National Security (State Threats) Bill

Debate between John Hayes and Alicia Kearns

Committee of the whole House
Wednesday 17th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Alicia Kearns]

We have tabled 13 amendments, not to frustrate the Bill but to give it the necessary teeth. This Bill is soft where it should be hard, silent where it should speak, and blind where it should see. It is soft because, as drafted, it sets a higher bar to prosecute a person who supports the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps than a person who supports the terrorists whom the IRGC funds and commands; it is silent because whole categories of hostile conduct that our terrorism laws have criminalised for 20 years are simply missing; and it is blind because it has been written for one organisation on one timetable, with almost no provision for future designations. Good will is not enough, and we must close the holes that our enemies will exploit.

The Government have lifted much of this legislation from section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, yet they have added something that does not appear in the terrorism offence: a requirement that support was given for a prohibited purpose that was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United Kingdom. Let me ask the Minister the simple question that this Bill invites: what level of support for the IRGC do the Government consider beneficial to the United Kingdom? The IRGC is the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism, and if she agrees that there is no level of support for it that is beneficial to the UK, we can simply remove the prohibited purpose. She has just said from the Dispatch Box that she agrees that there is absolutely none, so let us act and amend the Bill.

Under the Bill as drafted, to convict someone who supports the IRGC the prosecution must prove that their support was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the UK—an additional threshold—but that requirement does not exist in terrorism law. To convict someone who supports Hamas, Hezbollah or the Houthis—the proxies that the IRGC arms and funds—there is no such hurdle, so the body that inspires, organises arms and funds the terrorists is handed a protection in law that the terrorist himself is denied. That is the difference between a prosecution that succeeds and one that never gets off the ground, and I know something about prosecutions that fail at the last moment. Our amendment 3 simply removes the extra defence and brings this offence into line with the terrorism law from which it is drawn.

I recognise that the Government may seek to argue that state entities enjoy protections in international law that terrorists do not, that we must set a higher bar than in equivalent terrorism legislation and that acting prejudicially to the UK’s interests is a reasonable test. However, state immunity protects the Iranian state from being sued or prosecuted in our courts, and it has nothing to do with the British resident who chooses to fund or promote the IRGC. We are not prosecuting Tehran; we are prosecuting the person here who does its work. The proposition that the Minister is left defending is that supporting the world’s biggest sponsor of terrorism should be harder to prosecute than supporting the groups it sponsors. That is not a higher bar; it is international lawyers tying the hands of Ministers who are meant to be keeping us safe.

On amendments 11 and 12, the same instinct to protect where we should prosecute runs through subsection (7) of proposed new section 17C, which makes a reasonable excuse a defence for accepting and keeping a material benefit from a designated body. That is not necessary, because there are already protections in the Bill for, for example, a lawyer or somebody who has no ability to know that funds were being taken. I recognise that such a provision is in the National Security Act 2023, but that is not a reason to repeat a weakness, and we have an opportunity to fix it. There is no excuse for keeping a hostile state’s money—not in this Bill and not in the Act it leans on.

The sentencing gets the gravity backwards. As drafted, supporting a designated body and actively assisting one carries the same maximum sentence of 14 years or a fine.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

Before my hon. Friend moves on to fines, the issue she has raised, and which I raised earlier, seems to be crucial. It is true that Jonathan Hall, as the Minister said on Second Reading, recognised that the approach to a terrorist organisation was different from the approach to a state. Nevertheless, creating this higher bar whereby to secure a successful prosecution it must be established that the individual concerned was acting on behalf of the designated body for a prohibited purpose—connection with the body alone is not sufficient—seems to me to make prosecution less likely rather than more likely. If international law is at the heart of that—the fear of appeals, and so on and so forth—we need to hear that from the Minister, and the case needs to be a highly persuasive, because it seems to me that the Government are making their lives more difficult, rather than easier.

[Alicia Kearns]

That is exactly the crux of the point I made in my speech on Second Reading. We should not set a higher threshold, because we will see prosecutions collapse for exactly that reason. We need to be arming prosecutors to go and get the justice that our country needs to better protect us.

Turning to the maximum sentence of 14 years, actively doing a hostile state organ’s work—moving its money, carrying its information, committing violence on its behalf—is graver than just supporting it. It is a kind of treason, and I suspect most British people would call it that. We urge the Government to consider having a higher potential sentence for actively working with or receiving material benefit from a designated body. Amendment 7 would therefore raise that maximum sentence from 14 years to 25 years. That figure is not plucked from the air; it matches the Australian regime under which the IRGC was listed last November. As I have said, the Government may argue that the 14 year maximum sentence is taken from the NSA 2023, but let us raise the maximum sentence in both. After all, we are talking about treason.

