European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 14th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Further to the point of my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) on the difference between transition and implementation, we know for sure that it will be an implementation period because we will have to implement the withdrawal agreement. We do not yet know whether it will be a transitional period because we do not know, and will not know at the point of Brexit, whether we will have any final deal to implement.

[Paul Blomfield]

The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point, and I will now make some progress.

I was at the point of talking about why closing down the opportunity for effective transitional arrangements would be deeply self-harming. As the director general of the CBI, Carolyn Fairbairn, said just last week,

“The message from us, from business, is more certainty quickly particularly around transition, particularly in the next four weeks”.

The Government amendments undermine the prospect of a transitional deal and create more uncertainty. The CBI, the British Chambers of Commerce, the EEF, the Institute of Directors and the Federation of Small Businesses came together to call for a transitional deal, saying:

“We need agreement of transitional arrangements as soon as possible, as without urgent agreement many companies have serious decisions about investment and contingency plans to take at the start of 2018”.

They continued:

“Failure to agree a transition period of at least two years could have wide-reaching and damaging consequences for investment and trade”.

It will also mean lorries backing up at Dover, because the adjustments necessary to avoid that cannot be physically put in place within 15 months, as I am sure everyone would agree. For the same reason, it will mean a hard border in Northern Ireland, with all the problems that that would create.

The Government’s approach is simply not in the national interest, and it closes down the flexibility that we might need. If negotiations go to the wire, both we and the EU 27 might recognise the need for an extra week, an extra day, an extra hour, an extra minute or even an extra second, as the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) pointed out, in order to secure a final deal. But that agreement would be thwarted by the Government’s having made it unlawful for themselves to do what they would want to do at that point.

The Prime Minister has consistently talked about parties working together in the national interest, and we are up for that—we have tried to be constructive; we have scrutinised and identified gaps; we have offered solutions; and on this crucial issue we seem to be in the same place as at least some members of the Government on the need for an effective transitional period. So let me make an offer to the Government. If they withdraw amendments 381, 382 and 383, and work with us on an alternative that affirms a departure date in line with the article 50 process but without destroying the chances of transitional arrangements, we are happy to look at that and work with them on it. If they do not—

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Brake]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. I think we may have the opportunity to put that to the test shortly.

In conclusion, the debate has unfortunately again revealed the obsession that Europe holds in the hearts of some Government Members. When it comes to Europe and our membership of the European Union, I am afraid that they have left their rationality at the door of the Chamber. If we do leave the European Union, they will be leading the country down a path that will, in my view and in the views of many Cabinet members, many Conservative Members and many Opposition Members, do long-lasting damage to our country.

[Mr Djanogly]

My concern is related to the timing issues of the phase 1 exit period and, by implication, of the transition period and, by extension, to how those periods link in to the proposed timing of the phase 2 deal on the future relationship with the EU following Brexit. That is the subject of a number of interconnected amendments.

The key point on timing is that, rightly or wrongly—probably wrongly—we have dropped our initial insistence that the terms of withdrawal, or what is known as phase 1, should be negotiated at the same time as the terms of our future relationship, which is known as phase 2. As things stand, the EU is saying that we should sort out phase 1—Northern Ireland, citizens’ rights and the amount of money—before we start scoping discussions on phase 2. The Government have said that the scoping of phase 2 should start in December, but the EU has threatened delay if we do not move forward significantly on phase 1 within the next couple of weeks.

Clearly, from the EU Commission’s perspective, and I believe from the perspective of British and continental business, the timelines are moving from tight to critical in terms of the need for a transitional agreement and a phase 2 outline. I separate the two because, of course, the transitional period is legally derived from and relates to the phase 1 exit date set out in article 50, providing time, for instance, to change over regulators and to allow companies’ systems to be changed over, too. Incidentally, it will also be used as a standstill period during which the Government can conduct their negotiations on phase 2.

Having heard the debate so far today, both in Committee and elsewhere, I am still unsure as to why we should fix an exit date that will thereby fix the date of the transition agreement. I can see only downside, with the Government losing control of one of the levers they could use to control the negotiations. Briefings I have just received also indicate that removing the flexibility of having different exit dates for different issues could undermine the ability of the banking and insurance sectors to amend their systems in time, risking financial instability.

