National Security (State Threats) Bill

John Hayes Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 17th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Shabana Mahmood]

The right hon. Gentleman is right. It is incumbent on all parliamentarians to reflect on the platforms we appear on, and what those platforms are seeking to do. There will always be a balance to be struck with freedom of speech and other matters, but where activities lead people to fall foul of the law, they will be pursued with the full force of the law—whether that is this Bill, the National Security Act 2023, or any other part of our criminal legislation framework.

On the attacks on the Prime Minister’s home, let me just say, factually, what happened in the criminal justice system. It was not part of the prosecution’s case that there was any additional direction of that activity. That was not part of the evidence. I would not want to let that stand without making that clear about the prosecution.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

The Home Secretary will know that I am an admirer of hers, and we tend to agree about much. We certainly agree about the threat posed by Iran. She will be familiar with the report produced by the Intelligence and Security Committee, of which I am pleased to be a member—indeed, I am basking in the glory of the compliments that the ISC has already received—which said:

“Iran poses a wide-ranging, persistent and unpredictable threat to the UK, UK nationals, and UK interests. Iran has a high appetite for risk when conducting offensive activity and”—

this is the critical point—

“its intelligence services are ferociously well-resourced with significant areas of asymmetric strength.”

Iran is a particular threat, and the Home Secretary will well understand that the way it uses its intelligence services is entirely different from the way that we see our intelligence services in this country. I have no doubt that she is mindful of that fact in relation to the Bill. I see this Bill as quite closely associated with how we deal with Iran. Will the Home Secretary comment on that?

On a point raised by the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and my right hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard), one way of dealing with oversight would be for the ISC to be pre-briefed by a Minister when proscription was considered, rather than it having to play catch up afterwards.

[Shabana Mahmood]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his contribution. The Bill seeks to create the legal framework by which designations will be made in future. The Bill will hopefully be approved quickly by Parliament, and I will seek to move forward with designations as quickly as possible, to deal with the threats that I am discussing in the House today.

I hope that the right hon. Gentleman would agree that the fact that I have spent some time considering the different nature of the threat posed by these three states in particular shows that we are very alive to the ways in which they use their unique positions to pose a threat to us in the United Kingdom. He is right about the way in which Iran operates; it is different from how Russia and China operate. The Government have to be alive to the different type of risks posed by these three countries in particular. At the moment, those countries account for a large proportion of the hostile activities that are monitored by our security services, but those activities are not exclusive to those three countries.

On matters of oversight, I will repeat my starting position. I do think that our current framework is robust and has stood the test of time. Of course, things change, and we would review the framework all the time anyway. I repeat my general offer—I suspect that I am making it to the whole of the ISC, given how well represented it is in this debate—of a conversation to pick up any concerns that its members have. The Minister for Security and I will make sure that we consider any additional proposals fully, but I am mindful that we do not want a position in which the Government cannot act quickly, or to over-regulate what is necessarily an Executive function, as speed is often of the essence. With that understood, a sensible conversation is always welcome.

In relation to Iran, Members will be aware that two men await trial under the National Security Act for the surveillance of Jewish sites. While investigations remain ongoing, the police are exploring potential links between Iran and the spate of arson attacks directed at our Jewish community in London. Faced with this intolerable hostility, our nation has bolstered its defences. The National Security Act, brought forward by the previous Government and supported by Labour, rightly commanded support from both sides of the House. It has given our authorities new tools and provided the legal underpinning for a series of complex and sensitive investigations, and it has secured important convictions, including of two men for gathering information and conducting surveillance to assist the Chinese state.

In addition, the foreign influence registration scheme has been in force for close to a year. Russia and Iran are placed on its enhanced tier. Anyone now conducting activity on behalf of those states faces a clear choice: identify themselves and register their activity, or face the prospect of prison.

Sanctions remain a vital tool in our action against hostile states. The UK now has more than 550 sanctions against Iranian-linked individuals and organisations, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in its entirety. Through measures like these, we have made this country a harder target. However, as we improve our defences, our adversaries respond and change their behaviour to pose new threats to our country. That has been particularly evident in the rising use of proxy groups—criminal gangs, professional enablers and front companies that do the bidding of a foreign power, against the interests of this country, in exchange for money.

There has long been a desire to ban state-linked organisations from operating in this country, and to target those who facilitate them. That is why the Government made a manifesto commitment to deal with state-backed domestic security threats in the same way that we tackle terrorism. The question was how to create the right legal power to do so. My predecessor, now the Foreign Secretary, tasked Jonathan Hall KC, the Government’s independent reviewer of terrorism and state threats legislation, with answering that question.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Oliver Dowden]

I totally agree, and it is dangerous for this country that there is a mutuality of interests among extremists who do not share our values and hostile states who are opposed to us. This Bill should seek to deal with that overlap. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood is in certain places backed by foreign states and has an equally subversive agenda here in the UK. Although its relationship with violence on our streets is often more subtle and obscured, the threat to our social cohesion and democratic fabric is no less severe. We have seen in recent months the United States Government designate various regional branches of the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist organisations, and an excellent article by Lord Godson highlighted today how many European states are taking steps to address this issue. The west is waking up to this reality and we in this country cannot afford to lag behind.

[Sir John Hayes]

This situation is worsened, of course, by the values we seek to defend being used against us. Fair-minded British people want to believe that every side deserves a hearing, so we afford to some groups that do not deserve it a kind of equivalence—on one hand we have the west and Britain and America, and on the other hand we have these other groups. That equivalence is entirely bogus of course, because we are defending an open society and they are seeking to close it.

[Sir Oliver Dowden]

My right hon. Friend is of course entirely correct. Members on the Labour Back Benches are, given their presence in the Chamber for this debate, at the more hawkish and national security end of the left-wing spectrum, but there are elements of the liberal left who succumb to that equivalence argument and it is profoundly dangerous.

