Iran (Proposed Nuclear Agreement)

John Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 16th June 2015 Westminster Hall

[Guto Bebb]

I agree with many of my hon. Friend’s points, and I agree that the benefits arising from a good deal are worth fighting for. However, I suspect that many Members have concerns about the nature of the proposed deal and about the certainty that any such deal offers Iran’s neighbours, who also have real concerns, as he acknowledged. I accept the point about mistakes made in the past, and the importance of having a proper deal in place. However, the key point is that the deal must be acceptable to all and must give other countries in that part of the world confidence in the long term.

There is also a concern about the proposed length of the deal; we are looking at a deal that will possibly be limited to 10 years. Again, in the context of considering the development of nuclear capacity, we must ask ourselves whether 10 years is reasonable or sufficient. Given that the deal does nothing, as far as I can see, to deal with Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, there is a real question as to whether 10 years is insufficient.

If the aim is to secure the right deal, can we justify the type of concessions that we have been reading about? Hon. Members touched on verification in their interventions, but we need certainty from the Foreign Office and the Government that there is confidence that the degree of verification allowed under any agreement will be acceptable. Once again, the track record of the Iranian regime does not allow us to be confident in that regard. I understand from those who comment and speculate on what happens in Iran that only last month the International Atomic Energy Agency was refused access, and Ayatollah Khamenei said:

“No inspection of any military site or interview with nuclear scientists will be allowed.”

The question whether we will have a proper verification process in any agreement gives rise to real concern. If we have an agreement with a proper verification process, it must be maintained and foolproof, but once again Iran’s track record does not give us much confidence.

The other question that we need to address is whether an agreement that is as compromising as the proposed agreement appears to be actually contributes to an escalation of the arms race in the region, rather than a reduction of tensions. The agreement appears to state clearly that putting Iran in a position in which it is within six months of a breakout for the next 10 years is acceptable. My concern, which I think is shared by hon. Members, is that other countries in the region would end up in an arms race—not to produce a nuclear weapon, but to be within six months of a breakout. It is worth mentioning that Prince Turki al-Faisal from Saudi Arabia stated clearly that

“Whatever the Iranians have, we will have, too”.

That comment should be taken seriously by the Government when they assess the merits or otherwise of the deal.

Any proposed deal has to satisfy the needs of the P5+1, a very unstable region and our allies in the region. However, the real test is whether it satisfies the original intention, which was to ensure that Iran did not develop a nuclear capacity. Dr Bruno Tertrais stated that we must not

“ignore the lessons of history: nuclear-capable countries never stay at the threshold for very long.”

Looking at the bare bones of the proposed agreement, it would appear that the P5+1 are now willing to accept Iran’s being at the threshold of a nuclear breakout and that that threshold will be maintained for the next 10 years. Dr Tertrais’s words are important in that context. Countries with the capacity to develop a nuclear weapon will almost invariably end up developing it.

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

The hon. Gentleman is slightly contradicted by the experience in both Libya and South Africa.

[Guto Bebb]

That is an interesting point, but I suspect that the significant political changes in South Africa made a real difference to how it viewed its position in the world. I suspect that the changes that happened in South Africa are not going to happen any time soon in Iran, so my comments are still worth bearing in mind.

To what extent is the Foreign Office confident that the proposed deal, the outlines of which have been given, will be made in the long-term interest of not only Iran, but neighbouring states in the middle east? If assurances about that cannot be given, there are real questions to be asked about whether we can support any proposed deal.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure, Mr Hollobone, to serve under the chairmanship of a fellow alumnus of Bromley Borough Council. I congratulate the hon. Member for Aberconwy (Guto Bebb) on securing the debate, although I will highlight one or two differences from his approach. I make apologies for my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West (Mr Thomas), who previously dealt with the subject; he has departed from the Front Bench to spend more time with the London mayoral election. Interestingly enough, this will also be my last debate from the Front Bench on foreign affairs, because I will be spending more time on politics, which I look forward to.

Given how the hon. Member for Aberconwy introduced the debate, I think that we may find more common ground between Front Benchers than between Front Benchers and Government Back Benchers—probably not the last time that will occur in this Parliament, particularly on foreign affairs. We have to define what we see as the objective of our relations with Iran, particularly in terms of the nuclear talks. Is any agreement a nuclear freeze or, as some have described it, weapons control? Is it to influence Iran’s foreign policy, and particularly its actions in respect of its neighbours, or is it to achieve regime change? All those things might be desirable, but they are not necessarily the prime objective of the talks. An analogy was made with eastern Europe and arms control, but that was immensely successful, as indeed were the Helsinki accords that helped to bring about perestroika and glasnost.

[Guto Bebb]

To clarify, the analogy with eastern Europe was made in the context of an agreement that was possibly successful as regards arms control, but was not especially good for the people of eastern Europe. An agreement now might be successful in controlling arms, but not be good for the people of the Gulf states, or indeed of Iran.

[Mr Spellar]

That may be true, but such an agreement is preferable to achieving none of those objectives. Not everything has to be agreed, particularly if we view the possession of nuclear weapons as a qualitative rather than simply quantitative change—it is not only another step. Throughout the history of arms control agreements, it has been recognised that the nuclear threshold is a particular and qualitatively different threshold in international relations. We could therefore have arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, even though it was repressing its own citizens and the citizens of eastern Europe and sponsoring terrorism abroad.

[Dr Fox]

Surely the aim is to stop a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty from gaining nuclear weapons capability, and thus making a mockery of the treaty and giving rise to a much wider risk of nuclear conflict in the region.

