Iran (Proposed Nuclear Agreement)

Liam Fox Excerpts

Tuesday 16th June 2015 Westminster Hall

[Dr Liam Fox (North Somerset) (Con)]

The election of Hassan Rouhani as Iranian President in June 2013 was heralded by certain sections of the western commentariat as a landmark moment: here was a Government with whom we would be able to do business and who would bring Iran in from the cold. Calls for caution from seasoned Iran observers were lost in the now all too familiar triumph of wishful thinking over critical analysis and the superficial obsession with media-friendly projection. Fast forward to 2015 and it has become clear that the country’s direction has not changed. It was never going to, and those who expected change fundamentally misunderstand the structure of Iranian power.

President Rouhani was destined only ever to have a limited influence in a state dominated by the Supreme Leader and the revolutionary guard. Khamenei has shown an amazing ability for consistency that western politicians can only dream of. He has never wavered in his belief about the purity of the Islamic revolution, his detestation of the United States or his contempt for the existence of the state of Israel. Nor has President Rouhani’s Administration brought any respite for the Iranian people. In 2014, Iran was the world’s leader in executions per capita. Freedoms that we in the west take for granted continue to be aggressively curtailed. Persecution of those who supported the green movement, and their families, continues relentlessly, and the western media seem curiously detached from, or even indifferent to, the plight of their savagely repressed Iranian colleagues. Iran remains a sponsor of state terrorism, providing financial, logistical and material support to Islamist terror groups across the region, including those targeting British forces when they were in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Iran persists in its refusal to respond adequately to the international community’s fears about its nuclear programme. Iran’s nuclear intentions cannot be seen outside the context of its support for terror proxies, arguably the defining feature of its foreign policy. The risks are clear.

Anxieties over Iran's nuclear intentions are well placed. Iran’s extensive nuclear programme features many of the key components required to facilitate the domestic production of a nuclear weapon: possession of large quantities of enriched materials; knowledge to convert enriched materials into weaponised form; and the development and possession of a delivery mechanism in the form of ballistic missiles. The country has a long history of clandestine nuclear work. Two of the nuclear-related facilities, at Natanz and Arak, which are at the centre of the international community’s concerns, were constructed secretly in a clear breach of the spirit, if not the letter, of Iran’s obligations under the NPT. For years, Iran used these facilities to enrich uranium to levels and quantities beyond those required for a legitimate and peaceful civil nuclear programme. Iran routinely neglects its obligations to co-operate with the IAEA, including repeatedly denying IAEA inspectors access to contentious nuclear-related facilities, such as the one in Parchin at which it is suspected of having previously undertaken tests related to triggers for nuclear weapons. It is logical to assume that Iran’s intentions are to develop a nuclear weapons capability and any claims that its intentions are exclusively peaceful should not be regarded as credible.

We may have seen a less confrontational diplomatic posture over the nuclear issue than under the former President, but the real position has not changed. Iran must not be allowed to dictate the terms of any final, permanent nuclear agreement; it has not earned the benefit of the doubt. A permanent deal must cover, in meticulous detail, all elements of Iran’s nuclear-related activity, including its ballistic missile programme. Ballistic missiles are, after all, the final critical-stage component of the weaponisation process and prohibited under United Nations Security Council resolution 1929. Omitting such sensitive technology from a final agreement would be inexcusable, and the Iranians are masters are manipulating the detail of any agreement to their advantage. Likewise, to be wrong-footed over this long-term issue due to short-term considerations of potential Iranian help with ISIS would be a colossal error.

We have a number of clear concerns. The time limitation of the agreement is merely to put off the dreadful day that we have all been dreading. As my hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy (Guto Bebb) said, allowing the number of centrifuges to remain at 6,000 or above is an utterly unacceptable risk and allows breakout at almost any time. On verification, anything less than unfettered access is unacceptable, because we know, in the light of the Iranians’ behaviour in the past, how they will manipulate any weakness in the terms of the IAEA’s access.

Khamenei has already talked about how sanctions must be lifted immediately that any agreement is made, tearing up the terms of the proposed agreement before it is finally put down on paper. It is a sign of things to come and we should not be giving the benefit of the doubt to such a leader.

A nuclear-armed Iran would make an absolute mockery of the NPT, not least because it would be likely to be followed into the nuclear club in short order by its regional neighbours, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey. The prospect of a nuclear arms race in one of the world’s most unstable regions, where the likelihood of the use of such weapons is probably greatest, should be of concern to us all. The stakes are enormous. It is no exaggeration to state that the fate of international security rests on the P5+1’s ability to secure the right deal. Anything less would reshape our whole understanding of international security with dire consequences. The P5+1 must not blink. A bad deal is worse than no deal. Appeasement has a very bad track record.

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[Mr Spellar]

That may be true, but such an agreement is preferable to achieving none of those objectives. Not everything has to be agreed, particularly if we view the possession of nuclear weapons as a qualitative rather than simply quantitative change—it is not only another step. Throughout the history of arms control agreements, it has been recognised that the nuclear threshold is a particular and qualitatively different threshold in international relations. We could therefore have arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, even though it was repressing its own citizens and the citizens of eastern Europe and sponsoring terrorism abroad.

[Dr Fox]

Surely the aim is to stop a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty from gaining nuclear weapons capability, and thus making a mockery of the treaty and giving rise to a much wider risk of nuclear conflict in the region.

