Ukraine and Georgia

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Wednesday 15th May 2024 Commons Chamber

[Leo Docherty]

Very soon.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

As chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Georgia, I have watched the demonstrations in Tbilisi with no little concern. Although I have noticed no new movement of Georgia towards Russia, as some have been suggesting—whether culturally, economically or militarily—it would appear that the current Georgian Dream Government are becoming more ready to use the apparatus of the state to suppress political dissent, free speech and the media, sometimes with violence. Will my hon. Friend impress on his Georgian counterpart, as an ally and a friend, that this is not how democratic countries behave if they wish to join western institutions and participate as a free democratic values country?

[Leo Docherty]

My hon. Friend is correct: Georgia must live up to the standard required if it is to be sincere about its democratic aspirations, and we do make that point to our friends in Georgia.

Ukraine

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Tuesday 28th November 2023 Commons Chamber

[James Heappey]

I must be careful not to stray into intelligence matters but my sense is that it would be overoptimistic to think that raised tensions in the middle east might lead to a reduction in Iranian support for Russia; I think that support is now well embedded. On the other side of the formula, as the hon. Gentleman implied in the first part of his question there is of course a concern that the wider donor community might be distracted by what is going on in the middle east, and it is important to take moments like this to reassure Ukrainians and remind friends and partners around the world that we must remain steadfast in our support of Ukraine even while we all work together to deter escalation in the middle east.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Effective military support to Ukraine is more than just about providing weapons; it is also about stopping Russia producing and getting its own weapons. The right hon. Member for Exeter (Mr Bradshaw) asked about this in relation to Turkey but I would broaden the question: is the Minister aware of western technology being sourced by Russia and does he think we are doing enough to stop it?

[James Heappey]

I am certainly aware that there was an alarming level of content from the west in a number of Russian systems that were compromised in the early part of the war. That leads to two further points. First, there is the reassurance that if we are constraining our supply chain to Russia—which the sanctions regime largely is, albeit not completely and we need to work on that—its capacity to develop complex weapons is diminished. Secondly, that also suggests that Russian industry does not have the ability to do these things itself.

Ukraine

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Monday 14th November 2022 Commons Chamber

[James Heappey]

Sometimes interventions take us in a direction we do not want to go, but the hon. Lady could almost see my notes and that is exactly where we go next.

That is why, in addition to providing Ukraine with vital weapons capabilities, the UK has committed £22 million to support Ukraine’s energy sector. That includes a £10 million fund for emergency infrastructure repairs and to reconnect households to power. It also includes £7 million for more than 850 generators, which is enough to power the equivalent of about 8,000 homes and will support essential services, including relief centres, hospitals, phone masts and water pumping stations. Approximately 320 have been delivered to Ukraine so far, with the rest to be delivered over the coming weeks and months. Finally, that funding provides a further £5 million for civil nuclear safety and security equipment. The attacks on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant continue to be a cause for major concern. We support the calls of the International Atomic Energy Agency for a nuclear safety and security protection zone around the plant, including its reactors, nuclear waste, spent fuel pools, and energy and cooling systems. The shelling and military activities near the plant must end.

Of course, there are wider ramifications to Putin’s brutal incursion. His decision to use food as a weapon of war has had a global impact, exacerbating economic fragility and food insecurity. Ukraine was one of the world’s largest exporters of grain, meeting the needs of hundreds of millions of people. At least 25 African countries import a third of their wheat from Russia and Ukraine. All this underlines the significance of maintaining the Black sea grain deal initiative. Since 1 August, it has ensured ships laden with grain have safe passage through the maritime corridor to the ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi. Several weeks ago, Russia capriciously pulled out of the agreement, citing so-called concerns over the safety of ships in the Black sea. I am glad that Russia has now seen sense and resumed its participation in the joint co-ordination centre. I want, in particular, to applaud Turkey and the United Nations Secretary-General for their efforts in brokering that agreement and ensuring its implementation.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Can the responsibility for the grain getting through actually be put down to Turkey’s efforts? Is Turkey still going to be helping us and standing firm on that very important issue?

[James Heappey]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right and I believe he may have been on the ground recently to have some of these discussions himself. Turkey is indispensable to the negotiations that need to be conducted to keep grain flowing, and we are very grateful to it for the role it is playing.

