Courts and Tribunals Bill

Joe Robertson Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 10th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith and Chiswick) (Lab)]

The number of outstanding cases in the Crown court is 79,619. The outgoing Conservative Government promised to reduce the backlog; it should have been 53,000 by April last year. Their abject failures led the present Government to ask one of the country’s most foremost experts on the criminal courts, Sir Brian Leveson, to propose comprehensive court reforms—reforms without precedent in half a century. Sir Brian produced his review in two parts, totalling over 1,000 pages and 180 recommendations. The Bill legislates where legislation is necessary to implement parts of Sir Brian’s review.

Given the current dire situation, with many victims waiting two or more years for their cases to be resolved and defendants spending far too long in custodial remand, the Government are right to propose structural change; otherwise, they would be endorsing perpetual delay.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Andy Slaughter]

Not yet; I am conscious of the time.

The removal of the right to elect for either way offences in clause 1 is the single most significant measure in reducing the caseload of the Crown court, with the Bill’s impact assessment indicating that that change will see 16,000 fewer sitting days in the Crown court each year.

In clause 6, the Government propose to increase the maximum sentencing power of the magistrates court to 18 months. We are told that will save a further 8,000 sitting days in the Crown court. Taken together, those two measures—ending election and extending magistrates’ powers—represent a sizeable shift of the caseload out of the Crown court and into the magistrates court. That will deliver on the main objective of these reforms, which is to ensure the capacity of the Crown court to try the most serious criminal cases in a fair and timely manner. There has been less scrutiny on how magistrates will cope with their new responsibilities; I will deal with that in a moment.

Clauses 3 to 5—the provisions that have attracted the most debate—will establish the Crown court bench division to enable cases with a likely sentence of three years or less to be tried on indictment without a jury. Clause 4 will allow trial by judge alone for some complex and lengthy cases. Compared to the other measures in part 1 of the Bill, those will have a less significant effect on the backlog, but a still substantial 5,000 Crown court days will be saved.

I accept the Government’s argument that there is a strong case for modernising how the Crown court operates. Some improvement will be achieved through adopting the measures on efficiency set out in part 2 of Sir Brian Leveson’s review, or the additional resources promised under the concordat with the Lady Chief Justice that will remove restrictions on court sitting days, but those are unlikely to be enough on their own. Given the crisis that the criminal courts are facing, I am willing to support the creation of the Crown court bench division and the other measures in part 1 of the Bill.

I do not accept the case made by some that the proposals represent the end for jury trial and that the Bill should be opposed on that basis. Of the 3% of criminal cases that currently go before a jury, about a third—some 4,000—of the less serious of those offences, such as possession of class A drugs, car theft, affray and large-scale waste dumping, will now go before a judge alone. I do not believe that undermines the jury system, although it will undoubtedly change how some cases are tried. Therefore, arrangements for judge-only trials in the Crown court need to be carefully reviewed once they are in force to test whether they deliver the time saving promised without undermining the right to a fair trial.

I turn to my reservations on the proposals. I am concerned that magistrates courts will not be able to cope with the increase in caseload envisaged by the Bill. The work of the magistrates court is delivered by a range of dedicated public servants: magistrates, district judges, legal advisers, His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service staff, probation, the Crown Prosecution Service and legal aid lawyers. However, we know that recruiting and retaining many of those key personnel are long-standing problems.

The Lord Chancellor wrote to the Justice Committee last week and told us that the Ministry of Justice hopes to recruit thousands of magistrates and hundreds of legal advisers and district judges over the next year or two. I am concerned that those are very ambitious targets, and that even if the recruitment bear fruit, they will not meet the challenge of diverting 24,000 days of complex hearings from the Crown court each year while dealing with the existing problems in the magistrates court, which has its own backlog.

Clause 7, which seeks to reform appeals from the magistrates court, will require electronic recording of proceedings. That strikes me as a significant change. The impact assessment is not clear about how much that will cost, but I doubt whether it can be delivered either quickly or cheaply.

Another area of concern is the process for allocating cases for judge-only trials. Prosecution and defence lawyers will wish to make written and oral submissions, and some may seek to challenge decisions on allocation by judicial review. To those concerns should be added the differing eligibility for legal aid in the Crown and magistrates courts and concerns that the loss of a lay presence in determining innocence or guilt risks losing diversity and adding unconscious bias.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (First sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 25th March 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Neither the question nor the answer were pithy enough.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

Q Why was it possible to get through two trials a day in the ’70s, but it is not now?

