Situation in the Red Sea

James Morris Excerpts

Monday 26th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[Grant Shapps]

I hope the hon. Lady will join me in welcoming action against the Houthis, who have attacked a ship that—as I mentioned—has provided aid to the people of Yemen on multiple occasions. I know that she does not make this mistake, but some people think that the Houthis are somehow the Yemeni authorities. They are not; they are not the Government. They are destroying that country through their actions, and are actually preventing aid from getting to the people of Yemen, so it is absolutely right that we take this action.

To assure the hon. Lady, the previous three attacks were seven days apart or so; it has been a longer period this time. We have been able to wait longer, perhaps because the Houthis have fewer options to attack shipping, but I stress that we will continue if they carry on attacking shipping. The simplest thing for all of us to do is to send a clear, united message to the Houthis that they must stop attacking innocent shipping.

[James Morris (Halesowen and Rowley Regis) (Con)]

The Secretary of State is absolutely right to say that military action is necessary but not sufficient to deal with the long-term problem of the Houthis. He has mentioned the necessity of tackling financing and the illegal shipping of weapons, but global shipping is peculiarly vulnerable to cyber-attack. What is the Secretary of State doing to ensure that the UK’s cyber-capabilities are shared with our international partners to protect our global shipping interests?

[Grant Shapps]

There are essentially two forms of warfare that my hon. Friend is pointing to: one is direct cyber-attack and the other is the use of electronic warfare to cause particular outcomes. I am afraid that we have seen a lot of that, particularly in the theatre in Ukraine, and we are very conscious of the way it is being used in the Red sea region as well. We will continue to do all we can to help through the Prosperity Guardian element of this operation, and to make sure that we are a step ahead of those who would, through preference, destroy the ability for world trade and good passage through open seas to take place.

Counter-Daesh Update

James Morris Excerpts

Thursday 13th July 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon]

I am grateful for the tribute that the hon. Gentleman paid to our armed forces. He will have heard what I said earlier about the issue of medallic recognition for personnel who served in this particular campaign. We have no plans to cut the size of the Army; indeed, in our manifesto we made a clear commitment to maintain the size of our armed forces.

[James Morris (Halesowen and Rowley Regis) (Con)]

The liberation of Mosul is a significant moment in our battle against Daesh, but does the Secretary of State agree that the real victory will be the creation of a modern Iraqi state that is capable of governing itself for all the people of Iraq and of ensuring that it resists any infiltration by Daesh as we clear it out of Iraqi territory?

[Sir Michael Fallon]

I absolutely agree. The kind of modern Iraqi state to which my hon. Friend aspires would not only reduce any threat to our country but would be good for the stability of the region. Iraq is already a democracy—a fragile democracy, but it is a democracy. It has called on its friends and allies throughout the world for help. Sixty-eight countries are in there, helping to bring about the kind of modern Iraq that he and I want.

Trident: Test Firing

James Morris Excerpts

Monday 23rd January 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon]

The hon. Gentleman and I disagree. I do not believe in greater transparency in this House when it comes to our nuclear deterrent.

[James Morris (Halesowen and Rowley Regis) (Con)]

With a resurgent Russia and an unstable world, does the Secretary of State agree that nothing that we have heard in today’s exchanges undermines the clear rationale for the renewal of our continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent to secure the long-term security of our country?

[Sir Michael Fallon]

The security and effectiveness of the deterrent are of course underlined by the testing and shakedown programme, in which boats come out of their long-term refit and are tested again to see whether they are fit and ready to rejoin the operational cycle, which is what HMS Vengeance has now done.

Oral Answers to Questions

James Morris Excerpts

Monday 19th October 2015 Commons Chamber

[Nick Smith (Blaenau Gwent) (Lab)]

4. What assessment his Department has made of progress in defeating ISIL.

[James Morris (Halesowen and Rowley Regis) (Con)]

11. What assessment he has made of the effectiveness of the UK contribution to international efforts to degrade and defeat ISIL.

[Sir Oliver Heald (North East Hertfordshire) (Con)]

18. What assessment he has made of the effectiveness of the UK contribution to international efforts to degrade and defeat ISIL.

