Iran (Proposed Nuclear Agreement)

Guto Bebb Excerpts

Tuesday 16th June 2015 Westminster Hall

[Guto Bebb (Aberconwy) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered Iran and the proposed nuclear agreement.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. This is an opportune moment to consider once again the proposed nuclear agreement regarding Iran. It is opportune because an outline agreement was presented on 2 April 2015, and it is expected that a full agreement might be reached by the end of this month. It is therefore right and proper that Parliament should once again consider the issue.

This debate follows the good and positive Back-Bench business debate held in November 2014, during the last Parliament. Since then, a number of parliamentary questions have been asked of the Government, and several statements have been made. On top of that, by way of context, it is important and relevant to consider the report published by the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs during the last Parliament. The context extends beyond this place to the outside world, and we need to be aware of it. The debate is opportune. I shall ask the Minister a significant number of questions, to which I hope he can respond. It is relevant to ask those questions before an agreement is finalised, as there are genuine concerns across the House about the details of the proposed agreement.

To start, we must ask what the intention is of any proposed agreement. That is crucial. My understanding was that initially, the aim of any nuclear agreement with Iran was to deal with non-proliferation and ensure no further development of nuclear weapons in that country, yet given the developments that we read about, it appears that the discussion has moved from being about a non-proliferation treaty to being about something more closely related to an arms control treaty. That is an important, but not necessarily positive, development. The original talks between the P5+1 and Iran definitely commenced on the basis of a non-proliferation treaty.

[Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this debate. Does he agree that the proposed deal seeks to legitimise Iran’s nuclear activities, such as enriching and stockpiling low-grade uranium, for which there is no civilian use whatever? We are talking about a country that is one of the world’s largest—if not the largest—state sponsors of terrorism.

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[Guto Bebb]

Thank you, Mr Hollobone. There is some merit to my hon. Friend’s points, but I called this debate to see what the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s view is of the potential context and contents of any proposed agreement.

A bilateral arms control treaty is not what our partners in the region are looking for. In preparing for this debate, I was fortunate enough to be briefed by representatives of the Bahraini Government on behalf of the Gulf Co-operation Council, and it is fair to say that our partner states in the Gulf have specific concerns about how significantly the proposed treaty has moved from what was originally intended. One of the most striking comments made by the representatives of the Bahraini Government was that they felt increasingly as if they were being treated by the P5+1 similarly to how eastern European countries were treated when there were arms control treaties between the US and the Soviet Union. If that development is concerning our allies in the GCC, the Government should take that seriously.

[Rehman Chishti (Gillingham and Rainham) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this important debate. He mentioned the GCC and Bahrain, but another linked point is Iran harbouring and sponsoring terrorism in Yemen by supporting the Houthi rebels to destabilise the region, as well as in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, in addition to supporting Hamas in Israel. We cannot have a nuclear agreement with a state that is sponsoring and harbouring terrorism. It is a short-term fix for a long-term problem for the international community.

[Guto Bebb]

My hon. Friend makes a pertinent point, which was certainly reflected in my discussions with the representatives of the Bahraini Government last week. The fact that good intentions are being taken for granted in relation to the treaty is being questioned by some of the Gulf states, which have concerns about Iran’s foreign policy objectives, to put it mildly, in that part of the world. It is important when we consider the potential treaty that we take into account the views of not just the P5+1 but partner states in that part of the world.

[John Howell (Henley) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend not feel that what he has described as the thoughts of the Gulf states are increased by the attitude to the detail, including about centrifuges? If Iran is allowed to retain 6,000-plus centrifuges against the original estimate of 1,000, that is clearly a bad sign.

[Guto Bebb]

I fully endorse those comments. I will address the issue of the centrifuges in due course. It is reasonable to say that the figure of 6,000 now assumed to be part of a proposed treaty is significantly in excess of the 1,000 originally discussed by the P5+1 when the negotiations started. The question whether that is actually in the treaty must be addressed.

I do not want to be described as a cynic, but it is fair to question whether the agreement is actually an effort to resolve the issue, or whether it is effectively an effort to ensure a foreign policy legacy for the current American Administration. I am making this contribution in the spirit of the Back-Bench business debate held in November 2014. I think that there is a genuine realisation that we need an agreement, but must that agreement be rushed to achieve a foreign policy goal for a US Administration who might not be in place for very long? We need some certainty on that.