[Mr Spellar]

I take the right hon. Gentleman’s exact point. In fact, he is reinforcing my argument. The fact that there are other undesirable aspects of the Iranian regime does not necessarily mean that we cannot seek a proper, verifiable and effective nuclear agreement. We may argue about how that is achieved, but the other aspects, desirable as they may be—we should certainly press them with the Iranian regime—should not prevent us from reaching an agreement. The former Defence Secretary is right: we need to focus on the arms control agreement.

I wish that I had some of the confidence of the hon. Member for South Norfolk (Mr Bacon) about the internal dynamics of the Iranian regime. The same goes for his comments about the sponsorship of terrorism. He referred to relations with Hamas and Hezbollah, but Iran acts as the armourers of those organisations. Furthermore, it is reasonably argued that in many cases Iran is pressing and supporting elements within Hamas and Hezbollah who want to take things further, as against those who want a more moderate position.

[Tom Tugendhat]

rose—

[Mr Bacon]

rose—

[Mr Spellar]

I will give way to the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells first, then to the hon. Member for South Norfolk.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Forgive me, but I am the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling; the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark), is not present.

Does the right hon. Member for Warley (Mr Spellar) agree that Iran’s actions in support of terrorism have not been limited to the region? We have heard a lot of talk about IS, but the reality is that actions in Argentina and Bulgaria, and the murder of Israeli and European citizens in Germany over many years, demonstrate that Iran’s involvement in terrorism is not a foreign matter, but very much a domestic one.

[Mr Spellar]

As does seeking to procure the assassination of the Saudi ambassador in Washington.

[Mr Bacon]

Of course, the right hon. Gentleman is right: the Iranians have been sponsoring groups of what we call terrorists in Gaza and Lebanon. I did not deny that at all; in fact, I think I said it. I was simply making the point that the world is on fire, and that is not because of Iran, but because George Bush, who did not know the difference between Shi’a and Sunni six weeks before the invasion of Iraq, smashed the region. We are still suffering the consequences, and Iran is trying to help clear up the mess.

[Mr Spellar]

That is a very simplistic reading of history. The idea that Islamist terrorism was dependent on the invasion of Iraq does not bear any scrutiny. It is interesting that, yet again, the hon. Gentleman referred to “what we call terrorism”. No, it is what the world calls terrorism—and that, indeed, is what it is.

We need to move on to the core questions: what is Iran’s capability, and what is its intention? Those are undoubtedly complex issues. We certainly did not create Iran; it is of very long standing. As the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) rightly said, it is a great historic and continuing nation, and was a great empire and civilisation. The hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) said that we made it a regional power. History, resources and population made it a regional power.

Interestingly, unlike some other Islamist groups, the Iranian regime has not discouraged education, but very much encouraged it. There is a substantial educated—indeed, sophisticated—section of society. Unfortunately, a considerable number of its members now live in exile, and they would be a huge benefit to a liberal country. There is clearly strong internal opposition to the regime, as we saw with the green revolution after the previous elections, which, as the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling said, was ruthlessly and shockingly repressed, with too little reaction from the rest of the world—probably not just a moral, but a strategic mistake. There are also widespread executions, and there is imprisonment in absolutely appalling conditions.

It is also rightly said that Iran has drastically worsening relations with its neighbours, who rightly accuse it of not only external threats, but fostering internal subversion. Although there are clearly legitimate, well expressed concerns at some of those neighbouring states’ internal reactions, there is, equally, an understanding of the problems they face. Those problems are a concern to the outside world, just as they are to countries to which Iran—or the Iranian regime, to be more correct—poses an existential threat.

I hope that the Minister will address the broader contextual issues, but my concern is that we see little evidence of strategic vision as Britain retreats from the world stage—something that has been widely commented on in the United States and that is being increasingly understood here. That vision does not mean simplistically dividing the world into friends and foes.

A strong reaffirmation of article 5 of the NATO treaty would be especially welcome to our allies on NATO’s eastern front, who face increasing Russian assertiveness and pressure, but that does not mean that we do not have similar concerns to the Russians in some other parts of the world. Over the years, Ministers will have clearly heard about the Russians’ focus on Islamist fundamentalism and what they refer to as the arc of instability to their south. I agree that that is hard to reconcile with the support given by the Russian nuclear industry to the emerging Iranian nuclear programme. I have heard the justification from Russian Ministers that that support is good business. The argument has also been put to me that one driver of the Russian approach—this was rather echoed by the hon. Member for Hendon (Dr Offord)—is the Iranians’ lack of capability to run the system. That runs against the evidence that there is an educated workforce in Iran. It is perhaps a slightly dismissive, almost colonial, position, and a serious miscalculation on the part of the Russians. Will the Minister tell us what efforts have been made to engage with Russia on this issue? Is there a unified Russian view, or are there diverse views in the Russian hierarchy?

Similarly, there is inconsistency in the Russian support for the Assad regime, which is, most significantly, being propped up by the Iranian Hezbollah and the revolutionary guard. We do not need to have any illusions about President Putin’s actions in Ukraine—and, indeed, right the way along Russia’s western flank up into Scandinavia—to see that we may have common interests and concerns in the middle east and north Africa. Ministers will recall that during the last Parliament I regularly made similar arguments about the need to engage Afghanistan’s neighbours in the post-drawdown settlement to ensure stability, stressing that not only Russia and the “stans”, but Iran, should be involved. We therefore need a broader policy on this issue.

I recognise that the Minister needs to time to reply, so, in conclusion, I thank him for his courtesy and for the assistance he has provided during his time in the Foreign Office, which has been most welcome and most appreciated.

[Mr Philip Hollobone (in the Chair)]

I know the Minister will want to conclude his remarks at 10.57 am to allow Guto Bebb the opportunity to reply.