Oral Answers to Questions

Jim Murphy Excerpts

Monday 19th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

The simple answer is that the conditions of service requirement attached to that medal is five years’ continuous service. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that some members of 16 Air Assault Brigade might be deployed for one more Herrick tour before our operations in Afghanistan are complete, but the jubilee service medal is a separate issue and the conditions set for it are very clear.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

In this week before Christmas, our thoughts are with our forces who are separated from their families and in particular those families who continue to feel the loss of a loved one in Afghanistan.

The Bonn conference on Afghanistan cannot be considered to have been a strategic success. I am not blaming the Government for that failure—it was an international responsibility—and the Opposition remain committed to the Afghanistan mission, but for the Government, bipartisanship in Afghanistan cannot mean just getting agreement between the two parties in the coalition Government; it is also about persuading the public and Parliament. What else can the Secretary of State say about his early assessment of the levels of non-combat troop involvement from the UK that will be needed in 2015 in Afghanistan?

[Mr Hammond]

I am pleased to hear the right hon. Gentleman reiterate the Opposition’s support for the Afghanistan strategy, as it is vital that we go forward with a broad measure of consensus. On the post-2014 troop levels, no decisions have yet been made about the level of UK troops in a training, support and advisory role. We will want to take that decision nearer to the time, when we have seen what other international security assistance force nations propose to do and when the level of international funding for the Afghan national security force has been determined and committed to, so that the scale and competence level of ANSF forces can be seen clearly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hammond]

The single service chiefs are reviewing force generation issues in the light of the proposed change structure of the armed forces. The issues around harmony are different in the three services, and it is right that the individual services develop harmony guidelines that are right for their conditions and allow them to operate within their single service budgets.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

The Minister with responsibility for veterans has confirmed the proposals to cut MOD police by 50%, which has been described by the Defence Police Federation as “irresponsible and ill thought out”. There will be real worries about the impact on the protection of munitions stores and barracks. Will he guarantee that there will be no cut in MOD police numbers at the most sensitive of bases, particularly Faslane and Coulport?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Andrew Robathan)]

Security, particularly of our nuclear installations, is absolutely at the top of our list of priorities, but that does not mean that we cannot organise things better, which is what we are looking at. May I just say to the right hon. Gentleman that we struggle with the huge black hole in the money that he left us?

Oral Answers to Questions

Jim Murphy Excerpts

Monday 14th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I believe that progress has been made. The composition of the Afghan national police is different from that of the Afghan national army in terms of the distribution of locally raised forces. There is a greater affinity between ANP forces and local people than between the army and local people, but there is still further work to do, and I fully recognise what my right hon. Friend says.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

We remain committed to the Afghan mission, and we now want to see military might matched by substantial political progress. The Secretary of State will know that reservists will play a bigger role in Afghanistan and beyond, which may require additional mandatory training. At a time when many reservists have lost their full-time jobs, the benefits system might be unintentionally penalising them and hindering their freedom to take on extra reservist training or allowances. It would be a disgrace if a single reservist lost a penny in benefits because of their service. Will the Secretary of State undertake a wider piece of work with the rest of Government and conduct an urgent review to ensure that our welfare state does not punish a single reservist?

[Mr Hammond]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for again reasserting the cross-party support for the Afghan campaign, and he is right that reservists are playing an important part in it. Sadly, one of those killed in action most recently was a reservist serving his country.

My hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces tells me that the problem the right hon. Gentleman raises is one that we are acutely alert to and aware of. There is work being done across Government to look at the problem and ensure that the concerns that he has raised are dealt with.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hammond]

I agree with my hon. Friend. The story that has been running this weekend has been deeply unhelpful to morale in our armed forces, and is based on untruths and misconceptions. There has been no change in the Government’s position on the number of Army posts that will go over the remainder of the decade and no change in the procedure for exempting those recovering from injuries incurred on active service from the redundancy process.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

We fully understand why the dedicated international security Minister is not with us today, but can the Secretary of State not come to a conclusion where he makes this temporary absence permanent and cuts the number of Ministers at the MOD? This is nothing personal against the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr Howarth)—he is a good man, he works hard and I am not suggesting that he should be sacked in his absence. However, the Levene review recommended a head count reduction in MOD Ministers and, at a time when the Army is being cut by almost by 20,000 and the Air Force and the Navy by almost 5,000 each, why is it that the only place in the MOD exempt from head count reduction is the ministerial offices?

[Mr Hammond]

As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the appointment of Ministers is a matter for the Prime Minister. But I cannot help noticing that the Leader of the Opposition does not appear to have taken note of the right hon. Gentleman’s self-denying recommendations.

Afghanistan

Jim Murphy Excerpts

Tuesday 18th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

With permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a statement on Afghanistan.

Let me begin by paying tribute to Rifleman Vijay Rai of the 2nd Battalion The Royal Gurkha Rifles, who died in Afghanistan on Saturday. His commanding officer described him as tough, loyal, utterly professional and immensely proud to have been serving in the British Army. I am sure I speak for the whole House in saying that our thoughts are with his family at this difficult time.

The House will appreciate that I have not yet had an opportunity to visit our troops in Afghanistan. I intend to do so as soon as is practical. The purpose of this statement is to provide information on progress in Afghanistan since the Prime Minister’s statement to the House on 6 July. Our mission is to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for international terrorism, and the presence of our armed forces in Afghanistan to achieve this aim is supported on all sides of the House.

This mission has a cost: 383 members of our armed forces have lost their lives since operations began—eight since the Prime Minister’s statement of 6 July. I know the whole House will want to join me in paying tribute both to their sacrifice and to all those who have returned with serious injuries, and to the families who support them. I would also like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the troops from Estonia, Denmark and Tonga who are operating under British command in central Helmand. Since 6 July, two Danish soldiers and one Estonian soldier have also lost their lives, and I am sure the House will want to join me in expressing condolences to their families.

I am clear that this is an operation to protect our national security and national interests. That view is shared by the 49-nation, UN-mandated coalition. We share a common purpose: to enhance security and build the capacity of the Afghan national security forces and the Afghan Government, so that Afghans themselves can be responsible for their own territory, their own security and their own affairs. We ensure our national security and the security of the NATO alliance by helping the Afghans to take control of theirs.

Our strategy is comprehensive, drawing security, governance and development objectives together. In 10 years, with international support and assistance, Afghanistan has come a long way. Governance and the rule of law are improving across the country. The Afghan Government are providing increasing levels of basic services, with Afghans enjoying much greater access to health facilities, and more education opportunities—including for girls—than in 2001. We welcome the Afghan Parliament’s decision on Saturday to approve the supplementary budget to recapitalise the central bank, paving the way towards agreement on a new International Monetary Fund programme of support in the coming weeks. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development has been actively engaged with the Afghan Ministry of Finance and the IMF in support of this objective. Agreeing the new programme will reinvigorate the Kabul process, allowing donors to align themselves behind Afghan Government priorities and systems as we move through transition and beyond.

Let us not understate the tangible improvements that have taken place, but let us also not underestimate the scale of the remaining challenge. We are working from a very low base. If progress is to be sustained, the commitment of the international community, including the UK, will have to endure for many years to come, long after international troops have withdrawn from combat operations.

On the security front, progress has been real and meaningful, but it has been hard won and is not irreversible. In many areas, Afghanistan remains a dangerous place. Levels of violence vary dramatically from region to region, but the insurgency continues to be a nationwide threat. The insurgency is under considerable pressure, but its leaders remain committed to conducting a violent campaign. Over recent months we have seen them increasingly focus on high-profile attacks, such as that on the British Council in August and on the US embassy and the international security assistance force headquarters in September. The murder of former President Rabbani is a particular setback. It is important that his death does not derail efforts to engage with those willing to renounce violence and work towards peace. We will continue to support President Karzai’s efforts to promote peace and reconciliation, and are encouraging engagement to support this from all those in the region, including Pakistan.

Despite that difficult background, there is also cause for optimism. In the UK area of operations in central Helmand, there is clear evidence that the ISAF troop surge has brought security gains, limiting the insurgents’ ability to prosecute their campaign. UK troops, partnered with Afghan security forces, are having a tangible impact on insurgent activity in our area of operations. On 9 October, 20 Armoured Brigade assumed authority for Task Force Helmand from 3 Commando Brigade, who can be proud of the progress made during their tour.

