Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between James Cartlidge and Anne McLaughlin

Tuesday 23rd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 47, page 54, line 34,  at end insert—

“(7) Notwithstanding the provisions above, this Act shall not come into force until the Lord Chancellor has laid before Parliament a written statement confirming that no provision in this Act contravenes Article 6 or Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

(8) The statement under subsection (7) must be laid before Parliament within three months of this Act being passed.”

This amendment would prevent any Act resulting from this Bill from coming into force until the Lord Chancellor confirms, via a written statement to Parliament, that none of its provisions contravene ECHR Article 6 (right to fair trial) or ECHR Article 13 (right to effective remedy).

I thank everybody on the Committee for their forbearance during the last week, while I was struggling to move, and today, when I underestimated how long a usually seven-minute walk to get here would take me. Thankfully, I have an X-ray on Thursday, and I hope that something will come of that.

May I also associate myself and my hon. Friend the Member for Lanark and Hamilton East with the remarks on Sir David Amess? I did not know him; I knew exactly who he was, though. There was that smile that made him stand out—a really genuine smile that reached his eyes. I always noticed that. I did not know him personally, but listening to people speak about him, including many people in the SNP group, who knew him really well and are really hurting, makes me wish that I had. Maybe that can teach us something in this place: that there are people who we can identify with and befriend who have different views from our own. Thank you for allowing me to say that.

I sure that Conservative Members and Opposition Members will agree with the fundamental principles that we should all be afforded the right to a fair trial and effective remedy. There can be little dispute that those are the cornerstones of a justice system that respects the rule of law and principles of natural justice. Amendment 30 seeks confirmation from the Lord Chancellor that any provision in the Bill will be prevented from coming into force if it contravenes article 6 or article 13 of the European convention on human rights: the right to a fair trial and the right to an effective remedy.

We have already debated how provisions in the Bill, such as the presumption for using prospective-only quashing orders, could risk breaching article 6.1 of the European convention on human rights on the right to a fair trial, which requires an effective judicial remedy. The amendment would ensure the Government had the opportunity to make cast-iron guarantees that that will not happen. That would be expressed via a written statement from the Lord Chancellor, laid before Parliament within three months of the Bill being passed.

The Minister may wish to point out that article 13 does not apply to the Human Rights Act 1998, but it could be applicable in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and that is why we felt it appropriate to include it in the amendment. Strasbourg does not recognise the practice of failing to give human rights without an effective remedy. Rather than stripping away rights, the Government should consider in any proposed review of the Human Rights Act that the right to effective remedy be added. As the Minister has assured us that the Bill will furnish the courts with a broader set of tools, with no risk of restricting individual claimants’ rights, he will surely consider the amendment a gift from me to him to help clarify his position.

James Cartlidge

-

Thank you for your generosity in allowing us to pay our tribute, Mr Rosindell, following this morning’s very moving mass at Westminster Cathedral.

The amendment would prevent any measure in the Bill from coming into force until the Lord Chancellor has provided a written statement to say that no provision in the subsequent Act contravenes article 6 on the right to a fair hearing and article 13 on the right to effective remedy of the European convention on human rights. I assure hon. Members that none of the measures in the Bill contravenes either article 6 or article 13.

The hon. Member for Glasgow North East mentioned remedies. We have the new remedies relating to quashing orders, which are a key part of how the Bill improves judicial review. In clause 1, there are adequate safeguards to ensure that any individual exercise of the new remedial discretions provides an effective remedy in cases concerning violations of convention rights. That is because the measures do not limit the availability of any existing right for such a breach and their use remains open to the court’s discretion. Presumption in favour of any of the remedial discretions only operates in circumstances where its exercise would

“offer adequate redress in relation to the relevant defect”

and it may be rebutted where there is good reason to do so. Further, the court is required to consider the interests or expectations of persons who would benefit from quashing of the impugned Act, as well as considering other factors.

On clause 2, regarding Cart judicial review, our position is that article 6 does not require a further right of judicial review in relation to decisions concerning permission to appeal from the first-tier tribunal to the upper tribunal and therefore considers that the measure does not interfere with an individual’s right under article 6.

When the Bill was introduced, the Lord Chancellor at the time signed a statement under section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to confirm his view that the provisions in the Bill are compatible with the convention rights. When the Bill passes to the other place, a second statement will be made, as required under section 19, taking into account any amendments. Should any Government or non-Government amendments be made that we felt contravened those statements, we would inform Parliament. It would be a breach of the ministerial code to proceed towards Royal Assent without either amending the provisions or informing Parliament of the issue.

In addition, ahead of introducing the Bill, the Government carried out a full ECHR analysis and published a memo for the Joint Committee on Human Rights setting out that analysis on parliament.uk. The previous Lord Chancellor wrote to the Committee’s Chair when the Bill was introduced and we will engage with the Committee fully should it choose to publish a report on the Bill. In summary, the Bill currently does not contravene either article 6 or article 13, and appropriate measures are in place should that no longer be the case at any point during its passage. I therefore urge the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment.

Anne McLaughlin

- - Excerpts

In the light of what the Minister has said about the potential breach of the ministerial code, and knowing how seriously almost everyone takes that, I hope that what he tells me is correct. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Anne McLaughlin

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 31, in clause 47, page 54, line 34, at end insert—

“(7) Notwithstanding the provisions above, nothing in this Act relating to Scotland shall come into force without a consenting resolution being passed by the Scottish Parliament.”

This amendment would require the consent of the Scottish Parliament to be given to any provisions in the Bill that relate to Scotland for those provisions to come into force.

As I am sure the Minister is aware, under the Sewel convention the Scottish Parliament should have the final say over any attempt by the UK Parliament to legislate in devolved areas. In recognition of the separate and distinct nature of Scotland’s legal system, article 19 of the Treaty of Union protects the authority and privileges of Scotland’s Court of Session. This is a fundamental part of the UK constitution and this amendment would ensure that the UK Government respect the principles of the Sewel convention and the constitutional arrangements.

Without an amendment specifically guaranteeing the requirement of consent from the Scottish Parliament to any provisions in the Bill that relate to Scotland, we risk interference with Scottish legal processes. The Faculty of Advocates, which was represented at the evidence sessions of this Committee, has said that in Scotland

“judicial review does not suffer from a lack of clarity, and any attempt to codify it is likely to undermine the very flexibility that renders it effective.”

Furthermore, Liberty has also commented on the situation and has said that

“the Act of Union does not serve to enable the UK Government to reshape the jurisdiction of the Court of Session. These are not technical or procedural points. In any event, the administration of the courts and the justice system in Scotland clearly falls within devolved competence.”

I am certain the Minister and Members opposite will be aware that this amendment is not only a reminder that this convention exists, but that it too must be respected in statute.

James Cartlidge

-

The amendment would require the consent of the Scottish Parliament to be given to any provisions in the Bill that relate to Scotland. I am emboldened to say that the word “relate” is in bold in my text, as that word is very important. I have a number of constitutional concerns about the amendment.

To reassure the hon. Members for Glasgow North East and for Lanark and Hamilton East, the measures in this Bill relate wholly to reserved matters. Ministers and officials have been engaging with the devolved Administrations over the course of the Bill, and we will continue to do so when the provisions in the Bill come into force.

I believe we are in agreement that chapter 2, “Online procedure,” and chapter 3, “Employment tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal,” of the Bill relate to matters outside the competence of the Scottish Parliament. Yet this amendment would still apply to the clauses in those chapters and require the consent of the Scottish Parliament before they could come into force.

The majority of the criminal procedure measures also relate only to England and Wales, although, as I have previously noted in Committee, we are aware that the Scottish Government’s position may be that the new automatic online procedure, introduced by clause 3, engages the legislative consent process. Furthermore, we believe that this is outside the competence of the Scottish Parliament, which, in the Government’s view, does not engage the legislative consent process.

