(1 year, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberOrder. I should point out that the debate must end promptly at 10.38 pm.
If the noise policy changes are made, as my hon. Friend says they will be, will they be retrospective?
(2 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman is putting a very brave face on this. Many commentators in the agricultural communities in this country see it far more negatively than he does. I take his point about the 15 years. The agreement will be phased in over 15 years. Many of them see this as a car crash in slow motion. If the hon. Gentleman had argued that the agreement was good for free trade reasons, fine. The minuscule GDP gain from it has been accepted. I see the most positive thing about it as access to the CPTPP, which will be coming on stream. Britain aims in the longer future to join that organisation, which I am sure he will agree is a good thing in itself. That begs the question that, if we can do that why not—
Order. Interventions, by their very nature, should be short.
I think 15 years is a very long car crash. There will be time to regularise, and the world will be a very different place in 15 years. I take the hon. Gentleman’s point on the CPTPP. It was made at the right moment, because I was about to come on to it.
A further reason for supporting the free trade agreement, as the Secretary of State mentioned, is the more strategic one. If we consider that world growth over the next century is going to be dominated by Asia-Pacific, we need to be in on the action there. Negotiations for the UK’s accession to the CPTPP have now started and Australia, New Zealand and Canada are parties to that agreement. Clearly, if we had not settled a deal with Australia and New Zealand, not least given their Commonwealth status, we could have had a much weaker pitch with which to start negotiations with CPTPP. I see this Australia FTA as helping to set out our Pacific stall, enabling us to then move on.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberOrder. I was very generous with Dame Margaret Hodge, for obvious reasons, but I shall be less generous now in respect of the length of questions. You are all warned.
I welcome the statement. While I fully support efforts to have the means to investigate criminality and sanctions-busting schemes at Companies House—and I hope that that will be properly funded, because it will be expensive to carry out—I also hope that the process of registration will not be burdened to the extent that we lose competitive advantage and throw the baby out with the bathwater.
(12 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberOn a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. Surely it should be possible to correct what I am sure is an inadvertent misleading of the House by the Minister—he would not have intended to do it. The ASBO is a civil order. A breach of it is a criminal offence, tested by the criminal quality of evidence.
Further to that point of order, I call Mr Djanogly.
I think that is exactly what I said. If I did not, I am happy to reaffirm it.
The community trigger will empower victims and communities to demand that agencies take action against persistent antisocial behaviour problems. The Government will shortly set out our formal response to the consultation and our new powers, which will put victims and communities at the heart of agencies’ response to this problem.
The Bill dealing with families seeks to ensure that we tackle the root causes of delay in care cases as part of a wider package of reform that was set out in the family justice review. I am grateful for the interventions of my hon. Friends the Members for Milton Keynes North (Mark Lancaster) and for Harrow East in support of the Government’s intention to tackle the delay in care proceedings. I am also grateful to the right hon. Member for Leicester East for his support of the Government’s intention to legislate on a target of six months in care cases.
Reforms to the use of experts in family courts—on both the number and quality—have been rightly raised by the Chair of the Justice Committee. Proposed amendments to the family procedure rules and practice direction on experts were submitted to the family procedure rules committee in April. These amendments seek to ensure that expert evidence is commissioned only where necessary—this, in turn, will save time in proceedings.
On the quality of experts, Ministry of Justice officials have spoken to health regulators on developing minimum standards, and this will be an important area for my Department to improve.
I think that question is for others in the Ministry of Justice and the Home Department to address.
The adoption clauses on ethnicity will also help to reduce the time children have to wait for an adoptive placement and will see more children placed in stable loving homes with less delay and disruption. My hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes North gave a very well-informed speech on adoption and my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Andrea Leadsom) spoke very well on the urgency of the early years of a baby’s mental development and the benefits of early intervention—
(12 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 1.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Lords amendments 3 and 4, Government motions to disagree, and Government amendments (a) and (b) in lieu.
Lords amendment 5.
Lords amendment 24, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 1 and 24 impinge on the financial privilege of this House. I ask the House to disagree to them and will ask the Reasons Committee to ascribe financial privilege as the reason for doing so. Notwithstanding that, the House now has the opportunity to debate the substance and effect of the amendments, and shortly I will state the Government’s full reasons for rejecting them. Before I start, I remind the House of the statement that I made on Report on 31 October 2011 relating to my declaration of interests. It can be found at column 626 of Hansard, and I confirm today that it remains accurate. I ask the House to agree to the Government amendments in lieu of Lords amendments 3 and 4, which relate to the director of legal aid casework.
