European Union (Withdrawal) Act

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Wednesday 9th January 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

If the referendum were rerun today, everything that I have seen over the last two years—not least as a member of the Brexit Select Committee—would still lead me to vote to stay within the European Union. Having said that, I do respect the result of the referendum as a valid expression of the will of the people, but to me this means leaving the EU in a way that secures the best economic deal available with the EU and that maximises the potential for retaining the close cultural, educational, justice and security relationships that we have developed with our closest partners and allies. The referendum was “in or out”, but it did not, as some wrongly insist, dictate the terms of our leaving, nor the terms of our future relationship with the EU once out. Both of those questions were left for Parliament to resolve, and that is what MPs must now do. It is for this primary reason that I would oppose a second referendum, which would be indeterminate, complicated to implement and very divisive.

[Angus Brendan MacNeil]

The hon. Gentleman will probably be aware that the Prime Minister spoke to 200 MPs in one of the rooms in Portcullis House last night. Again, she ruled out a second referendum, but she said that if the deal does not get through, there are two options left: a no-deal Brexit or no Brexit at all with the revocation of article 50. Businesses up and down the country are going to have to start thinking about how they react once the deal is voted down. Will the hon. Gentleman venture his view on what he would do in that scenario?

[Mr Djanogly]

I was at that meeting, which I thought was a good expression of joint interests from all parties to the Prime Minister. I hope that we saw within that meeting the start of what could become a consensus, moving forward after what might be a defeat next week. Having said that, I do not discount a second referendum, as the Prime Minister did not. I am simply saying that I think it would be a very poor second best and a sign that this place had failed, but I do not dismiss the possibility.

As for the Prime Minister’s deal, on balance I find it to be a fair one and practical in the overall circumstances of the hand that we had to play; it has my support. To criticise the deal as not being as good as what we have with the EU now is a facile argument, if only because the EU was never, ever going to allow us to leave on the same or better terms than apply to the remaining 27 countries, no matter how many German cars we bought. The deal was always going to have to represent a compromise of views within the Conservative party, within Parliament and certainly with the EU. The deal reached does not represent my optimum position, but no one was ever going to get everything they wanted.

That is not to say that I do not share some of the criticisms of the deal, including many that can be found in the Brexit Committee’s report on the deal. For instance, despite assurances from two Secretaries of State, the financial settlement has not been included in the withdrawal agreement as being wholly or even partially conditional on securing a binding future relationship. To my mind, this has been a failure of negotiation that will undoubtedly reduce our leverage in future relationship negotiations due to start in March 2019 if we have a deal. Furthermore, the lack of detail in the future relationship political declaration means that there will still be another cliff edge as we reach July 2020, when we will need to decide either to head towards the backstop or to extend the implementation period, and there will still be a level of uncertainty for business as to the final form of the deal, although much less so than if we crash out with no deal.

So, on balance, we should take the deal on offer. The mess and upset that would be caused by a hard Brexit is unacceptable. Yes, the legalities can be brought to the fore on things like the backstop, but the legal cart should not be leading the commercial horse.

[Norman Lamb (North Norfolk) (LD)]

I suspect that the hon. Gentleman might agree with me that the deal is very different from what people were promised during the referendum by those leading the Brexit campaign. If he does agree, is there not a case for thinking that it is undemocratic not to allow the people to have a say now, given that what is on offer is so different from what they were promised?

[Mr Djanogly]

I would not argue with the right hon. Gentleman about promises being made during the referendum campaign that could now be disputed, but the same could be said for a lot of general elections that we have had in the past. To say that elections or referendums are discounted because of what people maintained during the course of them would not, I am afraid, be a line that I would take.

Furthermore, if the deal is rejected by this House, from my point of view I will do everything I can to ensure that we do not leave the EU without a deal, and, to my mind, the next best thing after the Prime Minister’s option would be the Norway-plus alternative. If the Government’s deal fails to pass this House, and assuming that the Opposition’s no-confidence motion fails, I hope that we shall then start to find a new tone of cross-party working. We shall need a degree more honesty in how we describe Brexit issues, where in reality no one is going to win—not us and not the EU. We have the Labour Front Bench changing its position; we have the Brexiteers shouting, “Sell-out”, at every initiative while offering nothing as an alternative; and we have a Government who have frequently made soothing hard Brexit noises to Brexiteers while lining up a deal that clearly has a trajectory of close regulatory alignment to the single market and some form of customs arrangement. I do hope that the Government get their deal, but if not, it will surely be because they have unsuccessfully attempted to be all things to all men.

[Gareth Thomas]

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that if the deal does not pass this House next Tuesday, agreement to extend article 50 will be an urgent priority for the Government to bring forward a measure on?

