European Union

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 13th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker. We live in some fairly interesting times, because not only do we have a Deputy Prime Minister who has gone missing, but I am reliably informed that not one Liberal Democrat Member voted in the Lobby to support the Prime Minister. Is there a precedent for that within a Government?

[Mr Speaker]

The right hon. Gentleman is a wise greybeard, and he will know that there are precedents for most things, but fortunately whether people vote or the way in which they vote is not a matter for the Chair. However, he has put his point forcefully on the record.

Sudan and South Sudan

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Wednesday 7th December 2011 Westminster Hall

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North East (Mr Bain)—he has been congratulated before during the debate—on introducing this immensely important subject. As has been rightly said, the debate is very timely given the flashpoints of conflict, some of which are internal and some of which are external. Indeed, as I shall refer to later, there are also great concerns about the interruption of oil flow, which has an enormous effect on the economies, the budgetary position and, indeed, the solvency of both countries.

It is also important—this has come out substantially during the debate—to recognise that we must not simply focus on what these events mean for the countries concerned, for the ruling groups in those countries and, indeed, for those who are the participants in armed conflict. We need to highlight—I will refer to this later, but it has been mentioned several times during the debate—the impact that all this has had on the living standards and the opportunities for life of many of the people, particularly in South Sudan but, wider than that, in parts of Sudan itself.

During the conflict, which has rightly been referred to as one of the longest running conflicts, huge loss of life and devastation has been suffered by communities. It is absolutely right that tribute should be paid to a number of non-governmental organisations, several of which have been mentioned today—some are Church-based, but some are more secular, such as Saferworld. They have monitored the situation and ensured that the often unreported agony and misery of the people of South Sudan—not the sort of issue normally likely to be carried by television cameras, or where CNN is always likely to turn up—has been kept on the world agenda and has been the focus of international attention. That is important. The amount of oil is not hugely significant in terms of world oil supplies, and South Sudan is not an intrinsically strategic area, but it has some importance. It is not irrelevant because, as in so many areas of the world, there is a capacity for instability to spill across borders. We have already seen that to an extent in both this region and in the great lakes region. Conflicts continue in the border areas between Sudan and South Sudan.

According to reports, South Sudan is also witnessing the unwelcome attentions of the Lord’s Resistance Army. The LRA and other organisations have an impact on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the wider region. In those areas, the outside world, including China, has significant mineral interests. China is involved in Sudan, quite properly, to obtain access to oil. We have to ensure that there is an equal bargain for the people of South Sudan and Sudan. We need to ensure that, given the huge importance of oil revenues to the budgets of both countries, there is an equitable distribution—I realise that that is not easy to calculate—to ensure a win-win situation. That will involve responsible behaviour by production and transportation companies, and by the final client.

It is undoubtedly true, however, that in spite of those revenues, the impact on society has been minimal. Hon. Members have mentioned the appalling figures on maternal mortality and infant mortality per capita income. Approximately 45% of people in Khartoum have access to water. In South Sudan, very few people have access to anything like clean water. We know the impact that that has on health, let alone on the ability to run any sort of modern society. My hon. Friend highlighted the huge impact of AIDS, which is not just confined to South Sudan, but to much of that area of central Africa. Efforts have been made, but it is an ongoing problem. Any breakdown in the provision of support and aid—indeed, any breakdown of society—can only hasten the spread of that disease and prevent the necessary relief, alleviation and medication.

We need to move on from the problems, which have been outlined in debates over a number of years, to the solutions. That requires us to look beyond the simple differences between Sudan and South Sudan. Not only is external reconciliation required between the two states—there is a number of issues still running between them—but some internal reconciliation. One problem is that for years Sudan fostered tribal divisions in the border areas and in South Sudan to undermine the independence movement in South Sudan. That is not unprecedented. British Governments often operated a policy of divide and rule, as did many other countries. However, its legacy might roll on for many years. We ought to be particularly concerned if division is ongoing, if various tribes are being armed and if ordinary criminal issues, such as cattle rustling, escalate into tribal inter-ethnic warfare. The whole cycle of violence and disruption could continue and ultimately affect the oil fields, which will be the basis of the two countries’ income.

Where is the light in all of this? My hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh North and Leith (Mark Lazarowicz) highlighted the positive role being played by the African Union in hosting talks. In Somalia, the African Union is playing a more proactive role than it has in the past. It recognises that such instability can very easily spill over into other countries. In Somalia, problems have not been contained within its borders. We are only too well aware, for example, of the problems of piracy affecting international trade. Indeed, there was an announcement from the Under-Secretary of State for Transport, the hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mike Penning), only this week regarding the UK response. The Kenyan Government are having to take action because of the disruption and enormous impact that banditry and piracy are having on the Kenyan economy. Many of its resorts are close to Somalia and the cruise-liner business uses the port of Mombasa. In the first half of 2010, approximately 60 cruise liners stopped at Mombasa; this year only one. That has a substantial impact on the local economy.

The idea, therefore, that such problems can just be contained in one area, and are only a problem for the unfortunate residents of that area, is no longer sustainable. The encouraging thing is that that is recognised as being no longer sustainable. That is why we see a more proactive position from the African Union. The Arab League was also mentioned. It has looked at countries in its region and the difficulties that can flow on. It has not taken the position that it should stand away from such difficulties and that such problems are problems only for the countries concerned. That is encouraging, and I hope there will be some interaction between the African Union and the Arab League. I hope that the Minister will comment on that.

The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) mentioned the religious differences between South Sudan and Sudan. We know about the involvement of al-Qaeda in Sudan and how it was offered safe haven for a considerable period of time. Religious extremism is an additional concern to the mixture of various tribal and ethnic differences.

I have mentioned oil a number of times, because it is so significant: approximately 98% of the revenue of South Sudan. Arguably, oil was the driver for conflict in the past, with the desire of Sudan to keep control of South Sudan and the oil fields, the desire of the South Sudanese to have a greater share, and the vexed question of the transport of oil. It still has potential of course, with arguments about the price at which Sudan should be getting oil from South Sudan or the price of transiting oil through the pipeline, with Sudan wanting to charge what is estimated to be 15 or 20 times as much as transport on other pipelines in Africa, for example.

[Ian Paisley (North Antrim) (DUP)]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that one of the greatest investments that the western nations could make in new South Sudan would be in helping it to have a pipeline of its own, so that it could determine its own prices, rather than having to rely on Sudan, or to help it go through Kenya and find a way out in that direction?

[Mr Spellar]

As I used to say in ministerial times, I require notice of that question. However, if one already has a facility, which is a sunk cost, the most desirable outcome is to have a properly negotiated agreement to use that facility. One has to look at the distances, at which areas a pipeline would be running through and their safety and at the time scale involved, because constructing a new pipeline would be taken as an unfriendly act by Sudan. That might exacerbate tensions and could lead, for example, to cutting off the existing pipeline and therefore to no revenue at all—a potentially catastrophic situation for South Sudan. It is always worth examining alternatives—they might be viable—but they are not a real alternative to ensuring through whatever mechanisms, whether the UN, the African Union or the Arab League, that a modus vivendi is obtained between Sudan and South Sudan to ensure that oil, rather than a cause of contention, is a shared benefit.

[Martin Horwood]

Is the right hon. Gentleman concerned by the emergence of the so-called South Sudan Liberation Army in the relatively oil-rich states of Warrap and Unity, which the rebels are aiming to liberate—as they describe it—from the Government in Juba? They are advising civilians to evacuate towns and move to villages. Does that look like a deliberate campaign of destabilisation aimed at the oil revenues of the south?

[Mr Spellar]

I do not know what assessment has been made of the origins of that movement or who may or may not be supporting it, but it is absolutely clear that a continuation of the instability and fighting in those areas will not only disrupt the oilfields and revenue but, as we have seen so dramatically in South Sudan, southern Sudan and Darfur, completely disrupt all normal life, including agriculture, because of displaced populations. All that makes the area unviable and brings huge misery to the populations who, essentially, have to live in refugee camps, dependent on aid, and that is not a sustainable future.

A viable agreement between Sudan and South Sudan is therefore crucial. Sudan has a sizeable external debt—let us not argue about how it was acquired—which it has to service and South Sudan is totally dependent on oil for revenue, so both countries, for the viability of their Governments and their states, require a share of the oil revenue and a regular flow. It is argued that the interruptions to oil production have already led to sizeable reductions, with estimates of about a quarter, but I am not sure of the exact figure. Unless agreement is reached, those ongoing problems will continue; it is in both their interest to undertake an agreement. I referred to external and internal reconciliation, and no conflict between the two states is not alone in being hugely important. We have had worrying reports of attacks, although there are arguments that some are in response to guerrilla movements and attacks, but the facts need to be ascertained, and considerable international and regional pressure on the participants to lower the tension is needed.

One problem in so many areas of conflict once a peace agreement is signed, however, is the large number of people whose whole life had been bound up with military operations. I am pleased to see several colleagues from Northern Ireland in the Chamber, and a key factor is to create conditions of normalisation, in which arguments are settled in a normal fashion and become the norm or established practice. Year on year, people then gradually move away from their old way of life. Simply preventing people from shooting each other becomes important in establishing the norms of society; otherwise, the trouble could continue—a lot of it based on tribal differences running from generation to generation. However, tribal differences previously settled with traditional weapons are now settled with AK47s, causing huge devastation and the mass migration of populations, which become dependent populations. That is why it is so important for a real effort, using the experience from work in other areas of conflict, gradually to reintegrate groups who have been involved in guerrilla movements or in over-extended armies back into the population and for them to assume civilian roles. Again, that is why the reconstruction of agriculture, which my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North East mentioned, is so important, to provide alternative occupations and a security environment.

One of the difficulties on which I hope the Minister can comment is to do with those who did not participate in the violence or become involved in the various guerrilla movements and armed gangs if they are seeing all the benefits go to the people who were involved. That is not an unfamiliar story in many parts of the world. Getting the balance right is enormously difficult, but also enormously important and significant. So any programme must be community-based, as well as involving the participants, important though they are.

Another feature of the development of agriculture is, as has been mentioned, the appalling transport infrastructure. In many parts of the developing world, one of the key constraints on developing agriculture is access to market—the ability, when the harvest comes in, to get large quantities of produce to market and not to have it rot in the fields or during transport to market. We are all very much aware of the state of the infrastructure in South Sudan, and a significant priority in improving living standards and creating opportunities for people is the development of transport.

