John McDonnell
Main Page: John McDonnell (Independent - Hayes and Harlington)Department Debates - View all John McDonnell's debates with the HM Treasury
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Lady makes an important point. It is my understanding that some of these prepayment schemes get their income from being able to negotiate a discount with the supplier of the goods, as well as, perhaps, from the interest they earn on the prepayments. The question then arises whether the revenue the prepayment scheme gets is sufficient to outweigh the cost of enhancing customer protection. Some of these schemes are administratively expensive, and the cost of protection may exceed the income generated, which would lead to that service being withdrawn from the consumer.
As this exchange demonstrates, some complex issues are involved. The hon. Lady is right to raise them, and it is right that the Government should continue to address them. Many people rely on these schemes and it is important that they are well protected. We should make sure that there are alternative sources of information for them, in order to enable them to judge where they might get best protection and, perhaps, earn some interest themselves on the prepayment they are making, rather than the supplier making that money.
Both of the issues under discussion have cross-party support. There is a consumer affairs element in them, and this kind of legislation comes around very rarely. Indeed, I doubt whether we will see such an all-encompassing Bill for another decade. There does not appear to be any consumer legislation in the planned Queen’s Speech, other than the proposed groceries adjudicator Bill. Will the Minister therefore reconsider these two matters, and meet the relevant Members to see whether there is any way they could be better addressed in this Bill before it goes to the other place or before the final vote on it?
I think that there is adequate provision in the Bill on consumer credit; the FCA has the powers to tackle that issue and I am confident that it will be able to make appropriate use of the remedies available to it. A different issue about pre-payment schemes has been raised, but that does not fall within the scope of the Bill. Of course there is a mechanism in the Bill to move the regulatory perimeter if appropriate, but I think that it is the Minister with responsibility for consumer affairs who needs to respond on that point.
I know that we want to move on to deal with the next group of amendments, but before concluding I just wish to say that there is support across the House for new clause 4, which enables us to complete the transfer of regulation from the OFT to the FCA. That does yield important benefits for our constituents. We need to get that regime right if we are to ensure that there is a reasonable supply of affordable credit to our constituents and that they are well protected—that is the goal we are all aiming at. The Bill contains the powers to do that, and I commend new clause 4 to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 4 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 1
Retrospective reviews of Bank performance by court of directors and publication of court minutes
‘(1) Section 2 of the Bank of England Act 1998 (Functions of court of directors) is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (5) add—
“(6) The court shall conduct retrospective reviews of the performance of the Bank with respect to its functions and objectives.
(7) The court shall determine the particular matters to be reviewed under subsection (6).
(8) The court must publish a report on each review carried out under subsections (6) and (7) unless the court decides that all or part of such a report should not be published for reasons of confidentiality or because it would endanger financial stability.
(9) When all or part of a report of a review is not published under the provisions of subsection (8), the court must—
(a) publish as much as possible of the report,
(b) send a copy of the full report to the Chairman of the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons or, in exceptional circumstances, inform the Chairman of the Treasury Committee of the reasons for not sending it, and
(c) publish the report or part of the report as soon as possible after the court decides that the considerations in subsection (8) no longer apply.
(10) After each meeting of the court, the Bank shall publish minutes of the meeting before the end of the period of two weeks beginning with the day of the meeting.
(11) Subsection (10) shall not apply to minutes of any proceedings where the court has decided that publication should be delayed for reasons of confidentiality or because publication would endanger financial stability.
(12) Where any part of the court’s minutes is not published under the provisions of subsection (11), the Chairman of the court shall inform the Chairman of the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons of the reasons.
(13) Any part of the minutes of a meeting of the court must be published as soon as the court has decided that the considerations in subsection (11) no longer apply.”.’.—(Mr Tyrie.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s intervention, because that is exactly the point I am coming to. What is the accountability of the FPC? Ultimately, it has to come down, in some way, to the court of the Bank of England making an intervention to assess what is going on.
As we have discussed, the FPC will have far-reaching powers to intervene, some of which we may never know about. Some might be restricted to a 30-year rule, so we might hear about them in the future, although an awful lot may well be published. However, it is incredibly important that we look at what the Bank of England does to supervise. Currently, the court of the Bank of England is responsible for administrative matters, as we have heard—it is responsible for pay and rations. What we on the Treasury Committee want is the Bank to have a proper board—probably with a new name that reflects its updated role, although I do not think that will happen. We recommended that it should have a majority of external members who must have the relevant skills and experience, and the Treasury Committee wants the court of the Bank to be able to conduct—this is an important point—retrospective internal reviews of policy decisions of the Bank. The Bank’s response envisages limiting that to commissioning external reviews or conducting internal reviews only of the decision-making process of the Bank.
