Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJohn Hayes
Main Page: John Hayes (Conservative - South Holland and The Deepings)Department Debates - View all John Hayes's debates with the Home Office
(8 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesBefore you move to the vote, Mrs Cummins—forgive me for not rising with greater speed—I just wanted to test the Minister on clause 14 in particular. Clause 14 deals with the other public authorities that will enjoy the powers that the Bill affords. That was debated at length when the 2016 Act, which this Bill amends, was considered, and the Minister will recall that I also raised it on Second Reading.
It is of course true that a number of public bodies have lawful powers to intervene in a regulatory function where a malicious activity could have dire consequences. The Minister will have many examples to hand, but I will take just one for the purpose of illustrating my argument. The Environment Agency could intervene in the case of a watercourse that had been poisoned intentionally; that would be a criminal act resulting in an investigation and prosecution. One can imagine a circumstance where it would be necessary for that body to obtain communications data to discover how that occurred.
To be clear—the Minister will no doubt tell us—this is not the “what” being communicated, but the who, the when and the where. That is what we mean when we speak of the powers in the 2016 Act and this new Bill. We are not talking about the “what”; we know the telecommunications operator will be obliged to make available the content of communications data. The endeavour that the agency concerned will be involved in is finding out why something has happened. The “why” will of course be closely associated with the investigation and the possible subsequent prosecution.
As always, my right hon. Friend asks a pertinent question. I hope he will forgive me for saying that I very much hope that the letter I asked to be sent arrived in his inbox this morning. He may not have seen it, which I completely understand, as there are many pressing issues on his time. I have also attached it into the packet for the Bill and indeed copied it to the ISC secretariat, which has done such an important job in ensuring that we are all as one on this. I hope very much that that will answer my right hon. Friend’s questions. If it does not, he knows where I am—I would be delighted to clarify it further. As my right hon. Friend has very kindly asked, I shall give that list now, for the record: HM Revenue and Customs, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Department for Work and Pensions, the Treasury, the National Crime Agency, the Department for Business and Trade, and the Competition and Markets Authority.
My right hon. Friend reminds me of that famous scene in “Yes, Prime Minister”—thank God defence is held at central authority, or we would not have to worry about the Russians; we would have a civil war in two weeks. His point about local authorities having intelligence powers is valid. They do not have the same intelligence powers as MI5—let us be absolutely clear about that. That is not what we are offering.
It does the Minister great credit that he has made that list available during the course of our consideration. That is very important. What I had feared might happen was that we might not get it while we were in Committee. In fact, I have not actually seen it, but I am grateful to him for making it available, at least, during our consideration.
This is an area that concerns me. I am quite certain the security services have protocols on how to deal with such things, but it worries me that the DWP is on that list. Having been involved in work on the Horizon Post Office scandal for many years, I know the DWP did not cover itself in glory on some of those cases. Can the Minister reassure the Committee that there are protocols governing when and how it will use those powers? That, I think, would give the public some assurance that there is a standard for how they will be used.
I will happily ask. The right hon. Gentleman is asking for internal management structures, though.
I am grateful to the Minister for offering me a second bite of the cherry. Perhaps I can offer a Hegelian synthesis between him and the right hon. Member for North Durham. We talked earlier about operational purposes, but we have to be careful about that: in the case of the agents of the police, one cannot publish purposes in fine detail, because that would be unhelpful. However, in broad terms, perhaps the way forward on this is to illustrate the kind of purposes that the bodies the Minister described might employ, within the legal constraints that he just set out. Perhaps that is the way forward; it would certainly satisfy me, and I cannot think that would not help to satisfy the right hon. Member for North Durham, who is a reasonable man—not my right hon. Friend, but a right hon. Gentleman and a personal friend, which is better than being a right hon. Friend.
As always, I welcome my right hon. Friend’s contribution. That is covered in many areas in the letter I wrote to him.
I am delighted to clarify that the letter was emailed to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings. He is a traditionalist in many ways, but I believe he has entered the electronic age.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 13 and 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule agreed to.