The central achievement this summer has been the commencement of the formal security transition process. July saw the first group of three provinces and four urban areas across Afghanistan, covering almost a quarter of the population, begin that process. This included Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand province, where the Afghan national police now lead on security in this bustling community of 120,000 people. ISAF remains ready to provide support if needed, but the ANSF have been able to respond effectively to insurgent attacks and to pre-empt many. That has been a source of considerable pride, both to the Afghan security forces and to the civilian population. Here in the UK, we should remember that the ANSF have suffered very considerable losses themselves.

The process of transition is on track and will continue. The Afghan Government, with ISAF support, are continuing the preparatory work needed to begin the transition process in the next set of provinces and districts. October also saw Task Force Helmand resume responsibility for the upper Gereshk valley. That follows the temporary deployment of US marine corps to the area, during which time UK forces provided security on the strategically significant Highway 1, outside the UK area of operations. UK forces will now work with the ANSF to prepare the district to enter the transition process in the future. We look forward to the second tranche of transition and an announcement later in the autumn by President Karzai outlining which areas are to be included.

Strong Afghan national security forces are key to achieving our objectives. The ANA now stands at 169,000 men and the ANP stands at 134,000, and both are on track to meet their target levels by October 2012. But progress cannot be measured in quantity alone—it must be measured in quality too—in respect of the effectiveness of the Afghan forces and the strength of their organisation. The Afghan-led response to the attacks on the US embassy and ISAF headquarters saw the ANSF successfully complete an exceptionally difficult night-time building clearance and, for the first time, Afghan air force helicopters were deployed in direct support of troops on the ground. Operational effectiveness rates are improving, allowing the ANSF to take the lead in many operations. Literacy rates among the ANSF are also improving. All 12 of the Afghan army’s planned specialist branches are now functioning, which will, in time, improve self-sufficiency and professionalism. Measures to improve retention rates in the ANSF have also been introduced. Such measures include a pension scheme and a work cycle consisting of periods of operations, training and leave. So the ANSF are improving but, as the recent report by UNAMA, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, shows, there remain important areas where further improvement is crucial.

President Karzai has stated his commitment to his Government assuming lead security responsibility across the country as a whole by the end of 2014, which is a goal that we share and support. That means that British troops will not be in a combat role by 2015, nor will they be deployed in the numbers they are now. The ANSF will, however, still need support from the international community even after the conclusion of the transition process. We will continue to support their development: for instance, through our lead involvement in a new officers academy announced by the Prime Minister in the summer.

On 5 December, the Afghan Government will chair an international conference in Bonn. This is a key opportunity to advance the political track. The Istanbul conference in November and the Chicago summit next May are further opportunities for the international community to reiterate its long-term commitment to Afghanistan. That commitment is crucial if we are to deliver on our key objective of ensuring that Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for international terrorism. Our armed forces will continue to protect our national interests with the selfless devotion to duty we have come to expect. I am sure that we in this House will reciprocate by maintaining the staunch cross-party support that has underpinned the operation from the outset, and I commend the statement to the House.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

I echo the tribute paid to Rifleman Vijay Rai of 2nd Battalion The Royal Gurkha Rifles, who died in action on Saturday. On all such occasions it is right that we should recognise the sacrifice and dedication of our service personnel here at home and overseas. They fight for others’ security and peace in order to protect our own. They carry our pride and our patriotism and they, and their families, must be the constant in our minds. It is also right that we should pay tribute to our allies, many of them nations that have also been scarred by terrorism.

I welcome the new Secretary of State and thank him in advance for his statement. I want to put on record my personal view that, whatever other disagreements I had with the right hon. Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), I never doubted his passion about doing the right thing in Afghanistan, his personal commitment to supporting our forces, and the skill that he showed in trying to build consensus on the operations in Libya. As I made clear to him, when the Government do the right thing we will strongly support them, while carefully scrutinising their decisions. Will the Secretary of State take this early opportunity to reiterate his predecessor’s welcome commitment that nothing in the strategic defence and security review will adversely impact on the Afghan front line, and will he say whether anyone currently serving in Afghanistan is in line for compulsory redundancy?

Media attention has understandably been on Libya in recent months, but it has been another difficult summer in Afghanistan. Despite the painful losses, British casualties have mercifully been significantly lower than in the last two years, and casualties among all international forces lower than last year. There are, however, worrying security trends, with high-profile terrorist attacks including that against the British Council, which reminded us again of the danger in which many of our people, including civilians, put themselves for the sake of stability in Afghanistan and security at home. There have also been increased targeted assassinations across the country, and signs of insurgency spreading to previously calmer areas, and mixed messages on the political track. Despite that, our forces are doing brilliant work in central Helmand, jointly with the Afghan army and police force. This remains an intense and challenging campaign and one that is in our national interest. I hope the new Secretary of State will consistently make the case for why our forces are engaged in Afghanistan.

Let me turn now to my specific questions. We continue to support the intention to end the British combat role in Afghanistan by 2014. Will the Secretary of State share his assessment of the security situation and how it has changed in the districts and provinces involved in the first phase of transition? Will he assure the House that detailed plans for troop withdrawal will always be based on military advice and conditions on the ground?

On security, last week I spent time at NATO HQ and met the Secretary-General of NATO, who was full of praise for our forces. We discussed the security situation in Afghanistan. Will the Secretary of State comment on reports that Pakistani militants are exploiting a security vacuum left by the departure of US troops from parts of eastern Afghanistan, notably Kunar and Nuristan?

This is an issue for the whole of NATO, so how does the Secretary of State think we can persuade other nations with forces in Afghanistan to bear more of the burden? Pakistan is, of course, central to the future of Afghanistan and the wider region, so could he reflect on the worrying assessment by Admiral Mike Mullen that Pakistani intelligence is currently supporting extremists in Afghanistan? The campaign of targeted assassinations has also suggested a pattern of infiltration by the Taliban into Afghan forces. Could he say what changes are being made to Afghan national army and Afghan national police recruitment procedures and effective background checks to protect against this in future?

On the political process, we all know that for progress to be made in Afghanistan, there must be inclusive politics inside and beyond the country’s borders. Within its borders, could the Secretary of State reinforce the importance of protecting the gains made in development in Afghanistan in reducing child mortality and improving education? There are more than 7 million students in schools across the country, one third of whom are now girls. Beyond Afghanistan’s borders, India has recently signed a strategic partnership with Afghanistan. What does he see its significance as being, and what does he read into Pakistan’s response? The forthcoming Bonn conference, as he suggested, can be a real moment of strategic progress. Will he share his assessment of the credible likely outcomes coming from the Bonn conference?

In conclusion, we need Afghan security forces that are strong enough to defend and sustain the political and economic progress, and a constitution that reflects a changed Afghanistan, but to do so we need genuine and deeper achievements on economic development, political reconciliation, and better involvement with neighbours. Britain fought three wars in 80 years in Afghanistan; this is our fourth, and we have no intention of there being a fifth. That is why it is essential that real progress be made at the forthcoming Bonn conference.

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his welcome, and indeed for his continuing endorsement of the cross-party approach to this issue. He asked about the impact of the SDSR on the Afghan front line and I can tell him that in the very short time that I have had at the MOD, one of the first things I have done is to ask for an assessment of the equipment and personal protection available to our troops in Afghanistan. I am satisfied that they have the best level of protection they have had since this campaign began and appropriate equipment to carry out the task that they are being asked to carry out, and I will ensure that that remains my No. 1 priority. He asked about compulsory redundancies. No troops serving in Afghanistan will be subject to compulsory procedures either while they are serving in Afghanistan or during their recovery period upon return.

The right hon. Gentleman talked about the importance of the political track, and I absolutely agree with him. If Afghanistan is to have a stable and sustainable future, there has to be an inclusive solution to the political challenges that the country faces. I recognise that there are huge issues in achieving that but it must remain our focus. He was also right to draw attention to the success of our forces. A military solution alone will not be sufficient, but without a climate of security we will not be able to achieve the nation-building and reconciliation process that is so important for the future. I confirm that I will consistently make the case for the presence of our troops in Afghanistan.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the current security situation. In the districts and provinces that have transitioned, the experience is good and the Afghan national security forces are showing good capability. Indeed, ISAF in Lashkar Gah has had to intervene only once since the transition took place.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about Pakistani militants, and I think he was referring to Haqqani network activity in the more easterly provinces to the east of where Task Force Helmand is operational. There has certainly been an increase in activity and the pattern clearly is that there has been a reduction in military activity in Regional Command South West but a corresponding increase in some other areas, including the area subject to Haqqani network influence.