What is key and what I hope the Minister will report on in his contribution is that the effort has to be sustained. If the area descends once again into feuding civil war, I recognise the danger that the interest and, indeed, patience of the public in the wider world will start to run out. That is a key message that the Foreign Office must convey to the countries in the region in the best possible way—not threateningly, but in a matter-of-fact way—so that the people of South Sudan who have suffered so much for so long have some decent opportunities not only for themselves but for their children.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 29th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Alistair Burt]

We fully expect that the withdrawal of the provincial reconstruction team and those who support it will be in line with the timetable announced. We welcome the fact that further districts of Helmand were included last week in President Karzai’s announcement of a further tranche towards transition. We of course keep the closest watch on conditions on the ground, but so far our assessment is that the timetable will be able to be kept.

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

I welcome the Minister’s responses, but this was clearly the precursor to next week’s conference in Bonn on the future of Afghanistan. What are the Government’s objectives for the conference?

[Alistair Burt]

Our objectives are to fulfil the three themes of the conference: to look at future commitments from the international community to Afghanistan; to support the political process; and to discuss civilian transition in Afghanistan. It is a very important conference and we hope that all parties will be able to attend. It is not a NATO conference, for example, and we hope that it will be possible for Pakistan to send representatives, as its future security is intimately bound up with that of Afghanistan.

[Mr Spellar]

May I also thank the Minister for his very full response to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Heeley (Meg Munn) on protecting the significant gains that women have made in Afghanistan? What are the Government doing to ensure that the voices of Afghan women are heard at that conference and in subsequent discussions?

[Alistair Burt]

I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman’s questions. Civil society in Afghanistan and women’s involvement in it are growing. We have made representations over a lengthy period to the Government of Afghanistan to ensure that their own delegation includes a significant number of women representatives, which it will do, and they will voice their aspirations. Our delegation has also ensured that those issues are well up on the agenda, and it is important that the advances made by women in recent years, including that of 2.5 million girls now going to school, are not knocked backwards.

North Africa and the Near and Middle East

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Monday 28th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

They have been invited, as I have just been reminded by the Minister for Africa, my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (Mr Bellingham), and their engagement will be very important.

We have committed £128 million in famine relief for Somalia since July, and nearly £4 million this year to support the African Union Mission in Somalia. The United Kingdom already makes a huge contribution to efforts to improve matters there.

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

The Foreign Secretary spoke of putting guards on merchant vessels. That was announced at the end of October. Will he tell us what has happened since then, particularly in regard to the establishment of the procedures and protocols and the various rules?

[Mr Hague]

The rules will follow briskly, but of course these things take time to organise. The fact that there has been an announcement does not mean that there will instantly be a guard on every ship; it means that the procedures are in the process of being changed. I have no reason to think that people are dragging their feet, but I will check and write to the right hon. Gentleman, because we will certainly not let them drag their feet.

Successive British Governments have grappled with the problems emanating from Somalia, but we believe that now is the time to seek intensified international action, which I hope the House will welcome.

Regrettably, the situation in Sudan is also deteriorating. I was present when South Sudan became independent in July, when effective international diplomacy helped to ensure a largely peaceful separation from its northern neighbour. Recent events, including the bombing of South Sudan by the Sudanese air force on November 10, have jeopardised the prospect of Sudan and South Sudan co-existing peacefully in a stable region. We urge both sides to exercise restraint and refrain from military activity in each other’s territory, including through support to proxy forces. We are deeply concerned by the lack of humanitarian access in the conflict areas of southern Kordofan and Blue Nile state, and I urge the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement to address this and to negotiate for a lasting peace settlement. The two countries must resolve remaining legacy issues from the comprehensive peace agreement, particularly on oil revenue, citizenship, border demarcation and the status of the disputed region of Abyei.

The House does not often debate the Sahel, but it is a region of growing importance to the UK. I visited Mauritania in October, becoming the first British Minister ever to do so, as a signal that Britain will seek closer engagement with it and the wider region. The Sahel is deeply affected by poverty, insecurity, weak governance and a lack of education and employment opportunities. The revolution in Libya has also had an impact, risking an influx of weaponry from Libya as well as potential new recruits for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, in the form of former mercenaries.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

It has certainly been a wide-ranging and interesting debate. We had the Foreign Secretary and the hon. Member for Shrewsbury and Atcham (Daniel Kawczynski) competing as to who had visited the most distant locations, and the hon. Gentleman also expressed his concern that the Conservative party was dominated by Guardian-reading, Radio 4-listening liberal lefties, which I am sure was a revelation to the Foreign Secretary. My right hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire South (Mr Alexander) welcomed the debate, which is timely and a welcome opportunity to discuss the momentous events taking place throughout the region.

I do not want to appear churlish, but briefly I shall express a slight concern, because in Afghanistan we in the UK have a direct influence on events and a vital interest, with several thousand of our service personnel there, and this weekend the Bonn conference on the future of Afghanistan will take place, with more than 1,000 delegates attending. That would have been a significant moment even before the events of last weekend, so we should also recognise the considerable parliamentary concern about how the substantial gains made by the women of that country can be preserved.

In a speech last week, the Foreign Secretary pointed out:

“In 2002 only 9% of Afghans had access to health facilities in their local area, today this proportion has risen to 85%. One in three of the six million children in school in Afghanistan is a girl. Just last year 50,000 new teachers were trained, over 30% of them women,”

and:

“Sixty nine female MPs were elected in 2010.”

That is why last week more than 100 Members of this House attended a photoshoot to show their support for the gains made by Afghan women, so I am slightly surprised that the Government did not this week schedule a debate in which they could have outlined their aspirations for the conference, but at the very least I hope that we will have more information in Foreign Office questions tomorrow and a report back next week.

The other inevitable problem with a debate of this breadth is the difficulty of focusing clearly on particular areas and of developing clear themes. During the Foreign Secretary’s speech I was not clear whether there was an overarching strategic approach. The issue of national strategy has concerned the Public Administration Committee, and I would have hoped to have seen more of the strategic thread, but perhaps that will emerge in the Minister’s response. So I shall inevitably have to deal with matters country by country, and I apologise for those that I do not cover in the time available, but the Minister needs a reasonable amount of time to cover the wide range of issues that have been addressed.

I shall begin with Somalia. There are massive governance issues that clearly have a huge effect on the local population, impacting on the safety of neighbouring countries such as Kenya in particular, and on world shipping, with continuing depredations from piracy, to which I shall return. The Minister will know only too well that I have been raising this with his Department for over a year. My persistent complaint has been that the Government have the right intentions but are slow in taking action and encouraging a collective international response. I welcome the statement that has been put out today indicating that discussions will be taking place at the European Council, but those discussions have to be translated into action.

At the end of last month, the Prime Minister made a welcome announcement about the placing of private armed guards aboard vessels. Straight away, I wrote to the Home Secretary, who had been designated as the lead Minister on this, to pose a number of entirely proper questions. I asked what would be the procedures for command and control; what would be the rules of engagement; whether there would be arrangements with ship owners to recruit only reputable firms and individuals; whether there would be a register and, if so, who would maintain it; what sanction there would be against companies that were not in compliance; whether this would apply only off the Somali coast and into the Indian ocean or elsewhere; and what discussions there had been with other countries in the relevant region, where guards would embark and disembark. Those are absolutely core parts of a policy for dealing with piracy by the use of guards. There was no sound from the Home Office until today, when it faxed my office to say that it had transferred the matter to the Department for Transport. That does not show the sort of urgency that is needed, and unfortunately it has been only too typical of responses in this area, where the general direction has often been right but the implementation has been sorely lacking.

October is when the piracy season starts in Somalia, because the monsoons go down and piracy therefore becomes easier. As was rightly pointed out in the debate, that is absolutely crucial, because it means that if the warlords and pirate organisers are the main source of funding for governance in Somalia, its governance will be enormously destabilised.

[Mark Lazarowicz (Edinburgh North and Leith) (Lab/Co-op)]

Another reason for urgency is that, unfortunately, despite the efforts by the international community, and by the British Government in particular, there is every indication and every reason to fear that there may well a recurrence of the famine next year. We therefore need action on an international level as soon as possible.

[Mr Spellar]

I fully agree with my hon. Friend. That is why we particularly welcome the support for the beleaguered population of Somalia, especially food aid, and the substantial involvement of the Department for International Development, working directly and through non-governmental organisations. We also welcome the initiative of the conference on 21 February that was announced by the Secretary of State.

As with the involvement of the Arab League in the middle east, I hope that we will ensure that there is significant involvement in Somalia on the part of the neighbouring African countries and, indeed, the wider African continent. The hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) properly referred to the considerable role that the forces of the African Union are playing there. Equally, the role of the naval patrols should be not only to stop the pirates coming off the coast of Somalia but to stop the illegal fishing and dumping of toxic waste that has created some of the preconditions for piracy in that unfortunate area.

We fully accept that we cannot intervene everywhere within the scope of the debate—that part of the discussion is where I might differ slightly from the hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart)—but we have to decide where, in particular, we are going to put our weight. Like all countries, we have limited resources. Even the United States has to make a decision about where it is going to put its main focus. I was therefore slightly surprised that the Foreign Secretary’s statement earlier this month had only about four lines on Tunisia—the country where the Arab spring started. Indeed, the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) referred to it as the first country of the revolution. Tunisia is therefore symbolic, but it also, in many ways, fits the criteria for a country that can succeed. It has a sizeable educated population and a long secular tradition in many parts of the community, and it gave women access to the political system well in advance of other countries in the region. It had an election which, as my right hon. Friend the shadow Secretary of State indicated, had about a 90% turnout for the Constituent Assembly, and that Assembly has already met. That is the ideal country on which to focus our efforts, partly for development and partly to build capacity in the political parties.

As I said on 16 May, there is a danger that some parties are well organised because of the underground structure that they have had in opposition to previous regimes and that other parties, which represent a wide body of opinion, are less well structured. It is important that those parties are given capacity, not by banning other parties, but by ensuring that there is a level playing field between the various tendencies. That applies across the region, but Tunisia might well commend itself as significant in that respect.