I turn to the Lords amendments. Access to justice is of fundamental importance to our legal system and to this Government, but our legal aid system is by any measure extremely expensive and sometimes prone to aggravating disputes unnecessarily by pushing them into the courtroom. The question for the Government has never been whether to reform it but how, and our approach is one with a principled basis of focusing scarce resources on the most urgent and serious cases while seeking a broader shift to earlier resolution of disputes. We have always been happy to accept amendments that deliver on those principles, so it should come as no surprise that the Bill is much revised. The Government have listened and made significant concessions, and I am grateful to the other place for its concern to improve the Bill.
In another place, Lords amendment 1, tabled by Lord Pannick, was said to identify the aims of the legal aid system in our society. It would place a duty on the Lord Chancellor, reflecting the provision in section 4(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999, to secure within the resources made available and in accordance with part 1 of the Bill that individuals have access to legal services that meet their needs effectively. However, clause 1(1) already sets out a clear duty on the Lord Chancellor to ensure that legal aid is made available in accordance with part 1 of the Bill, so the Government are concerned that the amendment replicates what is already in place.
Worse than mere duplication, technical problems with the amendment risk muddying the waters, creating legal uncertainty and undermining the Bill’s clear purpose. Unlike the clear duty in clause 1(1), which relates to legal aid made available under part 1 of the Bill, with legal aid being defined in clause 1(2), Lords amendment 1 would impose a duty in relation to legal services. Despite the purported qualifications in the words in brackets, it can be read as imposing a wider duty on the Lord Chancellor than that intended under the Bill, in that it risks imposing a duty on him to fund legal services beyond the realm of legal aid provision.
We believe that there are potential additional costs attached to the amendment, which would create uncertainty. It runs contrary to the policy intention of creating certainty through the unambiguous description of services in schedule 1 and the clearly defined circumstances in which exceptional funding is available. Both the uncertainty that would be created and the possible costs are undesirable outcomes.
The problem with the amendment is that it conflates the two important but separate principles of access to justice and the provision of publicly funded legal advice. It could be understood in the context of the 1999 Act, which, because it was drafted on an exclusionary basis, specifies what services cannot be funded under civil legal aid but leaves rather vague exactly what the Lord Chancellor is responsible for funding. However, the Bill is carefully drafted on an inclusionary basis, which means that it is explicitly clear about what services can be funded, thereby representing Parliament’s view on services that should be provided under legal aid to meet people’s needs.
Lords amendment 1 risks providing the basis for myriad new legal challenges seeking to widen the scope of the Bill. The central purpose of our legal aid reforms is targeting resources where they really matter, not providing work for lawyers. We cannot accept an amendment that might prompt endless legal dispute and judicial review.
Lords amendments 3 and 4, which were tabled by Lord Pannick, and the Government’s Lords amendment 5 all concern the director of legal aid casework. Lords amendments 3 and 4 are born out of concern that the director’s decisions will be subject to political interference from Ministers. I reassure the House that the Government absolutely agree with Members of the other place that the Lord Chancellor should have absolutely no involvement in a decision about legal aid funding in an individual case. However, we ask the House to reject Lords amendments 3 and 4, because they would have the unwelcome effect of preventing the director from being appointed as a civil servant.
I must remind the House that we are abolishing the Legal Services Commission to improve the administration of legal aid, not to create greater fragmentation of responsibility and accountability.
Clause 4 provides protection to the director by creating, in clause 4(4), a statutory bar on the Lord Chancellor’s involvement in funding decisions by the director in individual cases. The Lord Chancellor may not give directions or guidance to the director about the carrying out of the director’s functions in relation to an individual case. In addition to that protection, the Bill imposes a duty on the Lord Chancellor to publish any guidance and directions that he issues to the director.
Lords amendment 5, which is a Government amendment, goes further by requiring the director to produce an annual report for the preceding financial year on the exercise of their functions during that period. That annual report will be laid before Parliament and published. We consider that further offer of transparency to be an important safeguard.
I am aware that the question of directorial independence was one that exercised the other place considerably. It is because we agree that that is a vital issue that we are happy to put the matter beyond doubt. That is why I am asking the House to agree to the Government amendment in lieu of Lords amendments 3 and 4. That will reinforce the protections already set out in clause 4(4) by requiring the Lord Chancellor to ensure that the director acts independently of the Lord Chancellor when applying directions and guidance given under clause 4(3) in relation to an individual case. That provides additional assurance on the director’s independence without compromising common-sense administrative arrangements designed to improve control and accountability.