Clause 15
Internet connection records
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I agree with the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, and the ISC feels strongly on this issue. We are clearly speaking English and the Minister is speaking Japanese, because this is about understanding what is actually being given to the agencies without any judicial oversight, which is being dismissed as if these powers are no greater or more intrusive.
As the Committee will know, under the IPA an internet connection record is a form of communications data. It contains data on who has accessed something: it does not actually provide the content of what they have seen or been in contact with. However, under the IPA information can be sought to develop knowledge of who is speaking to who. I think the ISC see the value of this for not only security services but issues around child protection and organised crime, as has already been argued. We are giving the security services and agencies a degree of authorisation here, which I would argue they have not had up until now.
We then come to the argument made by the Minister and the Government that these regulations are not any more intrusive than what we have at the moment. I would argue differently because the power is broad. Previously, targeted discovery condition A, under section 62 of the IPA, required that the agency and officer know the service and precise time of use to discover the identity of an individual, so that they actually know what they are targeting. The Minister used the words “fishing expedition”—this regulation will be a fishing expedition. By default, it will bring in a broader range of individuals who have nothing to do with the target the agencies are looking at the time and connection records for, and are of no interest to the agencies or anybody else.
The Government are arguing that this regulation is no more intrusive—but it is, if we are dragging in a large number of people in that way. Actually, by not having any judicial oversight, they are allowing the agencies to agree that internally. Although the intrusion is not deeper, it is certainly a lot broader than what we have at the moment. The Bill says that the new powers can only be used for “national security” and the catch-all phrase
“economic well-being of the United Kingdom”.
I am still yet to be convinced of that terminology, but I understand that the Minister and the civil service like consistency across Bills, and that is why it is in this Bill.
Under sections 60A and 61 of the IPA, requests to obtain an ICR are like requests to obtain other communication data: they have to be “necessary and proportionate”, which runs through all of this. Again, the Government are allowing the agencies to decide what is necessary and proportionate. I am not suggesting for one minute that they are going to go on a fishing expedition, but again there is a problem with the Government’s approach to the Bill, and certainly with the agencies’ approach. They want these powers, and I do not personally have an objection, but we have to look at how other people, who are not drowned in the detail of this Bill, will perceive them. Some opponents would say, “Why should I be dragged into this?” It is really about giving public confidence; as the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings said this morning, when the IPA was passed, it was about trying to reassure people.
It would be very simple to ensure that this regulation has independent judicial oversight, as the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East has just said. I know the catch-all phrase that the Minister will come back with, because I am a quick learner: he will say, “The IPC has the ability to look back at anything.” Again, that is the haystack—where is the needle? It would be better and more reassuring if they were to have some judicial approval in advance. I will give the Committee one example. Let us suppose that we are looking at train records and patterns of behaviour on WhatsApp or a train-ticketing website. There is possibly a valid reason to do that—to see someone’s patterns of travel, and so on—but it will scoop up a lot of innocent internet users. The assurance here is that they will not be of interest and therefore they will not be part of it, but their information is being dragged into the system. Then a decision has to be made as to which ones people are interested in and which ones they are not.
That is a big change. I accept that it would not be the exact content that somebody accessed, but the connections would be there. It does not sit comfortably with me to leave such a big change to the security services. Knowing them as well as I do, I do not suspect that they will use the provision illegally or for alternative motives, but we have to reassure the public, and I do not think this does that. Would that be onerous? I am not sure that it would be. This comes back to the point that we have made about the ISC all the way through. If we are giving the security services extra powers, we need the counterbalance of a safeguard.
As the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings said this morning, that was exactly how the IPA was approached. Clearly, he was a very good Minister, because he accepted amendments and suggestions, whereas only one has been accepted for this Bill so far. The Minister spoke this morning about working with the ISC. The Minister speaks to us, but he does not necessarily listen to what we say or take a great deal of interest in what we propose. This is an important point. It comes back to the fundamental point that if extra powers are going to be given, it is only right that they come with responsibilities and safeguards.
