Iain Stewart
Main Page: Iain Stewart (Conservative - Milton Keynes South)Department Debates - View all Iain Stewart's debates with the Scotland Office
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman seeks to disagree with me, in a mild way and from a sedentary position, but the facts speak for themselves. The country’s finances are in a mess. Yes, we all want to protect people in all parts of the country, but there is no argument for protecting Scotland to a greater extent than the rest of the United Kingdom.
Does my hon. Friend agree that the operation of the Barnett formula in its strictest sense will protect the Scottish budget at times of reduction in the overall UK level of public spending? A population change is taken on the basis of a higher-than-average base line, so in times of public expenditure reductions, that will protect the Scottish block.
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend and I am grateful to him for making that point at this stage in the debate. I am glad to say that he is something of an expert on this subject, having been steeped in it for many years. He is absolutely right; it is also very important, for the reasons he has just stated, that we keep the Barnett formula. That is the way to protect the people of Scotland not from the effects of the Conservative-led coalition but from the effects of 13 years of Labour mismanagement of the economy.
I welcome the opportunity to speak in this debate. Although I represent a seat south of the border, I have a long-standing interest in devolution matters. I not only spent my formative years in Hamilton, but when the original Scotland Bill passed through the House in 1998, I acted as an adviser to the then shadow Front-Bench team, which included my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing). I have thus gained a probably unhealthy level of detailed knowledge of the Scotland Act 1998, and I hope to draw on it a little in my contribution.
I trust that the House will not object if I draw on a book on the Barnett formula and fiscal autonomy, which I co-authored in 2003 with the eminent Scottish lawyer, Professor Ross Harper. For the avoidance of doubt, let me say that I am not seeking to advertise the book: it is no longer for sale and I received no royalties for it at the time. Let me just say that it was not troubling “Harry Potter” for the No. 1 spot on the best-seller list. Nevertheless, I hope that the research we did for the book will help our deliberations today.
I want to put on record the fact that I was sceptical about devolution at the time of the referendum in 1997. I campaigned and voted against the devolution measures. I am happy to say that many of the doubts I had at that time have not been borne out by events. I believe that the Scottish Parliament reflects the settled will of the Scottish people and that, on the whole, it has been a success. Our job today is to improve and strengthen it, thereby strengthening the Union. The Scottish Parliament is not perfect, however, as there are some deficiencies, but I believe that the Bill goes a long way towards improving them.
I want to focus, as much of the debate has, on the transfer of fiscal powers. It is right that the Scottish Parliament is more accountable for the money it spends—a flip of the old adage, “No taxation without representation”. It is right for the Scottish Parliament to be held accountable to its electors for its own spending decisions. Going back to the 1997 referendum, I was intrigued by the option that did not get much coverage at the time, when the debate centred on the “yes/yes” or the “no/no” campaign. Some people believed in the “no/yes” option—they did not want a Scottish Parliament, but thought that if there was to be one, it should have proper fiscal powers and be held accountable.
I hope that the Bill will improve participation in Scottish Parliament elections. Although the turnout is higher than for local government, it is lower than for elections to this place, in which turnout is in no way at a particularly high level. Part of the reason for that lower turnout is that Members of the Scottish Parliament can make spending decisions without being directly accountable to their taxpayers and electors for them. I strongly support the Bill’s principles in addressing that point.
Speaking as an English Member, I want to put on record the fact that I often hear representations from constituents about why Scotland has free tuition, free prescriptions and so forth, which people do not have in England. I explain that the financial relationship between Scotland and England is much more complicated than the Barnett formula, which people often use as a shorthand to explain the whole fiscal relationship between Scotland and the United Kingdom. The point is nevertheless an important one, because if that concern is left unchecked, the Union will suffer. If people in England think that Scotland is getting an unfair advantage from the financial arrangements, the Union will suffer. As a Unionist, I make no apology for saying that; as a Unionist, I say that the Union suffering is the last thing I want to see. If Scotland wants to increase spending in a particular area, or introduce free care, tuition fees or whatever, the Scottish Parliament will now have to find more of that money, and that is an important point for strengthening the Union.