With regard to removing Cart JR, I should make clear that the unified tribunal system is a reserved matter, where it relates to matters of reserved policy. Our measures on Cart will apply to the whole of the UK, but only in respect to the matters heard in that tribunal system that fall outside the competence of the Scottish Parliament. The provisions relating to remedies apply to England and Wales only.

If it came into force, the amendment would actually lead to decisions in reserved areas operating differently across the UK, thereby reducing the clarity the Bill currently provides. In line with the memorandum of understanding on devolution, we will continue to engage with the devolved Administration at a ministerial and official level to ensure that we have time to fully understand any implications for the Scottish court system.

On that basis, I cannot accept this amendment and I urge the hon. Lady to withdraw it.

Anne McLaughlin

- - Excerpts

I am not sure what I am supposed to say, but I do not wish to withdraw the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Question negatived.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

James Cartlidge

-

This is one of those long ones, Mr Rosindell. This clause sets out when the measures will come into force. While some measures will come into force two months from when the Act is passed, including the coroner’s provisions and two of the criminal provisions, in clauses 14 and 15 and schedule 1, the remainder of the Bill will come into force by regulation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48

Short title

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

Anne McLaughlin

- - Excerpts

I am not sure whether the right hon. Gentleman’s intervention was aimed at me or the Minister. If he was aiming it at me, all I will say is that it would not be the first, second, third, fourth or fifth way in which I disagreed with the Attorney General in her reckoning. I will sit down and allow others to speak.

James Cartlidge

-

This has been a good debate on the new clause, which is interesting in many ways from a constitutional point of view, both theoretically and practically. My hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich does not have a secondary role. I am his constituency neighbour. He has a fantastic role that he is fulfilling as a brilliant constituency MP. It was a great honour to campaign with him in the general election, and I see a return on that investment, as he is a vocal spokesman for people of all political shades in the fine county town of Suffolk.

The hon. Member for Glasgow North East may have, shall we say, come here through the use of a crutch, but she should not downplay the role that her speeches could play. Of course we listen. We listen to all sides. Indeed, I have listened intently to the debate on the new clause. I will say one thing to the hon. Member for Hammersmith: although I completely understand where he was coming from, and his points made political sense, he appeared at one point to suggest that it almost was not necessarily relevant to debate the new clause. The new clause is about judicial review, and we know the first two words of the Bill’s title. In fact, we just agreed to the clause on the short title, which includes the phrase “judicial review”; I think my speech on that was the shortest I have ever made, by the way.

My right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings made some important contributions, which I am grateful for. I hope he received the letter we sent him, which I believe has been circulated to other Committee members, containing the response on the important matter of the most vulnerable children—those in care. I hope that reassures him on the safeguards. Secondly, on the make-up of the coronial stakeholder group in administrative justice, which introduces a broad umbrella because of the nature of the engagement, I hope that the letter has persuaded my right hon. Friend. I am therefore tempted to eke out the general thread of my argument and hope to encourage him that I am someone who is generally able to persuade people of things. The sword of Damocles that he holds over this speech with the threat to vote can be dealt with.

I should pay tribute to my right hon. Friend for his former role as Security Minister, which he referred to. He was involved in important proceedings when our country, as was proudly illustrated this morning, faced great threats, not least terrorist threats. He was also a Transport Minister, and I met him to discuss roads in my constituency. The essence of his argument was that the Bill does not go far enough, so he wants to debate important probing amendments. I will come back to that wider point.

On the specifics, as has been explained, new clause 3 would amend section 67 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by replacing the wording in subsection (8) and adding three additional subsections. Subsection (8) was originally drafted as an ouster clause—we have already debated ouster clauses in relation to clause 2— to ensure that certain decisions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal would not be subject to judicial review by the High Court. A right of appeal on a point of law was later introduced by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and is set out in what is now section 67A.

The tribunal was intended to be the highest authority concerning matters such as the conduct of intelligence services. However, a 2019 judgment of the UK Supreme Court rendered the ouster clause of limited effect in what we have all referred to today as the Privacy International case. The Supreme Court found that while subsection (8) was effective at excluding judicial review of IPT decisions on their merits or jurisdictional decisions involving issues of fact, it did not have the effect of wholly ousting the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction.

The new clause would amend the ouster clause in section 67 by clarifying and adding to the text in that section so as to meet the objection of the Supreme Court in Privacy International. That is an interesting idea, and I am sure my right hon. Friend is aware that the Government’s consultation, published in March, expressed concern around the uncertainty that exists as to whether, or in what circumstances, ouster clauses will be upheld by the courts. We therefore consulted on options to try to add some clarity with a broad framework for the interpretation of ouster clauses, but, having reflected on the many useful responses we received, we concluded that although our intention was to add clarity, the effect may in fact be to muddy the waters yet further.

As an alternative approach, we are pursuing the ouster clause in clause 2, which is designed to overturn Cart, seeks to learn the lessons from unsuccessful ouster clauses of the past, and is drafted in a clear and explicit way. We have been open in saying that if that approach is successful, we may consider whether it can be used as a model for ousters in other areas, where it is appropriate to do so. At least conceptually, I see the link between ousting the High Court from reviewing permission to appeal decisions of the upper tribunal and ousting the High Court from reviewing decisions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. They are both essentially concerned with which court ultimately should have the final say on an issue.

--- Later in debate ---

Anne McLaughlin

- - Excerpts

Encouraged by the Minister, I have decided that I will say a few words, even if none of them are original. Most of what I have to say is in agreement with the hon. Member for Hammersmith, but it is good to put the opposition of the SNP on the record.

What would this new clause do? Unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, this new clause would prohibit the use of oral evidence in judicial review and would also prevent courts from ordering any public body to disclose evidence in anticipation or during the course of judicial review proceedings. As we have heard, oral evidence is already rarely used in judicial review proceedings, but the courts retain a discretion to permit oral evidence where it is considered essential to the case. My understanding is that judges use that discretion appropriately, and frequently deny requests to cite oral evidence unless, as I have said, it is considered essential to the case. I am not aware of any indication that the system has the problem that the proposals seek to address.

I wonder what adding a requirement for compelling reasons would do to the existing position. It could be that that is just an alternative translation of the existing position. One compelling reason for adducing oral evidence would be that it is necessary to do so. If that is the case, the new clause is not needed. If the proposed compelling reasons requirement is seen to raise the threshold for which oral evidence is admissible, I think we should all find that problematic. Judges are already only allowing such evidence when it is considered necessary to do so. The clear result of the proposed change would be that oral evidence that is necessary for the fair resolution of the case would not be admitted. That surely cannot be acceptable to the Minister.

New clause 5 would also bar judges from ordering disclosure of evidence. Again, such disclosure is used only when absolutely essential. Judges order disclosure only when that disclosure is vital to resolve the case fairly. In many respects, the disclosure obligations act as a way of ensuring that the duty of candour is complied with where parties must submit to the court all relevant evidence and information relating to the case. In the vast majority of cases, both parties will comply, but where they do not the judge can ensure compliance by using disclosure powers. Weakening those disclosure powers would, in effect, weaken the duty of candour, which is a vital aspect of fairness in judicial review. If public bodies and Governments believe that they do not need to comply with that duty, the position of claimants would be severely weakened in judicial review proceedings. We should increase access to justice, not make it increasingly pointless.

James Cartlidge

-

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Lady, who made some perfectly reasonable points. It is disappointing that she did not rise to the bait by entering into the curry-labelling discussion instigated by the hon. Member for Hammersmith. I am not sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich is a vindaloo—I think he is a phaal. Anyone who googles that will find that it is the hottest curry there is. Maybe my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings is a phaal as well. It is inevitable, then, that they all think the Bill does not go phaal enough. As a great fan of curry, I generally go for the specials on the à la Cart menu. [Laughter.] That was not a reference to clause 2, by the way.

