accompany the income tax powers would be essential to move the economy forward. Capacity will increase with the income tax powers. However, I accept the position of my party that a referendum should be held on the original Silk recommendations. In my view, the principle of fiscal devolution has already been conceded in this Bill—we will discuss the minor taxes next week—so the case for a referendum is not very strong.
Amendments 2, 3 and 4 would alter the Bill so that the lockstep is removed from the income tax power, giving Wales the ability to vary income tax band rates independently of each other, subject to a referendum, as per the original recommendation of the Silk commission. As the Bill stands, the lockstep on the ability to vary income tax in Wales means that all three bands can be moved up or down only in tandem, as is the case in Scotland. I hesitate to point out that those powers have never been used in Scotland, even though they have been available since devolution in 1999. Of course, the Silk recommendation was for the power to vary income tax band rates independently of each other. In reality the lockstep kills the ability to vary income tax at all, which strengthens the argument that I put to the Minister in an intervention—the lockstep hinders what the Government claim to be trying to achieve in the Bill, which is to incentivise the Welsh Government to develop their economy. Without the ability to introduce innovative income tax policy, how are they meant to achieve that?
I entirely understand that point, absolutely, completely and utterly. I also understand that the leader of the Conservative party in Wales has placed on the record his desire to cut solely the top rate of tax—[Interruption.] The Secretary of State is muttering from a sedentary position. I presume that he is referring to his colleague, the leader of the Tory party in Wales, because it was he who called for a cut to the top rate of tax. We understand perfectly well how this legislation will work in Wales, but we are not in favour of any one part of Britain undercutting another through tax competition, which is unfortunately the position of the Secretary of State for Wales—[Interruption.] He keeps chuntering from a sedentary position that I do not understand it, but, dare I say, if he had greater faith in his own understanding of his own Bill, introduced in this House with amendments tabled in his name, he would stand at the Dispatch Box to explain the Treasury position and the tax amendments. Unfortunately, he clearly does not understand it sufficiently not to have to rely on his colleague the Exchequer Secretary. We are extremely grateful to the Exchequer Secretary for turning up to act as a human shield for the Secretary of State for Wales, but it is a crying shame that the Secretary of State and the Minister require his support.
There is no doubt that the Secretary of State understands the measure but, given what we have heard so far from the shadow Secretary of State, perhaps it would have been better if one of the shadow Treasury team had been making the speech instead. They might have understood it.
The Exchequer Secretary can continue to attempt to suggest that I do not understand the Bill, but I understand it perfectly. I understand perfectly how lockstep works, but equally understand that this Government have cut taxes for the wealthiest in Britain. They have exclusively cut the additional 50p rate to 45p. I also know that his party in Wales has proposed that it would like to go further with Wales, so he will forgive us if we are suspicious of the “tax cuts for the wealthy” motives of the Conservative party. I think we will continue to be suspicious. Unless he would like to get to his feet and tell us that he does not intend that his colleagues in Wales should cut taxes for the wealthiest, I suspect that he will not wish to intervene further.
On the subject of the complexity and cost of the Bill, the Exchequer Secretary left us entirely without answers about how it will work. In order to illustrate its complexity, I highlighted that he has today moved a poorly drafted clause that will see a Welsh Tory Member of the European Parliament who does not live in Wales and who does not have a residence of any description in Wales, but who lives in England, designated as a Welsh taxpayer. The logic of that is entirely lost on me, but I should have thought that he would want to check who his European Members are in Wales and where they lived before he determined that they would get a tax break—in her case, a £700 tax break—were his Government to do what the Secretary of State for Wales has suggested and cut all the tax bands in lockstep by 1%. That is the tax cut that she would get in Wales, despite the fact that she does not actually live in Wales.