[Nadhim Zahawi (Stratford-on-Avon) (Con)]

Many of the Gulf states—my hon. Friend mentioned Bahrain, but obviously this includes the United Arab Emirates and others—are nervous about Iran’s intentions. Iran knows that we want a deal, but it clearly understands the timetabling, and that it will be much easier to leverage something advantageous to Iran if we are working to a timeline that is affected by legacies in the United States of America or anything else.

[Guto Bebb]

My hon. Friend makes a fair point. The key thing is that the proposed treaty stands or falls on its own merits. It should not be subject to a timetable pushed on the basis of others’ priorities. That certainly came across in my meeting with GCC representatives prior to this debate.

We must ensure that the agreement satisfies the concerns of our allies in the middle east. In addition, it is important to clarify whether major concessions have been made by the P5+1, as current rumours about the agreement’s content would indicate. It is important for the Government to say what concessions have been offered in return for the ones that have been made, for example, in relation to the number of centrifuges. We need an outline of the concessions made.

To return to the Back-Bench business debate held in November 2014, I am glad to see my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Mr Bacon), who was one of the Members who secured it. It was a positive debate, in which a range of opinions were expressed about the intentions, or otherwise, of Iran, and about the historical context of any proposed deal. There were fine speeches that highlighted the missed opportunities in the past for an agreement with Iran. It would certainly benefit any Member who is interested in this subject to reread the debate, as I did prior to coming to Westminster Hall today.

I was struck by the very fair summary of that debate provided by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), who is also here today; I welcome him back to his position in government. He concluded that debate in an excellent manner by saying clearly:

“It is right that we should leave no stone unturned in the quest to”

reach an agreement,

“but we must not, and will not, do a bad deal. The stakes are too high.”—[Official Report, 6 November 2014; Vol. 587, c. 1034WH.]

Those comments can probably be endorsed by everybody here today. However, we need certainty that a proposed deal or compromise, which is rumoured to include significant concessions, is the right deal; we need reassurance on that.

What are the main concerns? My hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) mentioned centrifuges, and I have to mention one of the biggest challenges in this debate: how do I pronounce “centrifuges”? Initially, the aim of the P5+1 was to reach an agreement that would allow Iran to maintain 1,000, or possibly 1,500, centrifuges. In the Back-Bench business debate in November 2014, the then Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee stated that the evidence that the Committee had heard as part of its inquiry was that the maximum number of centrifuges that Iran should be allowed was between 2,000 and 4,000. It is said that 4,500 centrifuges will allow the production of 25 kg of highly enriched uranium within a six-month period, yet we hear a rumour that an agreement will allow Iran to have 6,000 centrifuges. We can do the maths. We would be looking at 25 kg of enriched uranium within not six months, but four. There is a real question as to why the demands of the P5+1 have changed so dramatically and what concessions have been offered in return. We need a response to that question.

Secondly on centrifuges, perhaps 13,000 or 14,000 centrifuges would be made redundant as a result of an agreement that would leave Iran with 6,000. How many of those 13,000 or 14,000 extra centrifuges would be dismantled? If they are not dismantled, what is to stop them being recommissioned, and how long would it take to recommission them? Again, there are significant questions about the possible allowance of 6,000 centrifuges and what happens to the 13,000 or 14,000 other centrifuges that would remain in Iranian hands.

It is important to state that 30 countries have a civilian nuclear programme. In the November debate, Jack Straw, the former Member for Blackburn, forcefully made the point that any sovereign country has the right to pursue an energy policy. I agree. However, of those 30 countries, only 11 have the capacity to enrich their own fuel. On what basis do the P5+1 conclude that Iran should become the 12th, given its Government’s track record on allowing monitoring and allowing third parties to examine its military capacity in relation to the enrichment of uranium?

[Chloe Smith (Norwich North) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend share my concern that Iran remains a premier sponsor of terror, and does he feel that we ought to consider that when we compare Iran with other nations?

[Guto Bebb]

I certainly accept that the good will and good intentions of Iran should be considered in the context of its continued support for terrorism in many parts of the middle east, which, as I have said, is a key concern of many of our partner nations in the region.

[Nadhim Zahawi]

rose—

[Guto Bebb]

I will take a quick intervention.

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I will be very quick. We sometimes get stuck on the number of centrifuges. However, since the negotiations began, the technology around centrifuges —I declare an interest: my background is in chemical engineering—has advanced so far that a single centrifuge now is much more productive than when the negotiations started.

