Sudan and South Sudan

Martin Horwood Excerpts

Wednesday 7th December 2011 Westminster Hall

[Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Owen. I congratulate the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Mr Bain) on securing this timely debate, which is a reminder, if one were needed, that the securing of comprehensive peace agreements and the achievement of independence do not in themselves deliver peace and security or the welfare of the people involved. The situation in Sudan and South Sudan is, if anything, more worrying today than it was only a few months ago.

The hon. Gentleman rightly referred to the interaction between armed conflict—some of it state sponsored—and the creation of refugee situations, which are making the development picture and the welfare, health and security of the people even worse. He referred specifically to the attack on 10 November, when it was reported that there was a bombing raid on a refugee camp in South Sudan, apparently carried out by north Sudanese forces.

On that same day, a US satellite monitoring group also reported that the north was building up and upgrading its air bases and air resources in what could be perceived as the precursor to an even wider aerial bombing campaign. Those are worrying signs, especially when put in the context of the truly appalling record of the Bashir regime in north Sudan. Mr Bashir has repeatedly stated that there is no room for cultural or ethnic diversity in the Sudanese state, and has predicted the fall of South Sudan as a failed state.

Clearly, it is possible that Mr Bashir is himself trying to make that prediction come true and make it self-fulfilling. His record clearly indicates support for terrorist organisations and a closeness to Iran; Sudan is Iran’s only Arab ally. A staggering number of deaths have been caused by the conflicts to date. It is possible that some 2 million people have died in Sudan during this present conflict—possibly as many as 300,000 in Darfur alone.

The International Criminal Court has warrants out for Mr Bashir’s arrest, not only for war crimes but for crimes against humanity and, since July, for genocide; a further two ICC arrest warrants are still outstanding. The list of outstanding issues between South Sudan and the north is lengthy and worrying. It covers citizenship, the border, debt, oil revenues, security and the status of arms. Sudan has still not implemented key parts of the comprehensive peace agreement. Critically, an independent national human rights commission has still not been established, and there are serious unresolved issues in the provinces of South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

The hon. Gentleman rightly outlined many of the effects of this kind of uncertainty and conflict, the attitude of the Sudanese Government in the north and the way in which they interact with the situation. I will not repeat some of the appalling statistics that he cited. The question is: what do we think can be done about this and what can the Government do?

I know that the Minister has himself visited the region, as has the Secretary of State for International Development, which is welcome, and we have raised both the implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement and the issues of human rights with the Foreign Minister, Ali Karti, only in the past month. The situation, however, needs to progress and that does not seem to be happening at the moment. Simply making representations to the Sudanese Government does not seem to be having a great effect.

I think that we have other levers at our disposal. It is right that the focus of the Government’s international development assistance programme for Sudan and South Sudan should be concentrated on the south, where the development indicators are truly appalling. The worst statistic that I have seen comes from the Christian charity World Vision, which states that a 15-year-old girl in South Sudan

“has a higher chance of dying in childbirth than completing school”.

It also notes that

“One out of every seven women who become pregnant will probably die from pregnancy-related causes”,

and that

“While the under-five mortality rate has decreased, one out of every seven children will die before their fifth birthday (135 per 1,000 live births)”.

Nevertheless, some 35% of what I think is the £140 million a year committed to Sudan and South Sudan—some £50 million per annum—is committed to the north. Does the Minister have an assessment of how well that spending is going? Is it being targeted at measures that will help reduce conflict? The non-governmental organisation Saferworld has highlighted the need to control small arms in the north. Can our development assistance facilitate projects such as the Regional Centre on Small Arms, which will try to reduce the potential for conflict in small areas, at least in a small way?

It has been suggested that the role of the Arab League, which is now a very interesting organisation, might be stepped up. I think that, for many years, many people in this country and in the west wrote it off as a talking shop, but it has pursued a much more active policy over Libya and now over Syria. The potential for the Arab League to play a much more proactive role in trying to avert further conflict in Sudan and to put pressure on the Bashir regime is important.

There are other interesting forces in the region. I was at a symposium yesterday that involved members of the Muslim Brotherhood organisations and parties in the emerging democracies of Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is, of course, located close to Sudan. Those parties are trying to prove their democratic credentials and to reassure potential western allies that, if they play a part in government in what we hope will be new democracies, they will respect human rights, have due respect for the rights of minorities and observe the democratic process.

If those parties are seeking connections with the British Government and positive and reassuring relationships with us, perhaps one of the tasks that we could set them, in a friendly way, would be to seek whatever influence they can over the regime and the Islamist movements in Sudan, and to point out that political Islam does not have to be synonymous with repression, the denial of human rights and a determination to exclude the rights of minorities.

There are other factors. The debt issue is important, because Mr Bashir would like to have access to support from everyone—from the International Monetary Fund, to the World Bank, to the African Development Bank. That seems to give us some international leverage. Has the Minister had any conversations with any of those multilateral institutions to see whether there are ways in which they can exert some influence on the Government in the north? War and conflict have been described as “development in reverse”, which I think is accurate. If funds are to be invested in these countries with a view to growth and to debt being written off, it is important that it is done in a context that means it is likely to succeed. The current context seems to provide exactly the reverse of that.