As temperatures drop, Putin apparently believes he can chip away at western resolve by forcing up food and energy prices. Our task is to prove him wrong. There are signs that, far from weakening the mood of the international community, it is hardening. Back in March, 141 states condemned Russia at the UN General Assembly; at last month’s UNGA, that number rose to 143, or three quarters of the entire UN. Russia’s four supporters were Syria, Belarus, Nicaragua and North Korea—with friends like that, Madam Deputy Speaker. The reality for Russians is that they have become pariahs, isolated from the community of nations and unable even to be elected to UN bodies such as the Committee on Non-Governmental Organisations, UN Women and UNICEF boards.

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[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

As we rejoice at the liberation of Kherson, we need to be mindful that Ukraine is still very much a country at war. As Russian Federation tanks rolled across the border on to sovereign Ukrainian territory on 24 February, the world bore witness to an attack against the post-second world war settlement of a magnitude and kind without precedent.

I congratulate the Government on the superb and consistent support the UK has provided to Ukraine, but the situation constantly changes and I believe we now need a rethink on sanctions. I frequently hear people, including UK Ministers, say that this is Putin’s war, not that of the Russian people, thereby laying the blame for an entire nation’s aggression at the feet of one man. This aggression, we must not forget, seeks to erase Ukraine from the map, destroy its culture, and turn back the clock to a period when the Russo-centric Soviet Union dominated eastern Europe and its peoples. Having had the opportunity to visit Ukraine, most recently in September, and speak with some of the brave men and women valiantly defending their homeland, the notion that this is solely Putin’s war is one that I reject. Of course, western-induced regime change within the Russian Federation is not a sound basis for the United Kingdom’s foreign policy, but even if it were I do not believe, as is mooted by some, that new leadership in Moscow would necessarily bring the war to an end. In fact, I believe that the opposite is possible: a new leader trying to burnish their nationalistic credentials by taking even greater destructive and indiscriminate military action. No Putin does not necessarily equate to no war.

[Liam Byrne]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for giving way and it was a pleasure to be with him in Kyiv earlier this year. He is making an incredibly important point, because sometimes we hear our allies say, “We have to make sure that Putin cannot do this again.” Actually, that is the wrong analysis. We have to make sure that Russia cannot do this again.

[Mr Djanogly]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right, and I will try to prove that point further.

Many of those in leadership roles surrounding the current Russian President, such as the Chechnya leader, Kadyrov—who suggested using a tactical nuclear weapon against Ukraine—espouse rigid nationalist views. They should not, and cannot, be absolved from blame for the invasion, as the term Putin’s war may allow. It is also important to highlight that many towns in reoccupied Ukraine now have unmarked graves resulting from murders perpetrated by members of the Russian armed forces: the Bucha massacre is a poignant example that we all have a duty to remember and reflect on. Reports are also rife of mass rapes, looting, torture, removal of children and confiscation of vital food stuffs—again, all deeds done by soldiers and administrators of the occupying power. It is clear to me that many people of the Russian Federation are up to their necks in heinous crimes committed during the ongoing war against the Ukrainian people, and the individual perpetrators must bear full responsibility and be prosecuted.

A case against those actively engaged in the invasion is clear, but what about the wider Russian people themselves? The problem is that by using the term Putin’s war, it is possible to excuse, overlook or ignore that the war, in all its gore and injustice, remains very popular among most of the Russian population. It is not just Putin, his cronies and his oligarchs. Some Russians, a small minority, have laudably taken a stand, memorably and notably Marina Ovsyannikova, who staged an on-air protest in March denouncing the war. Such defiance has, however, been more of an exception than the rule. Indeed, polling from within the Russian Federation continues to indicate strong support of over 70% for both the war and Putin among the populace.

[Bob Seely]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech, as ever. The extent to which the Russians support the war is a complex issue. He is not wrong to say that it is still very popular, but I just wonder if there is a slightly more generous way of putting it. There is a hard core against—very brave people, as he has outlined. There is a hard core for—the military bloggers and the nationalist community, who are becoming increasingly concerned. But in the last 20 years, because of the amount of propaganda in Russian society, most Russians know to avoid politics as an issue; they let the people in power get on with things. Does he accept the point that, rather than the war being popular, the agnosticism towards politics means that it is kept away from as a subject?

[Mr Djanogly]

I accept that it is a subject we could go into in some degree, but I would make the point that of those Russians who have been leaving Russia and going to places like Armenia, Georgia or the more than 250,000 who have gone to Turkey, it is by no means proven that they are anti-Putin. In fact, a lot of research says they are going to those countries because either they want to pursue their business activities, which sanctions prevent, or they do not want to be called up on the reserve list, not because they do not like President Putin.