I am listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman. He talks about the financial responsibility of the Scottish Parliament, but why does he feel that that should be confined to income tax? Does he not agree with Lord Forsyth, a former Tory Secretary of State for Scotland, who said:
“The SNP quite rightly argues that you can’t just limit it to income tax and stamp duty if you want to manage the economy. You can’t play golf with just one club”?
The point is that if the Scottish Parliament is to have responsibility, it must have responsibility not just for varying income tax, but for managing the economy.
I beg the hon. Gentleman’s patience, as I will turn to those points in a moment.
My hon. Friend makes a powerful point about the threat to the Union posed by a perception of unfairness in relative funding, and giving Scotland control over its tax revenue raising will partially address that. However, it is widely accepted that the baseline, under the Barnett allocation, is 15% to 20% higher than it would be in equivalent places in England, and that is an issue for the Union.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I am not sure whether his birthday is coming up, but I will happily send him a copy of my book, which goes into the matter in some detail. The baseline funding for Scotland is an important point, but whether to have a needs-based assessment is not part of the Bill, although the Bill opens up the possibility that that will be reviewed in future.
No one can deny that these are legitimate issues for debate, but does my hon. Friend not acknowledge that when we look at the matter detail by detail—my right hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr Laws), when he was adviser to my party, did some work on this—we see that a high proportion of the spending differential is justified by remoteness, the different balances, benefits and so forth? A part of it is not accounted for, but the gap is nothing like as big as my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington South (David Mowat) suggests.
My right hon. Friend makes an important point. The whole subject is difficult and complex, given the shorthand of Barnett and the vast difference between public spending in Scotland and England. In some areas, however, for the reasons that he has set out, there is a big difference, and those reasons will also be found in England. For instance, in remote parts of Cumbria or Devon, spending per head will be higher than in central London or Manchester.
If the hon. Gentleman looks at the study by Oxford Economics, he will find that London secures more public spending than any region or nation in the UK. If he and the hon. Member for Warrington South (David Mowat) are concerned about grant formula and Scotland’s spending relative to England’s, I have good news for them: they can vote to change that in the next few weeks and allow Scotland to have full fiscal responsibility. That would allow all the Barnett issues to disappear. If we were allowed to have the economic levers to grow our economy, we would be self-reliant on taxation.
As I said to the hon. Member for Angus (Mr Weir), if the hon. Gentleman allows me to make a little progress, I will come to the issue of full fiscal autonomy in a moment.
Clearly, the existing Scotland Act contains some fiscal powers for the Scottish Parliament: principally, the ability to vary the basic rate of income tax by 3p higher or lower than the UK rate. That has never been used, partly because the SNP Administration in Edinburgh has allowed the levy required each year for the mechanism to stay in place not to be paid. There is a more fundamental point, however: the administrative and set-up costs for making that small change in the income tax rate are disproportionate to the revenue that would be raised.
When the House was considering the Bill that became the Scotland Act 1998, it was calculated that it would raise, at the most, an additional £450 million. Given a total Scottish Office budget of over £22 billion, it was a tiny measure and would involve considerable start-up and administrative costs and not generate enough revenue. I can understand why it has not been introduced so far.
The hon. Gentleman talks of the amount that might be raised if the tax rate were put up. There is, however, a built-in perverse disincentive to lower the tax rate. If the income tax rate, for example, were lowered and that stimulated economic growth, and if the benefit were paid from higher corporation tax receipts, the Scottish Parliament would take the hit of reduced income tax, while the United Kingdom Government would gain the advantage of enhanced corporation tax.
I am explaining why I do not think the provisions in the current Scotland Act are sufficient, and why I welcome the measures to increase substantially the power of the Scottish Parliament to raise a significant chunk of its own revenue. There are still concerns about how they will be implemented, and I raised that point during Scottish questions yesterday. I have been reassured that proper consultation is taking place with members of the business community in Scotland, who will have to administer many of the new arrangements, but I urge my colleagues on the Front Bench to keep a close watch on the increased regulatory burden on businesses at a time when they can ill afford much additional bureaucracy.