[Mr Djanogly]

The hon. Gentleman makes a very important point. If the deal is rejected and we start looking at other possibilities—on a more consensual cross-party basis, I hope—then clearly whatever route we take leads to the deadline, and an answer to that may well have to be to extend the article 50 period. I am very pleased, looking back over a year ago now, that some of us in this place decided to ensure that the Government were not able to restrict the timing of the article 50 period, and so that will be a possibility.

Rather than add to the fudge, let me explain why and how, if this deal fails, Members of all parties should coalesce around a Norway-plus option, and why the “plus” element—being in a customs union with the EU—is a good thing. First, most business wants a customs union because it allows free movement of almost half our exports between Union members without tariffs and checks and paperwork. Opponents say that this would stop the UK forging its own trade agreements, but, to my mind, the benefits of the EU customs union are far greater. We must keep in mind that the EU has some 250 FTAs with some 70 countries, and the UK plan is to “roll over” those deals, meaning that, at best, we would have the same—not better—terms as the EU with one third of the world’s countries. There would be no advantage of being outside the EU. That is, of course, assuming that we are able to make those deals happen, which we know is proving somewhat elusive, as the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) explained.

Secondly, the chances of negotiating better FTAs as a country of 50 million, rather than a bloc of 500 million, is realistically and simply not how it normally works. Thirdly, there will be significant costs of going it alone on FTAs, from being forced to take US genetically modified crops to issuing visas to countries, as currently requested by Australia and India. Fourthly, FTAs take a long time to negotiate—an average of seven years.

Fifthly, the claim that Commonwealth countries will prioritise us over the EU is unrealistic, not least considering that the Czech Republic currently has four times the trade with New Zealand than we do and that the Swiss do much more trade with India than we do. Sixthly, “most favoured nation” clauses in our rolled-over EU agreements and the integrated nature of world trade will significantly reduce our ability to get commercial advantage. Finally, high levels of foreign input into our manufactured goods will create huge problems under the so-called rules of origin.

In conclusion, my view is that we shall be better off with a customs union arrangement with the EU, and the deal on offer presents the best opportunity of securing future prosperity for our companies and employment for our people. We should support it.

Leaving the EU: Meaningful Vote

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Monday 22nd October 2018 Commons Chamber

[Dominic Raab]

MPs will have their say in the meaningful vote. They have scrutinised at length every stage of the Brexit process. Of course, it is not for the Government or any Minister to set out which amendments are allowed; that will be for Mr Speaker to decide. We have made it clear that we not only accept but welcome the fact that we will have a substantive motion, and of course that means it should be amendable.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Once the Brexit deal has been secured, how long will it be before we move on to the meaningful vote, keeping in mind that Select Committees, for instance, will want to look at the terms of the deal in order to advise other hon. Members?

[Dominic Raab]

My hon. Friend raises an important point. We obviously want to bring forward the meaningful vote expeditiously, because that will give us proper time for scrutiny of all the legislation, but there must be time for the relevant Select Committees, and indeed every hon. Member of the House, to scrutinise it carefully. We are a little dependent on the time it takes us to negotiate the deal, but I will certainly bear in mind the important point he has made.

EU Withdrawal Agreement: Legislation

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Tuesday 24th July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Dominic Raab]

Yes.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The Government are still maintaining that no deal is preferable to a bad deal. Over the summer, the Secretary of State will be going round the European Union selling the Government’s White Paper policy document, and in that he has my full support. However, if he were to fail, for whatever reason, would he accept the clear evidence that a customs union-based approach is still preferable to no deal?

[Dominic Raab]

I appreciate the way in which my hon. Friend tries to tempt me down that particular path, but I think that it is only right to prepare for all eventualities in relation to the money, to the operational contingency planning that we are doing, and to the legislative steps. Obviously our overriding focus is on getting the best deal, and I shall be spending the weeks and months ahead in Brussels, talking to Michel Barnier and his team, and focusing on that. I shall be out there again on Thursday, looking to achieve the best deal.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Tuesday 12th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Tom Brake]

I say to the Secretary of State that if he goes naked to the negotiating table—flaunting it all—it is because he and his supporters have conducted their ideological warfare on the airwaves and in our newspapers, not because of any votes we may have today.

The Liberal Democrats have tabled amendment (a) to Lords amendment 19, which would provide people with a final say on the deal. It would be an opportunity to test the will of the people, and I do not quite understand why the Government—and, indeed, the Brexiteers—are so scared by the concept of testing the will of the people.