The creation of the FPC—on which my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) intervened on me—makes this governance issue incredibly important. As we have heard, the Monetary Policy Committee has just two tools: quantitative easing and interest rates, which it uses openly and publicly. We see detailed minutes of the meetings, followed up by evidence sessions by the Treasury Committee, which is also part of an incredibly important scrutiny process, which is fully transparent and very simple. However, as we have heard, the FPC has a large range of tools at its disposal, which means that it might not be able to give a full and open account to the Treasury Committee or publish entirely transparent minutes. Moreover, as I have said, it might be years before we know what intervention has been made. That is why we need an organisation that can intervene to look at what the FPC is doing and take on a strong governance responsibility.
That is why the court of the Bank of England needs to be able to look at the merits of the FPC’s policies and not just the method. The Bank’s board must not be restricted to finding out whether the wrong decisions were made but in the right way. That is why I would be incredibly grateful if the Minister gave serious consideration to new clause 1.
I am not part of the charmed circle of the Treasury Committee, but I wish to add my congratulations to the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) and the members of the Committee on the work they have undertaken in examining the Bill as it has gone through the House.
I have tabled amendments 46, 47, 49 and 50, which seek to enhance the Treasury Committee’s role in the appointments of the Governor and deputy Governors of the Bank of England, and the chair and chief executive of the Financial Conduct Authority. I have done so because the background to this legislation is perhaps the most catastrophic failure of the Bank of England and the financial regulatory authorities that we have seen in 70 years. Their failure to predict or intervene effectively to ensure that the financial crisis was averted or dealt with adequately, speedily and effectively is there for all to behold. It has brought this country to its financial knees and into a recession that is turning into a depression, which is something we have not seen since the 1930s. The reasons for that have been evidenced today. New clause 1 would address part of the issue—namely, the lack of transparency of the old regime—but another element was the lack of accountability.
This legislation will create, in the Governor of the Bank of England, one of the most important roles in the country. The Financial Times editorial of Thursday 19 April stated:
“The central bank governor is not just some technocrat, but the most powerful unelected official in the country. His role has become more political since the crisis, not less, and will be even more sensitive when the BoE acquires new powers to avert financial crises. The next governor must win public acceptance and possess sharply honed political antennas. This might be harder for a foreigner.”
That last comment refers to the speculation about some of the candidates that the Government are considering.
In today’s Financial Times, the shadow Chancellor sets out his concerns about the range of powers and responsibilities that the new Governor will have, stating that only a superman or superwoman need apply, because the job will be so influential and will have such a wide range of roles and responsibilities. The Treasury Committee appreciated that fact very early on in the game, in its consideration of the new legislation. That is why, way back in November, it recommended that it should have a role in the appointment of this significant post. The Chancellor of the Exchequer argued against that proposition. I find it extraordinary that the Treasury Committee won the right to have a veto over the appointment of the chair of the Office for Budget Responsibility, yet failed to win a role in the appointment of the much more significant post of the Governor of the Bank of England. Indeed, it has no role in the appointment of the deputy governors, and no effective role in the appointment of the Financial Conduct Authority proposed in the Bill.
I genuinely thought that the Government were about to shift their stance on this matter, because, back in November 2011, the Treasury Committee stated strongly that it was not persuaded by the Chancellor’s refusal to grant it a role in the appointment. It went on:
“The power of veto with respect to the OBR was given to ensure the independence and accountability of that body. The Governor of the Bank’s independence from Government is crucial for his or her credibility. Given the vast responsibilities of the Governor, the case for this Committee to have a power of veto over the appointment or dismissal of the Governor is even stronger than it is with respect to the OBR. We therefore recommend that, in order to safeguard his or her independence, the Treasury Committee is given a statutory power of veto over the appointment and dismissal of the Governor of the Bank of England.”
I wholeheartedly supported that view. The Chancellor’s argument was that the Treasury Committee could not have such a role because the Governor was exercising an Executive function and should therefore be a Government appointee. That is an absolutely specious argument.