The proposal to fix a date also possibly pushes us into a corner and unnecessarily increases the EU team’s leverage. Indeed, as has been said, when the Ministers came to the Brexit Committee, the flexibility to set multiple exit dates was described to us as a tool for setting different commencement dates for different provisions and for providing for possible transitional arrangements. What has changed in the Government’s approach over the past few weeks? That is something Ministers have to address.

It is now seemingly the Government’s intention to follow the Bill with further primary legislation to provide for an implementation period and the terms of the withdrawal agreement, along the lines of amendment 7 tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), which he says he will now update. The amendment has received a lot of cross-party support, and we will debate it at a later date. The Government initiative is welcome, but it will not in itself protect us from the dead-end option of fixing the exit date, which seems to pander to those who would welcome a no-deal Brexit.

My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) tabled new clause 54, which provides for securing a transition period of at least two years. Although the amendment will be substantially debated later, I think it is conservatively worded. When the Brexit Committee went to Brussels recently, Monsieur Barnier talked of the adequacy of two years for negotiations, as has our Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union. However, nearly everyone else, including the European Parliament representative and the representatives of MEDEF—the French CBI—thought that three years, and possibly up to five years, will be needed.

Two years from the exit date may be enough time to settle the provisions of phase 1, but most experts are saying that two years is widely over-optimistic for negotiating an FTA. We need to consider what will happen if the Government do not reach certain targets by certain dates. For the Brexiteers, it may simply be that we go into hard Brexit mode. I personally think that would be extremely damaging to British business, but it is of course the default position under article 50. For those of us who want to have a negotiated phase 2 settlement, more Government attention is needed in this area.

The hon. Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra) tabled new clause 69, a thoughtful amendment that asks what should happen if the Government do not secure a withdrawal agreement by 31 October 2018 or if Parliament does not approve the withdrawal agreement by 28 February 2019. Rather than jump off the proverbial no deal, hard Brexit cliff, there is a suggestion of ending the two-year period or agreeing a new transitional period. For that approach to work, we would have to ensure that we do not have a fixed exit date. It would, in effect, involve taking up the offer previously made by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield) and the Government starting to talk to the Opposition. Given where we are, that is going to have to happen one way or another, and we should face up to it now.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Commons Chamber

The proposals coming down the line at EU level are in step with the direction of travel that Parliament has indicated it would like to take, and Members have nothing to fear from this new clause. The family-friendly rights that come from Europe are not the bureaucratic, over-zealous red tape that some Members would have us believe. They encapsulate the idea that individuals can be employed without discrimination and treated fairly at work, and that expectant mothers can be given the right to maternity leave without fear of losing their job. At the general election in June, Members of this House stood on a manifesto that pledged to protect workplace rights, and I hope that we will consider those pledges. If I am not satisfied with the Government’s response, I will seek to divide the Committee on this issue later this evening.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I believe that, taken as a whole, the Bill works and will do what it says on the tin. Indeed, I note that no one has come up with a better plan to extricate us from the EU. Furthermore, the recent Government announcement that we should have a Bill to set out the terms of withdrawal and the implementation period will provide a good opportunity to readdress any legal complexities and tweaks that become necessary—for instance, through the proposals on human rights changing due to EU negotiations. However, the detail is what counts, and I think that this legislation is still something of an unpolished gem.

Clause 5 would change the role of the principle of the supremacy of EU law post Brexit and act as a carve-out to the concept of having retained EU law. Many of the related issues were debated on day one of our Committee proceedings in relation to clause 6. With clauses 5 and 6 in place, once the UK leaves the EU, EU law will no longer be supreme over new laws made by Parliament, and the UK courts will not need to follow European Court of Justice judgments made after exit day. However, it is time for a gripe, Mr Hanson. Ministers’ decision to speak twice on different issues within the same group has been somewhat unhelpful, because it disconnects the various parts of what we are debating. I agree the two groupings might have been preferable, but that was not on offer from the Chair. Having had my gripe, I will now move on.

Amending clause 5 to deal with the requirement of the withdrawal agreement, or even an incompatibility with it, could be activated by use of the Henry VIII powers set out in clause 9, or alternatively by delaying implementation of clauses 5 and 6 using the power in the Bill—a power that the Government currently wish to amend, but which I hope they will not—to set different exit days for different purposes.

Of course, having the position ironed out in the newly proposed implementation Bill could also be an option. This is a likely issue to be considered, as the Prime Minister did, of course, on 22 September, support a transition period, noting that

“the framework for this strictly time limited period, which can be agreed under Article 50, would be the existing structure of EU rules and regulations.”