In new clause 5, my right hon. Friend is probing in his uniquely penetrating way of gaining the Committee’s attention and focusing on some important points. I will try to set out why, although there is merit in what he says, it is not right for this precise moment—perhaps with further work, not least as there may be other potential routes to achieving his end.

The new clause would amend the Bill to include some specific rules relating to disclosure and the duty of candour in judicial review cases. The clause would do three things. First, it would remove the ability of the court to permit oral evidence to be given unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary. Secondly, it would remove the ability of the court to order a public authority to disclose evidence at all, either in anticipation of proceedings or during proceedings, unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary. Thirdly, in cases where a public authority is arguing that the subject matter is non-justiciable altogether or judicial review jurisdiction has been ousted, it would remove any evidential requirement on the public authority until the court has ruled on the subject of justiciability or jurisdiction.

The duty of candour is a common law concept that obliges parties in judicial review proceedings to disclose information relevant to the case. The independent review of administrative law examined that duty when it conducted a call for evidence last year. Legal practitioners and other stakeholders identified issues relating to a lack of clarity surrounding the exact extent and precise nature of the obligations arising from the duty. The independent review concluded that the duty of candour may have previously been interpreted in a way that causes a disproportionate burden on public authorities, and that there would be benefit in clarifying the parameters of the duty. The Government would like to ensure that the duty of candour is not invoked by claimants to rouse political debates or to discover extraneous information that would have otherwise been kept confidential.

I reassure my right hon. Friend and my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich that this remains very much a live issue for the Government. The difference here, I suspect, is not a question of objective, but of how best to achieve it. The independent review recommended that the issue could be addressed through changes to the Treasury Solicitor’s guidance. Although that is, of course, a matter for the Treasury Solicitor, the advantage to using guidance to address some of the issues that have occurred with the duty of candour in the past is that it can be more flexible and dynamic than legislation.

As I have already indicated, the Government remain open-minded about the possibility of going further on judicial review reform in time. Although my instinct continues to be that any issues with the operation of the duty of candour are better addressed through other means, and not through primary legislation, I will reflect on the arguments that my right hon. Friend has made for a legislative response. We have already discussed the point of the meeting. I am quite clear that that could be wide-ranging and could include this discussion, too. They all fit within the same theme, which he has painted with a broad brush today. I am quite happy to look at it in those terms, but also in more specific terms, particularly with the benefit of officials and so on.

In the light of the complexity of the issues at stake, and the importance of getting the legislation right, I cannot accept my right hon. Friend’s new clause. I hope that, with my reassurance that that the Government will continue to actively consider the matter, he will agree to withdraw it.

--- Later in debate ---

Sir John Hayes

- - Excerpts

Further to that point of order, Mr Rosindell. On behalf of the Back-Bench Members on this side of the Committee—and I hope others too—I thank the Minister and the shadow Minister. I served as a shadow Minister and a Minister for 19 years and I know how hard it is, particularly from the other side of the Committee, to maintain the progress of debate and to retain the calibre and character of scrutiny.

I thank the Minister for the way he has gone about his business, and the shadow team for the way they have gone about theirs. I wish the hon. Member for Stockton North well, as he has now fallen ill. I also thank you, Mr Rosindell, and your fellow Chairman, and all others who have made the Bill proceedings possible.

Anne McLaughlin

- - Excerpts

Further to that point of order, Mr Rosindell. I want to reiterate what everybody else has said and thank everybody involved. I wish the hon. Member for Stockton North well and I hope that he recovers by a week today, St Andrew’s day, because he will be wanting to celebrate.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lanark and Hamilton East—I have finally got the constituency name. That is not as great a constituency name as South Holland and The Deepings, however. I am going to visit, and I will let the right hon. Gentleman know when I do.

This has been a really interesting Bill Committee. I used to resist going on Bill Committees, but I came from the Nationality and Borders Bill Committee straight to this one, and they are the best bit of the job, because they are probably the only time we really get an in-depth understanding of what we are doing. A lot of the time, we have to skim through things because there is so much to consider. I look forward to the next Bill Committee.

I thank the Clerks and everyone involved, including the Doorkeepers. For those who are not speaking and are not involved in the debates, it must be really boring having to sit there and listen to it all. There are no nods of agreement there, but I can pick the answer up telepathically. If I have missed anyone in my thanks, I am sorry—oh, the Chairs. Thank you very much; thank you again for your forbearance, Mr Rosindell, when I was injured. I am still injured, but am recovering.

James Cartlidge

-

Further to that point of order, Mr Rosindell. I did not mention the hon. Member for Stockton North; I hope he recovers. I also wish to thank my officials, who have been excellent—very high quality—for my first Bill Committee. I hope we keep up the good work as we move forward. I am grateful to everyone who has helped us to reach this point.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between James Cartlidge and Anne McLaughlin

Committee stage
Tuesday 23rd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 47, page 54, line 34,  at end insert—

“(7) Notwithstanding the provisions above, this Act shall not come into force until the Lord Chancellor has laid before Parliament a written statement confirming that no provision in this Act contravenes Article 6 or Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

(8) The statement under subsection (7) must be laid before Parliament within three months of this Act being passed.”

This amendment would prevent any Act resulting from this Bill from coming into force until the Lord Chancellor confirms, via a written statement to Parliament, that none of its provisions contravene ECHR Article 6 (right to fair trial) or ECHR Article 13 (right to effective remedy).

I thank everybody on the Committee for their forbearance during the last week, while I was struggling to move, and today, when I underestimated how long a usually seven-minute walk to get here would take me. Thankfully, I have an X-ray on Thursday, and I hope that something will come of that.

May I also associate myself and my hon. Friend the Member for Lanark and Hamilton East with the remarks on Sir David Amess? I did not know him; I knew exactly who he was, though. There was that smile that made him stand out—a really genuine smile that reached his eyes. I always noticed that. I did not know him personally, but listening to people speak about him, including many people in the SNP group, who knew him really well and are really hurting, makes me wish that I had. Maybe that can teach us something in this place: that there are people who we can identify with and befriend who have different views from our own. Thank you for allowing me to say that.

I sure that Conservative Members and Opposition Members will agree with the fundamental principles that we should all be afforded the right to a fair trial and effective remedy. There can be little dispute that those are the cornerstones of a justice system that respects the rule of law and principles of natural justice. Amendment 30 seeks confirmation from the Lord Chancellor that any provision in the Bill will be prevented from coming into force if it contravenes article 6 or article 13 of the European convention on human rights: the right to a fair trial and the right to an effective remedy.

We have already debated how provisions in the Bill, such as the presumption for using prospective-only quashing orders, could risk breaching article 6.1 of the European convention on human rights on the right to a fair trial, which requires an effective judicial remedy. The amendment would ensure the Government had the opportunity to make cast-iron guarantees that that will not happen. That would be expressed via a written statement from the Lord Chancellor, laid before Parliament within three months of the Bill being passed.

The Minister may wish to point out that article 13 does not apply to the Human Rights Act 1998, but it could be applicable in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and that is why we felt it appropriate to include it in the amendment. Strasbourg does not recognise the practice of failing to give human rights without an effective remedy. Rather than stripping away rights, the Government should consider in any proposed review of the Human Rights Act that the right to effective remedy be added. As the Minister has assured us that the Bill will furnish the courts with a broader set of tools, with no risk of restricting individual claimants’ rights, he will surely consider the amendment a gift from me to him to help clarify his position.

[James Cartlidge]

Thank you for your generosity in allowing us to pay our tribute, Mr Rosindell, following this morning’s very moving mass at Westminster Cathedral.