I think the HMRC bodies should consider the possibility of certain unintended consequences. There is, for instance, the question of how payments into personal pension plans which attract the adding back on of basic or higher-rate tax contributions should be treated. If in the past contributions have been made at the United Kingdom rate and added back on, a different Scottish rate will create potential anomalies when it comes to how that income is treated. I suspect that a fairly small amount is involved overall, but it is an important detail that ought to be clarified before the Bill is implemented.
I welcome the move to devolve some taxes, and I hope that more can be devolved in time. I hope that, for instance, the issues surrounding the aggregates levy and air passenger duty issues will be resolved. I do not believe that this is the end of the story; I trust that those two taxes will eventually be devolved, and that the Scottish Parliament will be given greater fiscal autonomy.
I referred earlier to the book that I co-authored. Part of our research involved international comparisons.
I hesitate to interrupt my hon. Friend, but he has just demonstrated that he is one of the few people who understand, and have carried out an in-depth study of, the relationship between United Kingdom and Scottish finance. He is being modest about his book, but I need not be modest on his behalf. It is an excellent publication, which I have consulted on many occasions. May I ask him to show the House his book and tell us its title, so that every Member in the Chamber—[Interruption.] I do not think he will make any money from it. However, some Members might be better educated in future if they knew more about it. I believe that it is called “It’s Our Money! Who Spends It?”
Order. That was a very long intervention. I think that the hon. Lady has given the hon. Gentleman his advertisement; perhaps we can now return to the debate.
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I sense a rising demand for my book. Next Christmas is a little way off, but I have a couple of boxes of back copies which I will happily distribute.
As I was saying, part of our research involved examining the way in which other countries—Australia, Germany and Canada—operated financial relationships between state Governments and federal Governments, or provincial Governments, or whatever the term was in those countries. What struck us was that each of those countries has a system that comes close to what the Scotland Bill is proposing to introduce. Certain taxes are levied at the federal level. The example in each country varies, but some taxes are levied at the provincial level—the state level—and sometimes the state level has the power to introduce specific taxes of its own. That is balanced by a form of fiscal transfers between the federal level and the state level. There are perpetual arguments in all those countries about what the right level of spending, taxes, transfers and so on is—we will never get away from those—but on the whole the arrangements are stable. We can draw some comfort from the fact that the lessons from abroad point to the sort of system that the Bill is trying to introduce.
Conversely, there are few examples of a federal or devolved system of government where the lower level has full fiscal autonomy. Our research encountered only one example that came quite close to such an arrangement, which was in the Basque part of Spain. Since we did our work Catalonia has also adopted such an arrangement, but it is still fraught with difficulties. I do not believe that there is sufficient evidence from abroad to warrant the type of policy that the Scottish nationalists wish to introduce.
The hon. Gentleman says that the approach of the Basque country and others may be fraught with difficulties, but that country’s gross domestic product growth is now 30% higher than that of Spain as a whole and its credit rating is stronger than that of Spain as a whole. Although that sort of model may need to overcome obstacles, it clearly has had some success.
The hon. Gentleman has a more detailed knowledge of the current state of the Basque economy than I do, but our research showed that there were specific problems there. I shall discuss them in a moment, as they are directly relevant to the example in Scotland.
Does my hon. Friend acknowledge that joining the inland revenue contribution club is not a popular sport in Spain? The Spanish have found that devolving this responsibility results in the tax collection rate increasing substantially. No comparison can be made with the situation in this country, because one cannot escape the Inland Revenue.
Perhaps I should add that the Basque country and Catalonia have always had higher gross national product rates than the rest of Spain, so I do not think that the point made by the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) has much weight.
I am grateful for that intervention. I think it is unhelpful to make an exact analogy with a particular model. Spain has a very curious multi-speed system of devolution between its different constituent parts.
I promised to discuss why I do not believe, certainly at this point, that fiscal autonomy is feasible or desirable for the Scottish Parliament. There are huge unknowns in the fiscal relationship between Scotland and England, for the simple reason that we have never assigned tax revenues or allocated public spending on a straight territorial basis—that just has not happened. As part of our research for the book, I spent many hours enjoying and analysing the various forecasts and documents that the Scottish National party had published over the years giving its view on what Scotland’s net contribution to or net borrowing from the United Kingdom had been.