The Government have since complained that the EU has been slow to talk about an implementation period, which is certainly concerning. It has been described as a wasting asset, but this should not reduce our urgent need to consider how we would actually implement it.

There is no doubt, from reading the views of the significant number of experts, and from what the Exiting the European Union Committee has heard in evidence, that there is some level of confusion about the meaning of clause 5(1) to (3). I hope that the Government will clarify the position, although I have to say that much of the evidence that the Select Committee received was itself conflicting as to its importance. For instance, witnesses queried the intended effect of clause 5(1): is it only a declaratory statement, or is it setting out the position for the retention of the principle in clause 5(2)?

The point is that the relationship between the supremacy of EU law and retained law is not clear to a number of people. As Professor Mark Elliott noted,

“if retained EU law is domestic law, can it inherit the ‘supremacy’ of the ‘EU law?’”

Would retained law under clauses 3 and 4 benefit from the supremacy of EU law as provided for in clause 5(2)? Professor Syrpis backed that up in his written evidence to the Committee:

“The Bill may be handled in various ways; for example Clause 5(4) excludes the Charter, Clause 6(2) states that: courts need not have any regard to anything done on or after exit day by the European Court”

and schedule 1 excludes Francovich damages.

But it remains unclear whether these exclusions relate only to the retention of EU law in UK law, in clauses 2 to 4, and the interpretation of retained EU law, in clause 6, or whether they also apply to the principle of supremacy of EU law, in clause 5. In effect, I have seen enough indecision on this to think that the Minister needs to expand on his interpretation of the supremacy principle.

Of course, if domestic courts decide on the content and meaning of law post Brexit, domestic judges are going to have to respond to the challenge, as I am sure they are very capable of doing. Clearly we should help them on their way, so far as possible, by giving clarity on such issues as scoping the supremacy of EU law, although ultimately they will have to judge—

“judges will simply have to do their best”,

as Lord Neuberger put it. Frankly, I do not see what could be put in the Bill that would make this an easy process for judges in practice. However, as Sir Stephen Laws and Dr Charlotte O’Brien told our Committee,

“there is already an existing principle whereby, when deciding on law, the courts will look at foreign judgements and treat them as persuasive but not binding”.

Professor Richard Ekins took this a stage further and thought that the provision is only there

“to make it the case that no one thinks the judges are doing anything wrong if they read them”—

meaning Court of Justice judgments—

and that

“you could delete the clause and I think the judges would, properly, do the same thing”.

Clause 5(4) exempts the charter of fundamental rights from being converted into domestic law. The first point here is that, whether or not one agrees with the provision, one could ask whether this is the right Bill to insert it into. That argument was made by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield). The Bill is about converting EU law into UK law in order to have a functioning rule book, rather than dealing with policy issues—providing legal certainty rather than reshaping rights. We could have had a stand-alone Bill to deal with that, but I am not convinced that it would have helped the process, or indeed the outcome. In fact, to the contrary, I think that having the benefit of the clause 5 debate running contemporaneously is helpful—if only Ministers had thought the same when grouping today’s amendments.

As for the charter itself, it is a matter of fact that it contains certain extra rights other than those that exist in the Human Rights Act, such as the right to dignity and, as the right hon. Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms) elaborated, the right to protection of personal data. There is also a wider class of potential applicants, because it includes anyone with a “sufficient interest”. Also, stronger remedies are arguably available in certain circumstances, but all that still has to be within the scope of EU law, and I agree with the Government that the charter will lose its relevance after Brexit. However, in the wider context and while it is important to debate the issue, I have strong doubts that we will be losing much by removing the charter if we get the drafting of this Bill right, because many charter rights will form part of the general principles of EU law, as has been explained, and will thereby be retained by clause 6(7) and schedule 1 for the purpose of interpreting retained EU law.

Retention of the charter would also go against the principle of English courts taking control. There may be initial teething problems, but I note that the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker), told the Exiting the European Union Committee that an EU legal source exists for each charter right, such that judges will be required to look at the underlying source law or rights when considering cases post exit, rather than the charter. However, I am not sure that that is quite adequate, as it seems as though the Bill will contain no right of action in domestic law based on a failure to comply with any of the general principles of EU law and the courts will not be able to disapply any new law because it is incompatible with any of these general principles, including fundamental rights. Amendment 10, tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), would address that by allowing challenges to be brought to retained EU law—law after Brexit—on the grounds that it is in breach of the general principles of EU law.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Does my hon. Friend agree that a different amendment—perhaps a Government amendment on Report—could achieve the same purpose by restricting that part of schedule 1 to dealing with non-retained general principles of law, so that retained principles could form the basis for a right of action?