We have heard a lot about the will of the people, and I must say that it is now the only reason the Government can deploy for supporting Brexit. If we look at the economic grounds, we know from the impact assessments that it will do us damage. On the diplomatic grounds, our friends despair at what we are doing. On the security grounds, we hear threats and counter-threats about not delivering on the security agenda. On savings, we know there will not be any because, among other things, the Government will have to set up a whole series of parallel institutions doing exactly the same thing as the EU ones. On trade, do we really think we are going to get a huge boost from trade with Trump as a protectionist President?

Our amendment (a) to Lords amendment 19 would provide the people with an opportunity to have their views known on this subject, against a background in which much has changed since the referendum vote two years ago. It would give them a say on the final deal, which they are entitled to and deserve, and I think that would put this issue to bed once and for all.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The key difference between Lords amendment 19 and Government amendment (a) is that, in the event of a no deal scenario, the Government amendment simply requires a statement, while the Lords amendment in effect grants Parliament a power to issue negotiating directions. On the face of it, it looks attractive to say that if the Government cannot deliver, the Commons should be able to step in, but on these procedural amendments, I can see the other side of the argument.

Governments negotiate treaties, under the terms of the royal prerogative, and Executives govern, and I am not one who would wish to undermine that concept except in the most extreme circumstances. That is what I have been weighing up in recent days. I also recognise that the proposal in Government amendment (a) concedes the Lords request that Parliament should gain a legal right to a veto on an international agreement. I believe that this would be the first time such a veto had been allowed in law in the UK, and it moves us into line with the European Parliament approvals. It is fair to say that, in the past few days, the Government have gone some way to address the concerns on this issue.

In my considerations, I have been no little influenced by the Prime Minister, who I sincerely believe wants the best deal possible for the UK and who is asking to be able to go to the June EU meeting with the freest possible hand. However, if the Prime Minister gets the deal this country needs, even with the Government concession in their amendment (a), there is still no plan B if Parliament then rejects the deal. That is why I think the new compromise, tabled last night by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), moves towards the balance required in retaining both constitutional integrity and practical requirements. I was therefore very pleased to hear the Secretary of State say that this issue will now be looked at again in the Lords, and the Solicitor General reinforced that in his earlier comments.

[Mr Speaker]

I call Frank Field. You have two minutes.

Article 50

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Tuesday 24th January 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Davis]

I cannot off the top of my head think of a circumstance in which EVEL would apply, but it might do so. The point I would make to the hon. Lady is that that rests on a ruling by the Speaker, not by a Secretary of State.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Will triggering article 50 be adequate to release us from other related treaty obligations under the 1972 Act, such as our membership of the European economic area?

[Mr Davis]

That is a debatable matter of law. I think that that is the accurate answer. Subsequent matters may arise after the triggering of article 50, but if so we will come back to the House.

New Partnership with the EU

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Tuesday 17th January 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Davis]

Since the beginning of this process—since I took up my post—we have put the preservation of the stability and the interests of Northern Ireland pretty much at the top of the tree of the negotiations, particularly on issues such as maintaining an open border and preserving the economic basis of Northern Ireland, which is very dependent on trade with the Republic of Ireland. On the JMC, I do not know if it has gone yet but yesterday I approved a letter to the Northern Ireland Executive—although the next Government are now subject to an election, most Ministers are still in place—asking that during the interim period they send representatives, whether ministerial or otherwise, so that we are always across the interests of Northern Ireland. The hon. Gentleman must take it as read that I am absolutely committed to maintaining the stability, peace and prosperity we have got used to in the last several years.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

As the Secretary of State said, giving up our membership of the EU and the single market is not incompatible with our negotiating access to the single market, either in whole or in part, but has he yet considered the red lines he might put down on what we pay for such access?

[Mr Davis]

I have considered them, but the idea that I might talk about them is another matter. There is a naive belief in modern politics that we have to establish, in some butch way, red lines. If we were to establish a red line, we would invite those with whom we are negotiating to make that red line very expensive. I do not therefore intend to get into the business of laying out red lines here, there and everywhere; I intend to get the best possible outcome for the country.

Article 50

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Monday 7th November 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Davis]

All those figures will be published in due course, but the right hon. Gentleman is wrong about one thing: I have given in terms an undertaking to the House that there will be no dilution of employment rights as a result of our leaving the European Union. He has not been paying attention.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The High Court judgment noted:

“The Government accepts that a notice under Article 50 cannot be withdrawn once it has been given.”

Why did the Government simply accept that? If they had maintained that triggering could be reversed by Parliament, would not Parliament remain sovereign, despite the Executive taking the decision to trigger article 50?

[Mr Davis]

The reason was not really a point of law so much as a point of constitutional and political reality. I did not see it as possible that we could reverse the decision of the British people.