(7 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman talks about Teesside taxpayers, but Ben Houchen has never imposed a mayoral precept in Tees Valley, full stop. At the same time, he has saved Teesside airport and secured a new freeport for Teesside—no wonder people will be voting for him again.
Has my right hon. Friend seen the video that is doing the rounds of the theft in a shop in my constituency, Boots the chemist on Station Road? In the space of eight minutes, two threatening individuals robbed thousands of pounds out of that shop, and they are not alone: it is happening again and again. In fact, one of my team went out and photographed them leaving brazenly, not caring, and even spitting at the police. Will my right hon. Friend please now say to the Home Secretary, and through him to the police, that this is not a petty crime? This is a threat of violence and massive robbery, and it should be a priority for the police. We always talk about more police; surely what we should be asking for is more effective policing that gets those criminals off the streets.
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right to highlight this issue: often, the allegedly lower-level crimes are the ones that have the biggest impact on communities. I know that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has been very clear on that point, and I will make it to him again. That is also why we are rolling out a range of crime prevention measures through the safer streets fund; it is why we are improving CCTV and street lighting; and it is why we introduced the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 to give the police greater powers to deliver tougher sentences for more serious offenders.
(8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the right hon. Gentleman for his questions. I shall seek to address as many of them as I can.
When it comes to Chinese motivations, ultimately, it is a matter for the Chinese to be able justify their motivations, but the points that the right hon. Gentleman made were apposite. First, the Chinese look at successful democratic countries, such as the United Kingdom, Japan or the Republic of Korea where I was last week, and they want to seek to undermine them. It is no surprise therefore that they should seek to interfere in electoral processes, in the way that we have seen conduct from Russia that aligns with that. Indeed, the successful democratic elections around the world right now stand in contrast to the sham elections that we saw in Russia last weekend.
On the right hon. Gentleman’s point about the public record of the Electoral Commission, I think that that is the essence of what has happened here. These attacks and these attempts were ultimately pretty unsuccessful. I reassure the right hon. Gentleman and Members of this House that there was no infiltration of the closed register of the Electoral Commission, so the concerns that he raised have not arisen. On the further strengthening of the electoral register, that is precisely the work that the National Cyber Security Centre does in co-ordination with GCHQ, working with Government agencies, including the Electoral Commission.
The right hon. Gentleman was right to raise the risk of hack and leak. It is certainly something that we saw in previous elections, and I remain concerned. I also remain very concerned about artificial intelligence, deep fakes in particular, being used to disrupt elections, hence the work that I undertook at the conference last week and the progress that we are making with the accord on artificial intelligence use by malign states.
In relation to targeted sanctions, it is not the case that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office paused targeted sanctions. On the conduct of the former Foreign Secretary—[Interruption.] I am not sacking the Foreign Secretary from the Dispatch Box. On the conduct of the current Foreign Secretary, who sits in the other place, all appointments to Government are subject to the usual propriety and ethic processes. Lord Cameron is addressing the 1922 Committee in his capacity as Foreign Secretary in the usual way, addressing a wide range of issues. It is not a specific briefing on this issue, but if leaders of the principal Opposition parties wish to have a further briefing on this issue I am of course very happy to facilitate that, in the way that they know I have done in relation to other national security issues.
We are highly alert to the risks of hostile states hoovering up currently quantum-encrypted information that could subsequently be decoded with advances in quantum computing. We do extensive work with the National Cyber Security Centre and the Ministerial Cyber Board on critical national infrastructure to ensure that we guard ourselves against exactly that risk. On our relationship with China more broadly, Members of this House should take this moment very seriously. It is a grave moment, against a backdrop of an escalating threat from China, and we will take proportionate action in response to that escalating threat.
Tomorrow, it will be three years since parliamentarians here were sanctioned; your defence of us, Mr Speaker, has been remarkable. Although I welcome the two sanctions from the Government, it is a little bit like an elephant giving birth to a mouse. The reality is that in those three years the Chinese have trashed the Sino-British agreement and been committing murder, slave labour and genocide in Xinjiang. We have had broken churches, and, in Hong Kong, false court cases against Jimmy Lai. My question is: why two? America has sanctioned more than 40 people in Hong Kong; we have sanctioned none, and only three lowly officials in Xinjiang. Surely the integrated review should be changed. China is not an epoch-defining challenge, strange as that may be, but it is surely a threat. Can the Government now correct that, so that we all know where we are with China?