Finally, Lords amendment 24 concerns the provision of advice over the telephone, on which I am afraid I cannot agree with many of the sentiments of the other place. The effect of amendment 24 would be to weaken a key measure to modernise the system and bring it up to date. The aim of the telephone gateway is to route access to legal aid, in the first instance, by the phone. That is not only much more efficient, enabling calls to be properly triaged, but simpler to access and generally of higher quality.
(13 years ago)
Commons ChamberI would dearly have loved to reach the provisions relating to bail, and I think the right hon. Gentleman should ask the official Opposition why we have not done so.
Order. Clearly, that was not a point of order, and the Minister has now dealt with the point raised.
I shall now turn to amendments 69, 70 and 71, tabled by the hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green), which address pensions and compensation.
Amendment 69 looks to ensure that Legal Services Commission employees transferring to the civil service are treated fairly. As drafted, the Bill and commitment between the Ministry of Justice and the LSC will achieve that. The Ministry is committed to ensuring that transferring staff are not put in a less favourable position than that of existing civil servants. The Bill protects LSC employees’ terms and conditions at the point of transfer, with the exception of those for pensions and compensation. The Bill also protects employees’ length of service.
When LSC employees transfer to the civil service, they will be enrolled as members of the premium section of the principal civil service pension scheme. The Government Actuary’s Department has determined that that scheme is “broadly comparable” to the existing LSC pension offer. Broad comparability is the standard defined by the Cabinet Office for the pension offer for staff transferred to organisations within the public sector. LSC staff will be able to choose whether to move any entitlement built up in the LSC scheme to the civil service pension scheme, or whether to leave it within the LSC scheme. Those arrangements have been communicated to LSC employees and their representatives. I will write to the hon. Lady on the TUPE point.
New clause 17 was moved by the hon. Member for Makerfield (Yvonne Fovargue). Her significant experience in the field became clear, as it also did in Committee. Many Members spoke to the new clause, including the hon. Members for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi), for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and for Walsall South (Valerie Vaz), the right hon. Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Joan Ruddock), my hon. Friends the Members for Eastbourne (Stephen Lloyd) and for Bradford East (Mr Ward) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake).
The new clause is very broad and would widen the scope of legal aid and increase its cost at a time when we are seeking to focus funding on the highest priority cases. It would have the effect of bringing into scope areas which are not covered in schedule 1—and which we intend no longer to fund—by virtue of their interconnected and complex nature. We have undertaken a comprehensive consultation on legal aid with published impact and equality assessments, and we have received almost 5,000 responses. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington pointed out, cases will arise where it will be difficult to separate two or more legal issues in terms of funding. Under the current legal aid scheme, there are provisions in the funding code to cover mixed cases, where the case is partly in and partly out of scope. Those provisions allow funding of the whole case in certain circumstances, and in others they allow funding for aspects of the case. I am pleased to confirm to my right hon. Friend that paragraph 39 of schedule 1 ensures similar appropriate provision in the new scheme. We consider that that approach provides a more proportionate means of dealing with interconnected matters than the new clause proposed by the hon. Member for Makerfield.
(13 years ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move amendment 10, page 99, line 11, leave out from ‘where’ to first ‘for’ in line 13 and insert ‘—
(a) the services are provided to the individual, or
(b) the individual has died and the services are provided—
(i) to the individual’s personal representative, or
(ii) ’.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendment 11.
Amendment 91, page 103, line 3, after ‘family’, insert ‘or other intimate’.
Amendment 93, page 103, line 4, at end insert
‘or where an allegation is made that B has been abused by A or is at risk of being abused by A’.
Amendment 23, page 103, leave out lines 35 to 38 and insert—
‘“abuse” means any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality.’.
Amendment 92, page 103, line 35, leave out ‘physical or mental abuse’ and insert
‘any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (whether physical, mental, financial or emotional)’.
Amendment 74, page 104, line 23, at end insert—
‘(10) For the purposes of this paragraph, evidence that A has been abused by B or is at risk of being abused by B may consist of one or more of the following (without limitation)—
(a) a relevant court conviction or police caution;
(b) a relevant court order (including without notice, ex parte, interim or final orders) including a non-molestation order, occupation order, forced marriage protection order or other protective injunction;
(c) evidence of relevant criminal proceedings for an offence concerning domestic violence or a police report confirming attendance at an incident resulting from domestic violence;
(d) evidence that a victim has been referred to a Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (as a high-risk victim of domestic violence) and a plan has been put in place to protect that victim from violence by the other party;
(e) a finding of fact in the family courts of domestic violence by the other party giving rise to the risk of harm to the victim;
(f) a medical report from a doctor at a UK hospital confirming that the applicant has injuries consistent with being a victim of domestic violence, such injuries not being limited to physical injuries;
(g) a letter from a General Medical Council registered general practitioner confirming that he or she has examined the applicant and is satisfied that the applicant had injuries consistent with those of a victim of domestic violence;
(h) an undertaking given to a court that the perpetrator of the abuse will not approach the applicant who is the victim of the abuse;
(i) a letter from a social services department confirming its involvement in connection with domestic violence;
(j) a letter of support or a report from a domestic violence support organisation; or
(k) other well-founded documentary evidence of abuse (such as from a counsellor, midwife, school or witnesses).