The amendment would prevent any measure in the Bill from coming into force until the Lord Chancellor has provided a written statement to say that no provision in the subsequent Act contravenes article 6 on the right to a fair hearing and article 13 on the right to effective remedy of the European convention on human rights. I assure hon. Members that none of the measures in the Bill contravenes either article 6 or article 13.

The hon. Member for Glasgow North East mentioned remedies. We have the new remedies relating to quashing orders, which are a key part of how the Bill improves judicial review. In clause 1, there are adequate safeguards to ensure that any individual exercise of the new remedial discretions provides an effective remedy in cases concerning violations of convention rights. That is because the measures do not limit the availability of any existing right for such a breach and their use remains open to the court’s discretion. Presumption in favour of any of the remedial discretions only operates in circumstances where its exercise would

“offer adequate redress in relation to the relevant defect”

and it may be rebutted where there is good reason to do so. Further, the court is required to consider the interests or expectations of persons who would benefit from quashing of the impugned Act, as well as considering other factors.

On clause 2, regarding Cart judicial review, our position is that article 6 does not require a further right of judicial review in relation to decisions concerning permission to appeal from the first-tier tribunal to the upper tribunal and therefore considers that the measure does not interfere with an individual’s right under article 6.

When the Bill was introduced, the Lord Chancellor at the time signed a statement under section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to confirm his view that the provisions in the Bill are compatible with the convention rights. When the Bill passes to the other place, a second statement will be made, as required under section 19, taking into account any amendments. Should any Government or non-Government amendments be made that we felt contravened those statements, we would inform Parliament. It would be a breach of the ministerial code to proceed towards Royal Assent without either amending the provisions or informing Parliament of the issue.

In addition, ahead of introducing the Bill, the Government carried out a full ECHR analysis and published a memo for the Joint Committee on Human Rights setting out that analysis on parliament.uk. The previous Lord Chancellor wrote to the Committee’s Chair when the Bill was introduced and we will engage with the Committee fully should it choose to publish a report on the Bill. In summary, the Bill currently does not contravene either article 6 or article 13, and appropriate measures are in place should that no longer be the case at any point during its passage. I therefore urge the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anne McLaughlin]

I beg to move amendment 31, in clause 47, page 54, line 34, at end insert—

“(7) Notwithstanding the provisions above, nothing in this Act relating to Scotland shall come into force without a consenting resolution being passed by the Scottish Parliament.”

This amendment would require the consent of the Scottish Parliament to be given to any provisions in the Bill that relate to Scotland for those provisions to come into force.

As I am sure the Minister is aware, under the Sewel convention the Scottish Parliament should have the final say over any attempt by the UK Parliament to legislate in devolved areas. In recognition of the separate and distinct nature of Scotland’s legal system, article 19 of the Treaty of Union protects the authority and privileges of Scotland’s Court of Session. This is a fundamental part of the UK constitution and this amendment would ensure that the UK Government respect the principles of the Sewel convention and the constitutional arrangements.

Without an amendment specifically guaranteeing the requirement of consent from the Scottish Parliament to any provisions in the Bill that relate to Scotland, we risk interference with Scottish legal processes. The Faculty of Advocates, which was represented at the evidence sessions of this Committee, has said that in Scotland

“judicial review does not suffer from a lack of clarity, and any attempt to codify it is likely to undermine the very flexibility that renders it effective.”

Furthermore, Liberty has also commented on the situation and has said that

“the Act of Union does not serve to enable the UK Government to reshape the jurisdiction of the Court of Session. These are not technical or procedural points. In any event, the administration of the courts and the justice system in Scotland clearly falls within devolved competence.”

I am certain the Minister and Members opposite will be aware that this amendment is not only a reminder that this convention exists, but that it too must be respected in statute.

[James Cartlidge]

The amendment would require the consent of the Scottish Parliament to be given to any provisions in the Bill that relate to Scotland. I am emboldened to say that the word “relate” is in bold in my text, as that word is very important. I have a number of constitutional concerns about the amendment.

To reassure the hon. Members for Glasgow North East and for Lanark and Hamilton East, the measures in this Bill relate wholly to reserved matters. Ministers and officials have been engaging with the devolved Administrations over the course of the Bill, and we will continue to do so when the provisions in the Bill come into force.

I believe we are in agreement that chapter 2, “Online procedure,” and chapter 3, “Employment tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal,” of the Bill relate to matters outside the competence of the Scottish Parliament. Yet this amendment would still apply to the clauses in those chapters and require the consent of the Scottish Parliament before they could come into force.

The majority of the criminal procedure measures also relate only to England and Wales, although, as I have previously noted in Committee, we are aware that the Scottish Government’s position may be that the new automatic online procedure, introduced by clause 3, engages the legislative consent process. Furthermore, we believe that this is outside the competence of the Scottish Parliament, which, in the Government’s view, does not engage the legislative consent process.

With regard to removing Cart JR, I should make clear that the unified tribunal system is a reserved matter, where it relates to matters of reserved policy. Our measures on Cart will apply to the whole of the UK, but only in respect to the matters heard in that tribunal system that fall outside the competence of the Scottish Parliament. The provisions relating to remedies apply to England and Wales only.

If it came into force, the amendment would actually lead to decisions in reserved areas operating differently across the UK, thereby reducing the clarity the Bill currently provides. In line with the memorandum of understanding on devolution, we will continue to engage with the devolved Administration at a ministerial and official level to ensure that we have time to fully understand any implications for the Scottish court system.

On that basis, I cannot accept this amendment and I urge the hon. Lady to withdraw it.

[Anne McLaughlin]

I am not sure what I am supposed to say, but I do not wish to withdraw the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Question negatived.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[James Cartlidge]

This is one of those long ones, Mr Rosindell. This clause sets out when the measures will come into force. While some measures will come into force two months from when the Act is passed, including the coroner’s provisions and two of the criminal provisions, in clauses 14 and 15 and schedule 1, the remainder of the Bill will come into force by regulation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48

Short title

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anne McLaughlin]

I am not sure whether the right hon. Gentleman’s intervention was aimed at me or the Minister. If he was aiming it at me, all I will say is that it would not be the first, second, third, fourth or fifth way in which I disagreed with the Attorney General in her reckoning. I will sit down and allow others to speak.

[James Cartlidge]

This has been a good debate on the new clause, which is interesting in many ways from a constitutional point of view, both theoretically and practically. My hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich does not have a secondary role. I am his constituency neighbour. He has a fantastic role that he is fulfilling as a brilliant constituency MP. It was a great honour to campaign with him in the general election, and I see a return on that investment, as he is a vocal spokesman for people of all political shades in the fine county town of Suffolk.

The hon. Member for Glasgow North East may have, shall we say, come here through the use of a crutch, but she should not downplay the role that her speeches could play. Of course we listen. We listen to all sides. Indeed, I have listened intently to the debate on the new clause. I will say one thing to the hon. Member for Hammersmith: although I completely understand where he was coming from, and his points made political sense, he appeared at one point to suggest that it almost was not necessarily relevant to debate the new clause. The new clause is about judicial review, and we know the first two words of the Bill’s title. In fact, we just agreed to the clause on the short title, which includes the phrase “judicial review”; I think my speech on that was the shortest I have ever made, by the way.

My right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings made some important contributions, which I am grateful for. I hope he received the letter we sent him, which I believe has been circulated to other Committee members, containing the response on the important matter of the most vulnerable children—those in care. I hope that reassures him on the safeguards. Secondly, on the make-up of the coronial stakeholder group in administrative justice, which introduces a broad umbrella because of the nature of the engagement, I hope that the letter has persuaded my right hon. Friend. I am therefore tempted to eke out the general thread of my argument and hope to encourage him that I am someone who is generally able to persuade people of things. The sword of Damocles that he holds over this speech with the threat to vote can be dealt with.