My right hon. Friend’s views are well known to me, I genuinely welcome the constructive, at most times, debate that I have with him, but nobody should be in any doubt about the gravity of this matter. These are not the actions of a friendly state, and they require our serious attention. As he has described, this is an escalating situation. The measures that we have announced today are the first step, but the Government will respond proportionately at all times to the facts in front of us. No one should be in any doubt about the Government’s determination to face down and deal with threats to our national security, from wherever they come.
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberProper scrutiny is provided by the Intelligence and Security Committee. I certainly take the reports produced by the ISC very seriously—[Interruption.] I am fully aware of the membership of the Committee, to reassure Opposition Members. It is precisely because we take the recommendations so seriously that the Committee will receive a comprehensive response addressing all these points, including an update on the defending democracy taskforce.
It is appalling news that we have a potential espionage cell operating in and around Westminster. As a sanctioned individual alongside many of my colleagues, I am particularly perturbed by the news. Notwithstanding that, this should not perhaps come as a surprise, as the ISC, chaired by my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), has warned that the Government were ill-prepared and that the necessary security measures were not available.
I ask the Secretary of State a specific question: when was the Foreign Secretary told about the investigation? Was it before he went to Beijing? If he went to Beijing with this knowledge, did he raise it with his counterpart there? It is important to know that. With respect, it is no good coming to the Dispatch Box and telling us that we do not talk about such matters; the Prime Minister did so yesterday, and the investigation is not complete. What did the Foreign Secretary do?
I say to the Secretary of State that the problem lies in the mess we have got into over whether we define China as a threat or not? If it is a threat, why do we not call it that, take the action that is necessary to deal with it on that basis, and sanction some people?
My right hon. Friend, who is a former Cabinet Minister and current Privy Counsellor, knows full well that the Government do not provide a running commentary on updates and intelligence received by Ministers. I can assure him that the Foreign Secretary regularly raises electoral interference and interference with our democratic institutions with his Chinese opposite number. Specific cases, particularly those that are subject to an ongoing police investigation, would not, as is generally the case, be raised. On the wider principle, we have been robust and clear-eyed in addressing and raising these points with our Chinese opposite numbers.
On the action we have taken, I set out the steps that I took in respect of TikTok and Huawei, and I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend’s support for the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021, which we got to a very good place. There is not just that Act, but the National Security Act 2023, the National Security and Investment Act 2021 and the deployment of the carrier fleet. All those things have happened in the past short number of years. They are evidence of the seriousness with which the Government take this threat.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the hon. Lady for her questions. First, on how we ensure adherence, this instruction is going to Government Departments from the Cabinet Office, so we would expect that adherence to happen. We are one Government, and the Cabinet Office is responsible for co-ordination. Were there any evidence of non-compliance, I would take that up directly with the Ministers responsible for each of those Departments. I would expect them to take it seriously, as they have done in relation to previous guidance.
The hon. Lady raises an important point about the security of Members of Parliament. I discussed that with Mr Speaker prior to making this announcement, and there is already a high level of engagement between the Government and the parliamentary authorities, including through my right hon. Friend the Security Minister. Clearly, Parliament is independent of Government, but we are very willing to provide all necessary information to help parliamentarians make appropriate decisions.
On human rights abuses in China, that is something the Government have never been shy of calling out or engaging with the Chinese Government on, and we will continue to do so.
I say to my right hon. Friend—not to be churlish—so far, so good. Most of our allies have already done this, but I simply make the point to him that he cannot stop there. The reality is that, even though Government phones will have this taken out of them—this TikTok leak element—the key thing is that private telephones remain on Ministers’ desks and are used for communications. I honestly do not believe, whatever the complaints are, that in reality those private phones will never be used for Government business. They will be, they are, and there is no way of stopping that to some degree. Can he not now say that any Government Minister or senior official who has TikTok on their private phone should remove it, because that gets rid of the risk?
I have an amendment down concerning Hikvision cameras. I have never known it so difficult to drag any information out of Government as the sites at which they are using these cameras. They should now be removed from every single site that is a Government base, and the reality is that they are dragging their feet. Could he turn to that as well?