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to talk about the centrality—the crucial involvement—of Pakistan in the long-term solution to the problem. We should never forget that Pakistan has borne a burden as great as that of any other country in the fight against terrorism, taking more civilian casualties than any other nation. We will continue to work with the Pakistanis to ensure that they engage in the interests of Afghan security, and indeed of their own long-term security, by ensuring that the insurgency is defeated.

The right hon. Gentleman asked me about the infiltration of the ANSF through recruits. I absolutely accept that this is a critical issue. I have been assured that progress is being made, but I do not have the details that I can give to him across the Dispatch Box. I am very happy to write to him later today.

Finally, the right hon. Gentleman asked about protecting development gains. We are clear that a long-term lasting solution must involve the securing of those development gains and building on them—enhancing them. Afghanistan has to become a viable nation capable of offering its citizens basic services that they require, and capable, in a sense, of competing in its offer with what Taliban and other insurgents have been offering at local level. We have to build on those processes. We have to secure the gains that have been made, and I hope that at the Bonn conference the international community will take the opportunity to send a very clear signal of its long-term commitment to this process, beyond the draw-down of forces at the end of 2014.

Defence Responsibilities

Jim Murphy Excerpts

Monday 10th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

Thank you, Mr Speaker.

The meeting took place on the morning of 17 June, where there was a general discussion about Cellcrypt and what it might be able to do to support the MOD. At the end of the meeting, in the interests of probity, Mr Boulter mentioned that he was in a dispute with 3M alongside the MOD, and I acknowledged this. Beyond this, there was no discussion of the case or any individuals involved, nor was any classified information discussed.

That night, Mr Boulter sent e-mails claiming that he had had discussions on the issue of George Buckley’s knighthood. This correspondence later became the basis of a blackmail case in the United States. I made it clear that I was willing to testify that I had never had any such discussions. Subsequently, Porton Group has since clarified that Harvey Boulter did not in fact discuss the matter of the knighthood.

I accept that I should not have had a meeting with a potential commercial supplier without an official being present. This was entirely my fault and I take full responsibility for it. After the meeting, however, I notified my private office and asked them to prepare a brief on the subject of Cellcrypt.

Let me turn now to Mr Werritty, whom I first met in 1998. While I was in opposition, he worked as a paid intern in my House of Commons office and at this time had a parliamentary pass. He also received payments for research work undertaken during my time in opposition. Records currently show total payment of some £5,800 over the total period. He has not received any payment from me while in government. He has a very wide range of long-standing business, international relations and political links of his own. He did not receive any payment as a result of the meeting in Dubai, nor has he been involved in any defence procurement issues.

As a matter of transparency, I would like to inform the House that I have met Mr Werritty in the margins of trips of various sorts overseas, including annual leave and holidays with family and friends, on a total of 18 occasions.

As the permanent secretary points out today in her report, Mr Werritty visited me at the Ministry of Defence over 16 months, either in my office or in the refreshment facilities, on 22 occasions. The majority of these were short social meetings. In only four instances were others present. Three related to Sri Lanka and one was with Matthew Gould, known socially to both of us. It was also during one of these meetings in June that I first learned about, and told him to stop, using his business card stating that he was my adviser. Mr Werritty was never present at regular departmental meetings. During private meetings we did not discuss either commercial or defence matters. He had no access to classified documents, nor was he briefed on classified matters.

As I said yesterday, I accept, with the benefit of hindsight, that I should have taken great care to ensure a more transparent separation of Government, party political and private business and that meetings were properly recorded to protect myself and the Government from any suggestion of wrongdoing. Again, I accept my personal responsibility for this. The permanent secretary is making arrangements to ensure that such a separation of powers will exist in the future. In addition, because I do not believe that to be enough, Mr Werritty will not make private visits to the MOD in future, will not attend international conferences where I am present, and we will not meet socially abroad where I am on official business. This should ensure that no appearance of potential wrongdoing will occur in the future.

Since 1996, when I was a Foreign Office Minister, I have been involved in attempts to help resolve the conflict in Sri Lanka. As the war with the Tamil Tigers drew to a close, I worked with a number of others in business, banking and politics. It was my aim to create a mechanism that would allow reconstruction funding to occur through the private sector. This was called the Sri Lanka Development Trust, which seeks to promote post-conflict reconciliation and development in Sri Lanka. The aim was to use a proportion of profits made to fund development projects in Tamil communities. Neither myself, Mr Werritty nor others sought to receive any share of the profits for assisting the trust.

During the Shangri-La dialogue of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in 2010, I attended a bilateral meeting with the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister. This was attended by Mr Werritty and MOD officials and was minuted. The purpose of the meeting was to make it clear that although I would no longer be able to participate in the project, the others involved would continue to do so.

In December 2010, Mr Werritty and I met with the Sri Lankan President in London. This was not an official visit, hence why it was held in the Dorchester hotel. In July 2011, I gave a lecture hosted by Mrs Kadirgamar, the widow of my friend and Tamil former Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, who was assassinated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 2005, as the House will know. Mr Werritty is a personal friend of Mrs Kadirgamar and helped with the arrangements, as it was a personal not a ministerial commitment. I know that there are some in the Sri Lankan diaspora who do not want any contact with the current Sri Lankan Government, but as I said in my lecture, unless we have reconciliation based on mutual tolerance and respect for all citizens regardless of ethnic origin, we will not find peace in that island.

I have made it clear throughout this process that my desire is to be as transparent as possible, and I accept where I have been at fault, as Ministers must. Following the interim findings, the Prime Minister has asked the Cabinet Secretary to work with the permanent secretary to complete the report, addressing all the remaining questions that have been raised publicly and privately by this issue, and I shall fully and willingly co-operate with this.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

I remind the House of my properly declared interest and thank the Secretary of State for his statement. I have enjoyed shadowing him in the House of Commons, and until now we have had a good working relationship. Indeed, he will know that I defended him for the first month of this case, until he started to defend himself and his answers unravelled, but this whole crisis is self-inflicted. There have been daily revelations which barely 36 hours ago he described as “baseless”, but yesterday he was forced into a partial and belated apology. It is not a partial apology we want; it is full and complete disclosure of all the issues, so today we will listen with great care to any questions that he does not fully answer.

Some will question the loyalty of a friend who abuses his contacts in that way, and many will doubt the judgment of a Secretary of State who willingly allows himself to be professionally compromised in that manner. But this is not just about the Secretary of State’s judgment; it is also about his conduct and breaches of the ministerial code. The code is clear. Paragraph 7.1 says:

“Ministers must ensure that no conflict arises, or could reasonably be perceived to arise, between their public duties and their private interests”.

Yesterday the Defence Secretary apologised for the “misleading impression” that his actions may have given. His apology in itself is an admission of a breach of the code. So it is beyond doubt that he has breached the ministerial code; the only issue is on how many grounds and on how many occasions?

Paragraph 5.2 of the code says:

“Ministers have a duty to give fair consideration and due weight to informed and impartial advice from civil servants”.

The Secretary of State claims that the infamous meeting in Dubai happened by chance. Today we have another version of events: he has told the House that he did not discuss defence or classified matters with Mr Werritty. How then did Mr Werritty know his diary and how he was travelling back from Afghanistan? Why did the Secretary of State exclude civil servants from that meeting? Did he ask for advice and briefing before the Dubai meeting? Did he seek civil service advice in advance of any of the 22 meetings with Mr Werritty? If so, will the Secretary of State publish all such advice, together with a full list of topics discussed and those who attended, and any actions taken by his private office or his special advisers following those meetings?

The Secretary of State has admitted that distinctions between his professional responsibilities and personal loyalties have been blurred. Again, the ministerial code is clear on this. Paragraph 7.3 says:

“On appointment to each new office, Ministers must provide their Permanent Secretary with a full list in writing of all interests which might be thought to give rise to a conflict.”

Paragraph 7.4 continues:

“Where appropriate, the Minister will meet the Permanent Secretary and the independent adviser on Ministers’ interests to agree action on the handling of interests.”

So on their first day in a new job every Minister has to make a declaration. Under paragraph 7.5 of the code, statements of ministerial interests are published every six months, and the Secretary of State’s entry makes interesting reading. There are mentions of good organisations such as the Strawberry Line project in his constituency, but there is no mention of his adviser who ran a defence consultancy, arranged his meetings and handed out his business cards across the world.

