Summerland Fire: 50th Anniversary

Jason McCartney Excerpts

Wednesday 12th July 2023 Commons Chamber

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

It is our duty in Parliament not to hide from the past but to learn from it. The Summerland fire has never before been the subject of a debate in this House and, as we approach the 50th anniversary of the fire, it is time that changed.

I take the House back to 2 August 1973, when my constituent’s life and the lives of so many others changed forever. Heather Lea was enjoying the start of married life with her husband, Reg, while her parents and little sister, June, were on holiday on the Isle of Man, a place that held special memories for them all. Sadly, those memories are all Heather has left, because on that day her mother, Elizabeth, her father, Richard, and her little sister, June, were among the 50 people who lost their lives in the Summerland fire. As we will hear, the disaster could have been avoided yet, despite this fact, the bereaved families are still fighting for recognition and an apology. Sadly, the chances of there ever being justice appear to have long gone. Heather tells me:

“Fifty years is a long time but the burden has never diminished, and it never will.”

The Summerland leisure centre in Douglas on the Isle of Man was state of the art when it opened, two years before that fateful day, and offered a Mediterranean climate in a British seaside resort encompassing a swimming pool, amusement arcades, an underground disco, restaurants and bars. On the evening of 2 August, a fire was started in an unused kiosk on the crazy golf course outside the complex. The kiosk caught fire, collapsing against the exterior wall of Summerland. Due to the materials the architects used in the structure, the fire quickly spread.

The architects of Summerland had opted to use Galbestos in its construction. Galbestos is a plastic-coated metal cladding with limited fire resistance and, in combination with the use of decalin, which burns rapidly, for the internal walls, created the perfect cocktail for a disaster.

The fire broke through the highly combustible surface and burned undetected for a whole 10 minutes before bursting into the ground floor of the leisure building, igniting the Oroglas acrylic panels used on the walls and roof. The open-plan design aided the spread of the fire, with the internal spaces acting as chimneys to spread the fire. The terror that those in the building must have felt is unthinkable; survivors described mass panic, with the building appearing to melt before their eyes. One survivor said:

“There were fireballs coming down. It was like raining fire. There was no way to get away from it.”

The fire was the deadliest on land since the second world war. I realise as I say these words just how difficult it must be for the loved ones of those who were there to hear them.

Just over a month after the disaster, the lieutenant governor of the Isle of Man appointed a commission to investigate the Summerland fire, under its chair, the hon. Mr Justice Joseph Cantley OBE. The Summerland fire Commission identified several factors in the high number of deaths, including the construction of the building and the evacuation process, which was described as “delayed, unorganised and difficult” with a number of exits locked. It became clear that the materials used in the construction were known to be a safety risk. Either through the ignorance of professionals who ought to have known better or as a result of downright deception, they were still permitted for use. It is clear that regulations were bent to allow that to happen. The original inquiry in 1973 refers to the drawings submitted as unclear, with no dimensions and minimal details, including a serious error where the composition of the sixth floor was incorrectly labelled.

Significant changes were then made to the design to keep costs down, which the report said did not illicit any “particular discussion or anxiety’, despite replacing reinforced concrete walls with Galbestos, which was already known to have limited fire- resistance. The planning submissions relating to Summerland contravened a number of building byelaws and failed to meet the requirement that external walls of any building were to have fire resistance of at least two hours and for ceilings to provide adequate protection against the spread of fire. Permitting the use of both Galbestos and Oroglas contravened such byelaws. However, a waiver was agreed, as permitted under the local government building byelaws legislation of 1950.

The inquiry reported that the borough engineer had been orally informed by the architect of the corporation that Oroglas was non-combustible. Although the chief fire staff officer made it clear that Oroglas was combustible and offered no fire resistance, he raised no objection to the planning committee, which was tasked with reaching a decision on the waiver. Correspondence between the various architects made it clear that the design of the centre could not be delivered in any other way, as it said:

“Unless we are granted”—

an Oroglas waiver—

“we shall be in the soup as I cannot suggest an alternative.”

Compensatory safety measures should still have been taken, such as more exits and a sprinkler system, but no sprinklers were installed.

Oroglas was blamed for the disaster. Although it burned with frightening speed, the main culprit was Galbestos, which was used instead of reinforced concrete, but the fire resistance of that material was never even considered. The failure to consider the properties of materials was not isolated to those in the authorities. The decision to substitute decalin for plasterboard without understanding that it was also combustible, thus giving risk to a combustible void, is described by the inquiry as what

“may well have been the biggest single structural contribution to the disaster of the fire”.