--- Later in debate ---

[Michael Fallon]

Some of the military operations—the strikes—have changed the pattern of refining. ISIL appears now to be getting some of its oil from small-scale wells rather than the larger refineries, some of which have been put out of commission, but we are intensifying our efforts internationally to make sure that where ISIL is attempting to sell oil, it is not able to gain the proceeds from it.

[James Morris]

ISIL poses a direct threat to our national interest as well as threatening the stability of the middle east, and Britain should not be a bit-part player in combating ISIL on the ground. Does the Secretary of State agree that the time has come for Britain to extend its military operations beyond Iraq to take on ISIL in Syria?

[Michael Fallon]

I agree with my hon. Friend that ISIL has to be defeated in both Iraq and Syria, and we support the air strikes being conducted by the coalition against ISIL in Syria—air strikes which are now being carried out by Australian and French as well as American aircraft. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has said, there is a very strong case for us to be doing more in Syria to deal with the heartland of ISIL—its command and control—but we will only return to Parliament for authority to do so when we have established a sufficient consensus here in this Parliament.

Oral Answers to Questions

James Morris Excerpts

Monday 8th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I absolutely reject that. The safety of the reactors is paramount and is consistently assessed at every stage of their life, from design and build through to operation and disposal. That is independently regulated in accordance with the law and by our own independent nuclear regulator.

[James Morris (Halesowen and Rowley Regis) (Con)]

T6. Does the Secretary of State agree that some of the most severe threats we face emanate from cyberspace, and that the strategic defence and security review should include our cyber-security capability to ensure that we have both offensive and defensive cyber capability?

[Penny Mordaunt]

I agree with my hon. Friend. Following the 2010 strategic defence and security review, the Government put in place a national cyber-security programme backed by £860 million of Government investment up to 2016. It is for the current SDSR to decide where cyber sits in the overall prioritisation of security threats and responses. However, we have been clear that we will continue to invest in our cyber-defence capabilities, partly because, as he knows, it is a rapidly developing area and we need to keep up.

Trident Renewal

James Morris Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Dr Lewis]

I shall also try to be more concise in the remainder of my speech, Mr Deputy Speaker.

All I can say to the hon. Member for North Devon, whom I greatly respect and admire, is that he ought to have a word with the then president of the Liberal Democrats, who proudly proclaimed on the Liberal Democrats’ official website that it was entirely as a result of the Liberal Democrats that we had not taken the decisive step of signing the maingate contract in this Parliament. I can only leave them to decide the issue between themselves.

Let me return to some of the purely military arguments in favour of the continuation of the strategic deterrent, mercifully leaving the politics to one side. The most important argument, as I have stated in previous debates in this House, is the recognition that future military threats and conflicts will be no more predictable than those that engulfed us throughout the 20th century. That is the overriding justification for preserving armed forces in peace time as a national insurance policy. No one knows which enemies might confront us during the next 50 years, for that is the period we are discussing by the time everything is designed, constructed and deployed, and has served out its operational lifetime. It is highly probable that at least some of those potential enemies will be armed with weapons of mass destruction.

Secondly, it is not the weapons themselves that we have to fear but the nature of the regimes that possess them. While democracies are usually reluctant to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear dictatorships, although they did so against Japan in 1945 as has been pointed out, the reverse is not true.

[James Morris (Halesowen and Rowley Regis) (Con)]

There is consensus in the international community about the Iranian nuclear programme and efforts to reduce it. Significant nuclear proliferation in the middle east is likely in the next 20 or 30 years, which feeds into my hon. Friend’s argument about the 50-year time span that we should consider in this debate.

[Dr Lewis]

It does indeed. I cannot think of an existing nuclear power that has done more than the United Kingdom to slim down and reduce the firepower of its independent nuclear deterrent. The response, as has been repeatedly pointed out by Government Members and by some Opposition Members, to those unilateral reductions on our part has been absolutely zero. There is not the slightest shred of evidence that if we were to abandon our nuclear deterrent completely any other country would follow suit. All that would happen would be that those near-misses, which have been discussed so eloquently today—the risks of nuclear Armageddon by accident—would continue between the superpowers if they are tangible risks, but we would add another risk: the risk that someone hostile to us with a nuclear armament could blackmail us into concessions, surrender or absolute annihilation. The risk of the deliberate firing of nuclear weapons against us is something that we would be crazy to accept voluntarily and unnecessarily.