The 2015 review of the Muslim Brotherhood concluded that membership of, association with, or influence by the Muslim Brotherhood should be considered a possible indicator of extremism. A decade later, in the current far more dangerous geopolitical environment, we need to look again at that assessment. That is why I continue to believe that the Government should take up the opportunity to do so. Some of our closest allies have done so and indeed have taken a much more robust approach. For example, the United Arab Emirates has designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation. We should ask ourselves why a country such as the UAE has such concerns about the radicalisation of its own students in our mosques that they are restricting their study here. The test under this Bill is rightly a foreign powers threat test, and there may well be other avenues for addressing this issue, but none the less I make the point that where an ideological body or a body linked to an ideological movement is acting to the benefit of a hostile state, this regime, alongside others, should apply.

Finally, I would like to address the future-proofing of this legislation, which has been touched on by some Members. Just as threat actors have evolved, so too have their methods, and foreign powers and their proxies no longer exclusively rely on the old-school methods of human surveillance, forged documents and so on. They can deploy bots that distort the democratic debate, as we have seen; ransomware to cripple business; cyber-attacks to disrupt public services; and deepfakes to impersonate trusted public figures. That list goes on, and AI will accelerate all of that—a point I made at the UN General Assembly ahead of the Bletchley Park AI safety summit. Cross-Government co-ordination to address this issue is more urgent than ever.

In this country we cannot just look at state threats purely in a physical silo, detached from the digital domain. Hostile states will use AI to automate reconnaissance, scale spear phishing, identify vulnerabilities, and so on. A criminal who once needed specialist skills may increasingly be able to purchase or access those capabilities through AI-enabled tools, and hostile states that once needed sophisticated cyber-units may be able to outsource, automate or accelerate parts of that work. Many Members will be familiar with the concerns and indeed opportunities surrounding Claude Mythos and its advanced cyber-capable AI models. That is a warning to us, but it is a warning of much more to come in this space.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

I think we agree about the threat we face and about its scale. We do not need to spend the four hours allocated for this debate sharing that agreement, as the hon. Member for Cardiff West (Mr Barros-Curtis) rightly said. Our job is to scrutinise the Government’s proposed response to the threat, and that is what I want to do with my time. It is especially important to do that when the timescale for consideration of the legislation is compressed, as it is today.

I have huge sympathy with those who have spoken about the IRGC, but I would counsel against using this legislation to make the final decision about its proscription or designation. I do not want to steal the Minister’s lines, but I suspect that she will say to us, rightly, that it is important that we do not set a precedent, under this new system, of making designations in primary legislation, rather than by ministerial decision. There is an important procedural point there, which it will be necessary to maintain if we want to defend the flexibility that I think the Government are seeking in this legislation.

However, it is right to reflect on the problem that the Government are seeking to solve. The problem is clearly the gaps that they, and many of us, perceive in the proscription regime under the Terrorism Act, which does not enable them to deal with damaging behaviour by entities, including state entities, that are not captured by the proscription regime. That is the problem that Jonathan Hall identified in his report, and the problem that the Government are seeking to remedy through this legislation. They have made it clear that their objective is to present a regime that is broadly equivalent—the Government have used the word “equivalent” in their publications relating to this Bill—to the proscription regime. I want to explore that a little, to understand exactly how the Bill is going to deliver on its objectives.

I will start, as the Bill does, with the grounds for designation. The Bill is clear that in order to designate a body under this legislation, the Secretary of State must reasonably believe that it is, or has been, involved in what is described as “foreign power threat activity”, and then must consider that

“designating the body is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”

It is important to understand what foreign power threat activity is. It is defined in section 33 of the National Security Act 2023 as

“the commission, preparation or instigation of acts or threats”,

which are set out in subsection (3), and include obtaining or disclosing protected information or trade secrets, assisting a foreign intelligence service, entering a prohibited place, sabotage, general foreign interference and obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service. Section 33 goes on to specify other acts:

“serious violence against another person…endanger the life of another person, or…create a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public.”

I set that out in detail because it is important to understand that for designation to be attached to a relevant body, it must have been involved in that sort of serious harmful activity. That is what would justify designation in the mind of the relevant Secretary of State: the body’s activities must be considered to be different from those of a normal state or other body engaged in its normal business.

In the explanatory notes, the Government give examples of things that might result in designation, such as, in paragraph 21,

“a foreign intelligence service obtaining protected information and inspecting sensitive defence or intelligence sites in the UK…a mercenary group carrying out acts of serious violence on behalf of a foreign power”,

or,

“a network preparing to carry out sabotage or threatening to commit acts that create a serious risk to the health and safety of the public”.

I set all that out because the Bill creates an offence of supporting a designated body, but in the construction of that offence, it is clear that the Government do not believe that all acts or expressions of support for a designated body are sufficient for that criminal liability. I want to understand why not.

[Sir John Hayes]

I hesitate to interrupt the flow of my right hon. and learned Friend, but the key point is legitimacy, as he and I have discussed. A state can be conducting legitimate activity by definition, whereas the bodies that have been proscribed previously are never legitimate implicitly. It is a difficult tightrope for Governments to walk, and that is why historically they have tended not to defer to a place where they chose to proscribed state bodies, because the implication is for the state as a whole. Where states take a “whole-state approach”—China being a good example—it is hard to walk that tightrope.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

My right hon. Friend and Committee colleague is right in what he says, and I will come back to how and why we distinguish what the Bill proposes from the proscription regime.

On what is required to prove at least one of the criminal offences set out in this Bill, clause 2 introduces a new offence under a proposed new section 17A of the National Security Act 2023. The offence involves support for a designated body, but only if such support is given for “a prohibited purpose”, which proposed new section 17A(4) sets out is

“a purpose that the person knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”

That is an additional element that the prosecution must prove. That will undoubtedly make this offence more difficult to obtain convictions under, and there may be good reason for that, but if there is, I want to understand what it is.

I make two observations on the Government’s chosen approach in relation to that specific proposed new offence. The first is that this is not equivalent to proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. I use that expression because that is the wording the Government have used in setting out their aspirations with the Bill. Although the Government intend designation to be similar to proscription in many respects—I accept it cannot be in all respects—proscription does not require an additional motive for someone who supports a proscribed organisation, but merely that they support the proscribed organisation and know that that is what they are doing. No additional motive, demonstrating some kind of animus against the welfare of the United Kingdom, is needed, and that is an important distinction.