Sir Brian Leveson: There are lots of reasons.

[Joe Robertson]

But jury trials are not the principal reason.

Sir Brian Leveson: No, no, I do not and have never blamed jury trials at all. The reason is that the complexity has changed. Pace, disclosure of unused material, special measures, bad character, hearsay and data—cell site data, which is now critical to almost every single prosecution, and data taken from phones—have all added to the complexity and length of trials. I am not criticising juries at all, and I welcome jury trials, but the threshold must now be adjusted if we are to get justice for everybody in good time.

[The Chair]

That brings us to the end of the time allocated for the Committee to ask questions during this panel. Thank you very much for coming to give evidence, Sir Brian. We would have liked to have longer with you, but we have many witnesses to question. On behalf of the Committee, I thank you for coming and for giving evidence.

Sir Brian Leveson: You are very welcome, Sir John. If I can help in any other way, I will. I am happy to meet parliamentarians: I have offered to meet the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats, and I am happy to meet anybody to talk about this on a cross-party basis.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paulette Hamilton]

Thank you. You have explained that perfectly.

[Joe Robertson]

Q Victims say that they want to see greater diversity in the criminal justice system, and I agree with them. Which group of people is more diverse: juries, the British public or judges?

Dame Vera Baird: Is it your only point? The answer would be that judges are not as diverse as juries.

[Joe Robertson]

Q So do the changes in the Bill reduce diversity in the criminal justice system?

Dame Vera Baird: Not in the slightest. I assume you know that 73% of people who are entitled to a jury trial do not elect it and choose to stay in the magistrates court. That is men, women and black people. Black people and women disproportionately elect trial because they clearly feel that they will get a fairer trial with a diverse jury, but who says that is right? On the day, if you were a sex offender with some nasty allegations, for instance, you would have a better chance of acquittal in front of a judge than you ever would in front of a jury. It is just an opportunity to try to pick the best trial for yourself, but it is a punt in the dark. It is a go on the wheel of fortune. Sometimes it will work and sometimes it will not.

[Joe Robertson]

Q But we do agree that people with more diverse backgrounds elect jury trials and that option is being removed for them.

Dame Vera Baird: Seventy-three per cent of people offered jury trials do not take the offer up. Are you sure that the term “elect” is correct? Is it not “demand”?

[Joe Robertson]

I am asking the questions.

[The Chair]

Joe, I think three punts is enough. We have to move on.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Slinger (Rugby) (Lab)]

Q Professor Hohl, do you think the Bill will lead to a fairer system, particularly for women?

Professor Hohl: This is an unanswerable question. What is fairness? [Interruption.] Well, it is an answerable question, but not a black and white one. We have heard this morning about a separation between the speediness of justice and the fairness of justice, as if they were two different things, when all the research shows that, for both defendants and victims, the time taken is part of justice. To artificially separate them does not work.

The way we measure the fairness of the system is about due process, not about outcomes. We cannot measure fairness through conviction and acquittal rates. The way our system is set up is about due process. Due process is not taking place when the system is on its knees, so getting the system to function better, so that due process can take place, should lead to a fairer system—provided that the Bill functions as intended.

[Joe Robertson]

Q May I ask for a clarification? Is Charlotte on her own in her views? Is she the only person who holds the views she has expressed?

Dame Vera Baird: Of course not, and I did not intend to say that. I have been trying to think, since we discussed it, about how I would feel if my experience were being used for a political cause, and it had been a very nasty experience. I might feel the same sort of—I do not know whether it is resentment or disappointment, or whether it is that it was inappropriate. I can well understand that, but many other victims do not agree that this will not help.

Women are waking up every morning, for three or four years, dreading the day when they will have to relive what happened to them in rape cases, or a man who has been very badly beaten up might wake every morning, worrying that he will have to relive it. It goes on and on like that, because there is a right to demand—as, I am afraid, I would phrase it—a trial for relatively small offences. I do not make little of them, but those will be in the queue. If Charlotte’s case is coming up next Monday, all the cases that have elected for trial before hers will be in the queue in front of it.

[Dr Mullan]

indicated dissent.