Returning to the reluctance of democracies to launch nuclear weapons against countries that do not have them—although we use them, as I have said, continuously as deterrents—we should consider the alternative. If a dictatorship such as that in Argentina had had an arsenal of even a few small atomic weapons and the means to deliver them, no matter how many conventional forces we had had, we would not have dared to retake the Falkland Islands, because we must not project on to other countries that do not share our political principles and freedoms the sense of self-restraint that we apply to ourselves.

The third argument that I always outline is that the United Kingdom has traditionally played a more important and decisive role in preserving freedom than other medium-sized democracies have been able or willing to do. Democratic countries that do not have a nuclear deterrent have little choice but to declare themselves neutral and hope for the best or to rely on the nuclear umbrella of more powerful allies. The United Kingdom, for historical reasons, is a nuclear power, and it is much harder to defeat it than many other democracies by conventional means because of our physical separation from the continent.

The next argument is that our prominence as the principal ally of the United States, our strategic geographical position, to which I have just referred, and the fact that we are the junior partner might tempt an aggressor to risk attacking us separately. Given the difficulties of overrunning the UK with conventional forces, compared with our more vulnerable allies, an aggressor might be tempted to use one or more mass-destruction weapons against us on the assumption that the United States would not respond on our behalf. Even if that assumption were false, the attacker would find out his mistake only when it was too late for all concerned. An independently controlled British nuclear deterrent massively reduces the prospect of such a fatal miscalculation.

The fifth military argument, which was mentioned earlier, is that no amount of conventional force can compensate for the military disadvantage that faces a non-nuclear country in a conflict against a nuclear-armed enemy. The atomic bombing of Japan is especially instructive not only because the emperor was forced to surrender but because of what might have happened in the reverse scenario. If Japan had developed atomic bombs in the summer of 1945 and the allies had not, a conventional allied invasion to end the war would have been out of the question.

I tend to find that people wish to try to sweep aside the patent logic of nuclear deterrence by projecting on to historical figures events that did not happen and could never possibly be tested. The hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Mr MacNeil), who has now left his place, asserted that Hitler would not have been constrained by a nuclear deterrent held by the allies if he had had nuclear weapons. In 1943, Hitler proposed to use the nerve gas, tabun, which was far, far more deadly than the gases that the allies then possessed. When he consulted his chief scientists, they said that it was most unlikely that the allies had not discovered tabun too, and he therefore decided not to employ it, even though it would have had a devastating effect. That is an example of even Hitler being deterred by the mistaken belief that his enemies had a weapon when in fact they did not.

The hon. Member for Moray made his points with clarity and calmness, as always. He said that he did not think that deterrence had worked. Of course, when something does not happen—that is, world war three—it is difficult to show that it would have happened if one had done something different. However, I always apply the test of the proxy war. The right hon. Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Dame Joan Ruddock) observed that throughout the cold war period many proxy wars went on around the globe. In fact, that is an argument in favour of the case that nuclear deterrence had something to do with the fact that the superpowers did not fight each other in Europe. If no other conflicts had been going on among proxies of the superpowers, one could have argued that they would not be likely to have been at each others’ throats if they did not have a nuclear deterrent. The fact that they were fighting each other by every means possible other than open war—state to state—on the European continent strongly suggests that the possession of the nuclear deterrent, and the balance of terror, had something to do with that stability.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

Plato, among other Greek scholars, is reported to have said:

“If you want peace, prepare for war”.

That is the fundamental principle behind the theory of deterrence, and why the United Kingdom has to maintain its independent nuclear deterrent. We need one now and in the future. Our independent nuclear deterrent is the ultimate guarantee that a potential aggressor state—possibly possessing nuclear weapons itself—will not attack us. As we have heard, over the past 10 years or so we have watched the Russians greatly enhance their military and strategic weaponry. They most certainly are not scrapping their nuclear weaponry. Indeed their military presence, around our shores, in the air, on the seas and under it, is increasing not decreasing, especially around Scotland. Why are they doing this, and why should we abandon a defence against such a latent threat?