The Government may say that the reason for that difference is to protect those who are engaging with a legitimate entity in a way that, just as my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) says, can never be possible with a proscribed terrorist organisation. In that case, however, I am struggling a little with the purpose and effect of designation itself. Surely the point of designation in the Bill is to move an organisation from the acceptable column into the unacceptable column. Surely the list of reasons why someone might be designated, which I read out earlier, is there to show us that those organisations, when they are doing those things, should not be worthy of support of any kind; but that is not, I think, where this legislation leaves us.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

The “2026 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community” states:

“The global security environment is becoming more complex.”

That complexity is being fed by the increasing sophistication of our adversaries. My right hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden) talked about AI and the impact it may have in adding to that complexity and deepening the threat.

It is not just the US agencies that have come to that conclusion. The director general of MI5, in the speech referred to by the hon. Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards), said:

“My teams are routinely uncovering attempts by state actors to commission surveillance, sabotage, arson or physical violence right here in the UK.”

These adversaries, far from being remote, are real and present on the streets of our constituencies. That is why the Government’s attempts to improve the tools at the disposal of Ministers are welcome. It is why all the considerations made by Governments, of whatever hue, that are sufficient to deal with that rapidly changing threat deserve the hearing they are receiving. That is not an unqualified level of support—I shall explain my qualifications in due course—but in essence it is right that the Government look again at the legislative framework associated with keeping us safe.

There is a weakness in democracies that is not shared by most of our enemies. That weakness is that legislation passes through this House and is scrutinised, debated and considered. That takes time. Our adversaries can, at will and at a whim, change their approach. Keeping pace with that change is difficult in an open and free society. That very openness and freedom is, of course, what we are here to promote and, indeed, to defend.

The director general of MI5 went on to speak about the various enemies we face. For example, when he spoke of Russia, he said that the police have

“disrupted a steady stream of surveillance plots with hostile intent”

from the Russian state. He went on to speak about Iran. He said:

“Iran’s autocratic regime is likewise frantically trying to silence its opponents around the world, including in the UK.”

The hon. Member for Leeds South West and Morley spoke about the number of plots that have been tracked in a single year. The director general went on to say:

“The UK was among the first to call out this wave of…transnational aggression”,

but in fact the problem is worldwide. On China, he said that

“clandestine technology transfer…efforts to overtly influence UK public life…harassment and intimidation of opponents”

are all features of Chinese activity here. Because China adopts a whole-state approach, it is not possible to separate the cause—China’s determination to undermine us—and its effect, in terms of the mechanism it uses to do that.

None of that is a surprise to those who have sat on the Intelligence and Security Committee. As Members will know, it commissioned a report into Russia, before I was a member, and then, while I have had the privilege of serving on the Committee, reports into China and Iran. Our China report says that:

“The fact that China is a strategic threat is not news…China’s state intelligence apparatus—almost certainly the largest in the world, with hundreds of thousands of civil intelligence officers (leaving aside their military capability)—targets the UK and its interests prolifically and aggressively.”

The Chinese are particularly enthusiastic about their activities in high-tech industries and academia. Their ability to gain a head start in the economy is partly as a result of their infiltration of the knowledge sector, their theft of innovation, and the ability to persuade, frankly, naive—I am choosing my words carefully, as I was going to say witless—individualsto be party to the theft of intellectual property.

China is active in its attempts to do harm across the world, and particularly in Britain, as the Government recognises. This and previous Governments have also long recognised that we need to update legislation to deal with that changing and increasingly complex threat—indeed, I note that both my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), present in the Chamber, and I were Security Ministers in previous Governments. The attempts by China to gain technological dominance, the attempts by Iran to infiltrate institutions, and the perpetual attempts by Russia, both in cyber-space and elsewhere, to undermine Britain’s interests and industry are clear.

The Bill is part of a fitting response to those threats, but there are questions that I want to address, some of which amplify the remarks of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), who sits with me on the ISC. There is an important matter for the Government to deal with about the relationship between the Bill and the Terrorism Act 2006, in particular, as my right hon. and learned Friend said, proposed new section 17A to the National Security Act 2023.

Essentially, the Government are creating a higher bar than that which applies in existing legislation. As was set out in the speech by my right hon. and learned Friend, we need to understand why that higher bar exists in the proposed legislation, and how it will be crossed. The purpose of the legislation is clear, but in practice it will only work if it can be supported in the courts. Designation will undoubtedly be challenged, so it has to stand up to the test of legal scrutiny. I have doubts as to whether the double bar that will be required to make designation practically possible can be straightforwardly met. Some more commentary from the Government on that would be helpful.

I would also be interested to know why a different approach has been taken for designation itself, and why there is no discretionary power in the Bill for the Home Secretary to take action promptly—such action will sometimes be necessary—as she can in respect of proscription. As I know from my time as Security Minister—the Minister, too, will know this—it is sometimes necessary to act quickly on proscription because circumstances demand it. The Bill does not allow that level of discretion and flexibility, and I think the House has every reason to wonder why.

In addition, the new statutory test for designation appears to introduce this cumulative two-pronged approach. We understand that proving that designation will protect and safeguard the interests of the UK is necessary, but that is not necessary in the case of proscription in the same way—at least, not in specific terms—and I wonder why the Government have chosen to adopt a different approach in that respect.

There are a series of quite technical challenges to the Government over whether this well-intended legislation—which I think enjoys broad support across the House, from those who understand the scale of the threats that I have briefly outlined—will work in practice. I hope that the Minister, during the course of our considerations this afternoon, will be able to address some of those matters, particularly in relation to proposed new section 17A.

The chief of the Secret Intelligence Service said recently:

“We are now operating in a space between peace and war. This is not a temporary state or a gradual, inevitable evolution. Our world is being actively remade, with profound implications for national and international security.”