What I am suggesting is that at some point citizens and leaders need to take collective responsibility for the actions of the state and the armed forces that operate in their name. For Russians, I would argue that that time has long passed. If we agree that there should be collective responsibility, we can make the moral case for collective sanctions—economic and travel. Travel restrictions, like those implemented by six EU states, are a more practical way of reinforcing the message of collective responsibility than economic sanctions, which mainly apply only to wealthier people.

As the situation stands, at the end of the war, whenever that may be or indeed before, assets that have been frozen, across the west and other areas of the globe, will be reclaimed by their owners, including here in the United Kingdom. The public, including many constituents in Huntingdon who I have corresponded with about the situation in Ukraine, naturally assume that a frozen superyacht owned by a sanctioned individual will be sold, with the proceeds used for reconstruction. We are talking about some £18 billion of frozen assets, not including real estate, in the UK alone. That is not, alas, currently the case. If the situation is not remedied, an embarrassing political situation, not to mention a morally dubious one, beckons.

Ministers should be prepared to consider, working with our allies, how frozen assets can be legally seized, sold and the revenue put to work for Ukraine’s rebuilding. The World Bank’s assessment made in September is that Ukraine will need $349 billion for recovery and reconstruction. It is worth saying that it is not just a question of law changes, but adopting a more aggressive attitude within the existing system. For instance, when the FBI boarded Mr Kerimov’s yacht Amadea in Fiji, it looks like the United States used the oligarch’s maintenance of the yacht as a criminal breach of sanctions, thereby allowing confiscation. We could and should be more assertive than we are.

As for possible law changes to facilitate confiscation, the first is a revisiting of the Trading with the Enemy Act 1939. During the second world war, that Act allowed the Government of the day to confiscate assets owned by residents of enemy countries in British territories. It focuses squarely on the assets of any person or organisation of countries with which the United Kingdom is at war. Thankfully, there has not been much cause to review it since 1945. An amendment to the definition of war, however, could provide a valuable basis for considering how Russian assets could be seized for the benefit of Ukraine and its reconstruction.

Secondly, Canada’s Budget Implementation Act 2022, which was passed in June, includes amendments that allow for the forfeiture of property that is subject to a seizure or restraint order under the Special Economic Measures Act 1992 and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law) 2017. That is done under both regimes using forfeiture orders, allowing the relevant Canadian Government Minister to apply to a court to forfeit assets that have already been seized or frozen. A number of safeguards are rightly built into the legislation. For instance, any person who appears to have an interest in the property may be heard by the relevant court.

A further possible avenue that I wish to highlight is one proposed by the Washington DC-based New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, which formulated a multilateral action model on reparations. In the model, the institute draws 13 convincing conclusions that lay the basis for an international, effective and legal reparations and compensation scheme. The model builds on the relatively recent and practical example of the Kuwait compensation fund, which, together with the UN compensation commission, paid some $52 billion in compensation to 1.5 million claimants over 30 years following the Iraqi invasion in 1990. The establishment of the fund and commission was possible only due to the agreement of those nations with a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Unfortunately, as Russia is an aggressor in the case of Ukraine, that exact road map cannot be followed. The institute therefore makes the argument for working through the UN General Assembly rather than the Security Council.

The avenues that I have highlighted are but a number that are worthy of wider consideration—there are others. It is crucial, however, that the conversation surrounding compensation and reparations now begins in earnest, because just to continue saying, “This is only Putin’s war” is no longer relevant or morally sustainable.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

I call the Scottish National party spokesman, Martin Docherty-Hughes.

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[Liam Byrne (Birmingham, Hodge Hill) (Lab)]

It is a great privilege to follow such remarkable contributions. It has been especially heart-warming to hear from Members who have talked about the people sponsoring Ukrainian refugees, because not just across this House but across this country, there is a shared sense that the brave men and women of Ukraine’s armed forces are fighting for freedom and to ensure that our values do not perish on the continent of Europe.

As we heard in the American elections, there are those who are beginning to argue that, now advances are being made and now Ukraine has recaptured about half the territory taken by the Russian invaders, it is somehow time to let up, to sue for peace and to question whether we are supplying too much to Ukraine’s armed forces. Those voices must be shut down as quickly as possible. Now that Ukraine’s armed forces are on the west bank of the Dnieper river, it is possible for them to begin targeting the supply lines into Crimea, which means Crimea suddenly comes into the crosshairs. It is now possible for us to think realistically about a battle of the Black sea in the months ahead.