Did the Secretary of State provide full and complete disclosure to his permanent secretary about his links to Adam Werritty and his defence consultancy, Security Futures? What advice did the permanent secretary give him and what was agreed on the handling of this interest? Will the Secretary of State now publish the record of the information that he supplied to his permanent secretary when he took up this job? In the media this morning, the former Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Jock Stirrup, is reported as saying that he raised his concerns with the Secretary of State for Defence’s office. Is this true, and has the current or any previous permanent secretary ever raised their concerns about his professional proximity to Mr Werritty with him or his office?

Looking at the ministerial code, it is clear that, on paragraphs 5.2, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5, the Secretary of State has driven a coach and horses through the rules. He cannot believe that today’s partial apology gives him a free pass round breaches of the ministerial code. Our forces look to him for leadership. When they step out of line, when they break the rules, they take responsibility and accept the consequences. They, and we, expect no less of the Defence Secretary. We all hope that he has done nothing wrong, but the only way to clear his name is total transparency, which is why this case should now be referred to the independent adviser on Ministers’ interests.

In conclusion, we might never know what got the Secretary of State into this crisis—whether it was arrogance, naivety or hubris. The British people

“expect the highest standards of conduct…We must be...transparent about what we do and how we do it. Determined to act in the national interest, above improper influence”.

[Interruption.] Government Members might shout about that, but those are not my words; they are the words of the Prime Minister in the foreword to the ministerial code of conduct. The Prime Minster must now apply those standards to the Secretary of State, otherwise the ministerial code will not be worth the paper it is written on.

[Dr Fox]

I am not entirely sure what questions arise from that. The right hon. Gentleman asked why no civil service advice was sought before social and private meetings. The answer is that civil service advice is not sought before social and private meetings. He asked when the permanent secretary raised concerns. The permanent secretary raised the matter of the business cards with me in August. I told her that I had dealt with that in June when I first saw them. I demanded that they should not be used again and that any subsequent cards should not display either the portcullis or a reference to me as Secretary of State. The right hon. Gentleman has spent most of his time over the last few days focusing on the meeting in Dubai with Cellcrypt. I have set out how the meeting came about, what the conversations were during the meeting, what conversations did not take place, what Mr Boulter said did take place and the action I took as a consequence, which was to ask my private office for a full briefing. No commercial contracts were made and no financial gain was made as a result of any of those discussions. When a man who was involved in a blackmail case is feeding information to the media, which is often taken without question, it is rather difficult to take the shadow Secretary of State beginning his statement without telling us the specifics of the declaration he was making, which is that his Front Bench team took £10,000 from Cellcrypt, the company at the centre of all this, to visit the United States. I hope that today I have answered as many questions as I can; perhaps the shadow Secretary of State might want to answer some that arise for him.

Oral Answers to Questions

Jim Murphy Excerpts

Monday 10th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Nick Harvey]

My hon. Friend makes a good point. Obviously, as numbers contract, the demands put on all our personnel are difficult to balance, but the work to which he alludes, and to which he has given his time in the past, is very important for all the reasons that I have specified, and we will ensure that that is taken into account in deciding force numbers.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

I join in the Secretary of State’s earlier condolences to the relatives of those who have lost their lives in Afghanistan. The whole House will be in awe of the remarkable professionalism of our forces, and all that they have achieved in Libya as part of a wider coalition, so will the Minister for the Armed Forces update the House on progress in persuading other allies who are less involved in the fighting to bear more of the burden in helping to train and stabilise the country?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Peter Luff)]

I am delighted to be able to do precisely that; it was published a few hours ago. [Hon. Members: “Read it out!”] It runs to more than 100 pages, so I think that I would be in trouble with the Speaker if I did that. Section 4 is specifically about SMEs. I invite the whole House to pay careful attention to this important document and to take part in the consultation on it.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

May I say how much I agree with the Secretary of State when he says that we cannot allow the unpopularity of the Iraq conflict in many quarters to prevent us from standing up for what we believe in in other countries around the world? That is why there remains consensus across parties about the action in Libya and Afghanistan. However, now that there is a timetable for the drawdown of our combat role in Afghanistan, can he update the House on how much longer he anticipates Her Majesty’s forces remaining engaged in Libya?

[Dr Fox]

We have set out, in accordance with the plans President Karzai himself has set out, that we do not plan to have a combat role in Afghanistan beyond the end of 2014. The big question now is what we do beyond 2014 and what signals we send to Afghanistan and Pakistan about our determination to provide regional stability. We have already said that we will take charge of the officer training academy and are encouraging other countries to do the same. I anticipate that there will be a role for special forces and mentoring and training as well as what I have set out. That is one of the issues we discussed at the NATO summit last week, and we will set out further details at the Chicago summit in May.

Baha Mousa Inquiry

Jim Murphy Excerpts

Thursday 8th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Dr Liam Fox)]

With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement on the report into the death of Mr Baha Mousa in Iraq in 2003. In any conflict, no matter what the reason for our country’s involvement and no matter how difficult the circumstances, what separates us from our adversaries are the values with which we prosecute it and the ethics that guide our actions. To represent Britain, in war as well as in peace, is to represent our inherent democratic values, the rule of law and respect for life. When those values are transgressed, it is vital that we get to the bottom of what has happened, are open about the issues and their causes, ensure that what reparations we can make are made and do all that we can to prevent it from happening again. Only in that way can we ensure that those values hold firm in how we think of ourselves and in how others perceive us.

I am today laying before the House the independent report published this morning by Sir William Gage as chairman of the public inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the death of Mr Baha Mousa in Iraq in 2003. I am grateful to Sir William and his team, who have produced a report that is sober, focused and detailed. Above all, I believe it to be both fair and balanced. It is, however, a painful and difficult read. As the report sets out:

“Baha Mousa was subject to violent and cowardly abuse and assaults by British Servicemen whose job it was to guard him and treat him humanely”.

That was the primary cause of his death. The inquiry was rightly set up in 2008 by the previous Government with the intent of shining a spotlight on the events surrounding the death of Baha Mousa and to provide the most definitive account possible in the circumstances. It does that comprehensively. What happened to Baha Mousa and his fellow detainees in September 2003 was deplorable, shocking and shameful. The Ministry of Defence and the Army have previously made a full apology to the family of Baha Mousa and to his fellow detainees and have paid compensation to them.

We can take some limited comfort that incidents like this are extremely rare, but we cannot be satisfied by that. Given the seriousness of this case, there is a series of questions that I have asked myself and that other Members will ask too. Among these are: who was responsible and what happened to them as a consequence? What action has been taken to prevent a recurrence? Do we have the right protection in place today in Afghanistan? And, of course, how will the Government respond to the recommendations made in the report? On responsibility, the report makes clear the extent of the failings of individuals, the MOD and the armed forces at the time and in earlier years. In addition to the shocking displays of brutality for which individuals were responsible, it is also clear that there were serious failings in command and discipline in 1st Battalion the Queen’s Lancashire Regiment. There was a lack of clarity in the allocation of responsibility for the prisoner-handling process, and sadly, too, there was a lack of moral courage to report abuse. However, it must be acknowledged that a small number behaved with both integrity and courage in reporting what they had witnessed. They are examples of how others should have behaved.

Wider than the battalion, there were also deficiencies in policies, orders and training relating to detention at that time. The chairman noted that there was inadequate doctrine on prisoner handling and a “systemic failure” that allowed knowledge of the prohibition on abusive techniques put in place by the Heath Government to be lost over the years. The report also confirms that the Army was underprepared for the task of handling civilian detainees, having expected after the end of war-fighting to provide humanitarian aid rather than become involved in counter-insurgency activities.

Since this incident in 2003, six different Defence Secretaries have stood at this Dispatch Box. I am sure that they all regret that it has taken so long to get to the bottom of what happened and that even now the refusal of some involved to tell the whole truth means that it has not been possible to establish the full extent of the culpability of individuals. Their behaviour is a matter for their own consciences, but others must take responsibility for the wider failures and deficiencies, and this report does not mean that our investigations of mistreatment of detainees are over. The evidence from the inquiry will now be reviewed to see whether more can be done to bring those responsible to justice. It would therefore not be appropriate to comment in the House on specific individuals and their role in this appalling episode.

