Scotland Bill

David Mowat Excerpts

Thursday 27th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Iain Stewart]

I beg the hon. Gentleman’s patience, as I will turn to those points in a moment.

[David Mowat (Warrington South) (Con)]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful point about the threat to the Union posed by a perception of unfairness in relative funding, and giving Scotland control over its tax revenue raising will partially address that. However, it is widely accepted that the baseline, under the Barnett allocation, is 15% to 20% higher than it would be in equivalent places in England, and that is an issue for the Union.

[Iain Stewart]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I am not sure whether his birthday is coming up, but I will happily send him a copy of my book, which goes into the matter in some detail. The baseline funding for Scotland is an important point, but whether to have a needs-based assessment is not part of the Bill, although the Bill opens up the possibility that that will be reviewed in future.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Mowat (Warrington South) (Con)]

Before I get into my remarks, may I apologise to the House for three things? First, it is not my birthday; secondly, I have not written a book; and thirdly, I think I am the first speaker in the debate not to have a Scottish accent. I do have a Scottish name, however, so I shall do my best with that.

I really have only one point to make about the Bill to those on the Government Front Bench. Overall, it is a good Bill that takes what Calman recommended and implements it sensibly. Indeed, a whole set of well-made recommendations will be introduced. The principal part of the Bill, as others have said, relates to fiscal autonomy, the change in the level of the block grant and the compensatory change to income tax. The theory behind it is absolutely spot-on, because it is right that Scotland is given an incentive to nurture its own tax base and to become accountable for how it spends that money. The important issue, which is not directly in the Bill but an unintended consequence of it, however, is the baseline for that allocation, the current Barnett settlement. The Barnett formula is not a subject for today’s debate, but others have spoken about it, and I shall put in my tuppence-worth.

The formula has been going for 35 years, and the most recent review of it was last year by the Lords Barnett Formula Committee, which produced an excellent report that received a poor response from the then Government. People accept that the formula no longer represents a needs basis for the allocation of moneys. The Calman report accepted that point, too, but the reason why we persevere with the formula is inertia. In the response to the Lords Committee, it was accepted that the formula was straightforward, but there are two reasons why it provides the wrong result. First, there has been no attempt to make any changes based on relative population movement over the past 35 years between the three countries in the Union which are most affected, Wales, England and Scotland. The result, as Holtham stated, is that the settlement for Scotland is about £4 billion more than it would be if it was worked out on a needs basis.

How does that relate to the Bill? The baseline will use that higher amount to set income tax, and to flex it up and down. In consequence, it will be harder to change the Barnett formula in future, because it will be linked directly to the level of income tax in Scotland in a way that it is not at the moment. From a political point of view, it would be hard for people to accept that the UK Government, while making a fairer allocation, were forcing up income tax in Scotland.

A second unintended consequence of the current baseline is that Scotland will for ever have a larger public sector in its economy than in England. I say to colleagues on the Government Benches, of whom there are not many, that it is wrong for us to go on about Scotland having to rebalance its economy towards the private sector and away from the public sector if we approve a formula that makes it arithmetically impossible for that to happen.

[Mrs Laing]

Does my hon. Friend accept the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes South (Iain Stewart) that the Barnett formula works in the way it does not just because Scotland is Scotland, but because Scotland has certain features, such as areas of deprivation in its inner cities and very rural areas where transport costs are enormous, that mean that it deserves greater spending in certain areas? Such areas are also found in certain parts of England and Wales.

[David Mowat]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. She made two points, the first of which was about sparsity. Scotland is more spread out than the rest of the UK. Page 18 of the Holtham report takes that sparsity into account. The Scottish national health service has to take sparsity into account in the allocation of money. Parts of Scotland are very spread out, such as the highlands and islands, Orkney and the Hebrides. The Scottish NHS adjustment in respect of that, which was validated by the Holtham formula, was 1.5%. We are dealing with a figure of 20%.

The second point that my hon. Friend made was about deprivation. There are areas of deprivation all over the country. That is why it is so important that the formula is based on need. There can be no argument about that.