[Mr Djanogly]

Yes, my right hon. Friend made that fair point in an earlier intervention. I am happy to say that I am open and willing to hear what the Government have to say on that, and I look forward to the Minister’s contribution later.

The concept of amendment 10 sounds reasonable to me—not least if we are to get rid of the charter—and I shall be listening carefully. However, I agree that the charter has significantly added to the complexity of human rights applications and that in removing the charter the Bill will provide an opportunity to simplify things outside the EU. The Minister has promised to deliver to the Exiting the European Union Committee a memorandum on charter rights, and I note the idea provided by new clause 16, tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie), of a report to review the implications of removal of the charter. I would happily accept Ministers’ assurance on that, rather than to legislate for it, and I hope that the document to be delivered to the Committee by 5 December will cover the two issues, as I think the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), said earlier.

My underlying acceptance of the Bill’s position is premised on there remaining, as now exists, a significant and meaningful body of human rights legislation in this country. That would include common law and the Human Rights Act and would be underpinned by the European convention on human rights. I am therefore pleased that the Minister took the opportunity to accept the need for retention of the ECHR in the post-Brexit period.

[Wera Hobhouse]

I rise to discuss new clause 78 and the amendments that are designed to retain the charter. I listened carefully to what the Minister said earlier, but if the Government are not inclined to retain the whole charter, I urge him at least to look again at new clause 78, because it would protect some equality rights.

Conservative Members like to argue that, when Britain decided to join the European Economic Community in 1975, what the British people voted for was an economic union—no less, no more—and that only afterwards the EU became a political union that we should now leave. However, if one looks at the fundamental role played by the British in drafting the European convention on human rights in 1950, this is not true. The convention aimed to protect fundamental freedoms for all Europeans and was driven by British values.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Grieve]

Yes, I think I agree with my right hon. Friend that the action of Parliament in triggering article 50 would do that. But it is not, I think, the intention of the Government to do any such thing, and never has been. Indeed, if it is the intention of the Government to do such a thing, I hope very much that they will tell me as soon as possible, because I think I might be withdrawing my support from them.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Is not the point that, everything else being equal, even if nothing else happens, article 50 has been triggered so we are leaving the European Union on a set date, unless 27 other countries decide to extend the date? Therefore, this argument is about the UK’s internal process. It is not a question of the EU or anyone else holding things up.

[Mr Grieve]

There are a series of processes. I do not wish to get too diverted from my main point. We are intending, and will require, a further statute in order to achieve what the Government have set out. I hope very much that we do not leave with a no deal on anything, because we would not be able to fly off to Rome on the day after, we would have no security co-operation and we would, indeed, be mired in complete and utter chaos.

The reality is that clause 9 is incompatible with the programme that the Government have set out. At the time that clause 9 was inserted, I think that the Government had not yet fully worked out the implications of how withdrawal had to take place.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

There is no possibility of precluding Parliament from making such a resolution one way or the other. That is up to Parliament, and it is up to the Government of the day at that point to respond as they choose. No Government would sensibly respond in the way the hon. Gentleman describes, so I do not think that that is a realistic possibility.

[Mr Djanogly]

rose—

[Mr Baron]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Djanogly]

My right hon. Friend will be aware that all parties are aiming for next October for the negotiation of the final deal, but the Secretary of State has said that he will keep negotiating until March 2019 and that, if necessary, he will go on after that into the implementation period, so there should be time one way or another.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I agree with my hon. Friend. There may well be time; I am not in any way denying that. The point I was trying to make is that Labour Members have alleged that it is proper for Parliament to be able to have what they have described as a meaningful vote. They have made it perfectly clear that what they mean by a meaningful vote includes the ability to tell the Government that they cannot continue to leave the European Union if the terms on which they wish to leave are not acceptable to Parliament. That is a logical fact, and people can agree with it or disagree with it. I do not in any way impugn the motives of Labour Members; it is a perfectly reasonable thing for them to think. It is just that we ought to be honest about the fact that that is the proposition they are putting forward, which is in marked contrast to the point made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield in his amendment 7.