New condition D removes the existing requirement for the exact service and the precise time of use to be known. Basically, it will now be possible to do a sweep, which will mean dragging people in. Therefore, I cannot see the problem in having some oversight of these powers. I would like to know why the Minister thinks that condition D is not more intrusive. It is more intrusive, because a lot more people will be affected by it. I think the Government are hiding behind the idea that because it is not possible to identify what the individuals have actually seen, it is not really interesting. If that is the case, why have it in the first place? I know the reason for that, but it would be interesting to know what thought has gone into this and how many people will be dragged in. It obviously depends on how the provision would be used in practice. If we went down the street and said to people that we are giving these powers without any judicial oversight—the Minister will say that IPCO can always look at it, and I understand all that—I think that most people would be quite worried. We would give reassurance by providing that important oversight.
This provision certainly needs to be looked at. Is it of benefit and am I convinced that this is a new power that the agencies need? I am, and I think it is right, but coming back to the previous point, we have to ensure that we do not do anything that undermines what is done or that gives ammunition to those people who want to cast aspersions on what is actually done.
I think I know the arguments that the Minister will put forward. We will no doubt come back to this matter on Report, when there will, I think, be amendments from members of the Committee; and if we have an election wash-up, this is one proposal that I think will be pressed by the Opposition.
To supplement what the right hon. Gentleman has said, this was part of the original legislation and it is and always has been a controversial aspect of it. There are two things that I would emphasise here. First, it is really important to understand that the kinds of inquiries that would necessitate the use of this power are exceptional. When we considered the original Bill in Committee, one of the arguments was around a criminal threshold: in what circumstances would the public bodies that we are talking about need to avail themselves of the powers? I am on the record as saying at that time that I entirely agreed with the then shadow Minister’s argument that it should not be permitted for minor crimes. In other words, the bodies that the Minister listed earlier would not be using the powers on a routine, daily basis for all kinds of things that they are lawfully entitled to do; they would take advantage of the powers in exceptional cases in which very serious matters were at hand. That would be a helpful way of assuaging some of the doubts raised by the right hon. Member for North Durham.
Or we could have what was suggested earlier: when the power is used, that is reported to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, so that it is aware of what is going on and can do something if it has concerns. At the moment, it is presented with a haystack and has to look for the needle.
Exactly. That point was made when we debated the original Act, and I think that I committed at the time to those kinds of things being detailed in the annual report. To clarify a point that was made earlier, David Anderson was clear at the time, and has been since, that we cannot detail the operational purposes of the agencies if doing so would compromise them. The techniques and approaches that they necessarily use in the performance of their duties could be compromised if we were to talk in detailed terms about the character of their operational activities. However, we can speak in broader terms about the kinds of circumstances in which powers might be used—and all the more so for the other public bodies, in a sense, because even if a serious criminal investigation is taking place, those investigations are not typically as secret as they might necessarily be in respect of the security and intelligence community.
Perhaps those two grounds—greater sight of the processes in those bodies and clarity about the circumstances in which the powers can be used; in other words, exceptionally and for very serious matters—would be helpful ways of dealing with some of the points raised by my colleague on the ISC, the right hon. Member for North Durham.
As usual, right hon. and hon. Members have raised some excellent points. Let me be clear: it is not true to say that there is no judicial oversight. To say that there is no judicial oversight would be correct if the IPC were not in place. I know what the right hon. Member for North Durham is going to say, but that is a form of judicial oversight.
As to the way in which the authorisations work, I hope that I have been clear—I will repeat it to ensure that I am—that an investigating officer would have to make an application to use the powers. That would have to go to a senior officer in their service who is not in their chain of command: someone who is not overseeing the operation or in their management chain—a separate element. Any abuse of that system could mean that that individual, or those individuals, are in violation of section 11. I know that the right hon. Member for North Durham takes his responsibilities on the ISC exceptionally seriously and is fully aware that sometimes there can be a pressing need for operational action at pace. That is what this is also designed to help. It is important that officers have the ability to act under a regulatory framework that means that abuses are, at worst, extremely limited due to various constraints.