In the time available to me before I give the Minister time to reply, I will make a couple of points. There has been a lot of discussion about Iran, particularly with regard to its nuclear capacity. There was an exchange between the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and the hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) about Russia’s attitude on this matter. I think that it is true that Russia would be concerned about proliferation. However, there is a danger that it is complacent about proliferation, particularly because of its involvement in the civil nuclear programme. It might believe that it has that under control, which may or may not be true. The situation inside Iran is uncertain. There are reports tonight of another explosion at the Isfahan facility, with no indication as to the cause. There is a degree of complacency.

Finally, with regard to Libya, I take the point of the hon. Member for South Thanet (Laura Sandys) about the difficulties in transitional periods. That will be true in all of these countries, not least in Libya. I hope that the Minister will give us an update on the concerns that we have expressed before about where the surface-to-air missiles have gone. We know that there are a considerable number and that they are being looked for. This is a matter of considerable concern.

In conclusion, this is an historic period. Much progress has been made, but it will not all happen at the same speed and it will not go uninterrupted in a single direction. There will be difficulties in transition. It is clear from the debate that there is a common sentiment on both sides of the House that not only do we welcome progress, but we want to work to ensure that it is achieved. We look forward to the Minister answering many of the points that have been made in the debate and saying how he will achieve progress in real time.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 19th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

Yes, absolutely. That is really a matter for my colleagues at the Department for International Development. Our strong commitment to put 0.7% of gross national income towards development aid helps us to find the necessary funds to help in this situation. I hope that other nations around the world will be encouraged, emboldened and inspired by the British example, and that some may even be shamed by it.

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

Let me stress our support for the Government’s response to the famine in Somalia and the creation of South Sudan. However, I urge the Foreign Secretary not to take his eye off the ball over piracy off the horn of Africa. Last year, some 60 cruise liners visited Mombasa; this year, just one. That has had devastating effects on its tourism industry. Seafarers around the world are considering boycotting the area. Over the summer, will the Government show more urgency in tackling this menace and in getting the international community to step up its action?

[Mr Hague]

We will continue to show a great deal of urgency. We are, of course, at the forefront of the EU’s counter-piracy operation. We provide its operational commander and headquarters. We have contributed £5 million to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, which will allow pirates to serve custodial sentences in Somalia. Royal Navy ships have robust rules of engagement. We are examining what can be done to change the balance of risk to make it more risky to be a pirate off Somalia. I am anxious to do that and we are talking to our international partners about it. We are also giving a lot of attention to the political situation in Somalia and supporting the work of the transitional federal institutions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hague]

Yes. Climate change is an enormously important subject for the Commonwealth, which is a remarkable network now encompassing almost a third of the world’s population across many different continents and climatic zones, so I hope that climate change will continue to be discussed in many different Commonwealth forums and that we can use our membership to promote the legally binding global deal on combating climate change. That is what we need.

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

We welcome the development of relations between Commonwealth countries and we share the Foreign Secretary’s hopes for CHOGM in Perth. However, we also need to recognise that this should be complemented by relations between the peoples of the Commonwealth countries. In that context, will he press for increasing involvement in CHOGM’s work and the wider work of the Commonwealth by the social partners, business and the trade unions?

[Mr Hague]

Yes, in general. It is important that this is not just about a relationship between Governments; the network of nations and peoples of the Commonwealth is felt in many different ways, through the Commonwealth people’s forum, the Commonwealth youth forum and the Commonwealth business forum, all of which will have events surrounding the CHOGM meeting that will take place in Perth at the end of October. We do not yet have the details of all those meetings, but the right hon. Gentleman can be sure that that broad agenda will be in action there.

Afghanistan and Pakistan

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

The British involvement in Afghanistan has been long and costly, and whether it has achieved its stated objectives is a moot point, but that does not imply that it was the wrong decision or that we should not be there.

In the aftermath of 9/11, it was essential to deny al-Qaeda a base to operate; the intervention was essential; and there was a United Nations-mandated coalition of the willing led by the United States, but as usual we were in close support. Following the general election, the coalition Government very much followed the Afghanistan policy of their predecessor, but two important changes did take place: first, the establishment of the National Security Council to co-ordinate Whitehall’s Afghan war effort; and, crucially, the publicly announced decision to set 2015 as the deadline for withdrawing British combat troops.

Both initiatives were welcome, although famously the National Security Council did not make the withdrawal decision. Nonetheless, the key policy objective in Afghanistan mirrors that of the Government’s predecessor: Afghanistan should not again become a place from where al-Qaeda and other extremists can attack the UK and British interests.

Achieving that objective is said to rely on four main goals: a more stable and secure Afghanistan; the conditions for withdrawal of UK combat troops by 2015; an Afghan-led political settlement that represents all Afghan people; and regional political and security co-operation that supports a stable Afghanistan. They were the right objectives then, and they are the right objectives today.

Some progress is being made on all those fronts. Increasingly, the Afghan army and security forces are taking over control of the districts, troops are beginning to withdraw and there is talk of a political-led settlement, all of which is of course welcome.

I just wonder whether we need to reassess the policy objectives. The Foreign Affairs Committee received evidence to suggest that the core foreign policy justification for the UK’s continued presence in Afghanistan—that it is in the interests of UK national security—may have been resolved some time ago. There is a big difference between the Taliban, who are locals who want their country back, and al-Qaeda, which is made up of hard-nosed international terrorists. Given the apparently limited strength of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, its desire to continue to use Afghanistan as a base is questionable. The tracking down and shooting of Osama bin Laden adds weight to that argument.

When the Prime Minister appeared before the Liaison Committee, I asked if he was still receiving intelligence that al-Qaeda in Afghanistan remained a threat to UK national security. He confirmed that it did, and he said the same when I put a similar point to him this afternoon. I said that that poses a dilemma for Parliament. It seems that the justification for Britain’s most important policy initiative is based on an intelligence assessment that has not been subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The ghost of the Iraq war hangs over us. Under the circumstances, I suggest that the intelligence is shown to a committee of Privy Councillors or the Intelligence and Security Committee, which can report to the House on whether it agrees with the assessment.

In the meantime, the military campaign continues. The Taliban are being pushed back, and so they should be with the firepower ranged against them. However, I question whether they can be defeated militarily. The Foreign Affairs Committee has considerable doubts over whether the international security assistance force’s counter-insurgency campaign is succeeding. We question the fundamental assumption that success in Afghanistan can be achieved through a strategy of clear, hold and build. The Taliban are, at heart, Afghans who resent the presence of occupying forces. It is questionable whether the USA’s full military onslaught on the Taliban is necessary to deny al-Qaeda a place from which to operate. The key thrust of the Committee’s report is that we should encourage ISAF, and the United States in particular, to engage in a political reconciliation process. There is little support outside the United States for continuing the surge started by George Bush and continued by President Obama. The continued military pummelling of the Taliban is, in all certainty, counter-productive in achieving a political settlement.

The recent announcement by President Karzai that the United States is involved in reconciliation negotiations is a good start. However, talking to the Taliban is not easy. There is no address or phone number, and the hard-liners and the top brass of the Taliban have turned their backs on any reconciliation attempts. None the less, in my judgment there is a split in the Taliban between the hard-liners and the moderates. Those who are most opposed to a political settlement tend to be more on the fringes of the movement—the uneducated and the unemployed. Those who are more focused on the future prosperity of their country are prepared to talk. We should exploit the divisions in the Taliban and engage in the process of reconciliation as soon as possible. The US draw-down of troops will help in that, as will the additional numbers announced by the Prime Minister during his visit this week. We have to set the tone and show that there is light at the end of the tunnel for Afghans who want to bring up their children and enjoy the prosperity that we are used to in the western world.

Combined with that, we must continue to support the Afghan army, police and security services. Huge strides have been made to bring those forces up to a level of competence that will allow them to maintain law and order in their country. There will be a large army and a large police force. The Prime Minister said this afternoon that for every one troop that is withdrawn, two will go in from the Afghan police and security services. Those services have a long way to go to achieve the operational standards that we see elsewhere. The exit of NATO combat troops will not be smooth, and the handover will be fraught with problems, but the sheer size of the Afghan forces should be sufficient to hold the line against the inevitable counter-attack once the occupying forces have left.

The US draw-down is bigger than expected, and 33,000 troops will have been withdrawn by this time next year. The President of the United States says that the US has crippled al-Qaeda’s capabilities and been successful in its mission in Afghanistan, claiming that Kabul is much safer than it was before despite continued attacks such as the one on the Intercontinental hotel last week.

Interestingly, the President has been criticised on both sides in Congress, with his opponent in the last presidential election, John McCain, arguing that the current troop levels should be maintained for at least another year to accomplish their objectives. On the other hand, the Democrats have argued that the President has been too timid. The cynic in me says that that probably suggests he has got it about right.

However, the military do not agree with the President either. We may raise eyebrows here when senior military officers enter the political arena, and we may wish that they would do the fighting while we do the talking, but they have nothing on what has been going on in the United States. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, quite openly said that he advocated a less aggressive draw-down schedule. General Petraeus, the former head of the armed forces in Afghanistan, who is about to become the director of the CIA, said that he, too, had recommended a more gradual withdrawal. Marine General James Mattis, commander of US central command, who was General Petraeus’s boss and immediate superior, agreed. With friends like that, who needs enemies? I respect the President for his courage in rejecting the arguments of his military and continuing with the draw-down.

The House should be in no doubt that this is going to be messy. Security incidents in Afghanistan continue, such as the tragic loss of Scott McLaren from the Royal Regiment of Scotland. However, the provinces and urban districts continue to be transferred to Afghan forces, which shows progress towards transition.

No one likes to engage in talks with an enemy that has been killing one’s own armed forces, and I share the view of Hillary Clinton, who has said that she finds the need to have contact with the Taliban “distasteful, but worthwhile”. It is not a pleasant business, but it is a necessary one. I have no doubt that any negotiations leading to a political settlement must be Afghan-led, despite the Taliban saying that they want to speak directly with the United States. So far, top US officials have sidestepped that, and I hope the Government will now encourage them to get more fully involved and get a forum up and running with the full involvement of Afghanistan, the United States and Pakistan.

Relations with Pakistan are difficult, but if we think we have problems, nothing compares with the US-Pakistan relationship, which is at rock bottom. I have to confess that I am quite shaken by the level of mistrust between Pakistan and the United States. The situation has been exacerbated by the shooting of Osama bin Laden. I personally have no doubt whatever that that was a necessary step for the United States to take, and I quite understand why such sensitive information could not be shared with anybody. As a result, I am quite puzzled by Pakistan’s aggressive reaction and apparent failure to understand why the US did not share the information with it.