[Mr Spellar]

I take the right hon. Gentleman’s exact point. In fact, he is reinforcing my argument. The fact that there are other undesirable aspects of the Iranian regime does not necessarily mean that we cannot seek a proper, verifiable and effective nuclear agreement. We may argue about how that is achieved, but the other aspects, desirable as they may be—we should certainly press them with the Iranian regime—should not prevent us from reaching an agreement. The former Defence Secretary is right: we need to focus on the arms control agreement.

I wish that I had some of the confidence of the hon. Member for South Norfolk (Mr Bacon) about the internal dynamics of the Iranian regime. The same goes for his comments about the sponsorship of terrorism. He referred to relations with Hamas and Hezbollah, but Iran acts as the armourers of those organisations. Furthermore, it is reasonably argued that in many cases Iran is pressing and supporting elements within Hamas and Hezbollah who want to take things further, as against those who want a more moderate position.

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[Mr Ellwood]

My hon. Friend is right to raise that question: what assurances do we have that Iran would maintain the deal? I shall certainly try to answer the questions that have been asked. I am, to the horror of my team, going to abandon the speech that they have carefully prepared for me, and do my best to answer the questions from the debate. I offer my apologies if I do not manage to answer all the detailed questions. I shall read Hansard—not because I like reading what I have said, but because it is important that I read what Members have said and reply in writing, if I may, to keep dialogue going.

My hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy asked whether the agreement was intended to be a non-proliferation or arms control treaty. It is a mixture, as I have made clear. It important for us to be able to maintain that, because there are breakout weapons systems that we are concerned about in addition to what Iran is doing on the nuclear side. He mentioned Iran’s foreign policy objectives, for itself and the wider region, which I want to touch on in relation to other concerns. Iran’s role, and where it sees itself in the region, is a major issue. It has a responsibility not just to itself but in the wider region and we look to it to act responsibly.

My hon. Friend mentioned the United States foreign policy aspects of the matter, and my hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Neil Parish) raised the question whether there was a legacy issue. I have never heard the line before that a President is most dangerous in his second term. It could be argued both ways; a President in that case is not tied by anything and therefore can be more robust in some of the measures that he or she is willing to pursue.

I want to go through the eight major headings of the deal, which may help the House to understand where the conversation and agreement are going, leading up to 30 June. First there is the question of a durable and verifiable deal. The first heading is enrichment, which covers Iran’s capacity and its enriched stockpile. The number of centrifuges is obviously part of that. Many figures have been given in the debate, but the number is less significant than the breakout time—how quickly a weapon could be procured if it was decided to close the doors and prevent IAEA from carrying out inspections. We have set that as a year. Whatever the experts are saying, that leads to the number of centrifuges that we would consider acceptable. We are less focused on the actual numbers at the moment, and more on the breakout time.

The second area heading is research and development, covering types of centrifuges, and leading to a mutually agreed scope and schedule. Thirdly, the Arak plutonium reactor has been mentioned. There will be a redesign to cut off the plutonium route to a nuclear device. Fourthly, Fordow, which has also been mentioned, will no longer be a site for the enrichment of uranium. The fifth area is duration. There are programme restrictions in a number of areas. A period of 10 years for the agreement has been mentioned. It could well be that parts of it will last longer, and parts might even be shorter. That is some of the detail being worked out.

The sixth heading is the possible military dimensions, which I have touched on. That covers the measures that Iran must address: the IAEA’s concerns about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme. If there is one area that is of concern in the discussions at the moment, that is probably the most difficult. The seventh area is sanctions: relief from the comprehensive EU and US economic and financial sanctions in return for IAEA-verified actions on Iran’s programme; an agreement on the termination of UN sanctions, with limiting transfers of sensitive technologies and activities; and other issues relating to conventional arms and ballistic missiles. The eighth and final area is transparency and verification, which many hon. Members have mentioned. That covers the ability to make sure that nothing is being done behind our backs, and a robust and credible monitoring programme including the implementation of various protocols to give the IAEA greater oversight of Iran’s activities.

[Dr Fox]

Does my hon. Friend accept that any verification process that does not entail unfettered access will fail to meet its basic objective?

[Mr Ellwood]

My right hon. Friend is right; we must have such access. I am pleased that the IAEA has confirmed that it currently has the access it needs. Were that to be closed down, those would be the consequences—it would be about whether sanctions would be brought back. I acknowledge my right hon. Friend’s understanding of and interest in the matter. He spoke about the Iranians as a proxy power elsewhere in the area. If Iran is looking for a more responsible role, as he mentioned and encouraged, it must be seen to take greater responsibility in events in places such as Syria. It is propping up Assad, so no space is being given to moderate Sunnis. They are then pushed, or encouraged, to join ISIS. Iran could easily assist the international community in progressing with a political solution for Syria, and could help immensely with what is happening in Anbar and Nineveh province in Iraq. General Soleimani is pushing across with the Hashed militias and causing sectarian friction in Iraq; that is unhelpful in the long term. Likewise in Yemen, weapons systems coming by boat and the provision of weapons for the Houthis, further complicate an already difficult and complex issue.

There are ways for Iran to show its initiative and greater responsibility in the region, and I think that many hon. Members would like to see that. It is not happening now and we are concerned about that. I am conscious of the time; I will write to hon. Members with more details. The debate has been extremely good. I simply want to make it clear that we are working hard for the deal, but, as has been explained, we need to make sure we reach the correct one. Without the correct deal, we have no deal.