European Union (Withdrawal) Act

Angus Brendan MacNeil Excerpts

Wednesday 9th January 2019 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Barclay]

I will just make some progress, and then I will happily take further interventions.

On the backstop, let me address colleagues’ concerns about being trapped, which was raised in a previous debate. The Government are not shying away from the fact that the backstop is an uncomfortable situation for the United Kingdom, but it is also an uncomfortable situation for the EU, in terms of the break in the four freedoms and the fact that we have a mutual interest in avoiding entering into it.

Indeed, since the previous debate, progress was made in the December Council on the confirmation of its commitment to use best endeavours to negotiate and conclude a subsequent agreement. Indeed, the EU27 gave me a new assurance in relation to the future partnership with the UK, by stating that the EU

“stands ready to embark on preparations immediately after signature of the Withdrawal Agreement to ensure that negotiations can start as soon as possible after the UK’s withdrawal.”

The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) is busy checking his phone, but that relates to his point. Both sides intend to make early progress on the issues he raised.

[Angus Brendan MacNeil (Na h-Eileanan an Iar) (SNP)]

The right hon. Gentleman talked about the risks to the 96-year-old United Kingdom. I see this as an opportunity for independence, as underlined by the fact that this Government have shown more respect to, and have engaged more with, the Government of Ireland than they have to and with the Government of Scotland. That shows that independence gives you power, a voice and respect—something that the UK does not show the Scottish Government but that it does show in spades to the Government of Ireland, an independent country. The Celts who are independent are in a far better situation than the ones who are stuck with Westminster.

[Stephen Barclay]

There is a legitimate point as to how we engage with the House as a whole—with Members on both sides—as we move into the next phase. I have already touched on my desire, and the Prime Minister’s commitment, to look at how we do that with the devolved Administrations in a more targeted way. If we look at the first phase, we will see that a huge amount of hours have been spent on engagement. The Prime Minister has spent a huge number of hours at this Dispatch Box. There are opportunities for us to work in a much more targeted way, to listen to Members’ concerns about issues such as citizens’ rights and employment, and to look at how, through the Select Committees in particular, we can work in a much more targeted way. I think that the next phase lends itself to that approach. I gently say to the hon. Gentleman, however, that that also requires a dialogue both ways. If Members are going to jump in, before we have even responded, with a judgment on the withdrawal agreement or on measures that have been taken, that suggests a lack of engagement on their part to work in a collaborative way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

If the referendum were rerun today, everything that I have seen over the last two years—not least as a member of the Brexit Select Committee—would still lead me to vote to stay within the European Union. Having said that, I do respect the result of the referendum as a valid expression of the will of the people, but to me this means leaving the EU in a way that secures the best economic deal available with the EU and that maximises the potential for retaining the close cultural, educational, justice and security relationships that we have developed with our closest partners and allies. The referendum was “in or out”, but it did not, as some wrongly insist, dictate the terms of our leaving, nor the terms of our future relationship with the EU once out. Both of those questions were left for Parliament to resolve, and that is what MPs must now do. It is for this primary reason that I would oppose a second referendum, which would be indeterminate, complicated to implement and very divisive.

[Angus Brendan MacNeil]

The hon. Gentleman will probably be aware that the Prime Minister spoke to 200 MPs in one of the rooms in Portcullis House last night. Again, she ruled out a second referendum, but she said that if the deal does not get through, there are two options left: a no-deal Brexit or no Brexit at all with the revocation of article 50. Businesses up and down the country are going to have to start thinking about how they react once the deal is voted down. Will the hon. Gentleman venture his view on what he would do in that scenario?

[Mr Djanogly]

I was at that meeting, which I thought was a good expression of joint interests from all parties to the Prime Minister. I hope that we saw within that meeting the start of what could become a consensus, moving forward after what might be a defeat next week. Having said that, I do not discount a second referendum, as the Prime Minister did not. I am simply saying that I think it would be a very poor second best and a sign that this place had failed, but I do not dismiss the possibility.

As for the Prime Minister’s deal, on balance I find it to be a fair one and practical in the overall circumstances of the hand that we had to play; it has my support. To criticise the deal as not being as good as what we have with the EU now is a facile argument, if only because the EU was never, ever going to allow us to leave on the same or better terms than apply to the remaining 27 countries, no matter how many German cars we bought. The deal was always going to have to represent a compromise of views within the Conservative party, within Parliament and certainly with the EU. The deal reached does not represent my optimum position, but no one was ever going to get everything they wanted.

That is not to say that I do not share some of the criticisms of the deal, including many that can be found in the Brexit Committee’s report on the deal. For instance, despite assurances from two Secretaries of State, the financial settlement has not been included in the withdrawal agreement as being wholly or even partially conditional on securing a binding future relationship. To my mind, this has been a failure of negotiation that will undoubtedly reduce our leverage in future relationship negotiations due to start in March 2019 if we have a deal. Furthermore, the lack of detail in the future relationship political declaration means that there will still be another cliff edge as we reach July 2020, when we will need to decide either to head towards the backstop or to extend the implementation period, and there will still be a level of uncertainty for business as to the final form of the deal, although much less so than if we crash out with no deal.

So, on balance, we should take the deal on offer. The mess and upset that would be caused by a hard Brexit is unacceptable. Yes, the legalities can be brought to the fore on things like the backstop, but the legal cart should not be leading the commercial horse.