I have asked the Chief of the General Staff, where individuals are still serving, to consider what action is necessary to ensure that the Army’s ethical standards are upheld. That is occurring through the chain of command as we speak. The investigations of the Iraq historic allegations team, which started work last November, are now well under way and are revealing evidence of some concern. It is too early to comment on what the conclusions of the IHAT investigations might be, but cases will be referred to the Director of Service Prosecutions, if and when there is sufficient evidence to justify that.

Since 2003, action taken by the MOD and the Army to address failings as they were identified has touched every aspect of the prisoner-handling system, from policy and doctrine to ground-level directives, as well as training and oversight. The changes wrought have been fundamental. The Army Inspector’s report in 2010, validated by an independent expert adviser, is one example of the detailed scrutiny applied to the training and doctrine for handling detainees. I assure the House that there is a commitment to continuous improvement at all levels inside and outside the armed forces.

As the report acknowledges, further positive changes have been made as a result of matters that emerged from evidence heard during this inquiry’s final module—module 4—which was a thorough scrutiny of our current detention policies, practices and training. The Minister for the Armed Forces and I take a close personal interest in detention matters in Afghanistan, and I am confident that our approach to detention there has improved markedly since the period rightly criticised in this report. However, we are in no way complacent about the issues identified by Sir William, and I can inform the House that I am accepting in principle all his recommendations with one reservation. It is vital that we retain the techniques necessary to secure swiftly, in appropriate circumstances, the intelligence that can save lives. I am afraid that I cannot accept the recommendation that we institute a blanket ban, during tactical questioning, on the use of certain verbal and non-physical techniques. I share some of Sir William’s concerns, however, so I have asked the Chief of the Defence Staff to ensure that that approach is used only by defined people in defined circumstances.

Between 2003 and 2008, 179 British personnel were killed in Iraq serving their country, and many more returned injured. In autumn 2003, 1st Battalion the Queen’s Lancashire Regiment faced an immensely difficult challenge as it attempted to bring law and order to a large area that had been subject to a brutally oppressive regime for many years. As Sir William acknowledges, the issues addressed in his report

“need to be understood in the operational context in which they occurred: the tempo of operations; the poor state of the local civilian infrastructure; a daily threat to life from both civilian unrest and an increasing insurgency; the deaths of fellow service personnel and incessant oppressive heat. In combination these factors made huge demands on soldiers serving in Iraq in 2003.”

There are few of us sitting in the comfort of the House of Commons who can claim to understand what that must have been like. However, the vast majority of armed forces personnel faced these same challenges and did not behave in the way outlined in this report. They represent the fine ethical values found day in and day out in our armed forces, and we must not allow the unspeakable actions of a very few to damage the reputation of the whole.

I want to make it clear that Baha Mousa was not a casualty of war. His death occurred while he was a detainee in British custody. It was avoidable and preventable, and there can be no excuses. There is no place in our armed forces for the mistreatment of detainees, and there is no place for a perverted sense of loyalty that turns a blind eye to wrongdoing or erects a wall of silence to cover it up. If any serviceman or woman, no matter the colour of uniform that they wear, is found to have betrayed the values this country stands for and the standards that we hold dear, they will be held to account. Ultimately, whatever the circumstances, rules or regulations, people know the difference between right and wrong. We will not allow the behaviour of individuals who cross that line to taint the reputation of the armed forces, of which the British people are rightly proud. I commend this statement to the House.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

I thank the Secretary of State for a strong statement. The whole House will welcome the way in which he is personally dealing with this difficult matter. I also welcome his courtesy in this morning allowing me early sight of the 1,400-page report into this horrific incident. It is a shocking episode, from which we must learn serious and lasting lessons. We all feel profound regret at the loss of Mr Baha Mousa’s life in British Army custody. His death in itself is tragic; that it appears that there was a cover-up afterwards compounds that tragedy. It is essential that our armed forces take responsibility for all actions committed during conflict. Our strength relies not only on our firepower, but on the standards and ethics that we uphold and on which we pride ourselves. This incident is a brutal violation of those standards.

Like the Secretary of State, I want to make it clear that although the report is damning about the actions of some in the Army in 2003, it is not a reflection of our armed forces in general. It is important that those in our forces hear that we remain proud of their bravery and professionalism, whether they are the 100,000 soldiers who previously served in Iraq in the recent past or those in Afghanistan or Libya operations today. All too many among their number have lost their lives or been injured to have their reputations attacked in that way. In Afghanistan, it is essential not only that our forces know that we are proud of their behaviour, but that Afghan civilians hear it loudly, too.

I would like to put on record my thanks to Sir William Gage and his inquiry team for their report, which is both forensic and frightening. It now seems clear that perhaps as many as two dozen members of the Army, including some in the chain of command, knew about the 93 injuries inflicted during those 36 hellish hours. The Secretary of State has outlined the details of the events, but it is deeply worrying that it now seems clear that there was a failure in the Army’s justice system, including in the court martial and the chain of command, and that incomplete assurances were given to Ministers.

It is right that politicians should avoid interfering in the criminal justice system in general and in military justice processes specifically, but that is sustainable only where the processes work and are demonstrated to be working. The report finds that multiple assaults took place in a confined space, including by senior NCOs, and that there was a

“loss of discipline and lack of moral courage”

to report the abuse. In accepting today’s recommendations, it is crucial that the Government take forward the proposal that those service personnel who reported abuse or who make complaints against their peers about the mistreatment of captured personnel should be afforded protection.

The report raises some serious questions; I wish to address just three, one of which the Secretary of State has already anticipated. He has stated that he accepts all but one of the 73 recommendations. He intends to retain the right to exercise the harsh approach in tactical questioning. There will be concerns in the House and elsewhere about that, so can he share further with the House the details as to why he wishes to retain the ability to enforce the harsh approach?

Secondly, the Secretary of State mentioned this in passing, but back in 1972, Ted Heath banned the use of the five techniques used in Northern Ireland during internment. Those techniques returned, despite being prohibited, albeit not banned, in the way that Prime Minister Heath had anticipated. The report suggests that legislation is not needed to ban those five techniques. However, will the Secretary of State look further at whether there will be an early opportunity to change armed forces legislation through the Armed Forces Bill, which is currently in their lordships’ House, to implement any parts of the report that would require legislative change? I am sure that he agrees that if legislative change were needed, it would be wrong to wait five years for the next armed forces Bill.

Finally, although the Secretary of State is right that we should not name individuals on the Floor of the House today, the report finds that individuals did not give full and accurate evidence about what happened and that there was a refusal to reveal identities. Previously, soldiers were given exemption from prosecution during this process. However, in addition to fresh Army disciplinary procedures that are currently being undertaken, will fresh legal processes now be initiated in the light of today’s report? Those named in the report surely cannot hide from justice behind their silence or their evasion in the court martial process, or be protected by a calculated cover-up by their peers in the Army or a failure to act in the Army’s chain of command.

In conclusion, on the eve of the 10th anniversary of 9/11, it is compulsory that UK forces should continue to behave in a way that is alien to our foes. When our forces have to detain someone, that detainee is both in our custody and in our care. There is strong support on this side of the House for the report and the recommendations, and for the Government’s reaction to it. However, the consequence of the report must be that never again should anyone be subject to such brutality and lose their life because they are in British custody.

[Dr Fox]

I am very grateful to the shadow Secretary of State for his response and for the way in which he phrased it. He is quite right that the report in no way reflects on the general behaviour of our armed forces; indeed, the whole reason why we are discussing this case is that it was a shocking deviation from the normal standards of behaviour that we have seen from our armed forces. He is correct that a number of individuals are still serving. We are looking at the evidence in detail—it is obviously a very large report—and as I have said, the chain of command is looking at how those individuals still in the armed forces might be treated, although I expect a number of suspensions today.

The right hon. Gentleman raised a number of issues about the harsh approach to questioning and why we should adopt it. First, I should say to the House that the so-called harsh approach involves a short burst of shouting—defined as a short, sharp shock—to bring a captured person back to the realisation of their situation. It is not a violent technique, but it has produced information that has led to both civilian and military lives being saved. To deprive our armed forces of techniques that can make them safer and protect the population both here and abroad would be wrong.

The right hon. Gentleman asked whether we needed a change to the law in respect of the five techniques that were outlawed by the Heath Government back in 1972. My understanding is that we do not—they are absolutely banned, as is currently made clear in training—but I will look to see whether doing that would reinforce the position and whether our legal experts believe it to be necessary.