Part of the SNP’s criticism was that the official Government figures, as published in the annual Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland survey, were based on assumptions about what Scotland’s share of corporation tax or income tax should be. However, the SNP’s own figures are based on assumptions and projections. They disagree with the assumptions made, but they could not analyse particularly and exactly what the Scottish revenues were.
Before the hon. Gentleman intervenes, I wish to illustrate that point by discussing two SNP publications that examined the period between 1979 and 1997. In one document, published in October 1996, the SNP estimated that Scotland had contributed £91 billion to the UK over that period. Three months later, however, it published a separate report covering the same period which calculated that the figure had been £27 billion. Well, what is £60 billion between friends? The point is that anyone wanting to analyse this has to do it on the basis of assumptions, not hard facts.
I certainly agree that the Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland—GERS—survey is based on certain assumptions and calculations. Most of the documents, certainly over the past decade, have effectively taken the GERS assumptions and, if they have differed from them, have always explained why. Those differences tended to be marginal. The key question here is not SNP figures versus those of another party; it is the work done by organisations such as Oxford Economics or, about a year ago, Reform Scotland, which calculated a broadly balanced budget of about £50 billion out and £50 billion in. Those seem to be generally accepted pre-recession figures.
But surely the point is that, if we want to set up new fiscal arrangements between the constituent parts of the United Kingdom, we should not do it on the basis of assumptions. We should do it on the basis of hard facts, and one of the conclusions of the book is that we need to do more hard research and assign revenues and spending on a territorial basis. Such proposals are not in the Bill, but I hope that the Government will take those matters forward.
I shall give the House an example to illustrate why there would be a huge debate about the revenue. Let us take Standard Life, which is headquartered in Edinburgh. If corporation tax were devolved, the company would be domiciled as Scottish, yet it trades throughout the United Kingdom and has many policyholders in England who contribute to its profits. How would we determine which profits were Scottish and which were English? These are huge issues and they would have to be resolved before a full system of fiscal autonomy could be introduced.
I believe that it would be a difficulty, and I have seen no evidence from the Scottish National party that properly costs this or assesses what the split would be.
Are not the economies of England, Scotland and the rest of the UK so closely integrated and dependent on each other that the consequences would not be the same as might be the case for, say, Germany and France? On the hon. Gentleman’s point about Standard Life, I am not normally someone who tries to air scare tactics about what might happen to the financial services sector under independence, but would there not be a danger that some companies, faced with the choices and difficulties that he has outlined, might choose to move their headquarters out of Scotland precisely because of the consequences of a differential in corporation tax rates?
That is exactly the point. The relationship between Scotland and England is so interwoven that to start to unpick it now would be hugely complicated and difficult. On the point about pensions, I have mentioned the potential difficulties under the current proposals that would need to be clarified. If there were full fiscal autonomy, those problems would be magnified many times over. People might have made national insurance contributions all through their lives. How would all that be untangled to sort out the different rights and contributions? The process would be enormously complicated. I am not saying that it would be impossible, but I do not believe that it is practical at this point in time. I hope that my right hon. Friends on the Front Bench will take up my point that we should move towards assigning revenues and spending on a straight territorial basis, so that in time we might be able to move to a system involving much greater devolution of fiscal power down to the Scottish Parliament.
The hon. Gentleman’s speech is throwing up practical issues that would have to be resolved in any circumstances. On his first concern, would the broad principle not be accepted that the tax liability would follow the economic activity? On his second concern about corporation tax rising, I would prefer to see corporation tax falling. Is it not odd that we have a party that is very keen on tax competition until it comes to Scotland’s competing? Is that not slightly contradictory?
It is not a contradictory at all and I am not saying that I rule out that possibility. My book does not rule it out. All I am saying is that at this point in time it would be an enormous leap in the dark that would throw up so many unintended consequences that it would be a foolhardy move. I welcome the sensible incremental step that the Bill is taking.