Given the time constraints, I am able to provide only a brief overview of the concerns in the processes that resulted in permission being granted to Summerland. However, just from what I have said, it is clear that there were multiple failings across the board, any one of which could have been disastrous on its own; put together, it is sadly all too clear how this tragedy unfolded. Even using the standards of the time, though, it is difficult to see how the judgment of death by misadventure, which the inquiry reached, can stand up to any kind of scrutiny.

[Jason McCartney (Colne Valley) (Con)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for securing this debate. I rise on behalf of my constituent Jackie, who came to tell me what happened to her last year. I had not heard about Summerland before, but she was in Summerland with her mother and her best friend. They both died, but she survived. I know that the hon. Gentleman is going to come on to what we can do now, but, having talked about the fire deficiencies, does he agree that 50 years on we need an apology for those deficiencies? Does he agree that we also need an apology for and recognition of the suffering caused to the survivors? Thirdly, and most importantly, does he agree that we should request that the Isle of Man Government have another review of the death by misadventure verdict?

[Justin Madders]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention and for the support he has given to the campaign. As I will go on to say, the Apologise for Summerland campaign has made those requests, which I will talk about in more detail later in my speech.

Taking the point raised by the hon. Gentleman, death by misadventure equates to an accidental death caused by a risk that is taken voluntarily. The 50 people who lost their lives did not voluntarily walk into a building comprised of materials that offered limited or no fire resistance. They were on holiday and they trusted that those involved in building Summerland would not knowingly have used dangerous materials. They believed that the building they were entering was safe. I do not think there is anyone who would think that that is not a reasonable position to take. That is why, among many other reasons, death by misadventure is such an inappropriate verdict to find.

The lack of clarity over the fire protections and precautions at Summerland is a huge concern. No schedule of the means of escape existed for Summerland. Enclosed staircases had no ventilation. Openings were not all fire-resisting or self-closing and contained materials that were not fire-resistant. The physical shortcomings of the construction were clear, but the organisation of emergency procedures was also sorely lacking. Some members of staff who were part of the “fire-fighting party” were not aware of their membership of it, demonstrating the absence of satisfactory training.

There had also been unapproved changes to the fire alarm system, creating a delay before the alarms sounded and the fire station was alerted. The automatic fire alarm from Summerland alerted the fire service at 8.05 pm. However, the public alarms at the leisure centre were still yet to sound. The inquiry concluded that

“no organised system of staff training existed....no member of the staff was given any duty or any instruction whatsoever as to his or her actions in the event of a fire”.

It is plain to see why there was mass panic when the fire started.

The lack of training is sadly borne out in the events following the discovery of the fire. One of the most startling and troubling parts of the account I have read—it is a very troubling read—is when the organist, who was playing at the time the fire was discovered, was asked to continue playing to prevent panic breaking out. Only two minutes after he was given that instruction, he reported that the fire was clearly visible at the back of the amusement arcade. Evacuation began only at that point, when the flames had become visible to the visitors, causing mass panic and undoubtedly making matters worse.

Around 20 minutes prior to that, staff had been unsuccessful in dealing with the fire or in notifying the fire service via the automatic alarm system. The inquiry concluded that the building, and by inference the lives of those lost, could have been saved if the fire service had been called shortly after it was found that the firefighting efforts of the staff had failed.

While there was some guidance and a document had been drawn up in 1971 in regard to evacuation, knowledge among managers and staff was limited. There was no evacuation procedure in place and drills had not been carried out. Those in management were unclear as to who was responsible, but failed to make enquiries to clarify that. Staff were not properly trained and there was no one exerting overall control. Had there been, the necessary alerts could have been made and evacuation processes could have been carried out. Instead, some exit doors remained locked, despite the fire service complaining to management about this previously; the escalator remained on, preventing a safe means of escape; and the generators failed to provide the emergency lighting that was needed.

The inquiry concluded that there were failures by the Douglas Corporation and the local government board in terms of providing and scrutinising plans and a lack of inter-communication. The choice of architects was also criticised, with the inquiry exposing their lack of scientific understanding and a failure to focus on fire safety. The inquiry said there was a lack of design management and a continual failure to examine the development of plans. That is important, because that could have highlighted the flaws, resulting in errors being identified.