She concluded:

“It also means everyone in society really understanding the world we are in—a world where terrorists plot against us, where our enemies fearmonger, bully and manipulate, and the front line is everywhere. Online, on our streets, in our supply chains, in the minds and on the screens of our citizens. We must all stand together against this.”

That means, of course, defending our values at every opportunity, in this House and beyond it; it means recognising that there is no ethical or moral equivalence between those who seek to do us harm and those who seek to defend us—whatever some of those who are either naive or malevolent might tell us—and it means being responsive to that threat, in the way that this legislation is intended to be, by having adequate resources for our security and intelligence services, and the right powers too. This Bill is an attempt to get those powers in place in order to protect us all. I wish it well, but I also press the Government to ensure that it is as effective as it needs to be.

[Kevin Bonavia (Stevenage) (Lab)]

As everybody in this House knows full well, protecting our national security is always the first duty of any Government, and we have heard a consensus on that today. The reality today is that the threat from hostile foreign powers and the proxies on which they rely has grown significantly in both scale and complexity. We cannot make the mistake of thinking that the threat is theoretical; it is real, it is evolving, and it is happening right here in our very own country. We have heard many examples of that today.

A lot of the focus has rightly been on the IRGC. Time and again, where we have said, “That organisation should be proscribed,” we have heard, “Can’t touch the IRGC, I’m afraid.” We have struggled with that. I am very pleased that our Government are today holding on to the Prime Minister’s promise that we will make good our defence of our country from organisations such as the IRGC.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards) eloquently set out, the IRGC is at the moment—it could change in future—the prime example of a state-backed organisation. It was initially set up to defend the Islamic Republic of Iran, but what kind of defence is that? Iran is hardly a friendly power to us—it has an extreme ideology, and it seeks not just to defend its own country but to export that ideology across the world, including to our own shores, as it has done time and again. This legislation seeks to end that. We have had debates in which it has been argued, “Well, is it the equivalent of proscription, and what does the test of knowledge mean?” Those questions are right, and I am sure that the Minister will respond, either in this debate on Second Reading or later in today’s proceedings.

What I want to get across is how real the threat is. Everybody here in the Chamber gets it—I hope we do—but my big worry is that our fellow citizens in the wider United Kingdom have not necessarily got it yet. It begins with someone thinking, “I read something online that doesn’t seem right”, and then they are taken down a pathway, and behind that pathway are hostile threats—the IRGC and others.

As legislators, we have to make use of the legislative tools to try to catch up with that, but I think we also have another job: we are not just legislators but representatives and communicators. I really hope that this Bill passes, but whatever happens, we have an obligation to say to our fellow citizens, “Be vigilant. Be resilient.”

Organisations, whether the IRGC or others, will not present themselves for what they really are. They will hide behind the proxies we have heard about today and do all they can to take the people of this country and use them, either knowingly or as dupes, for their nefarious ends—and we do not always know what those nefarious ends are. Whatever the country may be—Iran in this case—those ends are not consistent with our values. We have heard about differences of views or opinion, but in this case they are not of moral equivalence. I totally agree with that point. We in this country rightly struggle to make sure that other voices are heard, but at the same time we ensure that everyone is protected. That is certainly not the case in countries like Iran, Russia or China.

Let us pass this Bill today, but let us not stop there.

[Sir John Hayes]

The hon. Gentleman is building to a crescendo, so I wanted to intervene before he sits down. The vigilance he calls for, which echoes what I said about us coming together to make a strong case for our values and to defend them against those who assail us, is going to become more difficult because of artificial intelligence—my right hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden) made a telling contribution in that respect. It is really important that we are not so fascinated by the novelty of innovation that we wait too long to regulate AI. It took us 25 years in this House to work out that the internet might have malign effects. Finally, the last Government introduced the Online Safety Act 2023, and this Government have now taken that further—quite rightly. For heaven’s sake, let us understand the risks that this poses in weakening the very resilience that the hon. Gentleman has called for.

[Kevin Bonavia]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He makes a powerful point on AI. I was about to set out that we are already engaged in new legislative tools in this regard, including the Representation of the People Bill and the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, which passed through this place yesterday. But we cannot just say “Right, job done; We’ve given the Government as much flexibility as we can, so let them now get on with it.” It will hit the wall, and we do not know as of today just how powerful AI in its widest forms can be.

I have thought a bit about AI and about how in many ways in this place we are always catching up. Occasionally, we make laws that push society forward—we have made some great social reforms through legislation—which is great. However, too often we are reacting to a problem that has grown out of control. Our procedures in this place will not necessarily work in the future with things like AI. That is not a debate for today. However, I take the right hon. Gentleman’s point strongly in mind.

Although I support the Bill, I make the point that it is part of a much broader governmental, parliamentary and—I hope—whole-society approach. When we think about the tools that the Government need, from what I have seen the Bill will give the Government of the day broad-ranging powers, but I hope and pray that this Government, or any future Government, know full well that they will have to move far quicker than before to do what is needed. We as legislators in this place must be willing to support that Government in doing the job in hand. I support the Bill and hope that, as a result, it will make our country safer for all our communities.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir John Hayes]

My hon. Friend is right to draw attention to Iranian activity in Britain. In the report that our Committee produced on that, we said:

“The Iranian Intelligence Services have shown that they are willing and able—often through third-party agents—to attempt assassination within the UK, and kidnap from the UK…There have been at least 15 attempts at murder or kidnap against British nationals or UK-based individuals since the beginning of 2022.”

[Bob Blackman]

I thank my right hon. Friend for that intervention.

Another issue, which the Committee also referred to, was that certain charities in this country are linked to or directed and funded by Tehran. At least 13 charities are under investigation by the Charity Commission. I have asked continually for action from the Government and the Charity Commission to close down those charities to prevent them from acting against the interests of this country. At the moment, there is a lack of action and co-ordination, and it is not clear to me that this legislation will catch those charities, or whether there is sufficient legislation to do so. I would appreciate the Minister addressing that issue.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge) (Con)]

I am grateful to be called. I welcome the Minister to her place. It is a great job—I enjoyed it, and I have no doubt that she will, too. Though she may have shorter fingernails at the end of the day than she started with, it is worth it for the opportunity to serve with some of the finest people in our Government. The intelligence services and the police that she will be working with are truly exceptional, and it is worth putting on the record the gratitude of the whole House for what they do.