I thank my right hon. Friend for his questions. I will take the second point first. I am happy to meet him and provide further information about the sites where Hikvision is used. I should say that this point applies to surveillance technology from Chinese companies; it is not just about Hikvision.
The broader point my right hon. Friend makes is a legitimate one, and it is a balance that the Government have to try to get right. It is the case that many social media apps use huge amounts of data harvesting, and it is also the case that sophisticated foreign hostile state actors are perfectly capable of using many mechanisms to obtain bulk data aside from direct ownership. On balance, we believe that this is the correct approach.
Ministers of course need to exercise heightened caution in respect of the rules. It may be that communications devices are used for routine administration and so on, but substantive Government business should be conducted on Government devices. In addition, bespoke security advice is provided to Ministers, and they are expected to adhere to it.
(3 years, 12 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am pleased to say that the Minister for Digital Infrastructure has met every one of the parties my hon. Friend named; indeed, I have met many of them. Essentially, we are working across three strands. First, we are working with the existing vendors—there were three, now to become two—to secure them and make sure we do not lose a further one. We are also working with new potential incumbents such as NEC and Samsung. In addition, we are working across a range of countries, in particular the D10, to ensure that we work together to improve standards in telecoms.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who is being customarily generous in giving way, but can I just make a point to him and hear his answer? This situation has constantly been wrongly described as a market failure. It was not a market failure; the failure was in the reality of one country abusing and breaking World Trade Organisation rules on subsidies. The key problem has been that China has subsidised its providers dramatically, even over 100% on contract, which has killed this market over the last 10 years. Once we release the market by stopping that, the private sector will come back into this industry because competition will be real competition, not broken competition. That is the key point.
My right hon. Friend highlights one of a range of different market distortions that have been going on. To a certain extent, there will be some market correction, but the Government also need to intervene, and our diversification strategy addresses that. If we are to get existing vendors who are not currently in the UK market back in, or to create a new open RAN solution, we need to provide financial incentives, and the diversification strategy touches on many of the steps that we propose to take.
We are taking concrete steps towards a solution, but diversification is not just a problem to be solved. It is also an opportunity to be seized. As part of our strategy, we will invest in homegrown solutions that will put us at the forefront of developing 5G technology and all the transformative benefits it brings. The next phase of this work will be taken forward by the Telecoms Diversification Task Force, chaired by Lord Livingston, formerly of BT, and others. I am grateful for the work that he, industry and academic experts have done in developing the strategy and in taking it forward.
The Bill has not been designed around one company, one country or one threat. Its strength is that it creates an enduring, flexible and far-reaching telecoms regime, one that keeps pace with changing technology and changing threats, that supports billions of phone calls, email exchanges and file transfers in this country every day, and that is essential to the UK’s economy and its future prosperity.
I listened carefully to the concerns of Members on both sides of the House in designing the legislation, and I have sought to address those concerns head on in the Bill as it stands before the House. I genuinely hope that the Bill will command cross-party support and that we will be able to work together in the national interest to ensure the security of our telecoms networks. I commend the Bill to the House.
(4 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend is absolutely right to raise this point. The United Kingdom prides itself on the rule of law, a rules-based system and consistency, and that will remain the case, and of course we will welcome Chinese investment and investment from around the world. What has changed here are the US sanctions, and, as a result of those sanctions, we can no longer rely on Huawei equipment. Therefore, it is in the national interest to introduce this ban on new purchases from the beginning of the year.
I welcome the decision to eradicate Huawei from the 5G system, but I think that the Secretary of State can do it quicker than he says. I was listening to the “Today” programme the other day, and the head of BT said seven years, yes, but it could be done in five. Let us bring it forward to five, and make sure that it happens quickly. There is no reason why that cannot be done. The key point I want to make is that there are two contradictions in the Secretary of State’s statement. Having said that he is getting rid of Huawei in 5G, it is apparently fine for it to continue in 4G and 3G; it can go on for as long as anyone. It will be upgraded in software upgrades for the next decade. If it is a risk in 5G, why is it not a risk to us generally? Secondly, on human rights, we know that Huawei has lied in its declaration under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 that it has had no involvement in slavery. We know that now from Xinjiang Province. If we can prove that and are able to demonstrate it to this Government, will this Government ban Huawei altogether?
