European Union Bill

Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts

Tuesday 8th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr MacShane]

No, I did not resign, simply because I work in a team. When the hon. Gentleman graces the Front Bench, as I hope and I am sure he soon will, he will have to learn that there is something called teamwork, and that until he becomes Prime Minister he will take rather than give orders.

I am not sure that it would have been any particular help to have published all my animadversions immediately afterwards, although I told my steelworker community friends privately what had happened. Frankly, one cannot do business in that way. I am not even sure whether, constitutionally or legally, suggestions made before a decision is taken can then go fully into the public domain if they belong to other people. I think we may find, legally, that there are certain rules on what is the property of other states. We do not publish every communication with the United States, France, or any country, for good and sensible international legal reasons.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

The process in Europe is legislative. When this House legislates, the debates are published, regardless of the ultimate decision, so that the British people know how the debate has been formed in the legislature. As the Commission, Council and Parliament of Europe are legislatures, the information should likewise be public.

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[Mr Clappison]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Minister for the care and attention that he has taken in answering this debate and for the manner in which he has done so. I am sure that it has been of great assistance to the House, and I will now be going to the Library to seek out a copy of the European Union access to documents regulations—I certainly would not want to fall foul of them, given what we have been told this afternoon.

My right hon. Friend has approached the debate in the spirit of the new clause. I am sure that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart), in drafting the new clause, did not think that it was the finished article. It was a plea for greater transparency, and I hope that it has been taken as such. Despite possible problems with, for example, the phrase “relevant documentation”, what that might include, and what implications might flow from it, I hope at least that on the question of amendments proposed by a Government during treaty negotiations and treaty changes—that is what new clause 1 deals with—whether through the ordinary procedure or the new simplified revision procedure, members of the public and the House will be told what amendments are being, and have been, proposed by the Government, so that we, and members of the public, can judge, in due course, the strength of the Government’s position on what they ultimately recommend. We should be told whether a Government have been consistent in the amendments that they proposed and in what they subsequently recommend.

I will give one example. I was struggling earlier to think of one, although I know that there are a lot of them. During negotiations on the Lisbon treaty, Ministers in the then Government came to the House and advocated a certain clause or course of action, but it was discovered that during the negotiations on the Convention they had advocated exactly the opposite. One prime example was the creation of the European “foreign ministry” itself—the European External Action Service. During the debate, I have helpfully been told by the House of Commons Library that the then

“government’s amendments in the Convention to articles 1-27, III-197.1 describe the term ‘Foreign Minister’ as ‘unacceptable’ arguing that ‘he/she should have no ministry’. The government preferred the term ‘EU external representative’.”

Well we have our external representative—or rather, our High Representative—but perhaps that phrase conceals the fact that she is in reality a Foreign Minister, and the office was originally intend as such. We also have a European “foreign ministry” in the form of the EEAS, even though the then Government did not want it. They then had to come before the House, having apparently lost on that amendment, and argue from the Dispatch Box in favour of the creation of an external action service. The Minister will well remember, as I do, that on that occasion, Conservative Members opposed its creation. In the light of developments since, and what the public have come to learn and think about the EEAS and its conduct, I am not sure that our arguments against it have been entirely disproved. But there we are. That is one example.

The new clause was a plea for transparency. However, I know that there are important matters still to come before the House, and I do not want to delay them by pressing the new clause to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 2

Parliament Act 1911 in relation to sections 1 to 7

‘(1) The Parliament Act 1911 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 2(1), after “five years” there is inserted “or a Bill amending or repealing sections 1 to 7 of the European Union Act 2011”.’.—(Jacob Rees-Mogg.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The purpose of new clause 2 is to exempt most of the Bill from the functioning of the Parliament Act 1911. That would mean that were a Government to attempt to repeal it, they would have to do so with the consent of the House of Lords, without being able to re-present it a year later and get it into law regardless. The new clause would give the same protection to the rights of the British people to vote in a referendum on European matters as exists concerning the length of a Parliament.

It is one of the ironies of our constitutional system that the unelected Chamber has since 1911 been the final guardian of the democratic rights of the British people. Since 1911, it has been impossible to lengthen a Parliament without the willing consent of the House of Lords. It is the one part of the Parliament Act that the House of Commons cannot simply override. The last extension of a Parliament came, I think, in 1944, as a final extension—until the war had been completed—of the wartime Parliament. That principle clearly applies to referendum Bills, which relate to a right of the British people to exercise their democratic choice that should not be taken away from them lightly, and should be as protected as anything within the constitution can be.