Yesterday was the 10th anniversary of the death of my friend Jo Cox, and many of us have been wearing white roses in memory of her. When we last met, Jo and I were in one of the Committee rooms working on a report together entitled, “The Cost of Doing Nothing”. What we were talking about in that report was the action in Syria, the way in which the extremism in that country had torn it apart and how we had not acted in ways that we felt we should have done. I welcome very much what the Government are doing today, because they are demonstrating another response: they are not willing to stand aside and watch as the country gets torn apart in different ways. I will make criticisms in a moment, but I would first just like to place on the record my gratitude for the way in which the Government have approached this legislation. I agree with the broad sweep of it; I just wish they had given it a little bit more time, and I understand that the Minister will almost certainly agree with me.

Unusually, I would like to praise the hon. Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards). He made an absolutely outstanding speech and spoke brilliantly, not just for this whole House but for the country, on the threat to a particular community, which is actually a threat to us all. It is absolutely true that in too many ways the Jewish community are the canary in the coalmine of any society. When we see Jews under threat, when we see Jewish homes frightened, when we see Jewish sites vandalised—as sadly we are seeing too much—we know what is coming, and what is coming is not pretty.

But let us get back to the Bill because, while it is welcome, it makes that tragic error that we often make in this place—I know we made this error in our time as well—which is to seek the rapid answer rather than the complete one. In doing so, the Bill misses very slightly the challenge that is bound to come, because I am afraid that we do know what will come. By the way, I will no doubt support the Minister when she decides to use the powers, because she will be well advised by the teams we both know so well, but we know that when an organisation is designated, it will lawyer up, go to court and challenge her, and we will find ourselves going around the houses.

This is where I confess a failure of my own. One of the organisations that I sought to work on was the Islamic Centre of England. That organisation has the same connection to Islam that Christian organisations that claim the crusader cross, and that far-right baggage, have to the church of Christ. Let us be absolutely clear: it is a vile political organisation dressing itself up as a religious movement—there is nothing religious about it all—yet that organisation enjoys charitable status, as my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman) identified, and sadly, despite irregularities in its business and the way that it operates, it is still able to operate.

Let me list a couple more such organisations. Darul Hikma has praised Qasem Soleimani, the late head of the IRGC, whose death is certainly not mourned here, and it praised 7 October and the IRGC. The Abrar Islamic Foundation has praised Hezbollah and Hamas, and has run antisemitic and homophobic events. There are also the Ahl al-Bait Society Scotland—sadly, this reaches across the whole of the United Kingdom—Ahlulbayt Islamic Mission and Al-Ikhlas. They have all run, in various different ways, sessions praising the IRGC and supportive of Qasem Soleimani, which is entirely against not just the interests of the United Kingdom, but very particularly the interests of the Muslin community in the United Kingdom. Let us be absolutely clear about what the natural consequence of this will be: it will stir up sectarian and religious hatred. As the hon. Member for Leeds South West and Morley mentioned, we are first seeing the effect in the Jewish community—of course we are—but we all know where this will lead.

There are those of us who value all communities in our society, as I know the Home Secretary does, and who want Islam treated exactly the same as any religion. I think we Catholics are the only ones who are still lawfully discriminated against, but given that that excludes us only from the monarchy, I think we can be pretty comfortable with our position. Those of us who want to see all religions treated equally know that we simply cannot have poison poured into a few ears and pretend that does not happen.

I mentioned PressTV today, as well as the vile rumours being spread about the Prime Minister and others by Russia Today, among others, to show that we need to be conscious of what we are dealing with. Let us be quite clear: this is not a freedom of speech issue. This is no more a freedom of speech issue than the invasion of a hostile army is a right-to-roam issue. This is fundamentally about the deliberate actions of a state organisation—either the Russian, Chinese or Iranian state—to undermine us and tear us apart.

[Sir John Hayes]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way. Many people say that he was the second best Conservative Security Minister, and I tend to agree with that. Might he continue to build the bridges that have already been formed across the House during this debate by inviting the Minister, when she winds up, to re-examine the charitable status of a whole range of organisations that have intimate connections with the Chinese, Iranian or Russian state, as a parallel exercise to the consideration of this legislation? That would seem to me to be a sensible move that we could agree today.

[Tom Tugendhat]

My right hon. Friend, demonstrating why he leads the list of Security Ministers past and present, pre-empts me; I was coming to China. Here I declare various interests. I am a patron of United Against Nuclear Iran, an organisation that campaigns, just as the Government do, and as everybody does, against Iran having nuclear weapons. I am not sure that it is a contentious organisation to be a member of; I hope it is universally supported. Also, I am sanctioned by the Chinese, Russian and Iranian states. I want to highlight some of the issues that we are dealing with that have not quite come through in the debate so far.

Let us be honest: this Bill is shaped around the IRGC. It is shaped around a state organisation—a part of the Iranian constitutional structure—that is behaving like a terrorist group, because it is the sponsor of terrorism around the world. However, it is not alone; for example, we know that the so-called little green men who operated in Crimea were actually part of the Russian armed forces. There are Russian groups, such as the Wagner Group, that act as state-sponsored terrorist organisations in countries such as Mali. I am looking at the Home Secretary, here: I hope that those groups will be encapsulated in the Bill. It certainly reads as though it will cover them.

Let us look a little more directly at one question. There is an organisation that should be captured in this Bill but I suspect will not be: TikTok. The Home Secretary may wonder why I raise TikTok, so let me be quite clear. There are many social media platforms around the world, and I am not going to pretend that many of them are any better than a cesspit. They tend to encourage various forms of hatred. As an aside, when I meet people who have posted on those platforms in the flesh at constituency events, it turns out that they are absolutely charming people who would never be quite so rude to one’s face, but they are utterly vile online. That is quite remarkable, but there we go. I mention TikTok for this reason: other social media platforms respond to the triggers involved in advertising. Effectively, they respond to the interests of their shareholders. They may or may not like the product, but we know what they are doing. Unlike other platforms, which are edited for profit, TikTok is edited for effect. That is the difference.

