The Battle of Britain

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Westminster Hall

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I cannot think of anyone I would rather have chairing this debate, so it is of course a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I congratulate the hon. Member for Tewkesbury (Cameron Thomas) on raising this matter. In the time that I have been in this place, I think this is the first debate we have had about the battle of Britain. I ask myself why we have not had one before—I am rather guilty in that regard myself.

I rise simply to make some comments about the fact that my father was a fighter pilot throughout the second world war. He flew almost constantly in Spitfires and came in during the latter stages of the battle of Britain, so I grew up with stories about what happened. Almost the first story that my father told me was about when he was just finishing off his training—somewhere up near Liverpool, I think—and he and a couple of others were in a pub that night.

This was just after Dunkirk, and a bunch of soldiers who had returned from Dunkirk saw these RAF figures sitting by the bar and immediately came and attacked them under the stupid belief—it was not their fault, because the information was not given to them—that the RAF had not turned up at Dunkirk, because they could not see the aircraft overhead. The truth is somewhat different, because the fighter pilots had gone inland to break up the bombers long before they got anywhere near the beaches. If they got near the beaches, it was too late. He said, “We bore”—how can I put it?—“the imprint of a disgruntled set of pongos, who I remembered all the way through the rest of my life.” But he went on to qualify as a fighter pilot.

Most fighter pilots were not trained massively. There was a rush to get them done, so they had no real combat training. What they had was basic training on the aircraft to go solo, a few fighter runs and feints, and then they would be sent off to their squadrons, so the first time they would understand how to fly the aircraft properly was in combat. My father talked about what he used to say to his pilots when he later became a squadron leader and eventually a group captain. He said, “I used to tell my pilots that you have to abandon all that you have learned and understand only one thing: you don’t get into this aircraft; you strap it on—it becomes an extension of you. If you learn that, this aircraft will never let you down. It can always go as far as you want, and it will test you, but you will always come out of it.” That stayed with him all the time, and his pilots, I think, had very good records as well.

It is worth reminding ourselves that of course it was the pre-war planning that enabled us to have enough time and warning to put the fighters up in the air to take out the bombers. Sir Robert Watson-Watt and others developed the chain of radars. The Germans never understood fully what that was about until too late. And of course there was Dowding’s two-pronged determination. No. 1 was that this home chain should exist, and the system to run it through the tables, with the WAAF—Women’s Auxiliary Air Force—pushing all the details about individual squadrons coming across. The second bit, which was really important, was his argument with Churchill about not sending Spitfires over to France. That was critical because had we done that, we would not have been ready and prepared for what was to come next. That was a very big dispute. I think Churchill never really forgave him for standing up to him on that, but he was right to have done so, because we were ready and prepared with the right squadrons and the right aircraft.

The other side of it was that although, as the hon. Member for Tewkesbury said, the Germans were never going to succeed, there was a period when they were pretty close, and that was when they were bombing the airfields endlessly. That meant that many squadrons were coming back to find their airfields destroyed and were having to be diverted to amateur airfields and everywhere else, where there was no support, no supply, no ammunition waiting for them and often no fuel. It would then take them longer to be ready, and by the time they were ready, it was almost too late.

Dowding was within, I think, two days of ordering his squadrons north of London, because they were pretty much exhausted, as they were not able just to come back and fly again. At that point, Germany switched the bombing to London. That was a critical moment. It gave him breathing space to reconstruct, rebuild, and be ready for them a second time when they came back to the airfields, and that is exactly what happened. His leadership in all this was critical, for which he was not properly rewarded directly afterwards but was later on. As the commanding officer, Dowding was as important to this as Nelson was to Trafalgar or as Wellington was to Waterloo, and we should honour him and others who worked with him.

My father got five gallantry medals during the war—two Distinguished Service Orders and three Distinguished Flying Crosses, which are all combat awards—but like many other pilots who were there, he did not ask questions about this. He became a very good friend of the actor Christopher Lee, who was the godfather to my brother. I remember as a young boy, sitting in a back room with my brother while they had a drink together—that was normal in those days—when he came through and said to me and my brother, “Your father is a man without fear.” This troubled me for some time. When I eventually was in the Army myself, one evening over a drink, I said to my father, “Christopher Lee said you are a man without fear.” He said, “That’s not true. A man without fear is a dangerous man, because he cares not about anybody else. I was scared all through the war, but I controlled it because I could not let those around me down.”