I will not speak for much longer because I am sure that other hon. Members want to contribute. Beyond the usual representations, expressions of regret and concern, and the commitment to facilitate a comprehensive peace agreement—although those are all welcome—I would like to hear from the Minister whether we will start to use other levers more imaginatively to try to resolve some of what is happening in Sudan and South Sudan. At the moment, the situation seems to be spiralling into an ever deeper conflict, which I am afraid seems to suit the purposes of the regime in the north. That may be a very bad omen indeed for the prospects of having a free, independent and prosperous South Sudan.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Spellar]

As I used to say in ministerial times, I require notice of that question. However, if one already has a facility, which is a sunk cost, the most desirable outcome is to have a properly negotiated agreement to use that facility. One has to look at the distances, at which areas a pipeline would be running through and their safety and at the time scale involved, because constructing a new pipeline would be taken as an unfriendly act by Sudan. That might exacerbate tensions and could lead, for example, to cutting off the existing pipeline and therefore to no revenue at all—a potentially catastrophic situation for South Sudan. It is always worth examining alternatives—they might be viable—but they are not a real alternative to ensuring through whatever mechanisms, whether the UN, the African Union or the Arab League, that a modus vivendi is obtained between Sudan and South Sudan to ensure that oil, rather than a cause of contention, is a shared benefit.

[Martin Horwood]

Is the right hon. Gentleman concerned by the emergence of the so-called South Sudan Liberation Army in the relatively oil-rich states of Warrap and Unity, which the rebels are aiming to liberate—as they describe it—from the Government in Juba? They are advising civilians to evacuate towns and move to villages. Does that look like a deliberate campaign of destabilisation aimed at the oil revenues of the south?

[Mr Spellar]

I do not know what assessment has been made of the origins of that movement or who may or may not be supporting it, but it is absolutely clear that a continuation of the instability and fighting in those areas will not only disrupt the oilfields and revenue but, as we have seen so dramatically in South Sudan, southern Sudan and Darfur, completely disrupt all normal life, including agriculture, because of displaced populations. All that makes the area unviable and brings huge misery to the populations who, essentially, have to live in refugee camps, dependent on aid, and that is not a sustainable future.

A viable agreement between Sudan and South Sudan is therefore crucial. Sudan has a sizeable external debt—let us not argue about how it was acquired—which it has to service and South Sudan is totally dependent on oil for revenue, so both countries, for the viability of their Governments and their states, require a share of the oil revenue and a regular flow. It is argued that the interruptions to oil production have already led to sizeable reductions, with estimates of about a quarter, but I am not sure of the exact figure. Unless agreement is reached, those ongoing problems will continue; it is in both their interest to undertake an agreement. I referred to external and internal reconciliation, and no conflict between the two states is not alone in being hugely important. We have had worrying reports of attacks, although there are arguments that some are in response to guerrilla movements and attacks, but the facts need to be ascertained, and considerable international and regional pressure on the participants to lower the tension is needed.

One problem in so many areas of conflict once a peace agreement is signed, however, is the large number of people whose whole life had been bound up with military operations. I am pleased to see several colleagues from Northern Ireland in the Chamber, and a key factor is to create conditions of normalisation, in which arguments are settled in a normal fashion and become the norm or established practice. Year on year, people then gradually move away from their old way of life. Simply preventing people from shooting each other becomes important in establishing the norms of society; otherwise, the trouble could continue—a lot of it based on tribal differences running from generation to generation. However, tribal differences previously settled with traditional weapons are now settled with AK47s, causing huge devastation and the mass migration of populations, which become dependent populations. That is why it is so important for a real effort, using the experience from work in other areas of conflict, gradually to reintegrate groups who have been involved in guerrilla movements or in over-extended armies back into the population and for them to assume civilian roles. Again, that is why the reconstruction of agriculture, which my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North East mentioned, is so important, to provide alternative occupations and a security environment.

One of the difficulties on which I hope the Minister can comment is to do with those who did not participate in the violence or become involved in the various guerrilla movements and armed gangs if they are seeing all the benefits go to the people who were involved. That is not an unfamiliar story in many parts of the world. Getting the balance right is enormously difficult, but also enormously important and significant. So any programme must be community-based, as well as involving the participants, important though they are.

Another feature of the development of agriculture is, as has been mentioned, the appalling transport infrastructure. In many parts of the developing world, one of the key constraints on developing agriculture is access to market—the ability, when the harvest comes in, to get large quantities of produce to market and not to have it rot in the fields or during transport to market. We are all very much aware of the state of the infrastructure in South Sudan, and a significant priority in improving living standards and creating opportunities for people is the development of transport.

What is key and what I hope the Minister will report on in his contribution is that the effort has to be sustained. If the area descends once again into feuding civil war, I recognise the danger that the interest and, indeed, patience of the public in the wider world will start to run out. That is a key message that the Foreign Office must convey to the countries in the region in the best possible way—not threateningly, but in a matter-of-fact way—so that the people of South Sudan who have suffered so much for so long have some decent opportunities not only for themselves but for their children.