Let us look at the TikTok effect after 7 October, for example. It did not push a particular ideology. It did not try to tell us, as the Soviets did in the 1920s, that more tractors were being produced in Minsk than in Manchester, or wherever. It does not seek to tell us that something is better; it seeks to tell us that there is nothing there—that it is all about hatred and division. It seeks to promote a horrific outcome that some people want, which is effectively a destroyed, torn-apart state that is hostile to itself. I am afraid that is what TikTok is doing, and not by accident. Its algorithm is controlled by the Ministry of State Security, through the Chinese Communist party, in Shenzhen. It is not based anywhere else. That algorithm effectively acts as an editor—just as a newspaper editor would. It quite deliberately promotes not one side, but both sides. If one side is promoted, we may get persuasion, but we still get unity. If both sides are promoted, we get division, anger, hostility and rage. I do not think that the Bill touches on that issue, but I urge the Minister to have a look at it in months to come.

There was a time, 20 or 30 years ago, when we would have said that a state-sponsored organisation was fundamentally human and needed people. It would have needed agents—someone to hire the car, rent the room or whatever it happened to be—but that is not true today. These organisations do not need to cross the border; they can write the code, programme the algorithm, watch the fire start, and shape it. Sadly, we have seen such division inspired in the Home Secretary’s own community, between Indian-origin and Pakistani-origin communities. We have seen the same fire being lit, not because China particularly sides with one side or the other—it does not—but because it just wants hostility in the UK, and this issue is a dividing line. When we look at the designation of organisations, we must remember that those organisations include businesses.

I support this Bill, and I am very grateful to the Minister and the Home Secretary for bringing it to the House. I very much envy the Minister her place, and I am sure that she will enjoy her role.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Security (Dame Angela Eagle)]

I thank all right hon. and hon. Members who have spoken in today’s Second Reading debate. We have had a very powerful and relevant debate, with a great deal of expertise in the Chamber from both sides of the House.

State threats are overt or covert actions by foreign Governments that fall below the level of armed conflict, but go beyond legitimate diplomacy to harm UK interests. They present a persistent and evolving risk to the UK and our allies, and that evolution and the hybrid nature of the threats we face today has come across in all the many excellent contributions we have heard from Members on both sides of the House. There is cross-party recognition that the threats we are dealing with are increasingly complex, and rapidly changing and evolving. They manifest across a wide spectrum of activity, including interference in democratic processes, acquisition of sensitive information, threats to public safety and disruption of economic security. We all know—it has been mentioned by many hon. and right hon. Members—that certain states have the intent and capability to conduct such activity to advance their objectives. We have talked about Iran, Russia and China. Such activity is often opportunistic. It is adaptive, and it is increasingly integrated across multiple domains, combining physical, cyber, economic and international tools. Increasingly, as has been pointed out, it involves new and emerging tools such as AI, as well as TikTok, cyber, AI and a range of other things.

In December 2024, the former Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract, Castleford and Knottingley (Yvette Cooper), commissioned the independent reviewer of state threats legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, to conduct a review into the tools available in terrorism legislation to see how they might be applied to the problem of state threats. He proposed that there should be legislation to create a state threats power equivalent to that of proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000, and although the Bill does not deliver the recommendations of the entire Jonathan Hall report, it does deliver that proposal. To that extent, it is a narrow, not a comprehensive Bill. It is important that Members from all parts of the House understand that that is what the Bill does.

Rather than trying to shoehorn everything else into this Bill, it is important that we understand the nature of the Bill and what it actually does. It strengthens the Government’s ability to disrupt hostile intelligence services and their proxies by adapting counter-terrorism tools to tackle state-based security threats to the UK. It seeks to close that loophole. It creates a new power for the Secretary of State to designate organisations involved in foreign power threat activity, modelled on the Terrorism Act 2000. It introduces three new criminal offences of supporting, assisting or obtaining benefits from designated bodies. The Bill will enable proxy organisations to be treated in practice like foreign intelligence services, making it easier to prosecute those acting on their behalf. It strengthens the overall national security framework so that the UK becomes a more difficult operating environment for foreign intelligence services and their state-linked proxies.

Individuals acting for a designated body will feel the full force of our national security legislation and the potential accompanying prison sentences of up to 14 years. Designation will send a clear public signal to bodies and those prepared to assist them that their malign behaviour will not be tolerated in the UK. Our manifesto committed to adapt the approach used for dealing with terrorism to state-based security threats, and that is precisely what the Bill does.

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) is a passionate responder at the Dispatch Box, and her interest in this area and her commitment to getting it right are clear. The Government have been working on this legislation since Jonathan Hall made his recommendation. The Prime Minister, in the light of the arson incidents that we saw in north London earlier this year, gave a firm commitment to legislate in a matter of weeks, and we are doing just that to close this loophole on state or proxy-based threats.

To be clear, this legislation is no less robust than the Terrorism Act 2000. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said, Jonathan Hall said that using terror legislation is

“shopping in the wrong department”.

This Bill will ensure that we are shopping in the right department.

[Sir John Hayes]

I accept what Jonathan Hall said, but what he did not say was that a higher statutory bar was needed to achieve a prosecution. What worries some of us, including my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) and me, is that the addition of that will make it quite hard to achieve a prosecution under the proposed law, not least because the Bill suggests that there must be a criminal purpose—an illicit purpose—involved in the association with a designated body. Will the Minister address that specific point?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I think that there are some necessary differences between a terrorist organisation and a state-influenced or state proxy organisation, which the differences between the Bill and the National Security Act—which deals with terrorism—seek to bring out. Jonathan Hall said that the Bill “does the job” in closing that loophole. He also told the House that he thought it would be harder to achieve the prosecutions for designated organisations than those for terrorist organisations. The Bill builds on a tried and tested series of measures in the National Security Act, and we have developed it closely with operational partners. It does the job. We do not believe that it is tougher to get appropriate prosecutions up and running in this context.