I offer three thoughts to this debate—one about the military options and two about the political options—and I would be grateful if the Minister took them into account in his winding-up speech.

First, as former general Ben Hodges argued at the weekend, it is now possible for Ukrainian forces not simply to hit the lines of control into Ukraine with HIMARS from the west bank of the Dnieper river but, if we gave them longer-range ATACMS missiles, to extend the ambit of those fires into the Black sea. That would allow attacks on Russian navy assets, from which, let us not forget, Russia has been firing Kalibr cruise missiles at Ukraine’s water and electricity infrastructure, which is putting the pressure on morale that we have heard about this evening.

Hitherto, America and, I believe, NATO have said those longer-range fires are off the table. We have heard from the Americans that ATACMS missiles, because they have a range of 300 km and could be fired directly into Russia, will not be supplied to Ukrainian armed forces. We are therefore not equipping the Ukrainian armed forces with the full capabilities we have to offer.

Given the threat we know is coming from Russia, and given the threat we know is posed by the Russian navy in the Black sea, surely now is the time to take away that red line and make a much wider supply of weaponry available to Ukraine’s armed forces, so they can begin to double down on the advantage their courage has bought them with so much blood and treasure over the last few months.

Secondly, it is about not just projectiles but politics. There is a lesson to be learned from the way in which we brought Milošević to the negotiating table during the last Yugoslav war. It was very simple: we stated in terms that there would be an almost infinite supply of weapons to back the forces of goodness until he signed up to certain terms and came to the negotiating table. At that point, he knew there was no escape and that the bombardment would continue until he folded his cards. Sure enough, he folded his cards and came to the table, and the Dayton accords followed. Surely that is a lesson we should learn. Surely now is the time when we do not just say that Putin must leave, Russia must fail and Ukraine must prevail. Surely now is the time when we set out in terms the conditions that we are determined to see met and that, until they are met, there will be an infinite supply of weapons from us, as the arsenal of hope in this great conflict.

Those terms are very simple. First, wide blue safe skies across 100% of Ukraine. Secondly, 100% decolonisation of Russian forces from the territory of Ukraine, on 1991 borders—Russia must be removed from every inch of Ukrainian land. Thirdly, we must prosecute Russia for the crime of aggression. There are precedents for this in international law. We know how to do it, the case is very clear and we should make it very clear to Putin that the prosecution will now come. Fourthly, we should be prosecuting individuals for the war crimes of which they are guilty, not just in Bucha but across the black and blood-fouled earth of the territory that Russia has invaded. Finally, we must ensure there is a full exchange of prisoners, and a full repatriation of the up to 2 million people who the Russians moved from their homeland to various parts of Russia.

We know those are the five basic demands of Ukraine’s leaders, because many of us were in the presidential palace in Kyiv to hear them from President Zelensky. I do not understand why the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence and perhaps even the Prime Minister cannot set out that there will be an infinite resupply of weapons until these terms are met. I do not understand why we are not making that crystal clear to President Putin, to the people around him and to the men and women of the Russian army, who are already fairly mutinous. We must make it clear that we are not going away, we are not backtracking, we are not retreating and we are there with the Ukrainian people and their armed forces until every one of those five objectives is met.

The final thing we should be doing is increasing the political pressure on Putin and those around him. I agree with 100% of what the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) said this evening, but I would go further. We need to ask ourselves in this House today: why are we not proscribing the United party of Russia as a terrorist organisation? Are we seriously saying, here in this House, that that party is somehow better, cleaner than Hamas, Hezbollah or the Basque separatist organisation ETA? Those are all “political organisations”, be that with a capital “P” or a lower case “p”, and we proscribe them for the terrorist organisations that they are. So why are we not taking the United party of Russia through that process and why are we not challenging every member of that party to leave it and leave it now?

[Mr Djanogly]

I totally agree with what the right hon. Gentleman is saying. I believe the Prime Minister referred to Russia as a “rogue state” today or yesterday, and one would have thought that the consequence of that would be exactly what the right hon. Gentleman is saying.