It is worth mentioning—I hope that the Minister will be interested in this point—that one criticism has been made of the Bill by people who otherwise are sympathetic to it. It is that an incoming Government who wanted to push through the euro, or whatever, could simply repeal this legislation and go ahead with what they wanted to do anyway. Quite rightly, no Act of a Parliament can bind its successors, but the Bill contains no protection at all against a Government who do not want to follow it. Given that the whole purpose of the Bill is to protect the rights of the British people from further Europeanisation, it would be extremely sensible to exempt it from the Parliament Act in order to strengthen it. That would remove the one criticism made by people who are otherwise well disposed to the Bill. It would make it a stronger Bill, and one more settled in our constitutional situation. I think that many of us would like to see that.

An important constitutional development is noted in volume 1 of the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee’s 10th report. It is a constitutional development that should concern the House, and on which the House should use its powers to set its seal, as it sees fit. It is essentially the Lord Justice Laws doctrine that came out of the metric martyrs case. He said:

“In the present state of its maturity the common law has come to recognise that there exist rights which should properly be classified as constitutional or fundamental…And from this a further insight follows. We should recognise a hierarchy of Acts of Parliament: as it were “ordinary” and “constitutional” statutes. The two categories must be distinguished on a principled basis.”

Lord Justice Laws went on to set out his definition of a constitutional statute as opposed to an ordinary statute. In the Bills we pass, however, there is no such difference. It is a distinction thought up by the courts, particularly to exempt the European Communities Act 1972 from implied repeal. As a matter of the most urgent constitutional principle, if there are to be two types of Act, it ought to be this House and the House of Lords who decide and determine that, not the judges. The judges are there to determine what we have said and rule on it, not to say that a new type—a whole new category—of law has been created. It seems to me that one of the ways the House could get a round that is to make it clear when we think that a Bill requires particular and special protection. Fortunately—because, as some hon. Members may know, I am a great believer in tradition—we have a precedent for that in the Parliament Act, which allows the House of Lords to be overruled on everything, with the exception of a removal of a democratic right. The parallel with the Bill is exact: it is a protection dealing with a constitutional situation developed by the Lord Justice Laws doctrine.

[Martin Horwood]

With the hon. Gentleman’s combination of eloquence, erudition and traditionalism, he is well on the way to becoming a national treasure already. However, surely he would admit that he is really making a much better case for a written British constitution making such a distinction, rather than for giving extended powers to the unelected Chamber as the guardian of democracy. That seems quite quirky, even by his standards.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention, but I am afraid that he entirely misses the point. In framing the new clause I have been working within the confines of our unwritten constitution, using the elements and protections that are already there, and extending them to the Bill. I absolutely accept that it is an irony of our constitution, as it already exists, that the protection against a Parliament lengthening its own life is an unelected Chamber a few yards down the way. However, that is the situation in our constitution, and it is one that has been enormously effective for 100 years.

[Charlie Elphicke]

Does my hon. Friend not agree that his argument would have more force and credibility if the sunlight of democracy shone over the other end of this building?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

If my hon. Friend were to reread the Parliament Act 1911, he would see that it was introduced as an interim measure until the other place was reformed and until such time as the basis for selecting its Members had been changed. Again, therefore, I would say that my new clause is completely sympathetic with the unreformed House of Lords, and as the 1911 Act itself says, it would be part of a bigger reform of the balance of powers between the two Houses if the House of Lords were to be reformed.

I do not wish to take up much time with my new clause. It proposes an extremely simple, straightforward amendment: it serves the single purpose of making the Bill a little bit stronger, it uses a device already extant in our constitution, and it preserves and protects the rights of the British people to have a referendum against something potentially malign.