No other nuclear state has given up its nuclear deterrent, with the possible exception of Ukraine, but that is a fairly good case study—is it not?—and a warning too. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, about one third of the Soviet nuclear arsenal remained within an independent Ukraine. Then in December 1994, Ukraine, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom signed a memorandum to give Ukraine security assurances if it gave up its nuclear arsenal, which it did. Twenty years later—last year—Crimea was seized back from Ukraine by Russia, and then Moscow fomented discontent and military action in eastern Ukraine. Hardly surprisingly, some Ukrainian leaders and outside commentators have argued that if Ukraine had not removed its nuclear weapons, Russia might have been deterred from its aggression in Ukraine. Do they have a point? Is there a lesson there for us?

Once given up, we will never realistically be able to reactivate a nuclear deterrent capability. Our nuclear know-how has been built up since the second world war, with, of course, considerable American support. But once gone, it is gone for ever. I accept that international terrorist groups may well be trying to get their hands on a nuclear device and that they may not act rationally, as is a normal requirement for the strategy of deterrence. However, even international terrorists such as the Daesh in Iraq and Syria may—just may—think twice about exploding a nuclear device, assuming they get their hands on one and have the specialised knowledge required to use it. After all, the so-called Islamic State may not face its own obliteration with the same enthusiasm with which they murder countless people.

[James Morris]

Is not the crucial point, which was also made by my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), that the deterrent needs to be sufficiently credible, as in the point about Hitler, to deter even an irrational actor from the thought of using nuclear weapons against us?

[Bob Stewart]

I agree absolutely. Armageddon is seldom faced by anyone with equanimity.

I was an officer who spent several years in the 1st British Corps in Germany, supposedly preparing to face a Soviet threat from the east. We knew that the group of Soviet forces in eastern Europe had a huge conventional advantage over us and realised that our chances of survival would be very slight if the balloon went up. But we also trained and practised the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviets knew that full well and it gave those of us due to be positioned right up against the inner German border some comfort. We felt that our possession of nuclear weapons was definitely a deterrent that the Soviet Union would have to take seriously. Most of my fellow front line officers agreed with me. Some did not, but the majority did.

Remember: smaller NATO countries such as Denmark also have aeroplanes fitted with bomb racks to pick up tactical nuclear bombs from American stockpiles to fly and to use them. It is not just the nuclear members of NATO.

Most of us in 1st British Corps felt that our possession of nuclear weapons was a very sound insurance policy. Of course the situation is different today, but I use the example to explain how possession of a nuclear capability can help conventional forces.

I hate the idea of war. Who doesn’t? All my friends in the military are of the same mind as Winston Churchill, who once said that “jaw-jaw” is better than “war-war”. But in truth jaw-jaw often depends on the ability to have war-war. In the 1960s, I remember the US strategic nuclear bombers had a special motto that they painted on the noses of their B52s—“Peace is our profession”.

Nuclear weapons are a fact in our world and potential enemies may use them whether we like it or not. So I believe that we as a nation must also possess them. If you want peace, prepare for war—so that you deter it.

Afghanistan

James Morris Excerpts

Monday 10th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I think our allies are aware of the importance of at least exploring the possibility of some kind of negotiated settlement with the Pakistan Taliban in North Waziristan. I observe that there appears to be a space being allowed for these negotiations to progress, but that space will not remain open for ever, and I hope the parties will do everything in their power to reach a conclusion rapidly.

[James Morris (Halesowen and Rowley Regis) (Con)]

I welcome the statement. The Secretary of State was right to refer to the importance of the forthcoming presidential election in Afghanistan, and the importance of the Afghan security forces’ taking responsibility for the security arrangements. Can he say a little more about the £20 million of UK money that he mentioned, and about what it will be used for as part of that security operation?

[Mr Hammond]

It is not directly designed to support the security operation; it is designed to support the good administration of the elections. We have also allocated funds to increasing the participation of female candidates, and providing the training and capacity building that will enable more of them to take part in the election.

Defence Reform Bill

James Morris Excerpts

Wednesday 20th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Arbuthnot]

As I am coming on to discuss the reserves and why I think they are so important, I should perhaps declare an interest, in that my daughter is a second lieutenant in the Territorial Army. I think it is essential that we should change the reserves, boosting them, their numbers, their training and the equipment available to them. As a Defence Minister in the previous Conservative Government, I thought that that Government went too far in reducing the reserves, and I think that the previous Labour Government made the situation worse. It is high time that we begin again to build up and properly resource the reserves. I wish to pay particular tribute to two people, the first of whom is my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Mid Sussex (Nicholas Soames). When he was Minister of State for the Armed Forces, he valiantly championed the Territorials and found himself fighting rather a losing battle.