[Guto Bebb]

Indeed. My hon. Friend makes an important point that I was going to come on to. The research and development allowed as part of any agreement is very important. What guarantees can we be offered about the development of more advanced centrifuges? If there are no such guarantees in the agreement, real questions must be asked. If we are trying to reach an agreement to curtail the breakout time for Iran to develop nuclear capacity, the sophistication and possible development of centrifuges is crucial, yet there is no detail, as far as I can see, about what kind of monitoring of research and development will be undertaken.

[Dr Daniel Poulter (Central Suffolk and North Ipswich) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this debate. He asked a broader question about research and development, and about the importance of the agreement being not only retrospective but prospective. It should be future-proofed, so that improvements in technology, productivity and capacity are taken into account, and sufficient protections are put in place against the future capacity to develop uranium—and, indeed, other harmful technologies.

[Guto Bebb]

Again, I accept my hon. Friend’s comments. To a large extent, one of my concerns is monitoring, and the access that monitors will be allowed, so that that type of review can be conducted. There are real concerns as to whether that monitoring will be of an acceptable nature.

We also need to address the issue of the nuclear sites. If my understanding of the proposed deal is correct, two sites—Natanz and Fordow—will be retained. I must ask the Government and the Minister a question about that. If such a concession has been made, what concessions have been offered in return by the Iranians to facilitate the agreement?

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on not only securing this debate, but approaching it in a very balanced way. He was good enough to accept that, in the past, mistakes were made by both sides, and we in the west would now gladly take up some of the concessions that we once refused, because things have been moved on.

I say to the Minister that although it is terribly important that we have the proper safeguards in place in any agreement, particularly to protect our friends in the region—I accept that point 100%, and we must focus on it like a laser—we must not lose sight of the benefits that would arise from our reaching some sort of agreement with Iran. There could be many such benefits across the region, which is becoming increasingly unstable, and we cannot ignore the fact that Iran is a major regional power that we created with our misguided invasion of Iraq.

[Guto Bebb]

I agree with many of my hon. Friend’s points, and I agree that the benefits arising from a good deal are worth fighting for. However, I suspect that many Members have concerns about the nature of the proposed deal and about the certainty that any such deal offers Iran’s neighbours, who also have real concerns, as he acknowledged. I accept the point about mistakes made in the past, and the importance of having a proper deal in place. However, the key point is that the deal must be acceptable to all and must give other countries in that part of the world confidence in the long term.

There is also a concern about the proposed length of the deal; we are looking at a deal that will possibly be limited to 10 years. Again, in the context of considering the development of nuclear capacity, we must ask ourselves whether 10 years is reasonable or sufficient. Given that the deal does nothing, as far as I can see, to deal with Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, there is a real question as to whether 10 years is insufficient.

If the aim is to secure the right deal, can we justify the type of concessions that we have been reading about? Hon. Members touched on verification in their interventions, but we need certainty from the Foreign Office and the Government that there is confidence that the degree of verification allowed under any agreement will be acceptable. Once again, the track record of the Iranian regime does not allow us to be confident in that regard. I understand from those who comment and speculate on what happens in Iran that only last month the International Atomic Energy Agency was refused access, and Ayatollah Khamenei said:

“No inspection of any military site or interview with nuclear scientists will be allowed.”

The question whether we will have a proper verification process in any agreement gives rise to real concern. If we have an agreement with a proper verification process, it must be maintained and foolproof, but once again Iran’s track record does not give us much confidence.

The other question that we need to address is whether an agreement that is as compromising as the proposed agreement appears to be actually contributes to an escalation of the arms race in the region, rather than a reduction of tensions. The agreement appears to state clearly that putting Iran in a position in which it is within six months of a breakout for the next 10 years is acceptable. My concern, which I think is shared by hon. Members, is that other countries in the region would end up in an arms race—not to produce a nuclear weapon, but to be within six months of a breakout. It is worth mentioning that Prince Turki al-Faisal from Saudi Arabia stated clearly that

“Whatever the Iranians have, we will have, too”.

That comment should be taken seriously by the Government when they assess the merits or otherwise of the deal.

Any proposed deal has to satisfy the needs of the P5+1, a very unstable region and our allies in the region. However, the real test is whether it satisfies the original intention, which was to ensure that Iran did not develop a nuclear capacity. Dr Bruno Tertrais stated that we must not

“ignore the lessons of history: nuclear-capable countries never stay at the threshold for very long.”

Looking at the bare bones of the proposed agreement, it would appear that the P5+1 are now willing to accept Iran’s being at the threshold of a nuclear breakout and that that threshold will be maintained for the next 10 years. Dr Tertrais’s words are important in that context. Countries with the capacity to develop a nuclear weapon will almost invariably end up developing it.