Pakistan has difficult decisions to make. It has deployed troops in Waziristan and the north-west frontier, but my instinct is that its heart is still not in it. Another illustration is the US use of drones, which are fearsome weapons that are turning out to be remarkably effective—so much so that everybody wants them. So why is Pakistan ordering the United States to take its drone bases out of the country?

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that Pakistan has suffered huge losses, and at a high level, from the activities of the Taliban and other terrorists? That partly demonstrates its level of commitment.

[Richard Ottaway]

Yes, which makes it more the mystery why it does not take stronger action against the Taliban. It is not how to get into the hole that counts but how to get out of it, and I believe that Pakistan is still worrying about how it got into the hole. I would encourage it to engage fully and totally in denying the Taliban a base in its own country.

On the other side of the equation, the US should recognise that Pakistan is a proud and sensitive country. We all admire the US for its can-do attitude and for getting things done, but there comes a moment every now and again when it must think about how others will feel about that, and work with the grain, despite its dominant position on the world stage.

The UK does have a role in all that. There are now 3 million Pakistanis living in the UK. Our embassy in Islamabad is making every effort, but diplomatic opportunities exist to win Pakistan’s confidence in our genuine desire to help them. Can we help with textile exports or commercially in another way? Can we help it to break down the barriers with India? Above all, we should encourage the US to adopt a policy on Pakistan that takes account of Pakistan’s security concerns, and we should help the US to play a constructive role in the reconciliation process.

I am under no illusion about the difficulties involved in respect of any of those countries. None the less, the Foreign Affairs Committee commends the UK Government for its advocacy of the regional approach to political reconciliation. Currently, the conditions for political settlement are virtually non-existent, but if ever there was a time to make the effort, it is now.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Baron]

The hon. Gentleman raises a serious point. I certainly think that our recent aggressive interventions have radicalised parts of the Muslim world against us—a fact that I think was confirmed by a former head of MI5 in giving evidence. I certainly do not think that our involvement has helped our situation, and I see no concrete evidence that the situation has improved in regard to the threat on the streets of London. If I am wrong about that, I am sure that the Minister will correct me.

The bottom line is that there is confusion of purpose, and the first distinction that we are failing to make is that between achieving the objective and the four main goals.

The second distinction that the Government are failing to explore rigorously is that between the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The relationship is complex and not well understood. There is no shortage of evidence—some was submitted to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee—to suggest that the Taliban would not necessarily allow al-Qaeda back into the country if the Taliban were to regain control of certain regions. They know that, ultimately, al-Qaeda led to their downfall. Indeed, US intelligence sources suggest that fewer than 100 al-Qaeda fighters and certainly no al-Qaeda bases are left in the country. To all intents and purposes, we have achieved our mission some time ago—a point that my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway), the Chairman of the Select Committee, made well. We all know that the Taliban are not a homogeneous group, but there are fundamental differences between the Taliban and al-Qaeda—yet the threats from al-Qaeda and the Taliban have become conflated and almost synonymous.

[Mr Spellar]

Given the distinctions that the hon. Gentleman is making, why does he think the Taliban allowed al-Qaeda to establish themselves and a base in Afghanistan?

[Mr Baron]

The bottom line is that there are various factions of the Taliban, but the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda is very complex and not well understood. I could return the question and ask: how is it that, given that the fundamental differences between the two are clear, we are failing to explore them? At the end of the day, peace is not made with friends but with enemies. We have got to initiate talks.

These two distinctions—the distinction between the key objective and the four main goals, and the distinction between the Taliban and al-Qaeda—are very important. If we are trying to build a more stable and secure Afghanistan and make it a better country, we will in all probability have to beat the Taliban. If, on the other hand, we are just trying to make sure that Afghanistan is free of al-Qaeda, we might not have to defeat the Taliban. That shows the importance of the two distinctions. What they lead one on to believe is the need for the Americans and the British to open meaningful and non-conditional talks with the Taliban in order to explore common ground.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

We fully recognise how the extraordinary events of the past few days have impacted on the length of this debate and possibly on the attention that it will receive outside the House. It is probably true that

“The world will little note, nor long remember, what we say here”

today, but this debate is important, not least for those who have served, who have been injured and who have died in the conflict in Afghanistan.

In the time available to me, I want to deal with three main issues. The first is the prospects for Afghanistan and, as I stressed in our debate on this subject in May, the role of the regional powers. The second significant issue is the impact of all these developments on the stability of Pakistan. Finally, I want to talk about the report—and more significantly, the Government’s response to it—and the provision of equipment for our troops. As I have said, we debated this subject less than a couple of months ago. We have to address the tragedy of Afghanistan under Taliban rule and insurgency, and ask what our best approach is to enabling Afghanistan and its people to come out of this nightmare.

Interestingly, a number of Members of both Houses recently visited the exhibition at the British Museum on early Afghanistan, which presented a very different picture from the TV coverage showing a dusty wilderness and a population living in the middle ages. The exhibition showed early Afghanistan as an ancient centre of civilisation with a significant position at the crossroads of the ancient world and a rich cultural tradition. For an example, one has only to think of the Buddhas of Bamiyan, which were constructed in the sixth century and, sadly, destroyed by the vandals of the Taliban. In the Prime Minister’s statement today, he also drew attention to many of Afghanistan’s strengths, including abundant mineral wealth, fertile agricultural land and a position at the crossroads of Asia’s great trading highways.

[Mr MacShane]

Is my right hon. Friend aware that, up until about 1970, a Marks & Spencer was open and functioning in Kabul? Should it be an objective of British foreign policy to get M&S back there?

[Mr Spellar]

Similarly, the symbol of the end of the cold war was the appearance of McDonald’s in many capitals in eastern Europe.

We should also remember how much of Afghanistan’s ancient civilisation was destroyed by nihilist tribes, in a pattern not dissimilar to what is happening today. We need to focus on the process of political dialogue and reconciliation in Afghanistan, as well as on a political settlement in which enough Afghan citizens from all parts of the country have a stake. The central Government there also need enough power and legitimacy to protect the country from threats, from within and without. That first proposition depends on there being a new external settlement that commits Afghanistan’s neighbours to respecting its sovereign integrity, as well as a process by which the ex-combatants there can acquire civilian status and have an opportunity to gain sustainable employment and income.

Afghanistan will then require reconciliation. This will include ensuring that tribal, ethnic and other groups are represented and recognised. Parliament and parliamentarians should also be recognised and encouraged. In that context, we were all interested in, if not intrigued by, the proposal for an exchange of Speakers. We were wondering whether the Speaker might seek to delegate that responsibility, a prospect that caused some alarm to your predecessor in the Chair, Madam Deputy Speaker.

I shall turn first to Pakistan, however. I say to the Chairman and other members of the Select Committee that, if I have a concern about the report it is that the content does not fully reflect its title, “The UK’s foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan”. The section on Pakistan takes up only about six of the 97 pages, and looks largely at the effect on the campaign in Afghanistan of action in and by Pakistan. Frankly, the more important strategic issue is the impact of Afghanistan on Pakistan.

Pakistan is a country of 160 million people. It is the second-largest Muslim country in the world, and it has a significant military and nuclear capability. It is also, as the Foreign Secretary has rightly acknowledged on behalf of Britain, a country that has suffered considerable losses from fundamentalist terrorism, and it continues to do so. We need to think seriously about Pakistan’s concerns and prospects, and to take into account a factor that is sometimes overlooked—namely, its need to recover from the horrific flooding that it has experienced.

That is why the announcement of continuing aid to Pakistan by the Department for International Development is encouraging, and welcomed by the Opposition, especially the scaling up of investment in effective, non-fundamentalist education to £446 million a year by 2015. Pakistan faces, in the words of a DFID publication, “an educational emergency”, with 17 million children not in school, half the adult population and two thirds of the women unable to read or write—and the population is escalating. We have to be clear in this context that there is a considerable onus on the Pakistan authorities to ensure that the money reaches its intended recipients. As DFID says, aid is

“dependent on securing value for money and results and will be linked to the Government of Pakistan’s own progress on reform, at both the federal and provincial levels, including taking tangible steps to build a more dynamic economy, strengthen the tax base and tackle corruption.”

That places a clear obligation on Pakistan to improve its administration, especially in tax collection, to foster a more open and pluralistic society and, last but by no means least, to engage in dialogue to reduce tension with India, which occupies so much attention and resources in both countries. My right hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane) mentioned the Indian obligations, and there is an obligation on both sides of the divide if dialogue is to be used to reduce that tension.

What of India and the other regional powers? They were mentioned by a number of hon. Members—the hon. Members for Stroud (Neil Carmichael) and for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) and particularly the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind). It is true that all the regional powers could seek to pursue their own separate interests, looking on Afghanistan as a zero-sum game. We should make no mistake; it certainly could be like that. Indeed, if the situation in Afghanistan unravels, it could end up being a negative-sum game for those countries. The creation of a black hole of political intrigue, anarchy and violence in Afghanistan could impact in very different but very significant ways on all its neighbours.

China, as we know, has considerable Islamic problems in its western province, but also has considerable investment in Afghan resources. Russia faces the potential of instability on its southern flank and also has a significant drugs problem. Iran has a minority group in Afghanistan and also feels the impact of the drugs trade. Turkey has growing regional influence. India has a long and historic, but also a current and dynamic, interest in Afghanistan. Part of our strategy for disengagement will thus depend very heavily on the extent to which the regional powers can co-exist and work together for a progressive solution for Afghanistan.

[Thomas Docherty]

Does my right hon. Friend share my concern about the role of Tehran in destabilising both Afghanistan and the wider region? Does he share my assessment that we cannot allow Tehran to continue down this destructive path indefinitely?

[Mr Spellar]

That is certainly to be encouraged, but Tehran will have a degree of involvement. It has a Persian minority within Afghanistan, it is a significant power within the region and it suffers considerably from the impact of the drugs trade on its own population. It will thus have to be engaged in its own interest.