My right hon. Friend raises the distinction between 4G, 3G and 5G. First, 5G is the new technology. It is the successor to 3G and 4G. Indeed, as he said to this House previously, the reality of the 5G network is that it is fundamentally different, and it is a recognition of that fundamental difference that we are imposing these rules in respect of 5G. Of course, over time, 5G will be the replacement network and then, in turn, 5G will be replaced by 6G and, in all of that, Huawei will be absent.
(4 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt would be fair to give way to my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green first.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. Let me bring him back to the Government’s position. Is it correct, and does he agree, that the position of Her Majesty’s Government is now to move towards no involvement—I repeat: no involvement—of high-risk vendors in our system and that that, in the five-year period that he is talking about, will be the purpose of what they engage in?
I think we are all in agreement—certainly on the Government side of the House, and I believe that many Opposition Members also agree—that in an ideal world, there will be no need for any high-risk vendors at all. However, what we have to do, as a first step to getting to that point and within this Parliament, is ensure that we have developed the supply chain capacity. The point has been made by many right hon. and hon. Members that there is a lack of capacity on the supply side at the moment. That is why we are making this very strong commitment—by the way, this relates to the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis)—which will involve considerable expenditure by the Government to ensure that we work with our Five Eyes and other partners to develop new supply chain capacity in our political and national infrastructure in this Parliament, so that we can then commence the process of ensuring that we move away from high-risk vendors.
The rationale, as decided by the National Security Council, on advice from the agencies, was that that was a sustainable point—a cap from which we could start to work down. As my hon. Friend well knows, of course, there is a degree of arbitrariness in any number, but on balance it was decided that 35% was the appropriate place for us to land.
I am trying to help my right hon. Friend, believe it or not. I understood from the discussions that our position was clear. I accept that the engagement of the Five Eyes is a new position. I congratulate them on that. But critical to that is that the point of our engagement will start with, as the Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, my hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness (Matt Warman), said, moving towards no involvement of high-risk vendors. If we start by having diversification, we have no position for our Five Eyes partners. But if our purpose is to get this right for no involvement—I want the Secretary of State to say that now. If I do not get that—others can do as they like here—it will be my purpose to press the amendment to a vote.
When the telecoms security Bill comes forward, we will have the opportunity to have exactly this kind of debate. This is an amendment to a Bill that is about ensuring that we get broadband into blocks of flats. I completely appreciate why my right hon. Friend and others have chosen to table the amendment. The concerns of hon. and right hon. Members have been clearly heard and understand. This can be dealt with in the telecoms security Bill, but ahead of that, in recognition of those concerns, we already setting set out a pathway. First, we have made clear our intention to reduce our reliance on high-risk vendors as that diversification takes place. That gives further clarity to the House about the diversification process set out in the announcement from the National Security Council. Further, we have said we want to get to the position where we do not have to use them at all, which gives a sense of the clear endpoint and trajectory. But we are saying that in order to get from point A to point B we need to develop capacity, which is why we have said we will work with Five Eyes and other partners to develop this new supply chain capacity in our critical national infrastructure. Beyond all that, I recognise that this gives rise to tremendous questions about the basis on which the National Cyber Security Centre reached its decision. That is why for the first time we are saying that other than the ISC other Committees will have a chance to scrutinise and hold it to account for that decision.
(9 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Let me remind the hon. Lady of the statistics. There are 800,000 fewer people on relative low income, 300,000 fewer children on relative low income, 100,000 fewer pensioners on relative low income, 670,000 fewer workless households, and 390,000 fewer children living in workless households. Those are the real statistics. Let me make this point to the hon. Lady: it is far better for us to look at the real life chances of families that were left behind by Labour. Those families were trapped in poverty because they could not change their lives, but we are changing them.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the single best way out of poverty is to have a job, and is he pleased that the number of children in workless households is at a record low under this Government?
I welcome my hon. Friend to the House, and I agree with what he has said. Let me tell him about a couple of record lows. The number of workless households has fallen by more than 670,000 since 2010 and there are 50,000 fewer households in which no one has ever worked. Those are people who were left behind by the Labour Government.