Even more, I wish to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury, who, as a Back Bencher—the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) made the point—has achieved more in supporting and championing the reserves than I or my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex did, when we were Ministers. My hon. Friend’s contribution to the reserves debate deserves an immediate dukedom. [Interruption.] Yes, a dukedom.

The reserves bring incredible value to this country. They bring vital specialist skills which are made contemporary by their civilian lives and they bring those skills to a changing world where they are essential. Crucially, as my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury said, the reserves also tie the civilian world into the military world in a way that is becoming increasingly needed day by day. May I aim a shaft at my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State by saying that his clampdown on informal discussion between the military and politicians rather flies in the face of that need?

My second reason for supporting the Government is that wars are changing. We are increasingly less likely to see tank battles in Germany and increasingly more likely to be facing the emerging threats of cyber-attack, piracy and the covert destruction of our critical national infrastructure—the sort of things to which extra battalions of any particular regiment would not be the answer.

[James Morris (Halesowen and Rowley Regis) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is making an important point about cyber-security capability. Is not one of the strong arguments for reserve forces that a lot of skills reside in the private sector, in things such as cyber-security and dealing with cyber-attack, which need to be brought into the armed forces? That is a strong argument for continuing to develop reserve forces.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

My hon. Friend is right about that. The new cyber-command that has recently been brought on stream will achieve precisely what he describes. It will not be possible to achieve that expertise within a purely military environment; we have to rely on those who have civilian expertise, too. Because of all this, we will need new investment, in satellites and in software—in the sort of things that will not be visible to the man in the street—all at the same time as we are trying to sell to the public increased spending on defence. That will be difficult to achieve while we are reducing in Afghanistan.

Oral Answers to Questions

James Morris Excerpts

Monday 2nd September 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

3. What conclusions he has drawn from the Trident alternatives review about alternatives to a UK nuclear deterrent based on Trident.

[James Morris (Halesowen and Rowley Regis) (Con)]

9. What conclusions he has drawn from the Trident alternatives review about alternatives to a UK nuclear deterrent based on Trident.

[Christopher Pincher (Tamworth) (Con)]

11. What conclusions he has drawn from the Trident alternatives review about alternatives to a UK nuclear deterrent based on Trident.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The Trident alternatives review makes clear that that is just one of the many drawbacks of a cruise-based system. The other primary drawbacks are the risk, the time scale for development, the likely cost, the lack of range, and the vulnerability of the weapons system.

[James Morris]

Will the Secretary of State confirm that, when maintenance is taken into account, the cost differential between four boats and three boats is minimal, and that we should press ahead with a full replacement for Trident because it is in our national interest to do so?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend has conflated two different questions. The Trident alternatives review states categorically that Trident provides the best value and the best capability for the United Kingdom. As for the separate question of how many boats are needed, the Government are determined to maintain continuous-at-sea deterrence, and the best advice at present is that that will require four boats. The cost differential between three and four boats is about £1.7 billion in net present value terms, or about £50 million to £60 million a year over the life of the project.

Armed Forces

James Morris Excerpts

Tuesday 25th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[James Morris (Halesowen and Rowley Regis) (Con)]

I commend the Government for their work on implementing the community covenant. I would like to pay tribute to both Dudley and Sandwell councils in the west midlands for signing up to the community charter. Does the Minister agree that it is important for both councils to take a proactive role in supporting legions in my constituency, such as the Halesowen British Legion, the Blackheath British Legion and the Cradley British Legion, which lies just outside my constituency, and to drive forward the work they do in the local community?

[Mr Francois]

I pay tribute to the two local councils in my hon. Friend’s constituency for signing the community covenant and to the Royal British Legion for everything it has done specifically to encourage the community covenant campaign. As I said, over 330 councils have already signed up. I understand that another cohort of councils is likely to sign up to it to coincide with Armed Forces day and that another cohort is then expected in the run-up to Remembrance day 2013. I hope that, by the end of this year, the vast bulk of local authorities in the UK will have signed a community covenant.