On amendment 10, I turn from where the Bill is too soft to where it says nothing at all. This is one of the gaps about which the Government have offered no answer, and I have looked hard for one. Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006 makes preparing an act of terrorism an offence, but this Bill contains no equivalent. As the Bill is drafted, a person can plan to assist a designated organ—to be straightforward, let us talk about the IRGC—and unless and until they commit the act, they have committed no offence at all under this Bill. However, the entire purpose of national security work is to prevent and disrupt before harm is done, not to see the plot and clear it up afterwards. We would not tolerate that vulnerability in terrorism law and we should not invent it here. Amendment 10 closes that gap, and lets police and prosecutors act while a plot is still on the drawing board. If the Minister believes preparation is already caught elsewhere, I would welcome her showing me where, but I have yet to be shown that in the briefings I have had.

Amendment 13 recognises that the gap left by preparation is widened by a second omission: self-directed and inspired actors. The Bill misses entirely the person who is never directly commissioned or directed, but who absorbs a hostile state’s propaganda and acts on it alone. Twenty years of counter-terrorism has taught us this lesson at a terrible cost. The gravest or most likely threat is no longer the directed plot, but the individual radicalised online who acts on their own. Hostile states bring the resources, reach and sophistication of states to that propaganda, arguably with a greater inspiring power than any terrorist group can muster. We saw that with the bots that screamed for independence in Scotland and fell silent the moment Tehran’s internet went down, something my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) raised in his speech earlier. That is just a small insight into the ways they are invested in turning us against each other. A Bill that catches only the commissioned and directed is fighting the last war and leaving us dangerously exposed to the next. Amendment 13 captures those inspired to act by a designated body, but not directed by them.

I turn now to the most dangerous omission of all, which we touched on in the wind-ups on Second Reading, and the omission that would worry our allies and partners, which amendment 8 seeks to address. As drafted, the Bill captures activity in the UK and activity abroad that is “prejudicial” to the UK. It does not catch activity planned here on British soil to be perpetrated abroad where there is no ability to prove that it is prejudicial to the interests of the UK where there is no harm to the UK. Activity by the IRGC in France, Iran or Bosnia, or by the Chinese in Hong Kong, may not be directly prejudicial to the interests of the UK, so again we are adding an unnecessary threshold. But if it is perpetrated here, be it in Manchester, London or anywhere else, we must be able to prosecute those responsible.

In plain terms, the gap was turning the UK into a base for state terrorism: a cell here in Britain planning a campaign of intimidation against a journalist in Dublin on behalf of the IRGC, or a network running sabotage operations in Germany. Arrested and charged, their defence writes itself. If the act was not to take place here in the UK, you cannot argue that it was prejudicial to UK safety. The law does not like ambiguity. We should not leave prosecutors having to argue that an attack on Dublin or Berlin was also somehow an attack on London. Amendment 8 closes that gap directly, so that planning hostile activity from British soil is caught wherever that activity is aimed. If the Government are confident that that scope is already reached, they lose nothing by putting it beyond doubt. Far better to write the law clearly today than to watch a case fall apart on that very point.

The next omission is propaganda itself. Since 2006, it has been an offence to disseminate publications that promote terrorism. The Bill extends no equivalent protection against the propaganda of designated states. We have heard colleagues today talk about publications such as Press TV which, shamefully, former Members of this House appear on and are paid to have shows on. Two of the principal weapons of hostile states are the propaganda that recruits and the disinformation that divides. The Chinese Communist party pushes propaganda and disinformation through the United Front Work Department. I hope these powers will reach it one day, but amendment 14 brings designated bodies within the same standard applied to terrorist publications for 20 years, because I do not in any way think that the Government think that IRGC propaganda should have more latitude than that of a proscribed terrorist group.

Next is an omission that many living in our country, especially our Jewish community, will find the most difficult. Under section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, it is an offence to display in public the insignia of a proscribed organisation. It is the power that we rely on to take Hamas flags, Hezbollah banners and the symbols of Hizb ut-Tahrir off our streets. The Bill as drafted contains no equivalent provision whatever, so if the amendment is not accepted by the Government, either now or in the other place, the flag of the IRGC may fly lawfully on a British street, glorifying every stabbing, every attack on our Jewish communities, every kidnap plot and every assassination attempt that the regime has directed here. How do we look the people who are being hunted in the eye and tell them that the banner of their hunter is welcome on our streets?