[Liam Byrne]

One absolutely would have thought that, because there is no excuse not to think that. When we put the point to the Foreign Secretary when he came before the Foreign Affairs Committee this afternoon, he did not take it off the table, but nor did he give the Committee a timetable for that action. The hon. Gentleman is right, because not only should we be proscribing the United party of Russia for the terrorist organisation it is, but we should be designating Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism. That is an appellation we have plonked on the Government and state of Iran since, I believe, the early 1990s. We knew even before the invasion of Ukraine that there was a good case for this, because Russia is a sanctuary for the Russian Imperial Movement, which is designated by the United States as a terrorist organisation. Russia has been providing a safe harbour for that designated terrorist organisation for some years, so why are we not going to commence now the business of designating Russia as a terrorist state sponsor?

That has all kinds of implications, not least one of the suggestions that I think the hon. Gentleman was aiming at, which is to begin banning tourist visas for those from Russia immediately. There will always be people in this House who say, “We can’t go to war with the Russian people. We have to accept that there are good people among those tourists.” I hear all of that, but if we are serious about making sure that Russia is not able to do this again, we have to make it clear to the Russian people the way in which we see the sins of their nation and make it crystal clear that they must act within their country to deliver a different kind of leadership in the years to come.

The final piece of the puzzle, of course, is sanctions, and I hope that we will be able to have a longer debate about that when the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill comes back for its Report stage. It is ludicrous that the $45 million yacht, Phi, which the Minister and his colleagues have frozen, is down the road in St Katharine docks as yet unseized. We heard today that Mr Abramovich’s money from the sale of his football club has still not made it to Ukraine to begin with the reconstruction. When are these things going to happen? It is time that we do not simply freeze assets, but start seizing them and rechannelling the money into supplying Ukraine and its reconstruction.

Let me finish with a simple message: we in this homeland of Europe learnt something a long time ago in international relations from the approach the Athenians took to the poor Melians. They were the people confronted several thousand years ago with the message that might somehow makes right. That is not something we subscribe to in this country. This is a country that stands up to bullies and when we see others, like-minded souls, standing up to bullies such as Putin, our job is to back them every inch of the way.

Ukraine

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Tuesday 11th October 2022 Commons Chamber

[Alec Shelbrooke]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for the intent of her questions. I have not had those discussions—obviously, I am early in the role—but I will take those comments back to other Ministers. Overall, that question goes to allies and the international community—it is not just about our approach, because it is not just this country seizing assets and sanctioning, and it is not just this country that will be involved in taking things forward with the ICC. I cannot answer her questions specifically, but I am sure that colleagues have heard her and, if she would like to write to me with more details, I would be happy to respond.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

As Russia loses on the battlefield, it seems to be engaging in retribution through missile attacks on civilian areas. When the all-party parliamentary group on Ukraine recently went to Kyiv, the Defence Minister said to us that if refugees are to be encouraged to move back to Ukraine and internally displaced persons are to be encouraged to move back to reoccupied areas, defence against missile attack will become essential. Other countries are looking at that seriously and providing anti-missile support. Will we do so as well?

[Alec Shelbrooke]

Indeed, and we are already supplying levels of air support. What I said earlier remains relevant: we will continue to work with the Ukrainians to try to deliver what they need to defend their country. We are already supplying air defence systems.

Ukraine

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Thursday 22nd September 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Ind)]

I also pay tribute to our armed forces, and their contribution to the incredible events that we saw play out on television over the past few days. It was no easy feat, and we can salute all our armed forces, but particularly those pallbearers who did such a magnificent job. I believe that a worthy way to immortalise Queen Elizabeth and what she did for our country as our longest-serving monarch would be to rename one of our bank holidays to Elizabeth day. That debate is for another day, but I hope we can return to it.

It is an honour to follow the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson). He and I did not see eye to eye on everything, but in the case of Ukraine, I hope he recognises that I have always supported what he has done, and indeed, the nation can be proud of it. As I have seen on all my visits to Ukraine, the work Britain has done in stepping forward, more so than many other NATO nations, is recognised. Thanks are due to my right hon. Friend for leading that charge.

I want to step back from what is happening in Ukraine for a second and look at the bigger picture. We must ask ourselves a fundamental question, one that I pose on a regular basis: is our world likely to become more or less dangerous over the next few years? I think the answer is very clear: it is the former. This is not just about Ukraine, but a worrying growth in authoritarianism versus democracy across the globe, and the emergence of a new alliance—one that is not so obvious yet—between Russia and China. They share a mutual disdain for not only our international rules-based order, but for the west and the United States in particular. They are challenging the status quo that we have enjoyed since the end of the cold war. We have enjoyed that relative peace for three decades, but we have become complacent in nurturing our democratic values, and authoritarian states are becoming bolder and more assertive in promoting their own agenda. Consequently, our world is becoming more siloed and more protectionist, and we have become more risk averse.