[Michael Connarty]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, whose speeches I always read, if not always hear. He is very erudite and thoughtful in what he proposes, but today he seems to be saying that this Bill should be raised to a higher level than all the others passed by this House, apart from the European Communities Act 1972, which was given that status, which he opposes, by the courts. He is trying to put this Bill on a par with that Act, and although he does not like the process whereby the courts allocate that status, he says that it should also be allocated to this Bill, by this place.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

The hon. Gentleman has half got what I have been saying and has half misconstrued it. I do not think it right that laws passed by Parliament should be put on a different level based on what judges think of them retrospectively. I do not think that that is a democratic way of deciding which law is important and which is unimportant. One may think that the judges will always get it right, but what if they decided that the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 was amazingly important and this Bill was not, so that the 1991 Act could not be impliedly repealed, but one giving people a vote in a referendum could be? What I am saying is that it is better for us to take this power upon ourselves and say, “Okay, this is an important Act. We’re going to put that in, and say that it is exempt from the Parliament Act 1911.”

The hon. Gentleman asked a good question, which is: why start with this particular Bill? The reasons for starting with this Bill are, first, that the judgment putting the 1972 Act on to a higher plane is relatively recent, and secondly, that I was elected to Parliament only last May and have therefore not had the opportunity before to propose such a measure on a major constitutional Bill, other than the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill. The reasons for starting with this Bill are because of that judgment, and because I am now in a position to do this. It would have been a good thing to do earlier, on other constitutional Bills, including on devolution to Scotland.

[Austin Mitchell (Great Grimsby) (Lab)]

I am always impressed by the hon. Gentleman’s displays of legal knowledge, but surely his whole point is spurious. The judges’ argument is irrelevant and wrong: there is no distinction between some laws passed by Parliament and others. We cannot say that some are constitutional and others are not. That distinction does not exist: they are all of equal standing. The point that he is trying to make is also irrelevant, because he is appealing to a constitution that does not exist. Essentially, the British constitution is what Governments can get away with, and they get away with it in this place.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I so wish that the hon. Gentleman, who is a most distinguished Eurosceptic, were right, but unfortunately the judges have taken that power to themselves. I return to what Lord Justice Laws said in his judgment on the metric martyrs case:

“Ordinary statutes may be impliedly repealed. Constitutional statutes may not.”

The judges have set up for themselves two different types of Act. It seems to me that we should claim that power back for the democratically elected Chamber of Parliament, and say that when we think an Act is of significant constitutional importance, what we will do is not entrench it—that is against the spirit of our constitution—but give it a modest protection by saying that it can be repealed only with the full consent of both Houses. The great advantage of that, for those of us who remember what happened prior to 1911, is that it would require a Government to win a general election—to go back to the people—before they could get something through the House of Lords, if the House of Lords said no. That happened in 1911, with the reforms to the House of Lords, and in 1832, with the Great Reform Bill. That provision has been an historic and traditional way of protecting our democratic rights—one that, oddly, involves the undemocratic Chamber—and that is why I think it would improve the standing of this Bill. It would protect the democratic rights of the British people and deal with the constitutional situation as it is—as the judges have developed it—rather than the constitutional system as the hon. Gentleman and I might wish it to be.

[Charlie Elphicke]

It is not only an incredible privilege and honour to listen to the superb eloquence of my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg), but an even greater privilege and honour to follow him. Nevertheless, on this occasion I do not follow him in the sense of agreeing with the new clause that he is propounding. I put it to him in an intervention that it was ironic that he was seeking to use the unelected Chamber as the guardian of the people’s democracy. His answer was, “Well, look at the preamble to the 1911 Act.” I was reminded of the dictum of St Augustine of Hippo, who, as I am sure he knows only too well, said, “Make me pure, Lord—but not yet.”

[Charlie Elphicke]

In one moment.

I do not think that it is an excuse to say that because the House of Lords is partly reformed, we can give it a role as the guardian of our democracy pending the completion of that reform. Given that we have been racing towards the reform set out in the preamble to the 1911 Act for 100 years, it may take another 100 years to complete it—and given the way things carry on in this place, I suspect that we will indeed be waiting for 100 years to come.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I thank my hon. Friend for giving way, but I just wonder whether he thinks the House of Lords has done a bad job since 1911 in the one area in which it is exempt from the 1911 Act—that is, in defending the right of the British people to have an election at least every five years?

[Charlie Elphicke]

I do not decry the role of the House of Lords, the excellence of their lordships, the work that they do, their courage or the passion with which they advance their cases. Indeed, it is often said that the debates held in their lordships’ House are far more informed, considered, interesting and informative than our debates in this House. Having been in this place and not that place, I cannot compare the two. Nevertheless, it is a dangerous principle to say, “Let’s include a provision in the Parliament Act to say that the House of Lords should be not only the guardian of five-year Parliaments but the guardian of this Bill, to protect it from being altered.”