[Paul Flynn]

My right hon. Friend will recall that when we went into Afghanistan, one of the reasons for doing so that we heard from the Dispatch Box was that Afghanistan provided 90% of the heroin coming into Britain. Will he remind us what percentage of heroin comes to this country from Afghanistan after the sacrifice of 375 British lives?

[Mr Spellar]

Still far too much, but I think my hon. Friend would also recognise the role of the Taliban in that trade and the money they obtain from it to fund their activities. As I point out again in this context, it is in the interest of the wider world and in the particular interests of the regional powers to act along the lines I mention and the regional powers obviously need to be engaged in the process.

Let me deal now with the Select Committee report. There has understandably been a debate about the decision to announce a deadline for British combat withdrawal by 2014 and about the manner in which it was taken. This features quite strongly in the report and was obviously the subject of the Prime Minister’s statement today, which was welcomed by the Leader of the Opposition.

I have to say, however, that the Government’s response was, frankly, inadequate—almost embarrassing—and if I were a member of the Select Committee, I would have been rather insulted by such an inadequate response to the very significant questions that it posed. The Select Committee might well want to pursue these at a future date. It reads very much as a “seat of the pants”, “top of the head”, “don’t bore me with the details” response.

Let us examine the Government’s response to paragraphs 156 and 157, which makes it clear that the 2014 decision was not made by the Cabinet or even the National Security Council. My right hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham quoted from it earlier. The decision

“was made by the Prime Minister following discussions with a number of senior Ministers”.

It is not even clear whether those discussions took place collectively or individually. Obviously, in this context, sofa government is alive and well.

Nowhere in their response do the Government answer the Select Committee’s questions about what advice they had received from the military before the decision, and we consider that a significant omission. Equally unclear—especially in the context of the many references today to our engagement with the United States—is the answer to the question asked in the Select Committee about what consultation the United Kingdom had had with the United States. I do not know whether there has been any subsequent communication from the Government to the Committee on the subject, but the reply given on May 2011 did not match the significant questions that the Committee had posed. That is no way to run a war, and it is certainly no way to treat a Select Committee.

Further questions arise from today’s statement by the Prime Minister. First, it is clear that a dozen helicopters were ordered by the previous Secretary of State. The current Secretary of State, when he was the Opposition spokesman, raised the issue regularly—according to an estimate by my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), about 161 times—before the general election. Now he has put the order on hold. Given that the Prime Minister has committed British forces to two more fighting seasons, will the Government activate this order immediately? I gave the Minister notice of that question. I hope that he has a reply, not only for me but for the House, and, more important, for the troops.

Secondly, the Prime Minister announced a continuing military relationship with Afghanistan, and stressed that it would not involve a combat role for our troops. We have to ask—and the military too will seek an answer to this question—how force protection will be provided, and by whom it will be provided. We must also think again about the dangers of mission creep.

Because I want to give the Minister time to respond, I will end my speech now. The role of the Opposition in these matters is to support the national interest and, in particular, to take a long-term view of the issues and support our armed forces. However, on behalf of the country and our troops, we must also hold the Minister and the Government to account for their performance, and we look forward to the Minister’s reply to the questions that he has been asked.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Alistair Burt)]

I thank the House for its attention. I agree with the right hon. Member for Warley (Mr Spellar) that it is a pity that the debate fell where it did in the timetable, but, although there was huge interest in the Prime Minister’s statement earlier, I do not think that that detracts in any way from the importance of what we have been discussing or the manner in which it has been discussed.

Before I deal with the substance of the debate, I want to respond to the speeches made by my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway), the Chairman of the Select Committee, and the right hon. Member for Warley, the Opposition spokesman. My hon. Friend led the debate extremely well, referring to the Foreign Affairs Committee’s important report and guiding us through a number of the issues. I shall deal later with some of the points that he raised about transition, political reconciliation and the drawdown issues, but first I want to deal with his point about intelligence. I know that he raised it with the Prime Minister earlier today.

My hon. Friend observed that, understandably, we rely on intelligence reports to guide actions and give ourselves a sense of whether, for example, al-Qaeda might still be in the area. He asked how this intelligence could be scrutinised, particularly given the intelligence queries in respect of Iraq, and he wondered whether there was further scope for parliamentary activity. I have to say that I doubt that. We undertake rigorous analysis through the Joint Intelligence Committee to assess the terrorist threat to the UK, drawing on analysis from across the agencies, the MOD and the joint terrorism analysis centre. Ministers receive that advice to inform their decision making. We have all learned the lessons from the experiences over Iraq, and we continue to carry out the most rigorous scrutiny of these issues. The assessment is that while the threat has diminished, it has not disappeared.

Although I wish I could, I cannot see how the intelligence on which Ministers operate daily could be made available for the immediate analysis my hon. Friend has in mind. I understand his point, however. The onus is on the Government to handle the intelligence correctly because information is made available subsequently, and the process for confirming the information on which Ministers act at the time is rigorous. At present, however, I cannot see any means whereby Members might be more involved. I will address the substance of my hon. Friend’s remarks in the course of my speech.

I will also deal with the points the Opposition spokesman, the right hon. Member for Warley, made about Pakistan and regional powers, but first let me deal with the specific issue about the Chinooks, which he was good enough to raise with me in advance, so that I can give him clarification and make clear what the Prime Minister said today. Nothing has changed since the announcement we made in the strategic defence and security review. We plan to buy 12 additional Chinook helicopters, as the Prime Minister confirmed today, and a further two to replace those lost on operations in Afghanistan in 2009. The MOD is working towards the main investment decision on the helicopters. In the meantime, Boeing is under contract to continue all critical path work to ensure that the delivery time scale for the aircraft is met. So that is a definite commitment, but no order has been placed, and we are exactly where we were before the Prime Minister spoke today.

[Mr Spellar]

Can the Minister therefore give us any idea, even within broad parameters, of when it is likely that that order will be confirmed, and helicopters will start to arrive for our troops?

[Alistair Burt]

In all fairness, I cannot. This is a matter for the Secretary of State for Defence. The investment decision is in the process of being made. Our troops, of course, have helicopters. The aircraft we are currently discussing will be deployed in Afghanistan in the very long term, if they are deployed at all bearing in mind the time scales of our commitment to Afghanistan. There is no issue about the availability of helicopters now, however. As the Prime Minister said, the situation is much improved from that in previous years. We believe that the kit that is available to troops is entirely appropriate; adding to it through the future Chinooks will be important, but the availability of kit now is absolutely right.

I do not want to say too much about the question the right hon. Gentleman raised about decision making in respect of 2015. That would open up a debate on decision making by Government, in which I do not believe his predecessors would come out terribly well. We are therefore content to rely on the perfectly proper answer in the response to the report.

As always, debates on Afghanistan and Pakistan attract contributions with no little passion, and occasionally a lot of soul searching, from Members with a wealth of experience and insight to offer on the UK’s most important foreign policy commitment. I am therefore indebted to all colleagues who have spoken in our brief, but important, debate. We have looked at origins, intentions and policy. We have queried success and failure. We have looked ahead with varying degrees of optimism or pessimism to where we might be going and why, and the contributions from all have been good, even though I have disagreed with some of the judgments made.

In responding to my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South and his Committee, I wish to reaffirm our strategy and relate developments on it to some of the issues highlighted by colleagues in the debate and in the report itself. I then wish to pursue one or two specific points that colleagues have made today. I apologise in advance for not being able to cover every question, but I will write to colleagues who asked specific questions that I am not able to deal with now.

Our strategy for Afghanistan, as repeated clearly by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister this week in Afghanistan and again this afternoon, is clear and straightforward: we are in Afghanistan, with others, to ensure our own national security by helping the Afghans to take control of theirs, so that Afghanistan cannot be used in the future as the base for al-Qaeda terrorist attacks, which have taken too many lives in the United Kingdom and around the world. That aim is pursued through three inter-linked strands, which incidentally but not coincidentally do make for the better Afghanistan that my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) understandably seeks. Those strands are: political progress; development aid to help create and ensure the progress of a viable state; and, of course, security. This Government are totally focused, on behalf of all their citizens and especially those who are sacrificing so much in delivering on that aim.

Having looked at the Committee’s report and having listened to today’s debate, I wish to offer responses on progress under the following headings, which I think cover most of the things that colleagues have raised: transition and security, including issues relating to draw-down; political settlement and reconciliation; development progress towards a viable state; and Pakistan, which is a fundamental element.

On transition, the shared aim of the United Kingdom, the Afghan Government and our international colleagues is to ensure that the Afghan national security forces are in the security lead in all provinces by the end of 2014. We are making good progress towards that aim. The first tranche of areas to begin the transition process was announced by President Karzai in March, and implementation is due to begin on 20 July. It is testament to the excellent work that British forces are doing in Helmand that Lashkar Gah will be among that first tranche. Like all colleagues who have spoken today, I wish to pay tribute to all British military personnel who have served in Afghanistan. Their courage and dedication has allowed for the progress that has been made so far. The training and development of the Afghan national security forces is at the heart of the transition process. Since December 2009, those forces have grown by more than 100,000 personnel and will grow by an additional 70,000 in the next year. Quality is also rising, as is the Afghans’ pride in their armed forces.

Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd June 2011 Westminster Hall

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. I have been in a number of debates with you, but never with you in the role of a mute, so this is a new experience.

This debate, apart from being very interesting, has shown the value of delegations of Members of Parliament. If I may say so to the Minister, that is a message that needs to be heard both by the Foreign Office and by the House authorities. Participation in such delegations enables hon. Members to expand their horizons and brings a much more well informed atmosphere to the debates in the House in their various venues.

I congratulate the hon. Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman) on securing this debate on a country and region—the wider subject of the debate—that receives too little attention considering its crucial location, importance and, as we have heard, potential for conflict. It is also significant in terms of European energy supplies. I make no apology for highlighting that fact. When President Obama was speaking just outside this Chamber in Westminster Hall recently, he dealt head-on with the issue of the importance of energy supplies to countries when he observed of the middle east that the west squarely acknowledges that

“yes, we have enduring interests in the region—to fight terror, sometimes with partners who may not be perfect; to protect against disruptions of the world’s energy supply.”

It is a perfectly proper aspect of foreign policy that we should be concerned about that.