Our actions now—what we do and how we handle Ukraine, given that the conflict is now moving into a darker chapter—will determine how the next decade plays out. China is watching our response carefully, given that it has its sights on Taiwan. Seven months on from Putin’s unprovoked invasion, the west is, I think, starting to wake up to the reality that state-on-state aggression is back, but our institutions built to constrain rogue actors are vulnerable, and new technology has given autocrats new forms of leverage. The art of conflict itself is consequently changing, with not just cyber-attacks, as mentioned already, but economic attacks, including the unprecedented use of international sanctions. All those things have global consequences for the way we do business.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Do we therefore need to look again at what constitutes going to war, not least because we can now destroy other societies without a single bullet being fired—through the use of cyber, for instance?

[Mr Ellwood]

This is moving into the area of Clausewitz and what exactly war is—whether it is simply the military on the battlefield, or the politics and the economics. We have not really woken up to that, but Putin is using politics and economics to harm the rest of Europe with oil and gas, as well as grain. There is an irony here: we will have a debate in this place tomorrow, as we absolutely should, about supporting people through the cost of energy crisis we are facing here, but many of our problems are actually in Europe. Sorting those out would be a huge step towards dealing with some of the local problems we are facing.

We need to work more collectively and be less risk averse. We get spooked by some of the rhetoric that comes from Putin, and he has done it again by wanting to go down this avenue of using nuclear weapons. As has been touched on before, Russian doctrine includes the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and we need to understand that doctrine. The Minister refused to answer the question of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith)—others are saying, “Quite right.”



We need clarity on what our doctrine is because it needs to be confirmed with our allies as well. We could cross a threshold here and we would not necessarily know what to do. I am afraid that Putin has taken advantage of our risk-averseness and of the fact that we have put red lines in, such as over chemical weapons in Syria, and then not responded. People can shake their heads as much as they like. This is an awkward conversation that needs to be had as to what Britain, NATO and the United States will do if a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon is used in the Donbas region. I pose that as a question. We can take it behind the scenes and not discuss it, and then it will actually happen and we will look at each other and say, “What do we actually do?”

Russia needs to know that we are willing to stand up to what Putin is doing, otherwise he will continue, as will other adversaries, to take advantage of our collective weakness. We have done well to provide the weapons systems to Ukraine to advance it in what it is doing. We now need to take it further and leverage that ability to push forward, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip said, to make sure that we can conclude what goes on in Ukraine. If we do not put out this fire in Ukraine, it will spread elsewhere.

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[Dr Liam Fox (North Somerset) (Con)]

A number of colleagues on both sides of the House have talked about the seven months of this conflict. In truth, it is part of a much longer strategic conflict between Putin and Ukraine. From 2007, when Putin set out his worldview at the Munich security conference, we have known roughly where he was likely to go. From his interference in Ukraine in 2004 through the 2008 invasion of Georgia and the illegal annexation of Crimea, it is all part of a continuum of behaviour that I am afraid we have for too long overlooked because it did not suit us to take a realistic view.

This time, however, as the former Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson), rightly said, Putin’s aims have completely, clearly and explicitly failed. Those aims, let us remember, were to remove President Zelensky, install a puppet Government, defeat the Ukrainian armed forces and effectively destroy Ukraine as a functioning state.

As a consequence, Putin faces mounting criticism at home and abroad. Yesterday alone we saw 1,300 arrests in Moscow, and we should give our support to those willing to make that protest for their moral courage in doing so. We have even seen Moskovskij Komsomolets, the normally placid news outlet in Russia, criticising what it called the “underestimation of the enemy”, stating that Russia had suffered a defeat and was minimising losses by withdrawing—not the sort of comments we expect to see from that particular organ of the state.

The criticism from outside has not been confined to the free world. Prime Minister Modi made clear last week to Putin that this

“is not an era for war”.

Even the Russians had to admit that the Chinese had disquiet about what was happening in Ukraine, and little wonder, because it has brought about a much more united west and a new focus on areas such as Taiwan, which the Chinese have certainly not welcomed.

The net result all of that for Putin is that he is cornered, but that is by no means a cause for celebration in the west. As my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) wrote this week in a very good article in The Spectator—I commend it to all Members—Putin makes threats to frighten us, but to minimise the chance of the use of a tactical or strategic nuclear weapon,

“we need to assume that the threat is real”.