National Security (State Threats) Bill

John Hayes Excerpts

Committee of the whole House
Wednesday 17th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Alicia Kearns]

We have tabled 13 amendments, not to frustrate the Bill but to give it the necessary teeth. This Bill is soft where it should be hard, silent where it should speak, and blind where it should see. It is soft because, as drafted, it sets a higher bar to prosecute a person who supports the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps than a person who supports the terrorists whom the IRGC funds and commands; it is silent because whole categories of hostile conduct that our terrorism laws have criminalised for 20 years are simply missing; and it is blind because it has been written for one organisation on one timetable, with almost no provision for future designations. Good will is not enough, and we must close the holes that our enemies will exploit.

The Government have lifted much of this legislation from section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, yet they have added something that does not appear in the terrorism offence: a requirement that support was given for a prohibited purpose that was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United Kingdom. Let me ask the Minister the simple question that this Bill invites: what level of support for the IRGC do the Government consider beneficial to the United Kingdom? The IRGC is the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism, and if she agrees that there is no level of support for it that is beneficial to the UK, we can simply remove the prohibited purpose. She has just said from the Dispatch Box that she agrees that there is absolutely none, so let us act and amend the Bill.

Under the Bill as drafted, to convict someone who supports the IRGC the prosecution must prove that their support was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the UK—an additional threshold—but that requirement does not exist in terrorism law. To convict someone who supports Hamas, Hezbollah or the Houthis—the proxies that the IRGC arms and funds—there is no such hurdle, so the body that inspires, organises arms and funds the terrorists is handed a protection in law that the terrorist himself is denied. That is the difference between a prosecution that succeeds and one that never gets off the ground, and I know something about prosecutions that fail at the last moment. Our amendment 3 simply removes the extra defence and brings this offence into line with the terrorism law from which it is drawn.

I recognise that the Government may seek to argue that state entities enjoy protections in international law that terrorists do not, that we must set a higher bar than in equivalent terrorism legislation and that acting prejudicially to the UK’s interests is a reasonable test. However, state immunity protects the Iranian state from being sued or prosecuted in our courts, and it has nothing to do with the British resident who chooses to fund or promote the IRGC. We are not prosecuting Tehran; we are prosecuting the person here who does its work. The proposition that the Minister is left defending is that supporting the world’s biggest sponsor of terrorism should be harder to prosecute than supporting the groups it sponsors. That is not a higher bar; it is international lawyers tying the hands of Ministers who are meant to be keeping us safe.

On amendments 11 and 12, the same instinct to protect where we should prosecute runs through subsection (7) of proposed new section 17C, which makes a reasonable excuse a defence for accepting and keeping a material benefit from a designated body. That is not necessary, because there are already protections in the Bill for, for example, a lawyer or somebody who has no ability to know that funds were being taken. I recognise that such a provision is in the National Security Act 2023, but that is not a reason to repeat a weakness, and we have an opportunity to fix it. There is no excuse for keeping a hostile state’s money—not in this Bill and not in the Act it leans on.

The sentencing gets the gravity backwards. As drafted, supporting a designated body and actively assisting one carries the same maximum sentence of 14 years or a fine.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

Before my hon. Friend moves on to fines, the issue she has raised, and which I raised earlier, seems to be crucial. It is true that Jonathan Hall, as the Minister said on Second Reading, recognised that the approach to a terrorist organisation was different from the approach to a state. Nevertheless, creating this higher bar whereby to secure a successful prosecution it must be established that the individual concerned was acting on behalf of the designated body for a prohibited purpose—connection with the body alone is not sufficient—seems to me to make prosecution less likely rather than more likely. If international law is at the heart of that—the fear of appeals, and so on and so forth—we need to hear that from the Minister, and the case needs to be a highly persuasive, because it seems to me that the Government are making their lives more difficult, rather than easier.

[Alicia Kearns]

That is exactly the crux of the point I made in my speech on Second Reading. We should not set a higher threshold, because we will see prosecutions collapse for exactly that reason. We need to be arming prosecutors to go and get the justice that our country needs to better protect us.

Turning to the maximum sentence of 14 years, actively doing a hostile state organ’s work—moving its money, carrying its information, committing violence on its behalf—is graver than just supporting it. It is a kind of treason, and I suspect most British people would call it that. We urge the Government to consider having a higher potential sentence for actively working with or receiving material benefit from a designated body. Amendment 7 would therefore raise that maximum sentence from 14 years to 25 years. That figure is not plucked from the air; it matches the Australian regime under which the IRGC was listed last November. As I have said, the Government may argue that the 14 year maximum sentence is taken from the NSA 2023, but let us raise the maximum sentence in both. After all, we are talking about treason.

On amendment 10, I turn from where the Bill is too soft to where it says nothing at all. This is one of the gaps about which the Government have offered no answer, and I have looked hard for one. Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006 makes preparing an act of terrorism an offence, but this Bill contains no equivalent. As the Bill is drafted, a person can plan to assist a designated organ—to be straightforward, let us talk about the IRGC—and unless and until they commit the act, they have committed no offence at all under this Bill. However, the entire purpose of national security work is to prevent and disrupt before harm is done, not to see the plot and clear it up afterwards. We would not tolerate that vulnerability in terrorism law and we should not invent it here. Amendment 10 closes that gap, and lets police and prosecutors act while a plot is still on the drawing board. If the Minister believes preparation is already caught elsewhere, I would welcome her showing me where, but I have yet to be shown that in the briefings I have had.

Amendment 13 recognises that the gap left by preparation is widened by a second omission: self-directed and inspired actors. The Bill misses entirely the person who is never directly commissioned or directed, but who absorbs a hostile state’s propaganda and acts on it alone. Twenty years of counter-terrorism has taught us this lesson at a terrible cost. The gravest or most likely threat is no longer the directed plot, but the individual radicalised online who acts on their own. Hostile states bring the resources, reach and sophistication of states to that propaganda, arguably with a greater inspiring power than any terrorist group can muster. We saw that with the bots that screamed for independence in Scotland and fell silent the moment Tehran’s internet went down, something my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) raised in his speech earlier. That is just a small insight into the ways they are invested in turning us against each other. A Bill that catches only the commissioned and directed is fighting the last war and leaving us dangerously exposed to the next. Amendment 13 captures those inspired to act by a designated body, but not directed by them.