Dame Vera Baird: I see Kieran shaking his head, but there is no other way. There is a limited opportunity to give priority to cases. Obviously a very important point is whether the defendant is in custody. Most rape defendants are not in custody, because it is a “one word against the other” case, so they cannot be given any real priority for that reason. We end up very regularly with cases that took as long as Charlotte’s. That is really awful for a large number of victims. It also gives very little to the people who want this right: 64% of people who elect for trial plead guilty before they get to trial. You have to ask why they are electing for trial if they are going to plead guilty, but they have blocked up the jury list all of that time. This is about freeing up the jury list.

--- Later in debate ---

[Amanda Hack]

Q Thank you for sharing your experiences. It has been incredibly powerful. Jade Blue, you said that change is not optional—we need to reduce the suffering. That has resonated with me. We need to create a system that is bearable. As victims—and you have obviously experienced trials at different places in the system—do you feel that these reforms would have made the system bearable? Is there anything specific in the reforms that you could point to?

Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott: I guess there is the hope of fewer adjournments and fewer last-minute changes, which we hear about quite a lot. Any measure that could increase capacity for these kinds of cases is a measure we could get behind. Just having that—being able to plan your life and have reassurances that it will be going ahead—is important.

In the past, one of us mentioned floating trials for rape cases, which is, quite frankly, just absurd. Being able to have dedicated time to ensure that these cases do not become floating trials and that there is capacity for them to be seen in a prompt and timely manner would be welcome.

Morwenna Loughman: The first time my trial was listed, unbeknown to me and the rest of my family, it was listed as a floating trial, which means that two or more cases—in this instance, rape cases—are scheduled for the same time, on the same date and in the same court, on the assumption that at least two of you will drop over the course because it is so harrowing and re-traumatising. That is why mine got delayed right at the last minute.

We have talked a lot about the education of judges, which is absolutely essential, but we must also consider the education of juries. As I have said, they are not bastions of infallibility. The man who raped me was convicted. He was found guilty, but not unanimously. He was sentenced to 15 years, which gives an indication as to the level of injury that I sustained.

Two members of the jury found him not guilty and acquitted him of all charges. It was a majority vote; there was no unanimity, and it took them three and a half days to deliberate, even though I had received 48 injuries and he was arrested on the scene. I could go on about the extenuating circumstances. In every sense, how did it take them three and a half days to not even conclusively decide that this man had raped me?

Charlotte Meijer: I will add to that. The removal in the Bill of the defendant’s right to elect will make the victim feel empowered, knowing that the perpetrator is not in control. As I have said, there is the recording of magistrates courts, and the Bill is our hope that the waiting time will go down. That is the core reason why we are doing this. The system cannot get any worse than it is, so the waiting going down will be a significant change.

[Joe Robertson]

Q Thank you very much for sharing these very powerful experiences to help all of us here make better decisions. I would like to direct my questions not to the criminal court changes, but the family court changes. I should say that I was a practising family law solicitor and represented mothers who wanted to stop abusive fathers from seeing their children, and my wife is still a practising family law solicitor, registered with the Solicitors Regulation Authority and the Law Society.

I turn specifically to the removal of the presumption that a child should have involvement from both parents. What do you say to the overwhelming body of evidence that for most children—not all, but most—it is in their best interests to have some contact with both parents?

Farah Nazeer: The point is about abusive relationships. If the court is set up to look at the welfare of the child primarily, if there is not a history of abuse or domestic abuse in that setting, that will invariably be the outcome. This is to protect those cases where there is abuse within the context of the relationship, so it is not a case of one thing or another thing; it clears the path so a court can look objectively at whether or not there is a safeguarding issue there for the child without the burden of the presumption of contact. You start with the welfare of the child.

[Joe Robertson]

Q But the law is really clear. Section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989 says that

“the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration.”

That is already there. Section 1(3)(e) says that the court must have regard to harm that a child

“has suffered or is at risk of suffering”.

Those two provisions will instantly knock out any presumption that it is in the child’s best interest to have some involvement—that does not even mean contact—of both parents. I am just trying to understand why you think this change is needed, given that those provisions are already in the law.

Farah Nazeer: Primarily because those provisions have not saved the lives of the 63 children who have died since Women’s Aid has been working on this. In spite of known abuse, the court has granted unsafe contact, primarily to abusive fathers, and those children have died as a result.