I intend to answer. I fully anticipate that my friend, Mr Kinnock, were he to be so lucky as to win the forthcoming general election and be returned as the hon. Member for Aberavon, a great and noble seat in the Welsh Labour tradition, intends, as he has stated on the record, to live in Aberavon. The irony of this poorly drafted legislation that has been brought before us by those on the Treasury Bench today is that it would not matter where he lived. He could live in Copenhagen or in England and he would still, for the purposes of this half-cocked Bill, be considered a Welsh taxpayer. I do not think that the people of Aberavon would understand that and I suspect that the people of Wales will not understand why an English Tory MEP living in Ledbury will be deemed a Welsh taxpayer.
Let me return to the point about the complexity, if I may, and read a small section of the Bill to the Minister for the delectation of the House. It is entitled “Close connection with Wales or another part of the UK” and can be found in proposed new section 116G in clause 8. It says in subsections (3) and (4):
“T”—
the Welsh taxpayer—
“has a close connection with a part of the UK if in that year—
(a) T has 2 or more places of residence in the UK,
(b) for at least part of the year, T’s main place of residence in the UK is in that part of the UK,
(c) the times in the year when T’s main place of residence is in that part of the UK comprise (in aggregate) more of the year than the times when T’s main place of residence is in each other part of the UK (considered separately), and
(d) for at least part of the year, T lives at a place of residence in that part of the UK.
(4) In this section ‘place’ includes a place on board a vessel or other means of transport.”
I read those subsections for the enjoyment of the Leader of the House, who I am delighted to say has joined us, to point out what a ludicrously complex piece of drafting that is, and what a ludicrously complex Bill it is. We point that out because attending that complexity is cost—enormous cost.
The Secretary of State, or rather the Exchequer Secretary—the Secretary of State did not answer because he was not at the Dispatch Box—could not tell us how much it would cost to implement these measures in Wales. That is a surprise. He also talked about accountability. He might have been a little more accountable for his own Department, because it is today that the Government and his Department should have published the second annual report on the implementation of part 3 of the Scotland Act, inwhich we were anticipating, as outlined in the Secretary of State’s impact assessment to this Bill, a renewedand updated view on the costs associated with the implementation of these measures in Scotland. That has not been published today. It was not published in April as Ministers promised.
That is a dereliction of duty, not least because it leaves us in Wales with no idea as to how much these measures will cost. But we have reason to believe and to fear that it will be a significant amount of money, because we know from the first report on the implementation of the Scotland Act that it will cost more than £40 million to implement such measures in Scotland, and we know from the Government’s own impact assessment that it is likely to cost more in Wales. The reason is the porosity and populous nature of the border between England and Wales: 48% of the Welsh population and 10% of the English population live within 25 miles of that border, which means that fully 6.3 million people live along that border. In contrast, just 4% of the Scottish population and just 0.5% of the English population live within 25 miles of the border between England and Scotland, which means that just 450,000 people live along that border.
If it has taken so far, as the Government have conceded, £1.7 million to start the analysis of how these measures will work in Scotland, how Scottish taxpayers will be identified, how a pay-as-you-earn system will work, how employers will deal with it, and what the nature of the information to be provided to newly designated Scottish taxpayers will be—it is already £2 million-ish and counting, and soon to be £40 million for Scotland—do we not need to have some idea in Wales, as a part of prudent management of Treasury finances, and eventually Welsh Government—finances, of how much money it will cost the Welsh? If the Minister wants to offer us some indication, I should be grateful, but at the moment we are in the dark, and in the dark we remain concerned that the costs will be greater for Wales, and the disbenefits for Wales, therefore, potentially also greater.
In the light of the fact that there is such a long period before the measure comes into force, we will not press the amendments that we have tabled to the clause, but we will maintain our concerns about the motivations that lie behind it. We will continue to push for fair funding for Wales, not to the detriment of Scotland but in the interests of the people of Wales, and we will continue to ask the Minister to clarify what exactly this measure will mean for the Welsh people, and whether they will be better or worse off if the Bill were ever to be enacted.
After what is a relatively short speech from the hon. Member for Pontypridd (Owen Smith), I am still not entirely sure whether he is for or against it, but we are certainly for the devolution of income tax in the way set out in the clauses. I hope that the clauses and the Government amendments will have the support of the whole House, and that all other amendments will not be pressed.
Amendment 21 agreed to.