I should pay tribute to my right hon. Friend for his former role as Security Minister, which he referred to. He was involved in important proceedings when our country, as was proudly illustrated this morning, faced great threats, not least terrorist threats. He was also a Transport Minister, and I met him to discuss roads in my constituency. The essence of his argument was that the Bill does not go far enough, so he wants to debate important probing amendments. I will come back to that wider point.

On the specifics, as has been explained, new clause 3 would amend section 67 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by replacing the wording in subsection (8) and adding three additional subsections. Subsection (8) was originally drafted as an ouster clause—we have already debated ouster clauses in relation to clause 2— to ensure that certain decisions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal would not be subject to judicial review by the High Court. A right of appeal on a point of law was later introduced by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and is set out in what is now section 67A.

The tribunal was intended to be the highest authority concerning matters such as the conduct of intelligence services. However, a 2019 judgment of the UK Supreme Court rendered the ouster clause of limited effect in what we have all referred to today as the Privacy International case. The Supreme Court found that while subsection (8) was effective at excluding judicial review of IPT decisions on their merits or jurisdictional decisions involving issues of fact, it did not have the effect of wholly ousting the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction.

The new clause would amend the ouster clause in section 67 by clarifying and adding to the text in that section so as to meet the objection of the Supreme Court in Privacy International. That is an interesting idea, and I am sure my right hon. Friend is aware that the Government’s consultation, published in March, expressed concern around the uncertainty that exists as to whether, or in what circumstances, ouster clauses will be upheld by the courts. We therefore consulted on options to try to add some clarity with a broad framework for the interpretation of ouster clauses, but, having reflected on the many useful responses we received, we concluded that although our intention was to add clarity, the effect may in fact be to muddy the waters yet further.

As an alternative approach, we are pursuing the ouster clause in clause 2, which is designed to overturn Cart, seeks to learn the lessons from unsuccessful ouster clauses of the past, and is drafted in a clear and explicit way. We have been open in saying that if that approach is successful, we may consider whether it can be used as a model for ousters in other areas, where it is appropriate to do so. At least conceptually, I see the link between ousting the High Court from reviewing permission to appeal decisions of the upper tribunal and ousting the High Court from reviewing decisions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. They are both essentially concerned with which court ultimately should have the final say on an issue.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anne McLaughlin]

Encouraged by the Minister, I have decided that I will say a few words, even if none of them are original. Most of what I have to say is in agreement with the hon. Member for Hammersmith, but it is good to put the opposition of the SNP on the record.

What would this new clause do? Unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, this new clause would prohibit the use of oral evidence in judicial review and would also prevent courts from ordering any public body to disclose evidence in anticipation or during the course of judicial review proceedings. As we have heard, oral evidence is already rarely used in judicial review proceedings, but the courts retain a discretion to permit oral evidence where it is considered essential to the case. My understanding is that judges use that discretion appropriately, and frequently deny requests to cite oral evidence unless, as I have said, it is considered essential to the case. I am not aware of any indication that the system has the problem that the proposals seek to address.

I wonder what adding a requirement for compelling reasons would do to the existing position. It could be that that is just an alternative translation of the existing position. One compelling reason for adducing oral evidence would be that it is necessary to do so. If that is the case, the new clause is not needed. If the proposed compelling reasons requirement is seen to raise the threshold for which oral evidence is admissible, I think we should all find that problematic. Judges are already only allowing such evidence when it is considered necessary to do so. The clear result of the proposed change would be that oral evidence that is necessary for the fair resolution of the case would not be admitted. That surely cannot be acceptable to the Minister.

New clause 5 would also bar judges from ordering disclosure of evidence. Again, such disclosure is used only when absolutely essential. Judges order disclosure only when that disclosure is vital to resolve the case fairly. In many respects, the disclosure obligations act as a way of ensuring that the duty of candour is complied with where parties must submit to the court all relevant evidence and information relating to the case. In the vast majority of cases, both parties will comply, but where they do not the judge can ensure compliance by using disclosure powers. Weakening those disclosure powers would, in effect, weaken the duty of candour, which is a vital aspect of fairness in judicial review. If public bodies and Governments believe that they do not need to comply with that duty, the position of claimants would be severely weakened in judicial review proceedings. We should increase access to justice, not make it increasingly pointless.

[James Cartlidge]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Lady, who made some perfectly reasonable points. It is disappointing that she did not rise to the bait by entering into the curry-labelling discussion instigated by the hon. Member for Hammersmith. I am not sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich is a vindaloo—I think he is a phaal. Anyone who googles that will find that it is the hottest curry there is. Maybe my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings is a phaal as well. It is inevitable, then, that they all think the Bill does not go phaal enough. As a great fan of curry, I generally go for the specials on the à la Cart menu. [Laughter.] That was not a reference to clause 2, by the way.

In new clause 5, my right hon. Friend is probing in his uniquely penetrating way of gaining the Committee’s attention and focusing on some important points. I will try to set out why, although there is merit in what he says, it is not right for this precise moment—perhaps with further work, not least as there may be other potential routes to achieving his end.

The new clause would amend the Bill to include some specific rules relating to disclosure and the duty of candour in judicial review cases. The clause would do three things. First, it would remove the ability of the court to permit oral evidence to be given unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary. Secondly, it would remove the ability of the court to order a public authority to disclose evidence at all, either in anticipation of proceedings or during proceedings, unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary. Thirdly, in cases where a public authority is arguing that the subject matter is non-justiciable altogether or judicial review jurisdiction has been ousted, it would remove any evidential requirement on the public authority until the court has ruled on the subject of justiciability or jurisdiction.

The duty of candour is a common law concept that obliges parties in judicial review proceedings to disclose information relevant to the case. The independent review of administrative law examined that duty when it conducted a call for evidence last year. Legal practitioners and other stakeholders identified issues relating to a lack of clarity surrounding the exact extent and precise nature of the obligations arising from the duty. The independent review concluded that the duty of candour may have previously been interpreted in a way that causes a disproportionate burden on public authorities, and that there would be benefit in clarifying the parameters of the duty. The Government would like to ensure that the duty of candour is not invoked by claimants to rouse political debates or to discover extraneous information that would have otherwise been kept confidential.

I reassure my right hon. Friend and my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich that this remains very much a live issue for the Government. The difference here, I suspect, is not a question of objective, but of how best to achieve it. The independent review recommended that the issue could be addressed through changes to the Treasury Solicitor’s guidance. Although that is, of course, a matter for the Treasury Solicitor, the advantage to using guidance to address some of the issues that have occurred with the duty of candour in the past is that it can be more flexible and dynamic than legislation.

As I have already indicated, the Government remain open-minded about the possibility of going further on judicial review reform in time. Although my instinct continues to be that any issues with the operation of the duty of candour are better addressed through other means, and not through primary legislation, I will reflect on the arguments that my right hon. Friend has made for a legislative response. We have already discussed the point of the meeting. I am quite clear that that could be wide-ranging and could include this discussion, too. They all fit within the same theme, which he has painted with a broad brush today. I am quite happy to look at it in those terms, but also in more specific terms, particularly with the benefit of officials and so on.

In the light of the complexity of the issues at stake, and the importance of getting the legislation right, I cannot accept my right hon. Friend’s new clause. I hope that, with my reassurance that that the Government will continue to actively consider the matter, he will agree to withdraw it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir John Hayes]

Further to that point of order, Mr Rosindell. On behalf of the Back-Bench Members on this side of the Committee—and I hope others too—I thank the Minister and the shadow Minister. I served as a shadow Minister and a Minister for 19 years and I know how hard it is, particularly from the other side of the Committee, to maintain the progress of debate and to retain the calibre and character of scrutiny.