It may be sabre-rattling, but it may not be. We have miscalculated with Putin before; we cannot afford to miscalculate again. He is a tyrant with a tyrant’s behaviour: paranoid, petulant and progressively more extreme. He will throw more and more Russian lives into the fire without hesitation, as so many of his predecessors did.

[Mr Djanogly]

On the question of calling up the reserves, does my right hon. Friend think that Putin may now be over-extending his support with the Russian people?

[Dr Fox]

He may be, but we would be foolish to assume so. Public opinion, even in places such as Russia, under a regime such as Putin’s, can turn. Yes, internal forces can produce a change in the personnel and the nature of a Government, but that can take a long time to happen—if ever—and we should not calculate based on that coming through, as many lives may be lost in the interim.

As many Members have said, we must continue to support Ukraine, its Government and its people with moral and political support, as the Prime Minister set out in New York; to provide weapons to Ukraine, at whatever cost, as long as they are required; and to maintain our united front with other allied nations in the free world, especially in our efforts to stop Russia’s war machine being funded through the sale of fossil fuels.

While we deal with the Ukraine war, we must continue to focus on other threats that are being posed around that region. We do not have the luxury in security and foreign policy to choose to focus on one conflict alone, and I will briefly point to two other conflicts. The first is in the Balkans, where Russia and China have been heavily arming Serbia, and where the very real threat of renewed conflict—with all the horrors of the ethnic wars that we saw there before—is something that we must be alive to. The second example is the involvement of Iran, which has supplied weapons, drones and political support to Russia at a time when few other countries have been willing to do so, and is trying to develop its own nuclear weapon. As we have discussed in the debate, we have seen what nuclear blackmail can look like. Does anyone seriously believe that the world would be a safer place were Iran to become a nuclear weapon state, or that, were Iran able to, it would disrupt fossil fuel supplies any less than Russia?

The common thread running through much of this is that we have collectively allowed wishful thinking to replace critical analysis on far too many occasions. The safety of our world requires us to do much better in future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I, too, was very pleased to join the all-party trip to Kyiv a week ago. It will soon be represented in my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

If a deal involving peace for land had ever been possible, it is clear now that Ukrainians will not start to negotiate until all their land is free from Russia—and that includes Donbas and Crimea. That was the firm view of every politician, soldier and citizen I had the opportunity to meet in Ukraine. One can see why, as the vile outcome of Russian occupation is revealed in territory retaken by the heroic actions of the Ukrainian military. Sadly, the horrors of Bucha are not an isolated horrific incident. Indeed, it is becoming clear that looting, torture, murder, rape and intimidation is standard practice for the Russian occupiers. Horribly, Russia has deported tens of thousands of Ukrainian children, including 2,300 orphans to Russia. These crimes must never be forgotten or overlooked. I was very pleased to hear how UK prosecutors have been helping local agencies with evidence collection and advice.

This war is about more than just helping a freedom-loving people fight against a bullying aggressor. As others have said, Russian aggression has been used time and time again under Putin, right from the invasion of Georgia in 2008. There is nothing to show that unless stopped Russia would stop at Ukraine. To that extent Ukrainians are also fighting the war on behalf of all of us who refuse to accept a Europe where barbarity and violence call the shots. With that in mind, we should now consider Russia a state sponsor of terrorism and, as such, it would be equitable for frozen Russian state and state-linked assets, including frozen sanctioned individual assets, to be seized for payment to Ukraine for its reconstruction. That would require legislation similar to that passed by Canada in June.

[John Howell (Henley) (Con)]

Is my hon. Friend aware that we have just heard the news that a young woman was killed in Moscow by the Russian police for participating in anti-war demonstrations? Will he condemn that?

[Mr Djanogly]

I certainly will condemn that and the many other deaths in Russia that we are hearing about all the time.

The question recently came up as to whether individual oligarchs should be able to buy their way out of sanctions. I am doubtful that that could work without the international sanctions system being holed under the water line. However, if any deal is considered, it has to be co-ordinated and approved by Ukraine, not just the sanctioning country, and the restitution money involved should go to Ukraine. In that way, any decisions on the release of assets would be properly co-ordinated.

Over recent months, there have been many pictures of Russian tourists swanning around Europe as though nothing was happening in Ukraine. That should stop and we should now ban Russian visas to the UK other than for exceptional circumstances. Certainly, at the very least, we should not allow into the UK any member of Putin’s United Russia party. Sanctions are a slow-burn approach, but they are increasingly effective. However, there are so-called holes in the bucket—Turkey comes to mind and there are others. Will the Minister advise what efforts are being made to isolate such countries?