Last year we published a report called “Nineteen More Child Homicides”. Those child homicides were as a result of known perpetrators having unsafe child contact in spite of the court hearing about abuse by those fathers, predominantly—18 were fathers, one was a mother—who then murdered their children. The previous report some four years before also saw 19 children murdered in exactly the same set of circumstances. The report before that saw significantly more children murdered. What this does is set a very clear bar that you start with the welfare of the child. This is a response to the failure of that culture. That is why it is so important.

[Joe Robertson]

Q My point is that bar is already there. The Children Act starts with it—it is in section 1(1). I do not need to say this, but absolutely every death, particularly where the state has been involved and a court decision has been made, is a tragedy, but presumably you will agree that those tragedies will continue even with this change in the law if other things are not done within the family courts to deal with what are primarily safeguarding issues, rather than broad presumptions over children’s interests.

Farah Nazeer: Absolutely. The presumption is a really important first step because without the presumption, we will automatically default to the status quo. That is where the training and an understanding of domestic abuse and coercive control come in. As you can hear, we are not in a situation where safeguarding is applied consistently or domestic abuse or sexual violence are understood consistently. That is where the mandatory training piece has to come in to accompany the change to the law.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

Q Thank you so much for being here today. I am really interested in the victim’s perspective on fairness, the treatment of victims within the current criminal justice system and the changes being made.

As a former Crown prosecutor, one aspect of the criminal justice system that concerned me was the appeals process from the magistrates court to the Crown court. As you all know, if somebody is convicted in the magistrates court, they have an automatic right to a retrial at the Crown court without having to give any reasons, regardless of whether there was a fair trial in the magistrates court or otherwise. If the victims and witnesses want to continue the process, they have to give evidence all over again through that appeal, otherwise the appeal is successful.

The Bill seeks to get rid of that automatic right and put the process more in line with the Crown court appeals process. There will have to be grounds to suggest that the original trial was unfair. As victims and survivors who have had access to the criminal justice system, what is your view on the current system of retrials and appeals from the magistrates court in terms of fairness to victims and the likelihood of victims attending to give evidence and being re-traumatised? I am also interested in whether the automatic right to appeal and have a retrial is used as coercive control in the current justice system. There is a lot to unpack there, I grant you.

Charlotte Meijer: There are a lot of questions there. From my experience, we will never know whether my perpetrator picked a magistrates court because he knew that, if he was found guilty, he could have then dragged me on to a Crown court case—we do not know.

It is absolutely terrifying because, as we all know, going through a trial for the first time is horrific—it is something that I never want to do in my life again. I had the ability to go to court again for rape, and I declined it; if there had been an appeal and I had to go again to a Crown court, I probably would have dropped out. It is not something that I would want to experience twice.

There is also a really interesting thing there. What does that say about our magistrates courts? Are we basically saying that they cannot do what they should be doing? I think that changing the system strengthens the trials and credibility of magistrates courts—they should be credible, given that 90% of cases go there. It also shows that it is the final choice; the decision will be made there, unless more evidence comes forward.

On what you said about fairness to the victim, there is obviously no right to appeal for a victim if there is a not guilty verdict. I know there is a tiny bit of legislation to say that, if there is a huge amount of new evidence, they could reopen a case. However, that barely happens. You are basically told no, so how come a perpetrator can just appeal without any reason? From victims’ perspectives, and from my perspective, it is an absolute no-brainer.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Paulette Hamilton (Birmingham Erdington) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine. I rise to speak to the new clause that is tabled in my name, which I do not intend to push to a vote. It would require the Lord Chancellor to conduct and lay before Parliament a review of the impact of clause 3 after 12 months, and again after no later than 36 months. At its heart, the new clause is both modest and reasonable. It does not seek to block the Government’s proposals outright, nor does it attempt to rewrite the substance of the Bill. It simply asks that we understand the impact of the changes we are making and that we are accountable for them.

As Members across the House know, clause 3 introduces significant changes to the operation of the courts, particularly through the insertion of the new provisions into the Senior Courts Act 1981. Those provisions mark a clear shift in how justice is delivered. When we make changes of this scale, we have a duty not only to legislate, but to reflect on their impact and remain accountable for the consequences.

The Law Society of England and Wales has raised concerns that reforms to court processes must be carefully monitored to ensure they do not inadvertently undermine access to justice, particularly for those who already face barriers in navigating the legal system. These concerns are drawn from the experience of legal practitioners working day to day in the courts, particularly in cases involving litigants in person who often are trying to navigate complex procedures without legal representation. It has also emphasised the importance of evaluating how such changes operate in practice, including their impact on vulnerable and disadvantaged groups and on the capacity of the courts to deliver justice effectively.