As has been mentioned, both Britain and the EU have considerable interests in that regard. The EU countries are considerably helped by the diversity of supply, both from the existing pipelines and, potentially, from the Nabucco pipeline providing a route for gas, not only from Azerbaijan but from the Caspian region as a whole. That gives the promise of a more balanced and diverse gas supply for western Europe and, we hope, will avoid some of the problems that Europe has experienced with interruption of supply, which has periodically caused such difficulties, particularly in the accession states. That problem will potentially be exacerbated by the recent decision of Germany to shut down its nuclear reactors, with the inevitable and immediate impact on gas demand in Europe.

Therefore, the situation that I have described is good news for those countries and for us. The hope is that as the European region gets more competitive sources of supply and more diverse sources of supply, we will also start to see more stabilisation of prices, rather than some of the spikes in prices that we are seeing and the way in which, bluntly, those are exploited by the ever-greedy utility companies to introduce substantial increases in the charges for domestic gas supplies in particular. That will be important for us all. It is therefore encouraging that the EU will be supporting the Azerbaijan Government to move the Nabucco project ahead.

In that context, it was pleasing to see the report this month that the EU Energy Commissioner had characterised Azerbaijan as “the EU’s key partner” on regional energy projects, while delivering endorsements of the Nabucco project. It was also reported earlier this month that the legal framework for the pipeline had been finalised, with the support of the relevant Ministries of the transit countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Turkey. All that is extremely welcome news.

Britain, of course, also has a significant role. I partly take issue with the hon. Member for Wimbledon (Stephen Hammond) on project management. AMEC, for example, has been a major presence in Azerbaijan for some time, operating out of Baku. Perhaps it has been there so long that he does not look on what it is doing as a recent innovation, but it has been immensely successful and is seen as a major partner by the Azerbaijanis.

[Stephen Hammond]

I recognise that there are 175 companies beyond BP in Azerbaijan. My point was not about those that are there already, but that there are significant opportunities, particularly in areas where we have a worldwide competitive advantage.

[Mr Spellar]

There is always opportunity, but we should equally recognise when people are taking advantage of that opportunity. The hon. Gentleman rightly points out that BP is a major supplier, but this is about more than being first among equals. The UK accounts for some 52% of all foreign investment in Azerbaijan. BP’s stake is enormous. It will be one of the largest terminals that it will be operating on behalf of the Azerbaijanis.

Reference has rightly been made to the very significant presence in British tertiary education institutions from Azerbaijan. I have seen an estimate that some 80% of Azerbaijani students who study abroad study in the UK. That was highlighted by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford South (Mr Sutcliffe). In the strategic context, we must remember the importance of Azerbaijan as a route for supplies and forces going into Afghanistan. That is not insignificant in terms of Britain’s interest.

We must also consider the broader security situation. Nagorno-Karabakh has been mentioned. In many ways, that is a synonym for many of the difficulties faced right across the south Caucasus. We are aware of the recent history. What was said about the end of the cold war? It led to a period of less threat and less peace. Certainly the region that we are discussing experienced that. I am thinking of the two wars in Nagorno-Karabakh, with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the considerable number of displaced persons. The hon. Member for Harrow East rightly drew attention to the UN resolutions. He also mentioned the Minsk group, which is currently the main forum for resolution of the conflict, although we have to recognise that, unfortunately, progress has been fairly limited in that context.

This debate is particularly timely, in that the meeting on Nagorno-Karabakh has been taking place in Kazan, I think, yesterday and today, with Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia. I hope that the Minister will be able to enlighten us on that. We obviously hope that there has been progress, but it would be interesting to be updated on whether there has been any progress or developments at that meeting.

Before I yield to the Minister—I want him to have the full amount of time to deal with the many points that have been made—I want to sound a cautionary note. We should accept that in the Caucasus, progress will quite often take more time than we would hope. It will be slow—certainly slower than we would hope— and evolutionary. Russia may no longer be one of the two superpowers, but it is still, not only in its own estimation but objectively, a major and very significant power, a P5 member and a nuclear power. It is also clearly the regional power and has very clear interests in what it would regard as the near abroad. Therefore, its views, interests and perspectives have to be taken fully into account. That is the reality not only for the countries of the south Caucasus, but for those countries that are engaged there diplomatically or economically. It is therefore crucial that we have full engagement with Russia, recognising its legitimate interests but also representing ours, as well as the understandable concerns of other countries in the region. I hope that the Minister will be able to report the Government’s actions in this regard.

The debate has demonstrated the considerable interest that Members of Parliament take in Azerbaijan, and they are very well informed about it. We look forward to the Minister’s reply.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 14th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Bellingham]

I share my hon. Friend’s great concern, because catch-and-release simply encourages further piracy. I recently visited the EU Operation Atalanta naval headquarters at Northwood, and the Minister for the Armed Forces made it very clear to me that the Royal Navy and other navies are doing all that they possibly can not just to capture pirates but to gather sufficient evidence for them to be put on trial in courts in the region. That is why I and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary are working very hard with regional countries to build the vital penal and judicial capacity.

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

I regret that the Minister’s reply was rather complacent. At a conference in Singapore last month, his colleague the Defence Secretary will have heard several Asian Defence Ministers express alarm at the considerable rise of piracy in the Indian ocean. Suggested solutions have included a greater use of convoys, Q-ships and private security; particularly importantly, changed and toughened rules of engagement; and possibly exclusion zones. The international community is united on the need for the matter to be brought to a head. As we are a major maritime nation, when will the Government get a grip and take a lead to combat this menace, particularly by getting international agreement and changed rules of engagement?

[Mr Bellingham]

I can understand the right hon. Gentleman’s frustration. As I explained, there has not been a successful hijack in the gulf of Aden artery this year, because activity has been displaced into the ocean, and we are having significant successes. I can tell him that the EU agreed in May to amend its operational plan to deliver more robust action. I cannot discuss that publicly, but it is largely the result of efforts being made by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that we are very much on the case.

Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

This debate certainly covers a vast number of countries of interest, but it does not include China, which my right hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire South (Mr Alexander), the shadow Foreign Secretary, is visiting today, as he mentioned in last week’s exchanges. It is also unfortunate that so much other business has been put on today’s agenda, given what is clearly a timely, popular and well-supported debate.

I accept that we are in somewhat uncharted territory, and we recognise the difficulty for the Government of making decisions in response to rapidly changing circumstances, but it is nevertheless necessary that those decisions are taken speedily and coherently and that they are implemented effectively. For Parliament to scrutinise the Government’s performance properly, it is important that the Government share their thinking and the evolution of their doctrine in assessing options and that they ensure a firm grip on delivery.

I know that a considerable number of Members wish to speak, that they have an interest and considerable expertise in the subjects covered by the debate and that there is a time limit, so without more ado I will cover some, although not all, of the countries involved. Inevitably, given the dramatic death of Osama bin Laden, we must start with Afghanistan.

At the outset, let me make it clear that we believe that the allied forces were right to go into Afghanistan in response to 9/11, and that the UN was right to set up ISAF with the following mandate, which we should remind ourselves of today:

“Stressing that all Afghan forces must adhere strictly to their obligations under human rights law, including respect for the rights of women, and under international humanitarian law,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan,

Determining that the situation in Afghanistan still constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to ensure the full implementation of the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force, in consultation with the Afghan Interim Authority established by the Bonn Agreement”.

That mandate, in its essence, remains relevant today.

The UK took the lead in the initial phase of ISAF, and our forces have played a prominent and—I am sure that hon. Members in all parts of the House recognise this—distinguished role since then. They show great skill, courage and determination in their operations, and some have made the ultimate sacrifice, including the Royal Marines sergeant mentioned by the Foreign Secretary. Others have suffered serious injuries that will affect their whole lives, as was highlighted in the statement made earlier. Because my constituency is very close to Birmingham, I recently talked to a nurse there who works at Queen Elizabeth hospital in Birmingham, who described how heartbreaking it is to see these once-fit young men who have desperate injuries but who remain enormously positive and resolute. We owe them a huge debt. The nation must honour the military covenant, and today’s statement is an important step in that process. I also join the Foreign Secretary in his tribute to aid workers in Afghanistan, a number of whom have died in trying to bring help to the people of Afghanistan. They have shown enormous dedication and courage.

We must look to the manner and timing of the handover of the governance of Afghanistan to the Afghan authorities, army and police. One of our key objectives was to prevent al-Qaeda from using Taliban-run Afghanistan as a base from which to launch terrorist attacks around the world. While Osama bin Laden’s death has not finished al-Qaeda, it has certainly dealt it a serious blow. It also confirms previous intelligence suggesting that nearly all of al-Qaeda has left Afghanistan. That probably means that Washington will start phased troop withdrawals in the next couple of months. We must be clear that the process is determined by the situation on the ground, not by the calendar, but also that it will start to happen shortly.

It is clear that intense internal discussions are going on in Washington, and some elements of those discussions are starting to emerge. Senator John Kerry, the chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, last week described as “fundamentally unsustainable” the US’s current expenditure of $10 billion a month on what he called a massive military operation with no end in sight. He made it clear that he was not advocating a “unilateral precipitous withdrawal”, but that the US ought to be working towards achieving what he described as the “smallest footprint possible”. The ranking Republican Senator, Richard Lugar, who also has huge experience on that committee, reinforced the message, saying:

“The question before us is whether Afghanistan is important enough to justify the lives and massive resources that are being spent there, especially given our nation’s debt crisis.”

The atmosphere in Washington shows that people feel that the death of bin Laden will have a significant effect on the setting of milestones and the pace and slope of the US troop withdrawal.

I hope that in his reply the Secretary of State for International Development will outline, as far as is prudent and possible, our plans in this regard and the considerations that will shape the progress of the draw-down. Will he also, without being definitive, indicate the intended completion date, although we recognise that that will, of its essence, be tentative and might be varied in either direction? We all know that the British public are realistic and resolute, but it is also clear that they now want to see our boys, and increasingly our girls, starting to come home.

Will the Minister indicate what role he sees for the neighbouring powers—obviously Pakistan, but also Iran, Russia, China, India and possibly Turkey, as well as the various “stans”—in this process of a resolution for Afghanistan? They all have significant interests, which are not entirely geopolitical, and many also have kinship with ethnic groups within Afghanistan. However, their interests are not necessarily coincidental and will have to be carefully handled. It is in no one’s interests, neither in the wider world nor in the neighbouring powers, for Afghanistan once again to be a centre of instability and a haven for international terrorism. We need to decide what outcome is desirable and practicable and, together with the United States and the international community, move resolutely towards it.