I thank the Minister for the way he has gone about his business, and the shadow team for the way they have gone about theirs. I wish the hon. Member for Stockton North well, as he has now fallen ill. I also thank you, Mr Rosindell, and your fellow Chairman, and all others who have made the Bill proceedings possible.

[Anne McLaughlin]

Further to that point of order, Mr Rosindell. I want to reiterate what everybody else has said and thank everybody involved. I wish the hon. Member for Stockton North well and I hope that he recovers by a week today, St Andrew’s day, because he will be wanting to celebrate.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lanark and Hamilton East—I have finally got the constituency name. That is not as great a constituency name as South Holland and The Deepings, however. I am going to visit, and I will let the right hon. Gentleman know when I do.

This has been a really interesting Bill Committee. I used to resist going on Bill Committees, but I came from the Nationality and Borders Bill Committee straight to this one, and they are the best bit of the job, because they are probably the only time we really get an in-depth understanding of what we are doing. A lot of the time, we have to skim through things because there is so much to consider. I look forward to the next Bill Committee.

I thank the Clerks and everyone involved, including the Doorkeepers. For those who are not speaking and are not involved in the debates, it must be really boring having to sit there and listen to it all. There are no nods of agreement there, but I can pick the answer up telepathically. If I have missed anyone in my thanks, I am sorry—oh, the Chairs. Thank you very much; thank you again for your forbearance, Mr Rosindell, when I was injured. I am still injured, but am recovering.

[James Cartlidge]

Further to that point of order, Mr Rosindell. I did not mention the hon. Member for Stockton North; I hope he recovers. I also wish to thank my officials, who have been excellent—very high quality—for my first Bill Committee. I hope we keep up the good work as we move forward. I am grateful to everyone who has helped us to reach this point.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between James Cartlidge and Anne McLaughlin

Tuesday 9th November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)]

There has been much gnashing of teeth in the past week over MPs who breach standards and their right to appeal—natural justice, I think they call it. Why, then, do the Government propose to remove a vital last line of defence for ordinary people by removing Cart and Eba-type judicial reviews—the type used by the most vulnerable and the least powerful?

[James Cartlidge]

We have just debated this issue at great length in the Bill Committee and I understand that the hon. Lady feels strongly about it but, as we have explained, in those cases there are—we keep using this phrase—three bites at the cherry, whereas in almost all other areas of law there are only two, so the Bill is fair in that sense.

I am bound to say that it is incumbent on the Government to look at resource. When we have a backlog like we have, we have to ask whether using up 180 days of court time for cases that have a tiny chance of success is the best use of that resource. We have a backlog of very serious cases to deal with; that is our Government’s priority and where we are focused.

[Anne McLaughlin]

We have just spent a considerable amount of time arguing about that issue in Committee, so let me turn to another part of the Bill. The presumption in favour of prospective quashing orders will mean that this Government will be able to treat ordinary people unlawfully, safe in the knowledge that even if the courts say they have done so, there will be no redress or compensation, and there will even be time for the Government to change the law so that the unlawful thing becomes lawful. I wonder what it is about the wealthy, powerful friends of this Government that makes their right to so-called natural justice so much more compelling than the right of the ordinary man or woman on the street.

[James Cartlidge]

The hon. Lady knows that that is a wholly erroneous interpretation of the presumption clause, which is there simply to ensure that we expedite the accumulation of jurisprudence.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between James Cartlidge and Anne McLaughlin

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[James Cartlidge]

My hon. Friend may have had sight of the speech I had prepared to wind up yesterday’s debate. In fact, I was ready to take part at 10 pm, when rumour had it that the Opposition might still go ahead with the debate. He is absolutely right. We have a serious backlog issue. We have been very open about that. The primary driver of the surge in cases was the fact that courts were closed during the pandemic, and social distancing measures have made it much harder to dispose of cases, particularly in the Crown court. In those circumstances, 180 days of a High Court judge’s time is a precious resource indeed, which is why we take the view that exceptions should not be made in these cases. That is not depriving potential migrants of rights because they would still have, to coin that old phrase, two bites at the cherry.

[Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)]

If that is the case, and if the Minister is so concerned about the court backlog, does that mean that he will not support the Nationality and Borders Bill, which attempts to criminalise asylum seekers simply for coming to this country because they could not find safe and legal routes, at an estimated cost of an extra £400,000 per year, clogging up the court system even further?

[James Cartlidge]

It is a fair point, but the hon. Lady and my colleagues may be interested to know another statistic that we have discovered: the average time that these cases take from coming to court to reaching a conclusion is 88 days. That means that hundreds of cases are taking three months to be heard in the High Court. On that basis, we would not bring in new measures to toughen up sentencing on, for example, serious sexual offenders. If we did that, more people would potentially end up being found guilty of those crimes and going to prison for longer, which costs. That is precisely why we are taking measures to free up capacity. For example, in a later part of the Bill we will be remitting more cases from the Crown court to the magistrates court, because it is in the Crown court that those serious crimes will be heard.

[Anne McLaughlin]

rose—

[James Cartlidge]

I will take a second bite at the cherry from the hon. Lady.

[Anne McLaughlin]

I thank the Minister for that second bite. I know he was not deliberately conflating serious sexual offenders with asylum seekers, but I really want to make that distinction. We are talking about people fleeing for their lives from terrible situations, and in the same sentence he compares them to serious sexual offenders. Does he agree that there is no conflation there?

[James Cartlidge]

Of course. That is not the point I was making. To be absolutely clear, the point I was making is that we still have to deal with serious acts of violence and crime, whatever the crime may take place. If we do that, our actions may put more pressure on the courts, but I think our constituents would support that. Moreover, if someone comes to the tribunal system seeking immigration to this country, they will have two bites at the cherry—to use that phrase again—which is a consistent position.

[Anne McLaughlin]

indicated dissent.

[James Cartlidge]

The hon. Lady shakes her head. [Interruption.] She wants a third bite of the cherry. Well, I am going to ration them a bit, because there are oral questions soon. An inordinate amount of judicial resource is being used to review decisions of broadly equivalent judges who, importantly, are correct in refusing permission to appeal in the overwhelming majority of cases. However, if we take this away in immigration cases, there are still two bites at the cherry, which is consistent with article 13 of the European convention on human rights.

[Anne McLaughlin]

rose—

[James Cartlidge]

I will be very generous and offer the hon. Lady a third bite.

[Anne McLaughlin]

I have just served on the Nationality and Borders Bill Committee. I did not get a break between that and this Committee—in fact, last week the two clashed—so I know that what the Minister says is not the case. If asylum seekers arrive here by irregular means—in other words, if they come by boat because they cannot find safe and legal routes—they will not have an opportunity to apply for asylum, because they face offshoring and prosecutions. They will end up in the criminal court system before they even have an opportunity to go through the system that the Minister is discussing.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between James Cartlidge and Anne McLaughlin

Committee stage
Thursday 4th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[James Cartlidge]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who has considerable expertise in these matters and speaks on them very well. By the way, I am not suggesting that the Natural England case—it did not go to court, but there was a threatened judicial review from an organisation called Wild Justice, which I think Chris Packham is associated with—was vexatious. I make no comment on that. The point is that it would have achieved its aim, which was to have those particular licences declared unlawful, so the claimant would have been successful.

As I said at the time, had the remedies in the Bill been available, the legal advice could have assumed that at least one, or both, would have been used. If the prospective remedy, which we are debating in respect of these amendments, had been used, it would have made the many thousands of farmers, gamekeepers and others who were using those licences for shotguns far more certain that there would not be some kind of action, which from their point of view would be essentially retrospective, regarding the way they had used those licences that could undermine their rights, even though at the time—this is always the key thing about retrospectivity—they would have been using them both in the belief that they were lawful and in good faith. That is why this point is so important.

[Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)]

The Minister is talking about giving judges the right to use suspended or prospective-only quashing orders, but that is not what the Bill is about. The Bill is about the presumption that they will use those orders unless they can demonstrate good reason not to. Why not do what he is saying this means, and what other people seem to think this means, and just allow judges to use these orders?

[James Cartlidge]

We will debate the presumption in more detail, because there are a number of amendments to it in the later groups. With the greatest respect for the hon. Lady, I would simply say that that is an erroneous interpretation of the presumption. First, the Bill does bring in those new remedies, irrespective of the presumption, but the presumption is there. It does not force the judge to use them; yes, it highlights the fact that they are there and that we would expect them to be used were it appropriate, but what it ensures is that, whether they are used or not, the reasons and the thinking are written down. In a nutshell, this is about encouraging and expediting the accumulation of jurisprudence, which is incredibly important in a common-law system.

I understand the concern that such orders should not be used to prevent claimants from getting just outcomes. That very point was made on Second Reading by the Chair of the Justice Committee. However, I submit that the clause as drafted already protects against that. The list of factors for the court to consider in using the new remedies, which is set out in subsection (8), includes at paragraph (c) a requirement for the court to have regard to

“the interests or expectations of persons who would benefit from the quashing of the impugned act”.

In other words, it must consider the interests of the person or persons who has brought the judicial review.

In addition, the presumption at subsection (9) requires the court to use the new modifications for quashing orders only where it would offer “adequate redress”. Furthermore, subsection (2) allows the court to impose conditions on any remedy it gives, which is another way that the court can tailor any remedy to ensure it properly serves the interests of justice.

I therefore submit that the ability to limit or remove retrospective effect does have a clear purpose and that there are already sufficient safeguards in the provisions before the Committee to ensure the interests of the claimant are fairly balanced against the interests of good administration. The clause gives the courts the necessary flexibility to tailor its remedies appropriately.

Amendment 35 seeks to remove the subsection that states:

“Provision included in a quashing order under subsection (1) may be made subject to conditions”.

However, the whole point is that the ability to set conditions is very important, so that the court can strike the right balance in how it gives a remedy. For example, to avoid detriment to a claimant or those in the same situation, the court might specify that the defendant cannot take any new action to enforce the impugned decision, but is nevertheless afforded time to amend or correct it by virtue of a suspended quashing order. Removing the court’s ability to set such conditions would not be in the interests of justice or flexibility.

The final two amendments in the group, amendments 40 and 41, were originally connected to amendment 39, which the hon. Member for Hammersmith has withdrawn, and now relate to amendment 12. They are consequential amendments that remove elements of the clause that seek to provide further clarity in respect of the ability to limit or remove the retrospective effect of quashing orders. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that if we were to accept amendment 12, those amendments would logically follow. However, for the reasons I have explained, we do not accept the rationale of amendment 12 and, as such, we also oppose amendments 40 and 41. I urge him to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anne McLaughlin]

Thank you, Sir Mark.

On the power to issue a suspended quashing order with the option of prospective-only effect, the Bill says:

“the court must exercise the powers in that subsection accordingly unless it sees good reason not to do so.”

Our amendment 27 seeks to remove the word “must” and replace it with “may”. Given that Government Members are claiming that that is what they really mean, they ought not to have any problem supporting the amendment.

The word “must” clearly directs a judge’s reasoning and interferes with judicial independence and discretion, and the Government claim they do not want to do that. It is not just members of this Committee who have said so. The Secretary of State for Justice, the Lord Chancellor himself, said on Second Reading that the Bill

“gives judges greater flexibility in judicial review”.—[Official Report, 26 October 2021; Vol. 702, c. 195.]

As the Public Law Project pointed out, however, the inclusion of the statutory presumption contradicts that stated aim by tying the hands of judges so that they are required to use the new remedies in certain circumstances. If the powers are to be created, they ought to be the exception and not the norm, as the report of the independent review of administrative law suggests and as a number of Government Back Benchers, including the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) and the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Jeremy Wright) also suggested.

The PLP helpfully goes on to say why a statutory presumption is harmful, which is that it sets modified quashing orders as the starting point in all cases, which the judge then deviates from only if the court sees a good reason to do so. Even those who support that statutory presumption can list only a small number of cases in which such remedies might be appropriate. From what hon. Members have said this morning, however, they do not support the statutory presumption aspect, so they will have no difficulty in supporting amendment 27.

I do not know whether this is the appropriate time to say so, Sir Mark, but as the hon. Member for Hammersmith is pressing amendment 22 to a vote, I will be happy to withdraw my amendment and to support his instead.

[James Cartlidge]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Lady. I would not characterise the comments of my hon. Friends about judicial discretion as implying that they would therefore willingly see the presumption removed. I will not quite call it cheeky, but that is certainly a presumption of its own about our position on the matter and not entirely correct, as I hope we will discover should the amendment be pushed to a vote—it sounds as if it will be.

In her intervention on the speech by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley North, and in her speech now, the hon. Member for Glasgow North East, although she clearly has a strong view on presumption, did not deny the point, which is significant in terms of the previous group of amendments, that under the Scotland Act 1998 the Scottish Government—and, under other legislation, the other devolved Administrations too—have a power to make prospective-only orders. That is important. I am not suggesting that the power is used frequently, but it exists, although admittedly without the presumption.

[Anne McLaughlin]

But the Minister’s last point was that it is without presumption, and only in certain circumstances. As I understand it, in certain circumstances in England and Wales those orders can be used anyway. Basically, we are trying to turn things on their head so that judges are told, “This is what you will do, unless you can convince us otherwise.” That is not comparable with the Scottish system at all.

[James Cartlidge]

I entirely accept that the hon. Lady disagrees on the point of presumption, which I will come to in a moment, but in terms of the first group of amendments, which were primarily about the important changes to quashing orders—that is, the prospective-only remedy—all of this underlines the fact that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley North said, these things far from unprecedented in our constitution.

Before I turn to the specific amendments, one of the most interesting points made by the hon. Member for Hammersmith—which he made early on—was that people who bring a judicial review do not do so because they want a declaration; they want a quashing order. They want, as it were, the full bifta, rather than a relatively toothless outcome. On that point, an extremely important case to draw on is Hurley and Moore v. the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. That was an important decision regarding university tuition fees. Lord Justice Elias, one of the key judges, basically made a declaration against a quashing order—I quote the reasons why—saying that it

“would cause administrative chaos, and would inevitably have significant economic implications, if the regulations were now to be quashed.”

In my view therefore—this is important—the very presence of the new remedies, which as Conservative colleagues have said give more flexibility, makes it more likely and, dare I say, easier for a judge to issue a quashing order, rather than being restrained to the extent that the judge would otherwise simply issue a declaration. That is from the perspective of the best interests and the desire of the claimant to get their pound of flesh—their remedy—and to see their justice served. It is important to remember that point.

I turn now to the many amendments in the group. They deal primarily with the presumption, which the hon. Member for Glasgow North East was just talking about, in proposed new section 29A(9) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, and the factors that the courts must consider when deciding whether to use the new modifications—the quashing orders—at subsection (8).

There are two general points to stress. First, the Government’s intention in including both the presumption and the list of factors that the courts must consider is to assist in developing the jurisprudence around the new remedies. As the courts begin to consider cases where such remedies might be used, they will build up a body of case law about when the presumption is or is not rebutted and when the relevant factors apply. That will increase legal certainty, which is to everybody’s benefit. Secondly, I remind the Committee that we consulted both on the presumption and on which factors might be relevant in applying the new remedies. We reflected on the responses to that consultation. Respondents’ suggestions were helpful, particularly in allowing us to come up with the list of factors at subsection (8).