I have probably been indulged by the House rather longer than I intended. I want to move briefly to one other point before I resume my seat. It concerns another part of the Bill about which I have a specific concern, and that is the proposal to devolve down to the Scottish Parliament the power to set the drink-driving limit. I am a member of the Select Committee on Transport and we have just concluded an investigation into the drink-driving limit. Part of the evidence we received was a strong representation from the police that we should not have a different drink-driving limit in different parts of the United Kingdom. I am not against the power’s being devolved, but want to put it on the record that I would not wish the consequence of that devolution of power to be a marked difference in the Scottish and English drink-driving limits. That might cause some practical problems in border constituencies such as that represented by my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (John Stevenson), who is no longer in his place.
In conclusion, I welcome the Bill. It is a huge step forward, even for people like me who were devolution sceptics to begin with. It will do an enormous amount to strengthen the Scottish Parliament and the Union. I look forward to supporting it in the Lobby tonight.
What I think we would agree about—I think this has been the consensus—is that we should have a needs-based formula. What possible objection could anybody have to a formula based on need? Members have mentioned adjustment for deprivation, and fine, let us go with that, but the difficulty that we have got into is that we have never adjusted the Barnett formula for population change.
I must correct my hon. Friend. The Barnett formula has been adjusted in the past to take account of population changes. He is quite correct to suggest that it was not adjusted for the first 15 or 16 years, which led to a more generous settlement year on year than a strict population count would have allowed, but I believe that it was Michael Portillo, when he was Chief Secretary to the Treasury, who introduced a mechanism by which the percentage by which Barnett changes each year would be directly related to Scotland’s share of the UK population.
My hon. Friend is right to say that the Barnett consequentials each year take the correct, current relative population into account. However, the formula does not do that to the body of spending that is adjusted by those consequentials. He will find that very clearly in the reports of the House of Lords Select Committee and the Holtham commission.
One of my bugbears in this debate is that when we talk about the Barnett formula, we forget that Barnett does not change the baseline lock, it aggregates the annual changes in UK Departments’ spending and then adds on a population share percentage and a relevance factor percentage. My hon. Friend’s point is about changing the baseline. I believe that the Government have opened up the possibility of that in future, but we must be careful to point out that the Barnett formula deals only with year-on-year changes.
I thank my hon. Friend, but I have two points in response. First, the Government have said that they will not review the formula in the lifetime of this Parliament. Secondly, the outcome allocation that is consequent on what we call the Barnett formula takes into account two things—the spending brought forward and the Barnett consequentials. The first of those is not adjusted for population, and the second is.
Since I have nearly got to the end of my remarks, I will not take any more interventions on this subject, but—
Notwithstanding the deflationary bias, there might be growth in some elements of income tax revenue, but in terms of sharing risks the downsides for Scotland are much greater. In an intervention, I said that, if a future Scottish Government chose, for example, to reduce income tax to stimulate economic growth and it worked, they would take the hit in reduced income tax revenue, but the UK Government would benefit from the additional corporation tax yield. There are probably more downsides than upsides, because the range of devolved taxes is limited and, in cash terms, involve almost exclusively income tax.
The other problem is that the provisions fall foul of not being fully devolved. Income tax rates do not stand on their own; they must be looked at alongside allowances and thresholds, neither of which is being devolved. So the consequence of a significant change, in particular the UK Government’s plan to increase personal allowances to £10,000, which in principle is a very good policy, could mean a reduction in funding to Scotland of between £800 million and £1 billion a year.
One second.
I am sure that such a change will not be allowed to happen, but UK Governments have announced 17 changes to income tax since 2007, and they would have affected the proportion of income tax revenue or receipts assigned to the Scottish Government. Those changes included not only the big headline splash on the £10,000 threshold, but 16 others, each of which would have affected the assignation of receipts to Scotland.
Even if the provisions did not result in a real-terms cut to the Scottish budget, which I believe they do, and even if they did not create an in-built deflationary bias, which I believe they do, they would still provide an unstable platform for the Scottish Government, precisely because of the volatility of income tax receipts in difficult times. At no time was that clearer than between 2007-08 and 2009-10, when income tax receipts fell by 7.3%. Over those two years, that would have led to a drop in Scottish revenue in excess of £1 billion, and that is presumably the point at which the revenue-borrowing powers are meant to kick in and help. I shall take the hon. Gentleman’s intervention now, because the next part of my speech is complicated.