[Anas Sarwar]

When discussing the rights and wrongs of the Barnett formula, would it not be sensible to compare the averages for Scotland and Wales to different regions of England, because the north of England receives almost the same amount per head as Scotland?

[David Mowat]

Paradoxically, the part of England that receives the most per head is London.

[Pete Wishart]

The hon. Gentleman said that London secures the most identified public spending—that is before we get into unidentified public spending. I am grateful to him because he has been very consistent in his view, which is a valid view held by Conservative Back Benchers, that Scotland’s budget should just be cut. Those on the Government Front Bench, with Labour support, want to cut Scotland’s budget through the financial measures in the Bill. The hon. Gentleman and I can surely agree that the way to resolve this is to give Scotland full financial autonomy on these issues—he would benefit and I would benefit. Surely that is the right way forward.

[David Mowat]

What I think we would agree about—I think this has been the consensus—is that we should have a needs-based formula. What possible objection could anybody have to a formula based on need? Members have mentioned adjustment for deprivation, and fine, let us go with that, but the difficulty that we have got into is that we have never adjusted the Barnett formula for population change.

[Iain Stewart]

I must correct my hon. Friend. The Barnett formula has been adjusted in the past to take account of population changes. He is quite correct to suggest that it was not adjusted for the first 15 or 16 years, which led to a more generous settlement year on year than a strict population count would have allowed, but I believe that it was Michael Portillo, when he was Chief Secretary to the Treasury, who introduced a mechanism by which the percentage by which Barnett changes each year would be directly related to Scotland’s share of the UK population.

[David Mowat]

My hon. Friend is right to say that the Barnett consequentials each year take the correct, current relative population into account. However, the formula does not do that to the body of spending that is adjusted by those consequentials. He will find that very clearly in the reports of the House of Lords Select Committee and the Holtham commission.

[Iain Stewart]

One of my bugbears in this debate is that when we talk about the Barnett formula, we forget that Barnett does not change the baseline lock, it aggregates the annual changes in UK Departments’ spending and then adds on a population share percentage and a relevance factor percentage. My hon. Friend’s point is about changing the baseline. I believe that the Government have opened up the possibility of that in future, but we must be careful to point out that the Barnett formula deals only with year-on-year changes.

[David Mowat]

I thank my hon. Friend, but I have two points in response. First, the Government have said that they will not review the formula in the lifetime of this Parliament. Secondly, the outcome allocation that is consequent on what we call the Barnett formula takes into account two things—the spending brought forward and the Barnett consequentials. The first of those is not adjusted for population, and the second is.

Since I have nearly got to the end of my remarks, I will not take any more interventions on this subject, but—

[Gemma Doyle (West Dunbartonshire) (Lab/Co-op)]

rose—

[David Mowat]

Maybe one more.

[Gemma Doyle]

I am very grateful. Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the proposals to which he refers, which he seems to support, could actually lead to a £4.5 billion cut in the amount of money spent on Scotland? Is that what he proposes, and does he want to see it happen?

[David Mowat]

What I propose is that the allocation be done on a needs basis that is fair to the constituents whom I represent as well as to hers.

[David Mundell]

I very much respect what my hon. Friend says. He took part in a Westminster Hall debate on the issue, and I am sure the Chancellor and other colleagues are listening to him. We need to be clear, though, about whether he is arguing for a needs-based assessment across the whole UK. The hon. Member for Glasgow Central (Anas Sarwar) drew attention to the fact that there are significant differentials within England. The difference between the highest and lowest per capita public spending in England is £2,537, which is much greater than the difference between the Scottish and English average. We need to be clear about whether my hon. Friend and those who make the same argument want a change in spending within England, or just between the constituent parts of the UK.

[David Mowat]

The difference that we are really talking about today is the one between the constituent parts of the UK, but I have no difficulty with also applying that to the constituent parts of England. As I said, a needs-based formula is fair.

If my constituency of Warrington South, which has areas of great deprivation and some better-off areas, were in Scotland, the average constituent would receive £900 more. That is not fair—I get a considerable postbag about it. Today’s debate is not on the Barnett formula, but unless we address the matter at some point, it will become a tension in the Union from the other direction. We need to be cognisant of that, and we need to be careful.