The legislation to give independence to the Bank of England went through the House, although I never supported it. That means that the Governor has more than an Executive function. The Bank is not an Executive arm of the Government. The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Government cannot have it both ways. If they support the independence of the Bank of England from the Government, they must establish some other form of accountability to Parliament. If they do not believe that it is independent, and that it is simply an Executive arm of the Government, the Governor will be appointed directly by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Even if that is the Government’s argument, the Chancellor of the Exchequer is still accountable to the House, so there must be some role that the House can play in advising him on the appointment of this important post.
My amendments would simply reassert the role of the Treasury Committee and thus Parliament itself in this vital range of decisions about appointments to key elements of the new structure proposed by the Government. Let me be frank. I agree with everything said about the role of the Treasury Committee Chairman and I agree that he needs to be called “right honourable” and the all the rest of it, but sometimes people are born great and sometimes people avoid greatness being thrust upon them. I do not know what negotiations went on, and it might well be that the negotiations were along the lines of, “We will not push for a veto on appointment as long as we can get some transparency and thus at least some element of accountability for that post to the Committee itself.” If that was the tenor of the negotiations with the Government—I happily allow the Treasury Committee Chairman to intervene to clarify it—I am afraid that the deal is not good enough.
What needs to be said very clearly by this House is that these are such significant appointments—particularly the Governor of the Bank of England but also the head of the Financial Services Authority in view of its key role in seeking to avoid further crises and in regulating this country’s financial services—that this House must have at least some say over the calibre of these persons.
I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that the report does not reflect any back-room deals, but I would like to ask him a question. I am strongly sympathetic to the approach set out in his amendments. He needs to know that the Treasury Committee intends to hold pre-appointment hearings for these jobs in any case, including for the very senior jobs like that of the Governor, when he is identified. In the unlikely event that a nomination were challenged by the Committee, many would argue that the position of the person, even at nomination stage before he or she took up the appointment, would be untenable. In that case, does the hon. Gentleman not agree that the sensible thing for the Government to do is to engage with Parliament and with the Treasury Committee a little earlier in the appointments process?
I wholeheartedly agree, but sometimes in relationships with the Government a line is drawn in the sand, which makes the right of veto sometimes crucial, particularly if there is a bloody-mindedness in the direction of policy making by the Chancellor when it comes to appointments to key posts. Although I take the gist of the hon. Gentleman’s argument and can see how the Treasury Committee could create a climate of opinion or produce a report that influences the appointment in a way that makes it impossible for a person to take it up because of the lack of credibility, I think there needs to be an even stronger role for the Treasury Committee and therefore Parliament in all these matters.
This is a crucial opportunity missed in respect of the Treasury Committee’s ability to influence the Government; in respect of the Government’s ability to demonstrate to this House a greater openness when it comes to the transparency of the operation of the Bank of England and of the new regulatory authorities; and in respect of the Government themselves in how they make appointments to these crucial positions.
Does my hon. Friend agree that this is not just a matter of the relationship between the Government and this House, as it also relates to the relationship between the Government and the public? As we move into a period of austerity, if there is not sufficient accountability for the sorts of measures the Government view as necessary, it creates political instability. People do not see where the accountability lies for some of the austerity measures that are coming—not just in this country, but across Europe.
That is exactly the point I am seeking to make. This post will have wide responsibilities and the decisions taken will have immense ramifications for the country as a whole and for all our constituents. Because of the unique role of the Governor of the Bank of England, the individual will be subject to public scrutiny in a way that a Bank of England Governor has never been under scrutiny before. I think he will become an individual in whom people must have confidence. I have to say that I have some anxieties about some of the names being bandied about at the moment, such as the appointment of a former member of Goldman Sachs, a company that does not have a particularly distinguished record in relation to the operation of economies throughout the world before and after the financial crisis.
On a point of order, Mr Speaker. The main purpose of the Financial Services Bill—
Order. May I appeal to Members who are planning to leave the Chamber to do so quickly and quietly, so that the House can do the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) the courtesy of listening to his point of order?
Thank you, Mr Speaker.
The main purpose of the Financial Services Bill was to secure corporate responsibility in the financial sector, and the batch of amendments that were not reached dealt specifically with corporate responsibility. May I, through you, Mr Speaker, convey a message to the Leader of the House, who is present? There will be a second day of debate on the Bill, and he may well wish to look at the programme motion again to establish whether we can debate the important elements of those amendments on that second day.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his point of order. Let me say two things to him in response to it. First, as he can see with his own eyes, the Leader of the House is present, and will have heard what he has said. Secondly, business questions on Thursday will provide a good opportunity for him to pursue the matter further—and, knowing his indefatigability, I expect to see him in his place on that occasion.