Let me just finish the point; I know the hon. Member will come back to me.
Condition D is no more intrusive, and it does require the serious crime threshold, which does add an extra layer before it can be used. I hear the hon. Member’s point; the condition still requires proportionality and necessity, so it could not be simply anybody who is using Facebook, because clearly that is not proportionate. It still requires that targeting; it still requires those Venn diagrams, if he likes, to close over a target; and, even then, it requires the serious crime threshold.
The key thing to understand here is that the agencies have always had the ability to intercept communications data. Communications data is one’s letters. Communications data is one’s phone calls. We speak about communications data now, mindful of the way that people communicate now, and we think of the internet and telephones, but the process of intercepting communications has been a core part of the work of the agencies since the agencies began, so we need to put this in context.
The difference here is the nature of how people communicate. It is right to say that—I rise to be helpful to the Minister—the character of encryption, in particular, is making it harder, even in the kind of serious cases that have been described, for those who are missioned to keep us safe to do so by accessing the information they need. So it is right that the law needs to be updated. The critical thing for me, therefore, is this matter of the threshold, which was debated when we debated the original Act.
As far as I understand, this Bill does not change the threshold; it reinforces the threshold. If that is the case and, as has been said, exceptionality is a measure of significance and not complexity—some cases will be complicated, but it is about significance—then the only outstanding difference, as the Minister has said, is oversight. I think the reporting in the annual report matters—the right hon. Member for North Durham made that point—and that would be a small concession to make, if I can describe it as such. I take the point about alacrity, too. What we cannot do is slow down the process by making it bureaucratic.
I think there is an easy way out of this. Being very clear about thresholds, as the Minister very helpfully has been today, is perhaps the way out of it. To clarify that in writing might be helpful.
I suspect we are not going to come to an agreement on this, so I will probably leave it after this point. The IPCO oversight means that IPCO can look at a request at any point. The maximum period it can go without looking at it is 12 months, but it can look at any point. We have said that requests for communications data must be approved by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office
“except where they are urgent or are for the purpose of national security”.
That interaction, which the right hon. Gentleman rightly supports, is already there, so I do not accept it is lacking.
On the question of proportionality, the amount of information that one may need to investigate a paedophile network, for example, may mean being slightly vaguer about the specific time, whereas following a known individual may require different forms of flexibility and proportionality. I am afraid I am going to be very cautious about setting out what each one means, because these principles will have to adapt and be applied as appropriate.
We are going to have to close this down and move on because we have other things to do. Perhaps the way through is, as was suggested a few moments ago, that this be reviewed over time. If in the annual report we have a really thorough examination of how the measure has been applied and in what circumstances—in broad terms, of course, because we do not need the details of the crimes—that would give us the assurance we need. Our Committee has made that point emphatically. That would be a terribly good way out of this and it would not be a huge step. If the Minister agrees to that, I would certainly be satisfied.
It is not for me to tell the ISC what it should look into, but I would be surprised if it did not want to look into this in great depth.
I think the Minister might have misunderstood. Forgive me; I did not mean that. I meant that this could be reviewed in the IPCO annual report. That would obviously be considered by the ISC in the way he describes. I think we need a summary of how this will work in practice and a commitment that we do that now. He sort of talked about a retrospective review. Rather than debate this further now, that would be a very good way forward.
I am entirely supportive of the idea that IPCO should update the ISC and the Secretary of State about how it is working and provide information so that a proper view can be taken. I think that is entirely appropriate.
Government amendments 3 and 4 require that any Secretary of State to be designated by the Prime Minister as an alternative approver must have the necessary operational awareness of the warrantry process to undertake the role. This change will replace the current drafting inserted in the House of Lords relating to “routine duties”, which is over-restrictive and will undermine the resilience of the triple-lock process that the clauses seek to safeguard.