I would have much more faith in the proposal if reform of the House of Lords had been completed—something that I hope will come to pass. One of the problems that I have with the House of Lords is not the people in it or their mental ability—many of them are excellent people and their mental ability is far superior to mine—but my concern that they do not hold a democratic mandate. It is an important principle that where we have representatives in our legislature, they should have a mandate from the people. I guess it is because I am a Lincolnian politician—I believe in government for the people, by the people, of the people—that I believe that the sunshine of democracy should permeate our entire legislature, and not just this House. I admit to some radicalism in my thinking on such matters, but I believe it is important that all our politicians should be elected and have a democratic mandate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Michael Connarty]

First, may I compliment the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) on the eloquence both of the construction of his new clause and of his delivery in arguing for it? I believe that the new clause is flawed. He suggested that the evidence that we had received—he kept referring to Lord Justice Laws’ ruling—was correct, but we received evidence from many other people that it was incorrect. It was suggested that we could not establish two tiers of laws just because a judge decided to make a remark in court, and that all laws, including the European Communities Act 1972, stand the same and can have implied amendment and repeal.

If Parliament decided to pass a law here that was contrary to a ruling, directive or regulation of the European Union, it would still stand as a law. The dilemma would then be whether the European Court of Justice would have the right to overrule that decision or whether we would press on our courts our decision in the new Act, which would cause a judgment to be called for in the European Court. If no one called for such a judgment on an Act that we had passed contrary to a regulation or directive of the European Union, it would continue to apply. It would not be knocked down, and no penalties would be imposed on the UK, unless someone called for the European Court of Justice to make a judgment on that new Act. So it was nonsense to suggest that in 1972 we had suddenly created an Act that was incapable of implied repeal or amendment.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

The evidence that we received focused on the “notwithstanding” approach—that is, that one could not accidentally repeal, or move, an Act that was contrary to the 1972 Act; one would have to do it explicitly. That is different from most other Acts of Parliament that can impliedly be repealed. This is where we come back to Lord Justice Laws’ judgment, which has been de facto accepted.

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[Mr Lidington]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for acknowledging the importance of clause 18. We had a full day’s debate on that clause at the start of our Committee proceedings, but I rather think that you would warn me, Mr Hoyle, against recapitulating that debate this evening. It is hard to imagine why a future Parliament would choose to repeal this Act, thereby abolishing the referendum lock and the enhanced control and scrutiny that the Bill provides for Parliament and the British people. It would incur a high political cost for any Government who brought forward such a measure and, indeed, for individual Members of Parliament who were prepared to walk through the Lobbies in its support.

It is an important part of this Government’s commitment to rebuilding trust with the British people to make clear what the future arrangements should be. Although it is always possible that a future Government will decide to act differently, I find it hard to imagine that any such future Government would be able to defend taking away from the British people the right to have their say about further changes to the European treaties.

I have further concerns about the impact of the new clause on the long-standing relationship between this House and the House of Lords. It would alter the relationship by expanding the relative powers of the House of Lords. It has never been part of the Government’s intentions for this Bill that it should be used to alter that relationship.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, not only for giving way but for taking the new clause so seriously, but I must say to him that the Bill does not really extend the powers of the House of Lords and is not a new category of Act. Both it and the existing protection under the 1911 Act refer exclusively to the voting rights of the British people, which is why I think that they are exactly the same.

[Mr Lidington]

I hear my hon. Friend’s argument, but I could quite easily construct another argument. We have enacted other pieces of legislation in recent decades which are of great constitutional significance, which touch on the franchise—for example, the decision by, I believe, the Heath Government to lower the voting age from 21 to 18—and which could have been deemed to fall into a comparable category and to deserve equivalent protection.

This evening my hon. Friend is making a second attempt to persuade Parliament of the case for his proposal. A short while ago, he tabled an amendment to the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill that was very similar to this new clause. Indeed, it may have been identically worded. At the time the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper), expressed a view to which the Government and I subscribe. The rules governing the relationship between this House and the other place, as laid down in section 2 of the 1911 Act, have been in place for some time, and we do not intend to start changing that relationship.