I turn now to the most dangerous omission of all, which we touched on in the wind-ups on Second Reading, and the omission that would worry our allies and partners, which amendment 8 seeks to address. As drafted, the Bill captures activity in the UK and activity abroad that is “prejudicial” to the UK. It does not catch activity planned here on British soil to be perpetrated abroad where there is no ability to prove that it is prejudicial to the interests of the UK where there is no harm to the UK. Activity by the IRGC in France, Iran or Bosnia, or by the Chinese in Hong Kong, may not be directly prejudicial to the interests of the UK, so again we are adding an unnecessary threshold. But if it is perpetrated here, be it in Manchester, London or anywhere else, we must be able to prosecute those responsible.

In plain terms, the gap was turning the UK into a base for state terrorism: a cell here in Britain planning a campaign of intimidation against a journalist in Dublin on behalf of the IRGC, or a network running sabotage operations in Germany. Arrested and charged, their defence writes itself. If the act was not to take place here in the UK, you cannot argue that it was prejudicial to UK safety. The law does not like ambiguity. We should not leave prosecutors having to argue that an attack on Dublin or Berlin was also somehow an attack on London. Amendment 8 closes that gap directly, so that planning hostile activity from British soil is caught wherever that activity is aimed. If the Government are confident that that scope is already reached, they lose nothing by putting it beyond doubt. Far better to write the law clearly today than to watch a case fall apart on that very point.

The next omission is propaganda itself. Since 2006, it has been an offence to disseminate publications that promote terrorism. The Bill extends no equivalent protection against the propaganda of designated states. We have heard colleagues today talk about publications such as Press TV which, shamefully, former Members of this House appear on and are paid to have shows on. Two of the principal weapons of hostile states are the propaganda that recruits and the disinformation that divides. The Chinese Communist party pushes propaganda and disinformation through the United Front Work Department. I hope these powers will reach it one day, but amendment 14 brings designated bodies within the same standard applied to terrorist publications for 20 years, because I do not in any way think that the Government think that IRGC propaganda should have more latitude than that of a proscribed terrorist group.

Next is an omission that many living in our country, especially our Jewish community, will find the most difficult. Under section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, it is an offence to display in public the insignia of a proscribed organisation. It is the power that we rely on to take Hamas flags, Hezbollah banners and the symbols of Hizb ut-Tahrir off our streets. The Bill as drafted contains no equivalent provision whatever, so if the amendment is not accepted by the Government, either now or in the other place, the flag of the IRGC may fly lawfully on a British street, glorifying every stabbing, every attack on our Jewish communities, every kidnap plot and every assassination attempt that the regime has directed here. How do we look the people who are being hunted in the eye and tell them that the banner of their hunter is welcome on our streets?

The Government may say that criminalising the display of state symbols brings lawful state activity under UK criminal law, contrary to diplomatic convention, and that by reciprocity, hostile states could criminalise the Union Jack and UK uniforms abroad, exposing our personnel and dual nationals. I have taken the time to consider that. Yes, state immunity protects foreign states in our courts, but it should not and does not dictate what a resident of this country may do on British pavements.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dame Angela Eagle)]

I have to commend the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) for doing her homework. I wish to explain why we do not think these amendments are needed at the moment.

There are a couple of themes that run through my response to the hon. Lady’s amendments. The first is that it is not possible to treat a state body the same as a terrorist organisation, because one cannot abolish a state body. One has to think about the differences between the two, which is why we have called the measure closing the loophole in this Bill designation, rather than proscription. It is also the case that we clearly have other international obligations, both under international law, for the sovereignty of individual states, and under diplomatic law, with the Vienna convention, so that we can enable diplomatic relations or other arrangements with states that we might not approve of particularly. Within that difference lie some of the different approaches in the Bill and in the hon. Lady’s amendments.

The other common theme, which perhaps divides us in our approach to the Bill, as well as explaining the differences and why we will not be accepting the hon. Lady’s amendments, is that we are not trying to put all of Jonathan Hall’s recommendations on to the statute book in this Bill. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said in her opening remarks, we have accepted all the recommendations in Jonathan Hall’s report and will be legislating for them subsequently. What we wish to do with this quite narrow Bill is close that loophole with state-sponsored or proxy organisations as quickly as possible so that we can deal with the rising threats present on our streets as we speak. It may help to bear those two things in mind as I lay out the Government’s position regarding the amendments that the hon. Lady has just spoken to.

Through amendments 3 to 6, the hon. Lady seeks to remove the prohibited purpose test. The test is there precisely to cover the difference in treatment between terrorist organisations and states, which we cannot proscribe and with which we may have to have some kind of arrangements. While the Bill is modelled on the provisions in the Terrorism Act 2000, it has to reflect the realities of dealing with state entities. That is what the prohibited purpose test is about. There may be some cases where UK persons need to have legitimate dealings with a state entity; it might be a British diplomat or a non-governmental organisation delivering humanitarian aid. The prohibited purpose test is necessary to protect legitimate conduct without creating loopholes that can be exploited by hostile actors.

[Sir John Hayes]

I am glad that the Minister has addressed that point, because it was raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) and I on Second Reading. Surely the counter-argument is that it will be a sure defence when prosecutions are brought; it will be much harder to secure a conviction, because the necessity to prove a purpose will be tested beyond measure. The association with a state-sponsored organisation such as, for example, the IRGC is ipso facto proof, surely, of guilt.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Action that is prejudicial to the safety and interests of the UK is the test that we are talking about. If one were delivering humanitarian aid and had to deal with part of a state that we did not particularly approve of, that would not be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. It would be in line with what the UK wished to do, but if it were prejudicial, because it was hostile activity, the test would be passed.