The society has made it clear that such changes can have unintended consequences that are often felt most by the people who already struggle to access justice. That goes directly to public confidence in the justice system. Surely, trust and perception in the justice system are just as important as the legal framework itself. Concerns have also been raised by the Family Services Foundation, which highlights how procedural changes can disproportionately affect vulnerable individuals and families already facing complex challenges. That reflects its work with the families involved in the court system, where even small procedural changes can have a significant impact on people who are already dealing with instability, stress or crisis situations.

New clause 29 would ensure that Parliament receives clear evidence-based assessments of how the provisions are working in practice. Crucially, it would require that the assessments consider the impact on two groups: people from ethnic minority backgrounds and white British individuals living in lower-income households. As highlighted in earlier stages of the scrutiny of the Bill, there is a lack of clear statutory review built into the provisions, in particular in clause 3.

Some may ask, why specify those groups? The answer is simple—because justice is not experienced equally by all. We know all too well through evidence, lived experience and countless testimonies that people from ethnic minority communities often have lower levels of trust in the criminal justice system. That shapes how justice is perceived and whether it is seen as legitimate. For ethnic minority communities, this is fundamentally about trust in the justice system and perception of fairness.

Equally, we must recognise that socioeconomic disadvantage can profoundly affect a person’s experience of the courts. White British individuals from lower-income households are also more likely to feel marginalised by systems that appear distant, complex or unresponsive to their circumstances. If this House is serious about fairness, we must be serious about understanding how reforms affect those who are most at risk of being left behind.

New clause 29 does not assume the outcome. It does not claim that the provisions of clause 3 will necessarily have a negative impact, but it does recognise that without proper review, we simply will not know. That in itself would be a failure of our responsibility as legislators. The timeline set out in the new clause—a review after 12 months and a further review no later than after 36 months—strikes a careful balance. The reviews allow for early identification of any emerging issues, while also ensuring that long-term effects are properly understood. Importantly, the reviews would be laid before Parliament, ensuring transparency and enabling this House to scrutinise the findings. If the changes are working well, a review would demonstrate that; if they are not, a review would give us the opportunity to put things right.

I urge Members across the House to support new clause 29, not as a challenge to the Bill, but as a practical step towards fairness, transparency and accountability in our justice system. This House should be confident in reforms, but it should also be confident in knowing when to pause, assess and reflect. That is all that the new clause asks for.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

I wish to address a number of issues in relation to this grouping. First, I will say something about the figures that have been quoted at length today and in previous sittings. Secondly, I will say something about the reasons given by the Government for curtailing jury trials in this way. Then I want to go on to say something about evidence and procedure, and why jury trials exist at all, because sometimes it is possible to sit here listening, wondering whether the Government’s reasoning would not justify a banning of all jury trials for evermore on any crime. Finally, I will talk about some of the perversities that the hon. Member for Chichester has articulated well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Linsey Farnsworth]

No. I will make some progress; we need to make progress today.

The researchers found that more than 90% of respondents in the survey they conducted believed that discrimination on juries should be reported to trial judges and properly investigated, yet there is no mechanism under current law that allows juries to do so.

Appeal, a not-for-profit organisation, has submitted evidence opposing some elements of the Bill. However, in a paper that it prepared in 2024, Appeal set out concerns relating to majority decisions, as opposed to unanimous jury decisions, and the impact of racial bias. The case of R v. Connor et al was cited, in which questions from the jury suggested that there had been a focus on the defendant’s race and a letter from a juror after conviction confirmed racial bias in the jury’s deliberations.

Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 provides for confidentiality in jury decision making. However section 8A, enacted in Scotland, permits the Lord Justice General to allow information about deliberations from the jury room to be disclosed for the purposes of research. That provides an opportunity for the same to follow in England and Wales. Recent statistics show an increase in hate crime, including crime based on race and religion, rates of which spiked after Brexit and, recently, following the Southport murders. Now more than ever, we must be conscious of the impact that discrimination could have on the fairness, or otherwise, of jury trial.

[Joe Robertson]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Linsey Farnsworth]

I am about to conclude, so I will not.

I support new clause 29, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington, but I submit that the change and modernisation that the Bill seeks to introduce bring an opportunity to review all aspects of the criminal justice system in relation to ethnicity and socioeconomic background to ensure fairness for all.