As for the right hon. Gentleman’s point about exemptions from prosecution based on evidence, let me be clear that there was an exemption from prosecution based on an individual’s own evidence, not an exemption from prosecution based on the evidence of others that came out in the inquiry. Both military and civilian prosecuting authorities will be looking closely at the evidence to see whether it is possible to bring more of those involved to justice.

Defence

Jim Murphy Excerpts

Wednesday 20th July 2011 Ministerial Corrections

Departmental Public Bodies

[Mr Jim Murphy]

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) when the Science Advisory Committee on the Medical Implications of Less-Lethal Weapons was established;

Defence Transformation

Jim Murphy Excerpts

Monday 18th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Dr Liam Fox)]

I wish to express my condolences to the family and friends of Lance Corporal Paul Watkins of 9th/12th Royal Lancers, who was killed in Afghanistan on Saturday. My thoughts and prayers—and, I am sure, those of the whole House—are with them at this very sad and difficult time for them.

I wish to make a statement on the next steps in implementing the strategic defence and security review. This Government inherited both a national economic disaster that represented a strategic threat and a defence programme undermined by a £38 billion black hole. Without a fundamental review for 12 years, our armed forces were still largely configured for the 20th century, despite a decade of sustained operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The failure to set out a coherent long-term strategy for defence or to match commitments effectively to resources is one of Labour’s worst legacies. However, it is not enough to deal with the mess that we inherited; we also need to build something better for the future.

Right from the start, this Government have been determined not to repeat the mistakes of the past, and to make the difficult decisions that were ducked by the previous Government. We are determined to be bold and ambitious and to build formidable, well-managed armed forces structured for the rigours of future conflict and supported by an affordable defence programme. The SDSR has mapped out our long-term goal for Future Force 2020. The report of the defence reform unit that I announced to the House on 27 June was part of that process. Today, I want to set out the next phase of defence transformation, which involves bringing the Army back from Germany, creating a better future for our reserve forces, and delivering on our commitment to agree a 10-year defence equipment budget.

I have written to Members of both Houses and the devolved Administrations whose constituencies and interests are affected by the decisions that we have taken. Commitments must match resources in order to achieve a balanced budget. As part of the preparation for this year’s planning round, we have identified a number of adjustments to the defence programme. This includes rationalising vehicle acquisition to make the best use of those that we have already procured to support operations in Afghanistan, and continuing to bear down on non-front-line costs, where we will aim to deliver further substantial efficiencies in support, estate spending and IT provision.

Against this background, and as part of our overall approach to balancing the programme, I have agreed with the Treasury that the Ministry of Defence can now plan on the defence equipment and equipment support budget increasing by 1% a year in real terms between 2015-16 and 2020-21. I am grateful to colleagues, and particularly to the Prime Minister, for their support in this process. Such a long-term planning horizon will give greater stability and predictability, and stop the old practice of simply pushing programmes into future years. These and other changes will enable us to proceed with a range of the high-priority programmes set out in the SDSR.

I can therefore now give the go-ahead for the procurement of 14 additional Chinook helicopters, the upgrade of the Army’s Warrior vehicles, spending on the joint strike fighter, the procurement of the Rivet joint intelligence and surveillance aircraft, the cats and traps for the Queen Elizabeth class carriers, and the development of the global combat ship. This equipment can now be bought with confidence, ending a decade of uncertainty for our armed forces and for industry. However, similar discipline will be applied in future: we will order only what we can afford to buy.

Today I am placing in the Library the report of the review into the reserve forces, “Future Reserves 2020”. I would like to thank General Sir Nick Houghton, Lieutenant-General Graeme Lamb and my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier) for their excellent report. The report makes it clear, and I fully agree, that our reserve forces make an outstanding contribution to operations but have been shamefully neglected in recent years. For example, by some estimates, the Territorial Army has a trained and active strength as low as 14,000.

I am therefore pleased to announce that the Government will proceed with a £1.5 billion investment package over the next 10 years to enhance the capability of the reserves and consequently increase their trained strength, £400 million of which will be spent during this Parliament. The Government will work with employers and legislate if necessary to ensure that the reserves are more readily useable on operations. This significant investment will also build up the capacity of the reserves to contribute to homeland security consistent with the adaptive posture set out in the SDSR.

As the capability of the Territorial Army improves, this will allow a progressive adjustment of the regular-reserve balance of the Army while maintaining the land forces capability set out in the SDSR. This will include the delivery of the multi-role brigade structure of Future Force 2020. By 2020, if the Territorial Army develops in the way we intend, we envisage a total force of around 120,000, with a regular to reserve ratio of around 70:30. This will be more in line with comparable countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia.

Let me turn to basing. The decisions that we have taken in the SDSR to reduce aircraft types, bring the Army back from Germany and form the Army into five multi-role brigades will enable us to rationalise the defence estate and dispose of high-value sites that are no longer needed. The security of the nation and the requirements of defence were paramount in our analysis, but we have also considered the impact of changes on local communities, the impact on service personnel and their families, and the current pattern of the armed forces in Britain.

Army brigades currently stationed around Catterick and Salisbury will make up three of the five multi-role brigades. The other two MRBs will be based in the east of England, centred on Cottesmore, and in Scotland, centred on Kirknewton, south-west of Edinburgh. The MRB centred in Scotland will require a new training area, and positive discussions are being taken forward with the Scottish Government. Two major units and a formation headquarters will be based at Leuchars, increasing the number of posts there from 1,200 to more than 1,300. Consequently, the Typhoon force due to be built up there will instead be built up at RAF Lossiemouth. Other MRB units will be moved into Glencorse, Caledonia, Albemarle barracks and eventually Arbroath, as we intend over time to bring the bulk of the Royal Marines together in the south-west. We are also planning to place Army units in Kinloss in around 2014-15, continuing its long-term relationship with defence.

Taken together, this represents a significant increase in the defence footprint in Scotland of well over 2,000 posts. This is in line with the Scottish tradition of supporting our armed forces and is a recognition that these are United Kingdom forces under the Crown, protecting the citizens and interests of this United Kingdom. With the move to five multi-role brigades, we have concluded that 19 Light Brigade in Northern Ireland will be disbanded. Other units returning from Germany will move into the vacated bases and we remain committed to maintaining a permanent military garrison in Northern Ireland; 160 Wales Brigade will remain in Brecon.

We will retain St Athan at its current size for now, but intend to increase its usage to take full advantage of the excellent facilities there. RAF Marham will remain as a base for Tornado GR4. The defence technical training programme will move to Lyneham, guaranteeing its future. More details of these and other estate-related decisions are in the written statement I have laid today. The planning work, including the investment required to adapt sites, will now get under way, based on this strategic direction. It will involve consultations with local communities as appropriate and other statutory obligations that we will need to fulfil.

I am very conscious of the uncertainties that these changes will cause for service personnel and their families. Let me reassure them that the majority of the moves I have announced today will take place after 2015. In both basing and reserves, we have sought wherever possible to strengthen the strong and natural links between local communities and the armed forces. I do not underestimate the importance of these ties in underpinning the military covenant.

The overall package I have announced today is good news for our armed forces and means that they can look forward to the future with renewed confidence because the defence programme I have announced is underpinned with real resources. This investment in people and equipment is not the wish list of the past, but certainty for the future. I commend these decisions to the House.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

I join the Secretary of State in offering condolences to the family and friends of Lance Corporal Paul Watkins, who was tragically killed in Afghanistan over the weekend.

Last week, I offered wide and warm welcome to the Secretary of State for his thoughtful announcements on the Mull of Kintyre. Today, I am afraid, the right hon. Gentleman has chosen to take a different approach. The Government have been grappling with four big policy areas over the past few months: the RAF basing review, reserve forces, the financial settlement and proposed cuts to the Army. Each of those issues is of national importance and each is deserving of a statement in its own right, yet the Secretary of State comes here in what he thought was to be the last full day of Parliament to cram them into one 10-minute speech. This is a shabby way to treat our forces, and a shabby way to treat this Parliament.

The Government have chosen today, at the high point of one of the biggest political crises in decades, to bury this bad news of 10,000 cuts to the Army—a decision that will not take effect for many years to come. Why are the Government again blaming others? These announcements today are their cuts and their choices. The Secretary of State has announced cuts to the Army of 17,000—just under a sixth of the entire force in just 10 short months.

When in opposition, the Secretary of State said:

“In the real world the only logical conclusion you can come to is that the army is already too small”—

and he went on to demand

“A bigger Army for a safer Britain”.