The Government may say that criminalising the display of state symbols brings lawful state activity under UK criminal law, contrary to diplomatic convention, and that by reciprocity, hostile states could criminalise the Union Jack and UK uniforms abroad, exposing our personnel and dual nationals. I have taken the time to consider that. Yes, state immunity protects foreign states in our courts, but it should not and does not dictate what a resident of this country may do on British pavements.

Backing Business to Create Economic Growth

Debate between John Hayes and Alicia Kearns

Monday 18th May 2026 Commons Chamber

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

I will begin with an issue where the Government have promised action time and again but have failed to act: solar mega-plants. If rural communities are to host nationally significant energy infrastructure, we must be compensated fairly for doing so. An entire parliamentary term has passed, and yet the Government have still not regulated mandatory compensation, despite promising to do so.

The consequences are real. In Rutland and Lincolnshire, a 2,100-acre industrial plant with 10-foot solar panels will fence in some of our villages on all sides for the next 60 years—a decision that the right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Ed Miliband) happily signed off on in his first 24 hours as Energy Secretary. Mallard Pass has subsequently been purchased by Quinbrook Infrastructure Partners, a company with a global transaction value of $30 billion.

Last Friday, I convened a meeting with Quinbrook and the affected parish councillors from Rutland and Lincolnshire. I had to intervene just to get the executives in the room, and what they put on the table was an insult. They have refused to honour the promises made during the application process to pay per megawatt generated, reinterpreting it to mean only energy exported—a sleight of hand that will cost my communities £44,000 a year.

Let us put this in plain terms. A solar plant is estimated to generate annual revenues after finance and operating costs of £10 million to £15 million a year, and yet the company claims it can afford to give my communities only a paltry £96,000 a year.

[Sir John Hayes]

I am delighted to hear what my constituency neighbour is saying, because she is right; these careless corporates who have little interest in energy—and even less in the environment—are riding roughshod over the will of local people in order to impose huge plants on the best and most versatile land. As I said to the Prime Minister recently, this compromises our food security at the very time that we should be building greater economic resilience.

[Alicia Kearns]

My right hon. Friend is completely right. What is breathtaking about this offer of £96,000 a year is that in a previous meeting—in a statement the company now disavows—we were told that paying compensation any higher would make the project financially unviable. That is to say that a project generating £15 million a year would be made financially unviable if it upped its offer to £144,000 a year in compensation.

I wonder how Quinbrook’s investors and shareholders would feel if I asked them why margins are so narrow and whether they can have confidence in Quinbrook. I give notice today that if that offer is not substantially improved, that is precisely what I intend to do: I will name every investor and every shareholder on the Floor of this House, and I will write to them and ask whether they are comfortable with what is being done to my communities in Rutland and Lincolnshire.

Quinbrook is offering less than 40% of the rate being offered on comparable developments in the east midlands. In fact, the only national programme offering less than Mallard Pass is Cleve Hill, which—surprise, surprise—is also owned by Quinbrook. Over the two years of construction works, Quinbrook issued a good-will handout of £200,000 as a one-off donation—not for each year, but across the two. Some residents’ homes have already lost 70% of their value. My question is: when will the Government stand up for us? I intend to amend the Government’s energy independence Bill to make community compensation mandatory for solar developments and to backdate it, but the Government could act first.

The King’s Speech also contained no measures to ban SLAPPs—the use of aggressive, unfounded legal threats to silence whistleblowers. I will use parliamentary privilege today to expose one of the most stomach-churning examples I have encountered. I hope this will shame the perpetrator into silence and similarly force the Government into action.

The company, which is called Enough, sells self-swab rape kits to women and children, and it does so on the back of a series of lies: that the kits are admissible in court—they are not; that women are more likely to be raped than to get cancer—they are not; that 430,000 people are raped in the UK every year—they are not; and that owning of its devices will deter a man from raping you—as if it is my responsibility as a woman to stop a man raping me.

More than 40 sexual assault charities have urged against use of the kits. The National Police Chiefs’ Council has also spoken out against them. The Advertising Standards Authority is investigating the company, as is Trading Standards. The kits prevent proper evidence collection and stop perpetrators’ DNA being checked against police records. A case has already collapsed because of the use of one such kit.

In a debate on Times Radio, I told one of the founders, Katie White, that I had seen the threatening letters that Enough had sent to rape charities and young women across our country. When asked if this was true by the journalist, Katie said, “No, not true.” This was also a lie.