My father said that the toughest thing he ever had to do was to eventually deal with a pilot who had clearly lost it—who had broken. He had to send him down because he was a risk to the others around him. He said that these men would break down in tears in front of them because that was the end of their time—that was it; there were no further chances for them. He said, “That was the toughest thing you had to do; but, for the sake of the others, you made that decision, even though you hated doing it at the time.” Although they have become heroic figures, it is worth reminding ourselves that every day they were fighting for their lives and the lives of the people next door to them in the air. That is important.

I want to finish by saying that the lesson they taught us, from the 1930s all the way through, is one that we are now faced with again. We are faced by the growth of totalitarianism: brutal states like China, Russia and others, who will stop at nothing and who care nothing for human rights, nothing for the rule of law and nothing for freedom. These countries are growing in potency. Russia is invading a nation that is trying to become a democracy and fight for freedom. What we have to understand is that we are now under as big a threat as they were in the 1930s. We must understand that the preparation in the late ’30s is where we have to be today—I say that nodding to the Minister, who has served himself and will understand that fully.

There are three lessons that we draw from this. First, we can never appease dictators. Dictators of brutal totalitarian regimes must be confronted, never appeased. The second is: never trade land for peace. Fight for the souls and the hearts of those who honour freedom. Do not betray them with shabby deals, as we did in 1938, when we sold land of those we had no right to. The third bit, which I will finish on, is very simple: “Si vis pacem, para bellum”—“If you would have peace, prepare for war”—because if we are unready, you can bet that the others will not be. What is it that our fighter pilots taught us, those brave men who went on to fight through the rest of the war like my father and others? They said: “Never again find yourself in a situation where you have to put young men and women under fire because politicians failed to recognise what they had to do early on.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

Good afternoon, Sir Desmond. It is a genuine pleasure to serve under your chairmanship as we debate these momentous events in the run-up to Battle of Britain Day, which commemorates the 85th anniversary of the culmination of the battle on 15 September 1940. I congratulate the hon. Member for Tewkesbury (Cameron Thomas) on securing this very important and timely debate, which he introduced so very admirably. Lest we forget.

On a personal note, I regard it as a genuine privilege, as the son of a world war two veteran—albeit one who fought in the Royal Navy—to be able to sum up for His Majesty’s Opposition this afternoon. I would like to begin by declaring two personal interests, first as an amateur military historian and a battle of Britain buff in particular. Southend airport, which abuts my constituency, was RAF Rochford in 1940, one of Fighter Command’s vital forward airfields. Secondly, several years ago I worked with a former constituent and local historian called Steve Newman on a project to help restore and refurbish our official war memorial at Wickford. Steve is now involved in another ambitious project, this time to restore a world war two Hurricane, serial Z5134. With a dedicated band of helpers, he is attempting to rebuild this historic aircraft almost from the wheels up. I was privileged to view the fruits of their labour during the summer recess. Realistically, it will take them several years to achieve their ambition. I would like to place on record my admiration for what they are attempting, and to wish them every possible success.

Turning to the battle itself, there is no doubt that it was an example of heroism on multiple levels, beginning with the pilots, from some of the well-known aces, such as Peter Townsend, Bob Stanford Tuck, Douglas Bader and Sailor Malan, through to those who only flew in combat once and never returned. Those young men, some of whom had barely 10 hours on type, must have known before they took off that the chances of their returning alive were slim. Nevertheless, they took off anyway. In all, almost 3,000 allied pilots fought with Fighter Command in the officially defined period of the battle of Britain, which runs from 10 July to 31 October 1940.

However, it is important to note that the defence in the battle was by no means solely a British affair—far from it. As well as the RAF squadrons, those from other nations also played a crucial role, perhaps most famously the Polish 303 Squadron, based at RAF Northolt, which shot down more enemy aircraft—126—than any other squadron. It was supplemented by other Polish squadrons, plus the Czechs and Canadians, and indeed the three Eagle squadrons of American pilots who volunteered to fight with the RAF more than a year before Pearl Harbour.