(11) For the avoidance of doubt, no time limit shall operate in relation to any evidence supporting an application for civil legal services under paragraph 10.’.
Amendment 94, page 104, line 25, leave out ‘(“A”)’.
Amendment 95, page 104, line 27, leave out ‘other than A’.
Amendment 96, page 104, line 39, at end insert—
‘(1A) Civil legal services provided to an adult in relation to proceedings for financial relief in respect of a child who is the subject of an order or procedure mentioned in sub-paragraph (1).’.
Amendment 97, page 104, line 39, at end insert—
‘(1B) Civil legal services provided in relation to proceedings in which the court is considering giving a direction under section 37 of the Children Act 1989 (direction to authority, where care or supervision order may be appropriate, to investigate child’s circumstances).’.
Amendment 98, page 104, line 39, at end insert—
‘(1C) Civil legal services provided in relation to proceedings arising out of a family relationship involving a child in respect of whom a court has given a direction under section 37 of the Children Act 1989 (direction to authority, where care or supervision order may be appropriate, to investigate child’s circumstances); and “family relationship” has the same meaning for the purposes of this sub-paragraph as it has for the purposes of paragraph 10.’.
Amendment 99, page 105, line 42, leave out ‘to a child’.
Amendment 100, page 105, line 43, leave out first ‘the’ and insert ‘a’.
Amendment 101, page 106, line 1 , leave out first ‘the’ and insert ‘a’.
Amendment 102, page 106, line 3 , leave out first ‘the’ and insert ‘a’.
Amendment 83, page 108, line 44 , leave out sub-paragraphs (5), (6) and (7).
Government amendments 55 to 59.
Amendment 113, page 112, line 5 , at end insert—
‘Immigration: victims of domestic violence and indefinite leave to remain
24A (1) Civil legal services provided to an individual (“I”) in relation to an application by the individual for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom or a claim by the individual to a right to reside in the United Kingdom, on the grounds that—
(a) I was given leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for a limited period as the partner of another individual present and settled in the United Kingdom, or had the right to reside in the United Kingdom as the partner of another individual, and
(b) I’s relationship with the other individual broke down permanently as a result of the abuse of I by an associated person.
General exclusions
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) is subject to the exclusions in Parts 2 and 3 of this Schedule.
Specific exclusions
(3) The services described in sub-paragraph (1) do not include attendance at an interview conducted on behalf of the Secretary of State with a view to reaching a decision on an application.
Definitions
(4) For the purposes of this paragraph, one individual is a partner of another if—
(a) they are married to each other,
(b) they are civil partners of each other, or
(c) they are cohabitants.
(5) In this paragraph—
“abuse” means any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality.
“associated person”, in relation to an individual, means a person who is associated with the individual within the meaning of section 62 of the Family Law Act 1996;
“cohabitant” has the same meaning as in Part 4 of the Family Law Act 1996 (see section 62 of that Act);
“indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom” means leave to remain in the United Kingdom under the Immigration Act 1971 which is not limited as to duration;
“present and settled in the United Kingdom” has the same meaning as in the rules made under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971;
“right to reside” means a right of residence established under Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC.’.
Government amendments 60 and 61.
Amendment 145, page 112, line 11, at end insert—
‘(1A) Civil legal services provided to an individual for a matter arising out of any rule laid down under section 1(4) of the Immigration Act 1971 making provision for family members to enter or remain in the United Kingdom as the family member of a refugee or beneficiary of humanitarian protection.’.
Government amendments 62, 13, 14, 63, and 15 to 18.
Amendment 103, page 7, line 35, at end insert—
‘(7) But the Director must determine that an individual qualifies for civil legal services where the services relate to a matter falling within paragraph 10 of Schedule 1 and—
(a) the individual has been admitted to a refuge for persons suffering from domestic abuse;
(b) the individual has obtained medical or other professional services relating to the consequences of domestic abuse, or
(c) an assessment for the purpose of possible mediation of a family dispute has concluded that the parties need not engage in mediation as a result of domestic abuse,
and in this subsection “domestic abuse” means abuse of the kind to which paragraph 10(1) of Schedule 1 relates’.