In that context, what should be the basis of a settlement? First, there should be a new and more inclusive internal political arrangement in which enough Afghan citizens have a stake and the central Government have enough power and legitimacy to protect the country from threats within and without. Secondly, on which the first depends, there should be a new external settlement that commits Afghanistan’s neighbours to respecting its sovereign integrity, as outlined in the UN resolution that I have mentioned, and carries enough force and support to ensure that they abide by that commitment.

In the UN’s words, the internal settlement will require

“a process by which the ex combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income”.

It will then require reconciliation, including ensuring that tribal, ethnic and other groups are represented and recognised. Parliament and parliamentarians should also be recognised and encouraged. Several Members of Parliament participated in the sessions with the group of Afghan parliamentarians who were over here last month and who are developing a vibrant approach to their democracy. That event was extremely welcome, and we congratulate the organisers, but a lot more needs to be done by us and by the international community to sustain the process. As has been self-evident in many exchanges about this in the Chamber, there must also be a sustained drive to cut corruption.

In many ways, we have been looking from the wrong end of the telescope at events in what I will describe, in historical terms, as the north-west frontier region. We are considering events in Pakistan in the light of their impact on Afghanistan, whereas the crucial issue is how Afghanistan will affect Pakistan, which is a country of 160 million people—it is the second largest Muslim country—with a significant military, including nuclear, capability. It is also, as the Foreign Secretary has rightly acknowledged on behalf of Britain, a country that has suffered considerable losses from fundamentalist terrorism, and it continues to do so even in recent days. We need to think very seriously about Pakistan’s concerns and prospects. This is not helped by some of the knee-jerk responses to the death of bin Laden that we have seen in the media, with too many people making facile assertions regarding subjects about which they do not have, and may well never have, the full picture. Idle speculation on this matter is not helpful in forming an effective, considered judgment, and it is certainly not helpful in the internal politics of the region.

I therefore welcome the fact that the United States appears determined to continue to support Pakistan rather than to repeat the mistake that it made following the end of the Soviet invasion by cutting aid substantially and drastically. I note the welcome news in today’s Financial Times that Senator Kerry is about to visit Pakistan. However, there is also a clear obligation on Pakistan, in terms of good governance, to improve its administration, especially in relation to tax collection; to improve educational opportunities, particularly in taking education away from fundamentalist madrassahs and thereby ensuring proper education for its young people; to enable and sustain a more pluralist society; and to engage in dialogue significantly to reduce tension with India, which occupies so much attention and resources in both countries.

[Malcolm Bruce]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that commentators in the British press who attack aid support for Pakistan and Afghanistan are missing the point in that if we do not deliver education, hope and livelihoods to those countries, the chances of reducing terrorism and disintegration are lower, not higher?

[Mr Spellar]

I certainly do. This is an argument that needs to be had right across the world. Recently in Australia, there was a big attack on the aid programme to Indonesia—again, it is substantial—which is designed to ensure proper secular, state-run education, so that youngsters do not only get their education in fundamentalist organisations. It is enormously important that we sustain that programme for the future of that country, the largest Muslim country, as it is for the future of Pakistan, the second largest Muslim country. That is essential not only for the long-term security of the region but for international security. I was encouraged by the comments of the Foreign Secretary on that subject, and I hope that the Secretary of State for International Development will enlarge on them in his response.

Turning to the middle east and north Africa, it has been rightly said that the death of bin Laden was a serious setback for al-Qaeda, but the most telling blow has been the Arab spring, with its demands for democracy and more open societies, and certainly not for al-Qaeda’s dream of a return to mediaeval brutality. We should be realistic about the various elements that are involved in that movement and the possible course of developments.

I congratulate the Foreign Secretary on his Mansion House speech. I notice that he recycled quite a bit of it in his speech this evening. That is obviously part of the Government’s commitment to be greener. However, the speech bears repetition. As he rightly said:

“Demands for open government, action against corruption and greater political participation will spread by themselves over time, not because Western nations are advocating them but because they are the natural aspirations of all people everywhere.”

In that context, we should recognise that the events in the middle east and north Africa are not isolated. A tide has been sweeping around the world.

In spite of some disappointments, we should reflect on how much progress has been made around the world over the past couple of decades. Most countries in south America have emerged from military dictatorship, are overcoming their ruthless, destructive guerrilla groups and are building a better future. Interestingly, in his famous Chicago speech in 1999, Tony Blair referred to the need for

“more effective ways of resolving crises, like that in Brazil.”

Brazil is now a roaring economic power, and it has just celebrated the election of a new successive social democratic President. The countries of eastern Europe have returned to their European home, having thrown off the shackles of their corrupt, vicious, incompetent communist leaderships and the Warsaw pact. They have willingly joined NATO and the EU. Indonesia, which I mentioned in response to the right hon. Member for Gordon (Malcolm Bruce), is the world’s fourth most populous state and the largest Muslim state. In 10 years, it has gone from being a military-backed dictatorship to being a vibrant democracy with a rapidly expanding economy. It is now a G20 member and an effective partner against terrorism. There has been a seismic, historic shift in the international landscape, and we should recognise and welcome that.

That is why we fully supported and support the Government’s decision to join international partners to enforce United Nations resolutions 1970 and 1973 in Libya. Those who query resolution 1973 and this country’s rapid decision to act must consider how we would have felt, and how the world would have reacted, if Gaddafi’s tanks and death squads had poured into Benghazi over that weekend and killed people, to use his words, “like rats”. In this day and age, that would all have been carried out on 24-hour TV in real time.

While giving support, it is our responsibility, as a Parliament and as an Opposition, to scrutinise carefully the Government’s conduct and effectiveness in fulfilling the task. We need from the Government a clearer and better articulated strategy. Frankly, we need them to explain how their self-imposed cuts to our expeditionary capability will enable them to implement the policy. The article that the Prime Minister wrote with the French and US Presidents in April said:

“So long as Gaddafi is in power, Nato and its coalition partners must maintain their operations so that civilians remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds”.

It is incumbent on the Government to be clearer to this House and to the British people about how they propose to bring about such a resolution of this situation, especially in the light of the comments over the weekend.

It was asked earlier, but I think it needs to be asked again, what is meant by “infrastructure targets”. If it means command and control posts within a military structure, I understand that. I think it is arguable—I hope that the Attorney-General would back me—that that is perfectly within the bounds of the UN resolution. If, as some commentators have suggested, it means industrial infrastructure, and particularly electricity infrastructure, we have considerable doubts. Even in Kosovo, which was a major operation, the object was to immobilise the transmission systems not to destroy them, because after military operations are over, there is a need to reconstruct the country. It is difficult to do that without adequate electricity supplies. It is therefore important that we have clarity on what is meant by infrastructure. One meaning is perfectly within the current programme, but otherwise we have considerable questions and doubts.

It has to be clear that there is continuing international and regional support for our strategy. I can see no UN mandate for ground troops to move into Libya, and I think it is fair to say that there is no chance of getting such a mandate at the Security Council and no prospect of regional support. We must recognise that there is little appetite among the British public for such a course of action, and I suspect that the situation is similar in the United States and France.

I hope that the Secretary of State for International Development will update the House on the considerable efforts of his Department, with others in the international community, to assist the 750,000 people who are estimated to have crossed from Libya into neighbouring countries, and to get supplies to people in parts of Libya that are under siege from Libyan Government forces. I do not underestimate the task, but we need to know how we are tackling it, because it is substantial and urgent.

What are our realistic options across the middle east and north Africa? Although it is true that we are one of the few countries with the strategic capability to provide meaningful intervention, we must recognise the constraints imposed by our existing commitments elsewhere, the clear problems of overstretch, and the cuts made in the strategic defence and security review, which are increasingly seen as ill advised and outdated. Whatever action we take will be in conjunction with others, and not only our key strategic ally, the United States, but increasingly the EU, or at least key European allies. It has become clear, particularly in the last week or so, that a stretched United States has self-imposed limitations. Our European deliberations will have to consider that, and our response will have to be shaped accordingly. It is true that we could take a position of splendid isolation and say that those issues are nothing to do with us, but developments would continue in north Africa and the middle east. Although we should not overestimate our ability to shape events, we should not underestimate it either.

A key area is to develop capacity for the emerging democratic forces and parties in the countries concerned. It would be tragic if the principal beneficiaries of the new democracies were the remnants of the old dictatorial parties or underground fundamentalist Islamist groups. We should draw on the experience of eastern Europe, where post-communist parties were able to exert disproportionate influence because of their well-developed corrupt networks. I am sure all parties hope that the Westminster Foundation for Democracy will play a major role in building capacity for democratic parties.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

I am listening with great interest to the right hon. Gentleman. I am slightly concerned that he may not have learned the lessons of the past, in particular with respect to Iraq, where a thoroughgoing programme of de- Ba’athification stripped out the whole of the middle class and political class, making reconstruction far more difficult than it might have been. Does he not think that we should be cautious about completely stripping out individuals who may have been associated in some small way with an unsavoury old regime?

[Mr Spellar]

The hon. Gentleman has misunderstood what I was saying. I fully agree that the de-Ba’athification programme and the disbanding of the Iraqi army contributed substantially to many of Iraq’s problems. I am turning that point around and saying that I do not want the established networks of the old corrupt parties or the well-organised networks of the Islamist groups, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, to have a free field.

What I am talking about is not taking such people out of the structure but ensuring that emerging democratic forces, which by definition have been underground but are not organised in a Leninist fashion, can develop the capacity to compete on an equal playing field. They will then be able to play a proper role and not be outgunned—literally, sometimes, but certainly in finance and capacity —by other parties, which would have a detrimental effect. I am talking about building alternative capacity rather than moving along the route that the hon. Gentleman describes. That is the best prospect for the future of democracy in the countries in question.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Is my right hon. Friend aware that in Tunisia, there is serious concern about the resurrection of many of the security forces that existed under the Ben Ali regime, which are treating protests and demonstrations with great brutality and great force? They are breaking them up and seem to be trying to suppress the very voices of dissent that brought about the huge changes in February in the first place.

[Mr Spellar]

We certainly ought to be concerned about that; my hon. Friend highlights another significant concern. Because of the vast array of countries across a wide and diverse region, our debates focus on certain countries. Inevitably, today’s debate will be focused primarily on Afghanistan and Libya, along with maybe one or two other countries. I am concerned that some of the countries that have been making some progress might start to slip off the radar, and it is important that we do not allow that to happen.