[Ann McKechin]

The hon. Gentleman mentions basing the determination on needs. In last Wednesday’s Adjournment debate, to which the Under-Secretary referred, there was some discussion about the system in Australia. It is based on needs, and there is a commission that makes a judgment. There is frequent argument between the federal states about the definition of needs, and some commentators are now saying that they want to move back to a per capita formula, just like the Barnett formula. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that stability might be a better prize?

[David Mowat]

I do not agree that stability is a better prize if it is based on something that is wrong. I agree that it is difficult to compute need, but that is no reason not to try. We have let the matter drift. One of the determinants is relative population movement—I repeat that, notwithstanding the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes South (Iain Stewart); I guess we can discuss that later in the bar.

I ask the Under-Secretary to table a simple amendment to the Bill to provide for revising the block grant allocation to take account of relative need, in the way that the House of Lords Committee on the Barnett formula and the Holtham commission recommended last year and in previous years.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stewart Hosie]

The arguments in favour of the reasoned amendment will be made and they will explain, I hope with some support, why there are flaws in the Bill.

The Bill contains two fundamental fiscal measures: first, the reduction in the basic higher and additional rates of income tax by 10p, and the setting of a Scottish rate to compensate for that; and secondly, the availability of limited revenue and capital borrowing powers. Revenue borrowing will fill a part of the gap left when revenue decreases and a limited increase in capital borrowing will enhance direct capital investment.

However, the income tax powers are inadequate and include an in-built, long-term deflationary bias in the Scottish budget. The borrowing powers, particularly the revenue powers, are so tightly controlled that they are unlikely to be effective in delivering the sensible outcomes that many of us want. It is also worth noting that even the devolution of the income tax, the small stamp duty land tax and the landfill tax means that the Scottish Parliament will still have direct control of only 15% of the taxes raised in Scotland, with the remaining 85% accruing directly to London. I do not intend to talk about full fiscal autonomy, which there has been some talk of, but as a comparator we can look to the Basque country, which has been mentioned. It controls around 86% of its revenue.

I want to concentrate on the specific problems with income tax provisions. Receipts are sensitive to changes in economic circumstances and might fall dramatically in a downturn, as I will explain later. That presents an instability to the budget in Scotland, because we are talking mainly about income tax and the shortfall that would not be matched by the Bill’s provision of very limited borrowing powers. Growth in income tax revenue is low when compared with that of total tax revenue, and that is obviously deflationary, because only the modest growth in income tax will accrue to the Scottish Parliament, with the higher growth in total tax accruing still to London.

The figures between 2004-05 and 2008-09, for example, show that total tax revenue increased by £13.7 billion, but under the proposed plan the Scottish Government, although they control 15% of the tax, will receive only 9% of the increase. That automatically begins to squeeze the Scottish budget. Even within income tax, the most significant growth comes from the higher rates, and most of that growth will not be available to Scotland.

Historically, higher rate taxpayers account for a larger share of the growth in tax receipts, and therefore most of the growth in income tax receipts will accrue directly to Westminster, not to Scotland. We might, in fact, receive a declining share of Scotland’s income tax yields, because we are assigned half the basic rate, one quarter of the 40% rate and only 20% of the 50% rate. The impact of that deflationary bias can best be demonstrated by assuming that the powers had been in place since 1999-2000. Since then, the impact of the shortfall against forecast departmental expenditure limits would have represented an accumulative cut of about £8 billion.

[David Mowat]

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point about a deflationary bias vis-à-vis the total tax take, but, in comparing the proposal before us with the status quo, what is relevant is the increase in income tax versus the increase in public spending. That is the basis on which the current Barnett allocation works, and on that basis Scotland is likely to do better in the short term.

[Stewart Hosie]

That is not necessarily true, and we need to look at both these measures: the growth in income tax versus the growth in total tax, and the percentage of the share of growth that we receive from income tax alone, owing to how it will be assigned to Scotland, with most of the higher parts being accrued still by the UK, where growth is likely to be higher.