Requiring relevant operational awareness will ensure the necessary flexibility and resilience while maintaining a proportionate scope for delegation. It will allow scope to include those who may be new to their role and do not yet carry out such duties routinely, or who no longer carry them out routinely due to machinery-of-government changes but have valuable pre-existing knowledge that makes them a suitable alternative approver.
I am grateful to the Minister for the fact that his amendment goes some way to dealing with the issues that I and others raised in relation to the change from existing practice. At the moment, the Prime Minister provides the element of what has been described as the triple lock. The Government proposal is that other Secretaries of State should perform the role when the Prime Minister is unable to for a number of reasons. My anxiety, reflected by the Intelligence and Security Committee, is that those Secretaries of State who act for the Prime Minister in such circumstances should be people with operational experience. Typically, that would mean people with warranting powers—people accustomed to the business of issuing warrants, with all that that suggests.
The Government amendment speaks of operational awareness. I think “operational experience” is a better turn of phrase, although I accept the Government’s point that if there was a new Secretary of State—a new Home Secretary would be a good example—they would not necessarily have experience. By definition, they would be new in the job, whether that was the Home Secretary or Foreign Secretary and so on. It might be possible to speak of experience and responsibilities, so it could be either responsibilities or experience. Of course, the Government rightly say that a former Home Secretary, Foreign Secretary or Northern Ireland Secretary who was then doing a different job in Government could be one of the people designated, so I take that point.
The issue here is ensuring that the people who perform the role are competent to do so, and I know that is something on which we agree. It is really a matter of the semantics, but semantics are not always insignificant. I am aware of bolshevism and liberalism, but I would not want anything to do with either of them. I am aware of the separatist case on the United Kingdom, but awareness is as far as I want to go with that—I say that without contention or, indeed, acrimony of any kind. I am not sure that “awareness” is quite the right word, and I simply offer that semantic but not insignificant point to the Minister for his consideration.
Given what the Minister said about a change in Government—I do not expect one, but I suppose it is a remote possibility—perhaps the words “operational responsibility or experience” would cover the point made and be slightly tighter than “awareness”. Also, there is the matter of notifying the PM. The Committee made the good suggestion that the PM should be notified as soon as practicable, which may be something with which the Minister agrees. If the Prime Minister were indisposed because of illness or whatever, they would be notified as soon as is practicable that a warrant had been issued.
On the second point, I am sure that, like me, my right hon. Friend finds it absolutely inconceivable that that PM would not be notified. I am not convinced that that must be in primary legislation. I find it genuinely inconceivable that the Prime Minister would not be notified at the earliest opportunity. Obviously, if they could be notified immediately, the provision would not be required.
But, Minister, let us be honest: a lot of things that we would have taken for granted were ignored in Downing Street over the last few years. Until Boris Johnson became Prime Minister, it had been a great part of our constitution that convention was followed. Surely it would therefore be better to have the point about notification in the Bill; otherwise, we are leaving it to the free will of convention. I would have trusted convention, but we have had Boris Johnson as Prime Minister.
I want to help the Minister, because I do not necessarily agree with the right hon. Member for North Durham; occasionally, he and I do disagree, despite the impression that we have created in this Committee. Notification could be covered in a piece of statutory guidance that supports the Bill. It could state that the Prime Minister should be notified as soon as reasonable practicable, exactly in the terms just described. How’s that?
As is so often the case, I absolutely agree with my right hon. Friend.
Further to that point of order, Mrs Cummins. May I say a particular thanks to you for chairing this Committee today in such a fantastic and eloquent way?
Further to that point of order, Mrs Cummins. Since we are having further points of order, I want to say to the Minister, and the shadow Minister, how grateful I think most of the Committee are for the way this Bill has been conducted. This is a really good example of how a measure can be considered in Committee in a way that is not nakedly partisan or, worse, spiteful. I simply say to the Minister that I do regard the original Act as my child, and I see him as its foster parent, so he had better do a good job.
Bill, as amended, to be reported to the House.