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

The hon. Gentleman is slightly contradicted by the experience in both Libya and South Africa.

[Guto Bebb]

That is an interesting point, but I suspect that the significant political changes in South Africa made a real difference to how it viewed its position in the world. I suspect that the changes that happened in South Africa are not going to happen any time soon in Iran, so my comments are still worth bearing in mind.

To what extent is the Foreign Office confident that the proposed deal, the outlines of which have been given, will be made in the long-term interest of not only Iran, but neighbouring states in the middle east? If assurances about that cannot be given, there are real questions to be asked about whether we can support any proposed deal.

[Mr Philip Hollobone (in the Chair)]

I will call Guto Bebb at the end of the debate for two minutes to sum up what has been debated. Seven Members wish to contribute. I do not want to call the Front-Bench spokesmen any later than 10.40 am, with the debate closing at 11 am, so I am introducing a six-minute limit. If there are lots of interventions, I am afraid I will have to cut that to five minutes.

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[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure, Mr Hollobone, to serve under the chairmanship of a fellow alumnus of Bromley Borough Council. I congratulate the hon. Member for Aberconwy (Guto Bebb) on securing the debate, although I will highlight one or two differences from his approach. I make apologies for my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West (Mr Thomas), who previously dealt with the subject; he has departed from the Front Bench to spend more time with the London mayoral election. Interestingly enough, this will also be my last debate from the Front Bench on foreign affairs, because I will be spending more time on politics, which I look forward to.

Given how the hon. Member for Aberconwy introduced the debate, I think that we may find more common ground between Front Benchers than between Front Benchers and Government Back Benchers—probably not the last time that will occur in this Parliament, particularly on foreign affairs. We have to define what we see as the objective of our relations with Iran, particularly in terms of the nuclear talks. Is any agreement a nuclear freeze or, as some have described it, weapons control? Is it to influence Iran’s foreign policy, and particularly its actions in respect of its neighbours, or is it to achieve regime change? All those things might be desirable, but they are not necessarily the prime objective of the talks. An analogy was made with eastern Europe and arms control, but that was immensely successful, as indeed were the Helsinki accords that helped to bring about perestroika and glasnost.

[Guto Bebb]

To clarify, the analogy with eastern Europe was made in the context of an agreement that was possibly successful as regards arms control, but was not especially good for the people of eastern Europe. An agreement now might be successful in controlling arms, but not be good for the people of the Gulf states, or indeed of Iran.

[Mr Spellar]

That may be true, but such an agreement is preferable to achieving none of those objectives. Not everything has to be agreed, particularly if we view the possession of nuclear weapons as a qualitative rather than simply quantitative change—it is not only another step. Throughout the history of arms control agreements, it has been recognised that the nuclear threshold is a particular and qualitatively different threshold in international relations. We could therefore have arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, even though it was repressing its own citizens and the citizens of eastern Europe and sponsoring terrorism abroad.

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[Guto Bebb]

The reason we needed this debate in Westminster Hall was timing. The issue is live and is reaching a conclusion. I am grateful for the Minister’s comments and for his generous offer to write to right hon. and hon. Members on points raised in the debate. I fully understand that the complexity and extent of questions made it a challenge for him to respond in full in the 12 minutes allocated. I pay tribute to the shadow Minister, the right hon. Member for Warley (Mr Spellar), for his final Front-Bench speech. He said he disagreed with my viewpoint, but few disagreements came to light from his comments. I wish him well on the Back Benches.

The debate has made it clear that there is interest, certainly on the Conservative side, in this important issue. The Backbench Business Committee has not yet been convened, so Westminster Hall was our only option for getting this debated in the House. Given that the Foreign Secretary will go to Vienna, and in view of the interest shown in the Chamber, a statement should perhaps be made after the visit—and there should certainly be one if an agreement is reached.

[Mr Ellwood]

A statement will absolutely be made, and there will be an opportunity for Members to comment. Perhaps I may suggest that when the Backbench Business Committee is formed, if an opportunity is not provided by the Government, a full debate should be held in the House in the aftermath of 30 June.

[Guto Bebb]

I thank the Minister, and I am sure that there will be a delegation to the Committee.

Despite the fact that most of the Members who spoke were Conservatives, we were pleased to have some opposition, and I thank my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Mr Bacon) for his comments, which showed that this was a debate, not a one-sided discussion.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered Iran and the proposed nuclear agreement.