Today, however, he has announced a smaller Army for a country that we can assume he sees as having only smaller ambitions—from a party that promised thousands of extra troops. It is hard to conclude other than this is strategic shrinkage by stealth. Today’s cut in the Army is bigger than the entire current deployment of all UK forces in Afghanistan. Will the Secretary of State explain why he believes it is in Britain’s strategic national security interest to have an Army so dramatically reduced in size? Will he also say whether this announcement is a result of planning round 11 having been completed?

We welcome any additional investment in our armed forces, and the £1.5 billion from the Treasury is good news, as is the announcement about St Athan. Many of the new capabilities were frozen in the Government’s defence review. We will look at the small print with renewed care, which we have learnt to do in recent months. Notwithstanding last week’s trumpeted announcement on the extension of the operational allowance to Operation Ellamy, hundreds of our forces in Libyan operations will not receive a single penny.

Reservists are great patriots, and provide a bridge to our communities at a time when many people have little understanding of or connection with a large number of our armed forces. They serve with enormous bravery, and we should pay permanent tribute to those who have fallen in Iraq and Afghanistan. There would, of course, be concern if bespoke standing units of reservists became the norm, as that could increase the commitment required from civilians. What assessment has the Secretary of State made of the impact of today’s announcement on retention and recruitment, and how does he address the fear that his approach will undermine the “one Army” concept?

Reform of the defence estate is important to ensuring that our armed forces are properly provided for, but there will be fury in Fife. The RAF has been based in Leuchars for more than 70 years, and it is a matter of deep regret that the Government have chosen to break an historic link that has served the nation so well in peace and in war. It is clear that they have not done their homework. They are closing an RAF base to make savings that they have not identified, and are redeploying the Army at costs that they have not quantified. Will the Secretary of State say how much it will cost to convert the RAF base into an Army garrison—because there will be substantial upfront expenditure—and will he guarantee that there will no period without a military presence at Leuchars, which would have a huge impact on the local communities? Will he also commit his Department to detailed research on the defence estates and the industrial footprint of United Kingdom defence in Scotland?

Following the defence review, it is clear that the country is engaged in events that Ministers did not foresee and reliant on equipment that Ministers planned to scrap. We now have a defence policy based on assumptions that are completely out of date. It seems that the Government are starting to face up to the inadequacy of their own defence review. Surely now is the moment for them to think again, and properly to reopen that flawed and rushed review.

[Dr Fox]

That was one of the poorest attacks on a Government that I have ever heard. It is pretty rich for the Opposition, after calling for the statement for so long, to complain when we make it. They also seem to be utterly incapable of understanding, even now, the appalling financial state in which they left not only defence but the United Kingdom in general. Does the right hon. Gentleman really think that had we been given a choice—had we not faced a national economic emergency—we would be making spending reductions across the board? We are having to do that because of the mess that the Opposition left behind.

When it comes to numbers, yet again the Opposition seem not to have learned any lessons. They talk about total numbers all the time, but they do not talk about deployability. Yet again they have failed to learn the lessons of the mistakes that they made during their time in office. I want to see British forces that can be deployed better, and I want to see them better trained and properly equipped. When they talk about how much they value the TA, the Opposition would do well to remember that it was they who were cutting the reserves during their last months in office. It was they who were cutting reservists’ training and allowances to save small amounts of money. We do not need any lessons from them in that regard.

We are trying to augment the “one Army” concept by ensuring better interoperability between our reserves and our regular forces. We want our reserves, like those in other countries, to be properly used in a way that gives good value for the investment made in them, and gives them a greater say and more respect within the military family.

Investment had already been made in Leuchars, and I fully accept that some of that investment will be lost. However, we felt that—in the broader scheme of things, and if we were to achieve a better rationalisation of the estate—Lossiemouth was the better choice, given that we had an alternative for Leuchars in the form of investment in the Army in the south of Scotland.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the footprint in Scotland. I should be happy to look at our footprint across the United Kingdom. What we have done is return to Scotland a footprint that is much more akin to what was there when we left office than to what was there when we returned to it.

Mull of Kintyre Review

Jim Murphy Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Dr Liam Fox)]

I wish to announce the publication today of the Mull of Kintyre review, the report of the independent review of the evidence relating to the findings of the board of inquiry into the fatal accident of an RAF Chinook helicopter at the Mull of Kintyre on 2 June 1994. It is right that I should begin this statement by paying tribute to the 29 people who died in that accident, one of the worst in the history of the Royal Air Force. As is well known, the passengers were members of the Northern Ireland security and intelligence community who were travelling to a meeting in Inverness, and their deaths were a huge blow to the security of this country. They were also a human tragedy for each of the 29 families who were devastated by the loss of their loved ones.

I pledged while in opposition that I would set up a review, because I had worries that an injustice might have been done. The official conclusion that the accident was caused by the negligence to a gross degree of the two pilots on duty that day, Flight Lieutenants Jonathan Tapper and Richard Cook, had been criticised almost since the day it was reached. Doubt had been cast on the findings in different ways by the fatal accident review held in 1995, by the Defence Committee and the Public Accounts Committee of the House in 1998 and 2000, and by the Select Committee appointed in another place in 2002.

A number of Members of the House have continued to voice their doubts over the findings of gross negligence, and I wish to acknowledge the unflagging interest in the case shown by my right hon. and learned Friends the Members for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) and for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), my right hon. Friends the Members for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot) and for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (Mr Bellingham) and others, and also by Sir John Major. I know that the Ministry of Defence considered those reports carefully, taking independent and specialist advice, but given the weight and breadth of the comments, I thought it only right to ask an independent figure to check whether justice had been done.

I announced the establishment of the review—the first independent review of the evidence relating to the accident set up by the Government themselves—to the House on 16 September last year. It was my intention that its report, whatever its findings might be, should draw a line under this matter. It has been carried out by the distinguished former Scottish judge, Lord Philip, with the advice and support of a panel of three fellow Privy Counsellors, my noble Friend Lord Forsyth, Baroness Liddell and my right hon. Friend the Member for Gordon (Malcolm Bruce). I am extremely grateful to all four for their thorough and painstaking approach to the task and for the clarity with which they have presented their recommendations, which are unanimous. I held them all in high regard before, and hold them in higher regard now.

Lord Philip and his colleagues have concluded that the finding that the pilots were negligent to a gross degree should be set aside and that the Ministry of Defence should consider offering an apology to the families of Flight Lieutenants Tapper and Cook. I can tell the House that I have accepted these recommendations. At a specially convened meeting of the Defence Council on Monday it was decided that

“the Reviewing Officers’ conclusions that Flight Lieutenants Tapper and Cook were negligent to a gross degree are no longer sustainable and must therefore be set aside. We therefore order that those findings shall be set aside”.

I have written to the widows of the two pilots, to the father of Jonathan Tapper and to the brother of Richard Cook to express the Ministry of Defence’s apology for the distress caused by the findings of negligence. I also wish to express that apology publicly in the House today.

Lord Philip’s analysis is very clear. To put it as briefly as I can, he identifies the central point as being that, according to the regulations in force at the time, a finding of negligence should have been made against air crew who had been killed in an accident only if there was “absolutely no doubt whatsoever” about the matter. Although the two air chief marshals who acted as reviewing officers for the board of inquiry and made the findings had no doubts on the matter, Lord Philip is clear that that is not enough. The question that should have been asked is whether there was any scope for doubt in anyone’s mind. In this case, other competent persons did have doubts, which is sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the findings should not stand.

I would like briefly to make four further points. First, the report does not purport to tell us exactly why Chinook ZD576 crashed. It is central to Lord Philip’s report that the exact cause will never be established, and I am convinced that pursuing the matter further would serve only to increase the distress of the families and friends of those who died in the accident. But those who allege that there has been a long-running conspiracy to cover up technical shortcomings in the aircraft will find no support here. The Chinook has had an excellent safety record since the disaster on the Mull. It has been a mainstay of our operations in successive theatres of war and has the full confidence of those who fly it. However, the report reveals that on this occasion the pilot expressed concerns that he felt unprepared to fly the aircraft.

Secondly, I want to emphasise that the air chief marshals who made the decision, Sir John Day and Sir William Wratten, who are now retired, were and are highly respected and experienced airmen who acted at all times with full conviction on what was the right and proper course and in good faith. They did not reach their decision lightly and they asked for legal advice. Regrettably, that legal advice, although subsequently endorsed by independent Queen’s counsel, has now proved to be incorrect. I attach no personal blame to these distinguished officers and their advisers.