History also owes a great debt to those who kept them flying, not least the ground crew of Fighter Command, but also the Royal Observer Corps, the General Post Office technicians who assisted with communications and those working in the factories to produce the iconic Spitfires and Hurricanes on which the defence so crucially depended. Although Churchill rightly paid tribute to “the few”, in fact there were many who contributed to that critical victory in 1940, the vast majority of whom never flew in combat.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I just wanted to make the small point that I was fortunate enough to sit next to Jock Colville, who was assistant private secretary to Churchill throughout the war. They were visiting Uxbridge on 15 September, when a huge armada gathered. Churchill was watching as, one by one, the lights went up, until everything was up. He said to the air officer commanding, “What are you going to do now? Where are your reserves?” The officer said, “We have no reserves, Prime Minister.” Churchill asked, “What will you do?” The officer said, “I don’t know about you, but I’m going to pray.” Jock Colville told me that, with that, Churchill stayed silent for three hours, something he never did, but that when he got into the car, he turned to him and said, “Never in the field of human conflict has so much been owed by so many to so few.”

[Mr Francois]

The whole House is grateful to my right hon. Friend for that very telling intervention. While I have the opportunity, I pay tribute to his marvellous speech and, more than that, to the wonderful service of his father, of whom he can be immensely proud.

Also fundamental were the RAF commanders, principally Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park, who famously commanded 11 Group, which bore the brunt of the battle. Park, a New Zealander, displayed tactical brilliance in the husbanding of his squadrons, while also fighting a highly aggressive and effective defence.

Overall, however, perhaps the greatest single contribution to victory was that of the leader of Fighter Command throughout the battle, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding. As well as being a pilot, Dowding was keenly interested in scientific development, which he pursued zealously when promoted to the Air Council in 1930, with responsibility for supply and research. That critical appointment was to have profound consequences for the subsequent conduct of the battle a decade later, as several right hon. Members have alluded to.

Dowding had three great attributes that materially contributed to the RAF’s victory. First, he possessed tremendous foresight. Like Churchill, he realised very early on that Nazi Germany and its nascent air force would one day provide a potentially fatal threat to Britain’s security, and he began to plan accordingly.

Secondly, Dowding’s genius—I use the word deliberately —was that he conceptualised years in advance the battle that the RAF would have to fight. He then used his new appointment enthusiastically to pull together multiple strands of scientific development, crucially including Watson-Watt’s experiments with radar, to create a highly resilient defensive system.

In May 1937, Dowding presciently delivered a lecture to the air staff regarding the air defence of Great Britain, in which the scenario he outlined was one of a war with a European dictator—the inference was obvious —attempting to starve Britain into submission by the aggressive use of submarines, but not before the United Kingdom had been subjected to an all-out assault designed to destroy the RAF and cripple the nation’s ability to make war, by remorseless attack from the air.

As head of the newly created Fighter Command from July 1936, Dowding went on to create a command and control network alerted by radar, all feeding into Fighter Command headquarters at RAF Bentley Priory, and supported by an organisation of group and sector headquarters designed to co-ordinate timely fighter interception of incoming German aircraft. That was all interconnected by a system of telephone and, later, teleprinter communications. The historian and operational analyst Stephen Bungay, in his brilliant book, “The Most Dangerous Enemy”, describes that system as “the world’s first intranet”, albeit an analogue version, half a century before Tim Berners-Lee. Critically, the Dowding system, as it became known, allowed the RAF to make best use of its resources in combating an enemy that frequently outnumbered it three, or even four, to one.

Thirdly, Dowding possessed tremendous moral courage in dealing with superiors, up to and including Churchill. The epic 1969 movie “The Battle of Britain”, with its all-star cast, opens with the Dowding letter of 16 May 1940, which my right hon. Friend the Member for Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale (David Mundell) referred to. In it, Dowding famously argued the need to conserve Britain’s fighter strength during the fall of France. As he trenchantly put it,

“if the Home Defence Force is drained away in desperate attempts to remedy the situation in France, defeat in France will involve the final, complete and irremediable defeat of this country.”

In Dowding, Britain possessed a commander with an absolutely single-minded determination to prepare meticulously for, to fight and then to win the battle, for which his pilots, whom he referred to affectionately as “my boys”, held him in particular reverence. His truly was the controlling mind that orchestrated the ultimately successful defence of these islands.

Like many commanders before him, Dowding was a maverick, but he was not an extrovert. He was socially awkward, which led to his nickname “Stuffy”. He never suffered fools gladly, and his manner could be abrupt, even when dealing with superiors, which ultimately led to his downfall. Nevertheless, he was a man utterly dedicated to his task, and one to whom history owes an immense debt. Arguably, had Dowding never been born we might even have lost the battle, as we would undoubtedly have been far less well prepared to fight it.