I suggest to my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset that the political problem and the constitutional challenge that he has identified in the House of Lords judgment, namely the evolution within the jurisprudence of the United Kingdom courts of the idea of a distinct category of constitutional statutes which have a special status and which, in particular, cannot be impliedly repealed, should perhaps be addressed in the context of a more general proposal for constitutional reform. As my hon. Friend knows, my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister is considering the issue of possible reforms of the House of Lords. The best course may be for my hon. Friend to make representations to the Deputy Prime Minister as he considers what is the right way in which to proceed.

During one of the debates on the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, my hon. Friend said:

“Our constitution should be safeguarded and preserved; it is not something that should be treated lightly or in an airy-fairy fashion”.—[Official Report, 18 January 2011; Vol. 521, c. 708.]

I strongly agree with the sentiment that he expressed. That is why it is so important for the House to scrutinise thoroughly the issues raised by his proposal, and that is why I have considered it so carefully.

I welcome the scrutiny that the proposal has undergone, both this evening and during consideration of the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill. However, for the reasons I have given, I do not accept that the new clause is an appropriate way for us to achieve our shared intention. Following the debate on my hon. Friend’s similar amendment to the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, he withdrew the amendment. I sincerely hope that, having heard my arguments this evening, he will be prepared to withdraw his new clause.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 3

Decisions subject to special referral procedure in TFEU

‘(1) A Minister of the Crown may not permit the United Kingdom’s participation in the final adoption of a decision to which this subsection applies unless subsection (3) or (4) is complied with in relation to the draft decision.

(2) The decisions to which subsection (1) applies are—

(a) a decision under the provision of Article 48 of TFEU that permits the adoption of legislative acts in the field of social security;

(b) a decision under the provision of Article 82(2) of TFEU that permits the adoption of directives establishing minimum rules in criminal procedure, unless the decision falls under section 9(4);

(c) a decision under the provision of Article 83(1) of TFEU that permits the adoption of directives establishing minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions, unless the decision falls under section 9(4);

(d) a decision under the provision of Article 83(2) of TFEU that permits the adoption of directives establishing minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions.

(3) This subsection is complied with if—

(a) a draft decision is before the Council,

(b) in each House of Parliament a Minister of the Crown moves a motion that the House does not believe the United Kingdom should request the referral of a specified draft decision to the European Council under the provision of Article 48 of TFEU, Article 82(3) of TFEU or Article 83(3) of TFEU, as the case may be, providing for such a request, and

(c) each House agrees to the motion without amendment.

(4) This subsection is complied with if—

(a) a draft decision is before the European Council,

(b) in each House of Parliament a Minister of the Crown moves a motion that the House approves Her Majesty’s Government’s intention to support the referral of a specified draft decision back to the Council, and

(c) each House agrees to the motion without amendment.’.—(Chris Heaton-Harris.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

Well, that sounded better to me when I was writing it down. It seemed perfectly logical for this to be a matter for both Houses, and the other place does scrutinise European matters, as we have discussed. It has a depth of expertise on European matters, although it might be completely wrong in its conclusions.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

The House of Lords has an absolute veto on statutory instruments and many other things. It is only legislation introduced in the House of Commons on which the Lords does not have a veto. It would therefore have been illogical to have excluded it.

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

I could not have put it better myself.

Moving swiftly on, new clause 4 addresses the post-2013 financial framework. We are about to enter into very important negotiations about how much money we give to the European institutions over the next financial framework—that for 2014 to 2020. We have had many assurances from the Government that they will seek a very tough settlement, and I thought it would be wise to encapsulate in a new clause this Parliament’s view of a tough settlement. I thought it might be a good idea to spell out the situation if we do not get a freeze on the amount of money we are spending per year in that financial framework at EU level—or indeed a cut, which I hope we might be angling for. I wanted to make it clear that if we failed miserably in our negotiations and had to accept—perhaps for reasons of diplomacy, as I am unsure whether we would have to accept this as we have a veto on these matters—a rise in the amount of money that could be spent in that financial framework, that would also become part of the Bill. In fact, I would like that to be put to a referendum so that people can vote on whether we should give a lot more money to institutions that we do not completely trust. That is the main purpose of new clause 4. I hope its being moved will give the Minister another chance to state on the record exactly what our position will be going into negotiations on the financial framework post-2013.