We must not allow our level of interest in the countries that are making progress to fall. Development there must be sustained, because there will not just be a steady path towards a democratic society. There will be pitfalls along the way. To make a comparison with eastern Europe again, the involvement of the secret police networks can be a considerable factor in the development of those countries, as I described earlier. We ought to be alert to that problem, but we should also take the positive way and build the capacity of democratic parties so that they can take the best advantage of democratic elections when they come.

I hope that Members of all parties will consider the role that the Westminster Foundation for Democracy and other such bodies can play in building capacity for democratic parties. The Foreign Secretary has announced substantial cuts in the Foreign Office programme—the sum will go down from something like £139 million to £100 million. We did not get details, but we need to know whether the cuts will have an impact on those organisations and their programmes.

In the Foreign Secretary’s statement last week, he talked about increasing our presence in a number of missions across the world. Interestingly enough, only one of those, Pakistan, is in the area that we are discussing today. There was, understandably, mention of a reduction in Afghanistan and Iraq, but in none of the other countries concerned did it seem there would be an increase in our local involvement despite the considerable interest that we need to be taking in them. On the face of it, that seems a slightly strange decision, and it would be helpful to have some explanation.

We have to recognise that not all of the liberation of eastern Europe went smoothly. Ethnic tensions rose to the surface, and in one case, Czechoslovakia, were resolved by a—fortunately peaceful—division of the state. Catastrophically, however, in Yugoslavia they led to vicious civil wars, appalling violence and the necessity for NATO intervention. Some states in north Africa and the middle east are fairly homogenous, but others are riven by ethnic differences and, in some cases, considerable and long-standing ethnic feuds. The international community must use all its endeavours to ensure that the outcome of the Arab spring is more like Poland than Yugoslavia. In that context, I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s comments about Tunisia and hope, as I said to my hon. Friend the Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), that we will not focus only on countries where there is conflict. We must also provide assistance to those that are making a more orderly transition.

I shall move on briefly to the middle east and the Israel-Palestine issue. I am sure that everyone in the House and internationally is frustrated by the failure to get engagement in substantive talks leading to the creation of a new Palestinian state, living peacefully side by side with Israel. We echo the Foreign Secretary’s statement yesterday, which he repeated today, when he expressed Britain’s concern about the violence on the border and the loss of life, and called on all parties to exercise restraint. We should be persuaders for peace, to ensure that Palestinian aspirations can be realised alongside Israel’s equally legitimate desire for a peaceful existence within secure and recognised borders.

[Mr Winnick]

I certainly do not question Israel’s right to exist—I have made my views about that clear over the years. It was brought into existence by the international community and has as much right to exist as any other state, but not in the occupied territories. How can Israel genuinely say that it wishes to bring about a two-state solution at some stage—not that it has put much emphasis on that—when so much of the occupied territories has had settlements built on it? On what site is the second state, the proposed Palestinian state, going to exist?

[Mr Spellar]

I say to my hon. Friend and near neighbour that in all the discussions on the middle east, and particularly on Palestine-Israel, there is a danger of what David Ervine of the Progressive Unionist party in Northern Ireland, who went from terrorist activities to a very significant role in the peace process, described as “whataboutery”. I could equally respond to my hon. Friend’s valid points by asking, what about this, that and the other? What about the failure to implement the Camp David accord? What about the terrorist activities?

At the end of the day, the international community and the parties concerned have to get back to the basic fundamental principle of ensuring the establishment of a two-state solution on borders agreed internationally and between the parties, with the states living together in harmony. I cannot put it better than UN Security Council resolution 1850, which said that

“lasting peace can only be based on an enduring commitment to mutual recognition, freedom from violence, incitement, and terror, and the two-State solution”.

I very much hope, as I am sure we all do, that the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to Washington this month will intensify that process and involve a relaunch of the peace initiative by the Obama Administration. I am sure we all look forward to the President’s address on that subject.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

The right hon. Gentleman is speaking very sensibly on this subject. I have always supported a two-state solution. Does he agree that Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip, where there were many settlements, shows that if an agreement for withdrawal could be reached, settlements need not stand in the way?

[Mr Spellar]

Yes, and I presume that the hon. Gentleman would also have mentioned the fact that the Israeli army enforced those movements under the direction of Sharon. Pointing such things out is important, but it is equally important to get back to the fundamental need for talks and negotiation on the acceptance of a two-state solution. From many of the discussions that there have been, I do not believe that the sides are too far apart on the detail. We therefore look forward to the initiative that we hope the US Administration will take later this month, which we hope all parties will then pursue.

On Syria, we welcome the Foreign Secretary’s comments about making approaches to the EU and the UN to step up pressure on the regime. At the moment, however, the regime seems well past his “fork in the road”, and I hope that the message is getting through to it clearly.

I am mindful of the time, Mr Deputy Speaker, and of the numbers who wish to speak in the debate, so I wish to raise only two other issues—and to do so briefly. First, on protecting our security and national interest, and ensuring stability in the region, the Foreign Secretary will be unsurprised if I once again raise the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia. The problem now stretches right round the gulf of Aden and out into the Indian ocean, which has a considerable effect on countries in the region. Nearly 800 seafarers are being held hostage, often in appalling conditions. Some have been brutally murdered. More than 30 ships are being held—some are used as mother ships to extend the pirates’ reach far into the Indian ocean. Ransoms totalling well over $100 million were paid last year, and there are credible reports that the pirates have entered a deal with the al-Shabab organisation in Somalia, which is linked to al-Qaeda, for a percentage of the ransom.

Therefore, in effect, the shipping industry is directly funding terrorism. There has been some response, but I feel that it has been inadequate. I had a helpful response from an Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but I was concerned when a Defence Minister told me that there had been no recent change in the rules of engagement. I recognise that there is no easy instant solution, but there is a danger that the crisis will continue to outrun and overwhelm the response. Piracy threatens not only lives but a vital world trade route. Incidentally, the unwillingness of crews and ships to go through the Suez canal and pay dues could have a damaging effect on the income of the emerging Egyptian democracy. Frankly, the Government need to get a grip on that. They must engage with other maritime nations and get commitments for sufficient ships and personnel, but there must also be a step change in the rules of engagement and operational tempo.

To pull those arguments together and put them in a broader context, we do not accept that if we intervene anywhere in the world, we must take action everywhere. Nor do we accept the converse—that if we cannot or will not take action in one country, we should be immobilised elsewhere. That is why the previous Labour Government, when I was a Defence Minister, intervened militarily in Sierra Leone, but were unable to take action against the brutally repressive Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe.

I also accept—the Opposition have supported the Government in this respect—that a range of factors must be taken into consideration, and that countries must be considered on a case-by-case basis. However, we would like evidence not only of more coherent planning, but of more rigorous analysis. Around the time of Kosovo both Tony Blair, in his Chicago address, and Kofi Annan, in his Ditchley lecture, extensively developed the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. They might have been controversial, but they helped to create a framework within which policy could be decided, and indeed scrutinised and criticised.

I have not detected the development of such a doctrine in the speeches of the Foreign Secretary, including his speech today. The Opposition support much in his policy, but we require the Government as a whole to get their act together on policy and to be more effective on delivery. In short, we believe that it is time for them to get a grip.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

Escape of Taliban Prisoners

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 26th April 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

May I express our admiration and support for the work of our troops in countering the Taliban and inflicting heavy losses on them? Understandably, our troops will be concerned at the escape of some of those whom they risked their lives to capture. We fully recognise that these are early days in collecting information and framing a considered response. In that context, can the Minister give us an early assessment of the seniority, importance and capabilities of those who have escaped, especially as we approach the fighting season? We should be frank that this is a setback, but we also need to be clear about its significance.

Secondly, what assessment has been made about the—clearly failed—level of security at the prison, and what steps are being taken across Afghanistan to check on security arrangements at other prisons? Indeed, given the previous breakout, what had been done to make the prison more secure, and to vet the staff? Can the Minister give any assessment of those who have been recaptured—what level they are, and what level of co-operation has been given by the Afghan police and the local population in relation to their recapture?

Thirdly, has the Minister also asked for an assessment of recent intelligence gathering? Had any indication of an impending escape been picked up, and if so, was that information conveyed to the right level?

Fourthly, what discussions has the Minister had with our NATO allies, especially the US, about our immediate response and our assessment of the broader impact on progress in Afghanistan?

Finally, moving closer to home, has the Minister made, or will he be making, an assessment of the impact of the escape on the threat to our security in the United Kingdom?

[Alistair Burt]

I am grateful for the tone and the nature of the right hon. Gentleman’s questions, which mirror almost exactly the questions that we in the Department are asking. It is barely a day after the event, and the answers to his questions lie a little way in the future, but in fairness I must deal with them.

It is indeed crucial to find out who has escaped. Record keeping is not such that we can be supplied with a list immediately. It is a matter of huge concern to us to find out exactly who escaped, and their positions in the seniority of the Taliban. Estimates of who has been recaptured already vary. There are some estimates as low as 25 and others as high as 60, but we do not know. Again, it is just too early to find out, but we need to do that. The investigation into what happened will cover not only what has changed as a result of events but, as I indicated to my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer), what might be done in the future to make these places more secure.

The right hon. Member for Warley (Mr Spellar) made extremely good points about intelligence gathering. Again, we have not yet had the reports on what might have been picked up, but plainly it was not accurate enough to enable the escape to be prevented, or on threat levels to us, but those are at the top of our agenda.

What the incident demonstrates clearly is that in the process of working with Afghan authorities in the essential job that they do—taking responsibility for their own country, its security, its prison system and its justice system—it is vital for our engagement and the engagement of others to continue. Kandahar, the area concerned, is not the direct responsibility of the United Kingdom. Another nation is responsible for the provincial reconstruction team working with the authorities there, including the prison authorities.

Of course the incident is a huge setback, but it demonstrates why we continue to need to be engaged as much as any reason to say no, there should be no further engagement. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will join me, and the rest of the House, in saying that the work must continue and lessons must be learned every time there is an incident in order to prevent it from happening again, but ultimately Afghanistan must be responsible for its own security under a proper political process initiated by the Afghans themselves and supported by the international community.