I want to return to the hon. Gentleman’s point about changes to income tax allowances and other changes to the UK rates of income tax that would have a consequential effect. If I have read the Command Paper correctly, there will be a no-detriment rule. Therefore, if a change in the allowance structure has a consequential effect, the block grant will be adjusted appropriately.
That is what the Command Paper says, but because the Barnett rules have the effect of squeezing income, we will have to see precisely how the no-detriment clause works. Will it be an up-front no-detriment clause that pays against forecasts, or will it be retrospective and pay only if the estimate be lower than the forecast? None of that is at all clear yet. That is precisely the kind of issue that we want to probe with more detailed amendments in Committee.
The limited borrowing powers are slightly poorly designed and would constrain the Scottish Government, rather than assist them. Fundamentally, the borrowings can be made not against forecast reductions in revenue, but against reconciled outturn receipts 12 months after the end of the financial year. That means that revenue borrowing cannot even act as an automatic stabiliser to fill the tax gap during a downturn—something that every party accepts is necessary and supports. In short, the powers will expose the Scottish Government to the full negative impact of the economic cycle, rather than present them with the ability to mitigate those problems.
Secondly, revenue borrowing will be capped at £200 million in a single year and at £500 million in total. Therefore, even if the timing of the borrowings could have been sorted out, the limits would have been inadequate to close the revenue gaps in 2008-09 and 2009-10, when the calculated budget shortfalls were £400 million and £800 million respectively. That might be what the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun meant when she referred to the economic parts of the Bill.
Thirdly, the repayment of borrowings within four years almost certainly means that repayments will have to be made at precisely the wrong point in the economic cycle. To make that point more solid, I should explain that the proposals would have required the revenue borrowing needed to cover the shortfalls between 2008-09 and 2009-10 to be repaid in the current comprehensive spending review period, when the Scottish block grant is already under pressure from proposed cuts of more than £3 billion. Borrowing and repayment should be possible over the entire economic cycle and should not have arbitrary timelines attached to them. Cyclical borrowing can mitigate volatility, but the proposals will generate additional volatility in future budgets.
The highly limited revenue borrowing powers that are proposed will be further constrained because the first 0.5% of any shortfall—about £127 million in 2014-15—will have to be found from cuts in the cash reserve before retrospective revenue borrowings can even be found.
The second borrowing power in the Bill is for capital expenditure. It is welcome, but could be improved. The cumulative borrowing total that is set out is £2.2 billion. That is quite low compared with recent Scottish Government investment of more than £3 billion a year. Borrowing in any year will be limited to 10% of the capital DEL—approximately £230 million by 2014-15—not the total budget. For example, a replacement Forth crossing costing between £1.7 billion and £2.2 billion would use up the entire additional capital borrowing, if we were able to secure it under the constrained limits set out by the Treasury. The only way to increase the limit to allow additional borrowing would be for the UK Parliament to agree to a legislative amendment. I am not sure that that is the best approach for securing long-term sustainable capital investment.
The borrowing powers in the Bill will limit the Scottish Government to certain types of borrowing. They will be able to use loans, rather than bonds or other instruments that would provide greater flexibility. Transport for London, which is a local authority in respect of its borrowing powers, is currently issuing commercial paper worth £7 billion for Crossrail and other projects. Birmingham city council issued paper to the tune of £250 million in 2006, and it seems passing strange that what should be seriously enhanced powers for the Scottish Parliament would not even put it on a par with TFL or Birmingham city council in its ability to raise cash through commercial paper for important national infrastructure works.
We are also concerned, like the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun, that the Bill might not provide access to capital quickly enough to meet Scotland’s needs. The proposal is that access will commence from 2013, subject, as we heard earlier, to Treasury approval on a per-project basis. In the face of the budget cuts and the urgent need to invest in infrastructure, that is not soon enough.
The remaining tax proposals in the Bill are limited, although welcome. I have to say, however, that the Conservatives appear to have U-turned on some of the taxes that Calman said should be devolved. As I said, this is not a dry, academic exercise, and we would like stamp duty to be incremental, so that people do not pay the full whack for hitting the threshold. I am glad that responsibility for that is being devolved. It was worth £593 million in Scotland in 2008-09, but that was only 1.4% of all the non-North sea revenue raised in Scotland.