Battlefield victories are accentuating the size of the challenges yet to be faced. First, militarily speaking, Russia still maintains a powerful and vicious threat. Putin is an unpredictable enemy who is wounded and concerned to protect his Crimea legacy to Russia. He may yet become even less principled over civilian rights. Indeed, only yesterday he upped the ante by calling up Russia’s reserves.

Secondly, retaking occupied territory is one thing but holding it is another. Police, courts, schools and civil society all have to be re-established. War crimes and collaborators have to be prosecuted. Infrastructure has to be rebuilt. The cost and administrative challenges involved are enormous and urgent.

Thirdly, the military requirements are changing. In the early days of the war, basic equipment for soldiers and defensive weapons, such as anti-tank missiles, were the priority. Then, longer-range artillery to break down Russian defences was—and still is—required to enable offensive operations. Following reoccupation, the priorities then changed again and the need for anti-missile defence systems is now coming to the fore, as was highlighted very much during our visit.

If Ukraine is to encourage its more than 10 million internally displaced citizens and millions of foreign-based refugees to return to their homes in Ukraine, security from air attack becomes key to restoring confidence. That point was very much reinforced by Russian retaliation against lost ground, taking the cowardly form of missile attacks against civilian targets. Electricity and water infrastructure has already been bombed and the cold winter is approaching.

The challenges are immense, but one thing is for sure and came across very strongly during my time in Kyiv—namely, Ukrainian recognition of British support and the gratitude that was shown by everyone we met. Ukrainians feel that the UK is in this battle with them for the long term, that we were the first to speak up for them in the international community, and that we then backed that up with money, arms and valuable advice. The Government and virtually all Members of all parties in this House are to be commended for their support. History is on our side.

I was left with the strong impression that out of this war, out of this horror and barbarity, will develop an immensely strong and lasting relationship between our two countries. In the meantime, we must redouble our efforts to ensure a speedy victory for Ukraine as soon as possible and enable its restoration towards the modern democratic country that I know it has the potential to be.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

Ukraine: UK and NATO Military Commitment

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Monday 20th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Leo Docherty]

I am confident. A significant increase in money is delivering new capabilities to make our people more lethal, more agile, and more mobile. That body of work has been under way over the past couple of years, and was expressed in the Defence Command Paper published in March 2021. This is nothing new; we have been at this for a couple of years, and rightly so.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I congratulate the Government on the significant matériel now being provided to Ukraine, but what is their current assessment about the possibility of Russia using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine? Will the Minister confirm that plans are in place with our allies to deal with that in the horrific event of their use?

[Leo Docherty]

Of course we consider all scenarios in the Department. We still regard that as a very unlikely possibility, but the Ministry of Defence, like everyone else in defence, is always ready.

Trident: Test Firing

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Monday 23rd January 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon]

These particular demonstration and shakedown operations take place when each of our submarines emerges from a period of long-term maintenance, so they tend to take place every four or five years. It follows from that that there is not likely to be another one in the immediate future, but, as on this occasion, we will, of course, keep interested parties informed. We wrote to the Chair of the Defence Committee, the shadow Defence spokesman and the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

In certain theatres of war, such as Ukraine, Russia has been testing and refining its electronic and cyber-warfare techniques. Although I am not blaming Russia for this incident, will the opportunity now be taken to review the system’s protections against possible electronic counter-measures?

[Sir Michael Fallon]

Yes. I was in Ukraine last week and we discussed this, among other matters. Of course, we are taking very good care to ensure that our deterrent is properly protected against any new technologies that our adversaries might get hold of.

Oral Answers to Questions

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Monday 18th January 2016 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

Let me assure the hon. Gentleman that we will look at any evidence brought forward in open source reporting by other organisations in the assessment we make of each of the strikes in which our aircraft are involved. I have replied directly to one of the organisations he mentions—Airwars—pointing out that there is no particular evidence to back up the assessment it made in that particular case.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend give the House an update on the military and non-military support that is now being provided to opposition fighters in Syria?

[Michael Fallon]

Along with other countries, we have been supplying non-lethal equipment to those fighters and we played a part in the initial training programme that was organised by the United States, and we remain ready to do so. In addition, we are working with those groups on a route to a political settlement in the talks that are now under way under the so-called Vienna process.