Thirdly, the procedures for investigating air and other military accidents were changed some years ago, with the result that it is no longer the practice for boards of inquiry, now called service inquiries, to ascribe blame to those involved, whether or not they survived the accident. This is because sometimes the business of ascribing blame can get in the way of finding out what actually happened and, more importantly, preventing any recurrence.

Fourthly, the report makes one further recommendation: that the Ministry of Defence should reconsider its policy and procedures for the transport of personnel whose responsibilities are vital to national security. I accept that recommendation as well. It has implications for land and sea transport as well as air transport. I have directed my officials to ensure that the policy and procedures in place across all three services ensure that we do not unnecessarily risk so many individuals who are vital to national security in one vehicle. It is worth noting that Flight Lieutenant Tapper had asked for the passengers on the Chinook to be split between more than one helicopter.

This has been an unhappy affair that has caused much reflection within the RAF and anguish for the families of those who died, particularly the families of those who were wrongly found officially to have been negligent to a gross degree. I hope that this report and the action I have taken in response to it will bring to an end this sad chapter by removing the stain on the reputations of the two pilots.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

I thank the Secretary of State for his statement, join him in his moving tribute to the 29 people who died in this terrible incident and add our continuing condolences to their families. I also join him in offering our support to this unanimous report and the work carried out by Lord Philip, Lord Forsyth, the right hon. Member for Gordon (Malcolm Bruce) and my noble Friend Baroness Liddell of Coatdyke.

It is over such tragic and controversial events that the whole House should unite to ensure that the right outcome is found in the interests of service personnel, past and present, and their families. It is in our collective interest to establish as much as we can about what happened on 2 June 1994, to learn the right lessons for the Ministry of Defence and the RAF and to come to a settled view for the families of all of those who perished on the Mull of Kintyre. The Secretary of State has my full support in his work towards these objectives.

Successive Secretaries of State, initially Conservative and then Labour, decided to follow the findings of gross negligence produced by the two senior air marshals, Air Chief Marshal Sir William Wratten and Air Vice-Marshal Sir John Day. Their view, as the Secretary of State has suggested, overturned the original opinion of the RAF board of inquiry, which had found no evidence to suggest that either pilot was negligent. For gross negligence to be proven, the Queen’s regulations for the RAF state that

“only in cases in which there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever should deceased air crew be found negligent”.

It is a remarkably clear definition, and the contents of today’s report reveal that that test has not been met at any point since 1994.

No one doubts that all those involved in the inquiry acted in good faith, but it is now clear that the two air marshals initially sought, and were given, inadequate legal assistance in their interpretation of the standard of proof. I do not enjoy saying this, but it now also appears that Secretaries of State of both Governments were kept in the dark on differences between the board and the reviewing officers and that Ministers were deprived of the ability to reach a properly informed view. Investigations by the Public Accounts Committee in November 2000 and by a House of Lords Select Committee in November 2001 found that the reviewing officers of the board of inquiry were not justified in attributing gross negligence to the Chinook pilots because the findings did not satisfy the burden of proof required. It is important that in 2001 the board of inquiry rules were changed to ensure that no deceased pilot could ever be found negligent in this way again.

Let me turn to the wider lessons and ask the Secretary of State five specific questions arising from his welcome statement. First, he said that

“the report reveals that…the pilot expressed concerns that he felt unprepared to fly the aircraft”.

Will he tell the House how this matter was dealt with at the time by officers involved? Secondly, what issues surrounding compensation for the families of the deceased arise from the report? Thirdly, and I put this gently, the content of today’s announcement was trailed in the media at the weekend, days before Parliament had a chance to see it. Does the Secretary of State intend to carry out any inquiry on the possible leak of some of the contents of today’s report? Fourthly, and more substantially, did Lord Philip’s review find fault with the board of inquiry’s process, and should the make-up of boards of inquiry be changed to remove the perceived conflict of interest identified by the Public Accounts Committee in its previous report? Fifthly, the Secretary of State rightly said that he had written to the relatives of the two pilots, but have the contents of the report been shared with the families of the others who perished on the Mull of Kintyre?

In conclusion, I have said before at the Dispatch Box, and will continue to do so, that when the Government do the right thing they will rightly enjoy our support. Today, in the interests of all the families involved, the right thing is being done and lessons have to be learnt. We fully support what the Secretary of State has said today.

[Dr Fox]

I am extremely grateful for what the shadow Secretary of State has said and the tone in which he presented it to the House.

When we look at the experience under previous Secretaries of State, we see that the inquiries that took place were perhaps not quite focusing on the correct point. In Lord Philip’s inquiry, he very quickly, with his team, went to the point of the matter on a legal basis—that is, as the shadow Secretary of State has said, they grasped that attributing gross negligence could be done only if there was no doubt. This was not about establishing something beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the test that most of us would expect normally to be applied—it was an absolutely objective test. Perhaps in previous inquiries we were looking into the details and missing the main point.

The right hon. Gentleman asked a number of very reasonable questions. In answer to his specific question about how the matter was handled at the time, I refer him to paragraph 7.2.2 of the report, which says:

“We were told that Flt Lt Tapper telephoned his Deputy Flight Commander on the evening before the delivery of ZD576 to Northern Ireland expressing concern that some time had passed since his conversion training. He felt unprepared to fly the aircraft. He had attempted to persuade the tasking authority to spread the load between more than one aircraft, but his request had been refused.”

Yes, there will be questions of compensation arising. I spoke today to some of the families involved, but I did not feel that today was the appropriate time to be talking about money when there are very serious points of principle and we are opening up a very difficult emotional period for the families. However, we will undoubtedly take this forward in the usual way with those families.

As regards details appearing in the media, the right hon. Gentleman will recognise that very many of those were completely wrong. I suspect that people were making educated guesses that turned out to be not so educated.

Finally, neither Lord Philip nor his team criticised the initial board of inquiry. The problem came with the reviewing officers who attributed gross negligence when the board of inquiry had not come to a specific conclusion about who or what was to blame for the crash.

Oral Answers to Questions

Jim Murphy Excerpts

Monday 4th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

That is the natural way in which defence is developing in this country, as in others. We wanted to set up the joint force command to carry that process forward in a constructive and transparent way. It will also, as I said in my statement to the House, allow career progression right up to four-star level for those who might not get preferment through the traditional single-service structure. It is therefore not only good for defence but a thoroughly meritocratic reform.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

I associate the Opposition with the Secretary of State’s comments about our missing soldier in Afghanistan, and I appreciate the fact that he took the time to brief me personally earlier this afternoon. We all know that our forces are both brave and brilliant, and this is a reminder of the daily danger they face. The Opposition, the entire House and, more importantly, everyone in the country, regardless of their view on the conflict in Afghanistan, will wish the Government and our forces well in rescuing this individual soldier.

Will the Secretary of State assure us that not a penny piece that is currently planned for supporting the operation in Afghanistan will be affected by the implementation of the recommendations of the Levene report?

[Dr Fox]

Yes, I can give the right hon. Gentleman that assurance. We have ensured that nothing in our military planning, nothing that we are doing in Libya and nothing that is happening financially will in any way undermine our operations in Afghanistan.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Fox]

It is difficult to give an accurate figure, but I will try to obtain one from the provincial reconstruction team and write to the hon. Gentleman. What is clear is that, while we have taken a large amount of military equipment and money to Afghanistan, perhaps the most important thing that we have taken there is hope: hope for a generation who may be able to be educated and to have some economic capabilities of their own in the future, which events have denied to recent generations in Afghanistan.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

We read in the newspapers this week that the Prime Minister plans to announce a further troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. The whole country will feel disappointed that our forces have again had to learn of news through media leaks. As we head towards the 2014 deadline, can the Secretary of State repeat his guarantee that decisions about troop numbers will be based on conditions on the ground and on best available military advice, not on politics or other arbitrary factors?

[Dr Fox]

Given the last Government’s record, for the right hon. Gentleman to talk about troop numbers in Afghanistan being leaked to the newspapers is a bit like the pot calling the kettle black. We said very clearly that there would be a reduction of 426. Some 200 troops have already been withdrawn, largely because they were involved in logistic tasks above and beyond our core number. Any reduction in the core number, particularly in our force in Helmand, will be announced after discussions in the National Security Council between the relevant politicians and Departments and the military.