I turn now to amendments 22 and 27, tabled respectively by the hon. Members for Hammersmith and for Glasgow North East, which seek to remove the presumption at subsection (9). The amendments are based on a flawed assumption that the presumption is somehow intended to force the courts into using the new remedies where they are not appropriate. That is not the case. The Bill encourages the courts to use the remedies only where appropriate. It will be entirely up to judges to decide whether they offer adequate redress. If judges consider that they do not or that there is some other good reason not to use them, the court can rebut the presumption.

[Anne McLaughlin]

While the subsection says that

“the court must exercise the powers”

and amendment 27 asks for it to say that the court “may” exercise them, the Minister’s interpretation is that courts may exercise them. Does he understand why we want to amend the subsection? What he describes is what we are trying to amend it to.

[James Cartlidge]

That is a fair point. The words “must” and “may” often have significant meaning in Bills. The Bill’s wording does not seek to force a court’s hand but provides a clear message that Parliament expects to see the new powers used where appropriate. With respect, I think that clarity comes with the Bill’s wording.

However, the presumption also plays another important role in ensuring that the principles and practice around the new remedies are developed quickly. Jurisprudence can be a slow-moving beast, and the presumption will expedite the process and bring greater legal certainty. While removing the presumption from the Bill would not necessarily prevent the new modifications to quashing orders from operating effectively, we continue to believe that there is merit in providing this indication to the courts that they should properly consider the use of the new remedial options available to them, and to develop the case law as to their usage more quickly.

I turn now to amendments 24 and 34, the central purpose of which is to change the wording of the test that the court must apply when considering the presumption. The hon. Member for Hammersmith proposes “effective remedy” as an alternative to “adequate redress”, which he argues would be a more stringent test. I fear that we are getting pretty close to what we call semantic arguments. The Government’s intention is that the remedies are used only in circumstances where it is appropriate. We are not seeking to deny or restrict justice to claimants. I am not, therefore, persuaded that his wording would result in a higher test or make any material difference to the clause.

Amendment 24 also seeks to ensure that, in considering the “effective remedy”, the court considers the interests of not just the claimant but other affected persons. The way in which our “adequate redress” test is framed in no way prevents the court from considering the impact on persons other than the claimant. Indeed, when it is considered in conjunction with paragraph (c) of the list of factors at subsection (8), I contend that that is already captured by the clause.

Turning to amendment 23, which would remove the presumption contained at subsection (9) and replace it with a precondition—I think we are moving into smorgasbord territory—I submit that that would constitute a significantly more restrictive approach, which would limit the court’s flexibility to adapt the remedies to the situation before it. The amendment is redundant since the current presumption and list of factors provide an appropriate guide to the use of the new remedies. I do not see how it would make the situation clearer than the current drafting.

Let me turn now to a series of amendments that relate specifically to the list of factors at subsection (8), which is crucial to the operation of the new remedies. Amendments 13 and 21 seem to suggest that we need to tell the courts that the remedies that they use in judicial review cases should be used in the interest of justice and add a vague direction that

“good administration is administration which is lawful.”

The problem here, which confuses me, is that the implication of what the hon. Member for Hammersmith is suggesting appears to be that the courts would not otherwise act in the interests of justice or consider that lawful administration is a good thing. I do not think he necessarily trusts the courts to understand those rather fundamental concepts.

I argue that these amendments would add nothing of value to the Bill, as judges will retain the ability to use remedies in a way that they feel offers adequate redress for the claim brought. Our new remedies do not seek to change that. We are also struggling to find a clear justification for why a theoretical inquiry into the relationship between “goodness” and “lawfulness” needs to be made. Those concepts are very open to interpretation, and the amendment gives no indication as to their meaning in this context, while, in contrast, the current drafting makes the meaning clear and focused on practical issues.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anne McLaughlin]

Yes, and that is what we are talking about—ordinary people who ordinarily do not have the access to justice that people with perhaps a little more money do. The tribunal system, which we will come on to later, is primarily about more vulnerable people, I would say. We have been talking about the people who had the landmark ruling, whom it affected. Even if they had managed finally to access benefits after losing their job unfairly and waiting to access justice, we all know that benefits are not enough to live on. They do not even cover things like the mortgage. Being wrongfully dismissed has a massive impact on someone’s life. Thank goodness for the Supreme Court judgment and thank goodness it happened in 2017 and not 2022, because if it happened in 2022, it would not make a blind bit of difference to anyone’s life, regardless of the outcome. Despite the effort and cost of going to court, a victim is left without an effective remedy, and the Government or public body, although acting unlawfully, faces no real consequences. We must not underestimate the chilling effect that this will have. For that daytime TV audience not used to legalese, what that means is that it will put people off attempting to access justice in the first place, because who would put themselves through all this for no tangible outcome?

The clause creates a perfect storm, with claimants having no incentive to challenge the Government or other public bodies, while said public bodies and Government proceed safe in the knowledge that they can do what they like. It is the risk of being held to account, the potential for challenge, that drives good decision and policy making. That point was made by a number of Opposition colleagues, at least, earlier today.

The measure also undermines judicial discretion. I know that we have already argued about this today, but it is imposing a statutory presumption in favour of suspended quashing orders. The Minister, in trying to reassure us that the statutory presumption does not mean, “This is what judges must do,” while ruling out removing the provision that says, “This is what judges must do,” did nothing to reassure us.

As Liberty points out in its evidence, IRAL considered prospective-only remedies and chose not to recommend them. It also chose not to recommend a statutory presumption for suspended quashing orders. What was the point of the independent review if the Government were simply going to ignore its conclusions? Therefore, we will vote against clause 1 standing part of the Bill.

[James Cartlidge]

It is an interesting thought that the way we are going to measure the success of our debates is whether we can compete with “Loose Women” on the viewing figures front. I think that that is highly unlikely, no matter how wonderful our language and discourse, but if there is someone who has watched all the way through—good luck to them—I think that it would be hard for them to refute the idea that we have had a pretty thorough debate on the key issues of clause 1, which is very important.

I will answer one point from the hon. Member for Glasgow North East, and this is really where the disagreement, to which the hon. Member for Hammersmith was referring, exists about the extent to which we put our faith in judicial discretion. Yes, there is the point about the presumption, but as I said, that is about jurisprudence, from our point of view. To go back to what the hon. Member for Glasgow North East said about, I think, the case to do with tribunal fees, she was arguing in effect, “They would not have been refunded if these remedies had existed, because they would have applied prospectively,” but that would be only if the judge chose to use that remedy. That point is absolutely fundamental. There would be absolutely no requirement for them to do so.

[Anne McLaughlin]

The Minister keeps saying that, and I keep saying this, so I will just keep saying it. The legislation says that judges must—they must—use those orders unless they can demonstrate otherwise. Why not just say that they “may” do this, and give them the opportunity to do it? Otherwise, they will have to dig deep and find lots of reasons that are acceptable to the Government for not using it.

[James Cartlidge]

I did address that point in some detail in my speech on the last batch of amendments but one, but I will repeat the point. We want there to be certainty that judges should be considering these remedies, but that does not mean they have to use them. Rather, they should state the reasons, whether they do or do not, so that we build up that log of jurisprudence, which, as I said, is very important in a common-law system.

There has been an in-depth debate on this clause, so I do not intend to go much further. I just want to make one more important point. As far as Government Members are concerned, these measures strengthen quashing orders by giving judges more flexibility and more tools in the judicial toolbox, and thereby strengthen judicial review. On the question of whether they should be used, of course that is a discretionary matter.

Perhaps the issue is this: we see the glass as half full. We do not feel that the new measures would be used detrimentally for our constituents. On the contrary, we think that they would be used in ways that support better public administration while still protecting the right of the claimant to obtain their justice, but ensuring that quashing orders do not have detrimental side effects when used. That is why I say that we are not forcing the judges’ hands.