Hywel Williams
Main Page: Hywel Williams (Plaid Cymru - Arfon)Department Debates - View all Hywel Williams's debates with the HM Treasury
(10 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Deputy Speaker, and to do battle once more with the Exchequer Secretary, who seems to have been permanently seconded to the Wales Office—he is like a ringer, to use football parlance. We welcome him and the opportunity he now has to clarify some of the things that he was unable to clarify when we last debated the Bill.
On income tax, the Opposition’s priority is very clear: we believe that we ought to have a fair and progressive tax system across the whole UK. For us that means reinstating the 50p rate and having a starting rate of 10p. That will be far fairer for the people of Wales, and indeed the people of every other part of the UK, than the tax cuts for millionaires that the Exchequer Secretary has overseen at the Treasury.
In the context of the Bill, we have three further priorities. Our first priority—this is why we will support the Bill this evening—is to ensure that Wales has access to borrowing powers in order to offset the £1.6 billion that the Conservatives have cut from the budget for Wales. That is linked to the taxation powers set out in the Bill.
Our second priority is to ensure that Wales is not further disadvantaged by potential additional cuts to the block grant that might be associated with the transfer of tax powers, as we heard a moment ago from the Exchequer Secretary, and as I will test in a moment.
Our third priority is to test properly the costs and benefits to Wales of the transfer of additional powers, particularly in respect of tax, because one of the truths about the Bill thus far is that the Government cannot really be taking this seriously. If they took it seriously and thought that it would really benefit Wales, they would have done a bit of the work to determine what the net costs and benefits would be for Wales. They have undertaken no such analysis, which I think calls into question the seriousness with which they address it.
The hon. Gentleman has outlined three priorities. May I ask him, perhaps a little cheekily, which of those priorities is his priority?
If I understand the hon. Gentleman’s question correctly, the answer is borrowing powers for Wales, because we have seen £1.6 billion cut from the budget for Wales, which is money that could usefully be made up by borrowing. Of course, all the tax powers set out in the Bill—income tax and, more immediately, stamp duty and landfill tax and other minor taxes—are directly associated with those borrowing powers. We are keen to see those borrowing powers afforded to Wales, and therefore to see the Bill passed.
However, we have never said that income tax-varying powers are a Labour priority for Wales. We remain sceptical about the benefits they would afford to Wales. Our scepticism is entirely factually based. The Silk commission’s report looks extensively at the revenues Wales receives from taxes and compares them with expenditure in Wales. It determines, to put it in blunt terms, that Wales currently spends around £35 billion in public moneys and nets in revenues from tax receipts of around £17 billion. That leaves a significant deficit that would need to be made up by a Welsh Government, were they to be reliant to a greater extent on their own tax receipts.
The Minister explained a moment ago that, under the terms of the formula outlined in the Bill and in some of the explanatory material, Wales would of course benefit if the growth of GDP in Wales outstripped that of England, but he also said that it
“would be adversely affected if growth in Wales was slower.”
Although in recent years the rate of GDP growth has been faster in Wales than in England, he will know that historically—if we look at the past 20 years, for example, and certainly over any longer period—the rate has been lower in Wales than in England, for all the obvious demographic and industrial reasons. We need to be certain that Wales would not be worse off, in both the short and the long term. We remain suspicious that tax competition, which seems to be the Government’s driving ideological imperative on the matter, will not benefit Wales, for the reasons I have given.
The point I am making is that all the investment seems to be on an east-west basis, rather than on a north-south basis.
Apropos of that intervention, I would have thought that the hon. Member for Alyn and Deeside (Mark Tami) was rather more interested in developing the A55 than the M4.
I am sure that that very useful intervention will be noted by the constituents of the hon. Member for Alyn and Deeside (Mark Tami).
Plaid Cymru recognises the issue of congestion on the M4 corridor around Newport and wants investment to take place. However, the current Labour Welsh Government’s preference for a new M4 to the south of Newport at a cost of £1 billion is a disproportionate solution to the amount of congestion. According to Friends of the Earth and Professor Stuart Cole, the Welsh Government consultation documentation overestimated traffic growth in 2012 and 2013. The flows were lower than the Welsh Government predicted, so they do not have a strong enough statistical base on which to justify such a huge financial and environmental cost. As the Federation of Small Businesses has pointed out, committing the vast majority of Welsh borrowing capacity and money from outside the borrowing limit in the Bill to one single project is misguided and does not serve the whole of Wales or the whole of the Welsh economy.
I hope that my hon. Friends on the Front Bench will elaborate a bit more on the matter, but my guess is that they discussed the issue of reserved powers at earlier stages and a new clause is necessary to revive the debate on that on Report. I agree that this measure is relatively modest in asking that a report be laid, but I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Nia Griffith) will clarify that we are in favour of reserved powers, as described by the Leader of the Opposition in north Wales. There is no equivocation at all about whether we want reserved powers. We do. The new clause is framed in this way so that the House can debate what is an important issue.
From my reading of new clause 4, it does propose a reserved powers model, but that is contingent on a report not on the reserved powers model, but on borrowing by Welsh Ministers. The Opposition seem to be yoking two different things together. I suspect that it is a delaying, or even a wrecking tactic.
It certainly is not a wrecking tactic. I have made the position clear. I am just a Back Bencher, but Labour Front Benchers will also make it clear that the Labour party is committed to reserved powers for Wales. In the light of what is likely to happen in Scotland, that becomes much more important.
With all due respect to right hon. and hon. Members who have spoken today, I would like to begin with a quote that, for me, exceeds anything that has been heard today for eloquence:
“The will of the people is the only legitimate foundation of any government, and to protect its free expression should be our first object.”
I quote that in support of our new clause 3, which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd). The quote comes from Thomas Jefferson, third President of the United States, primary author of the declaration of independence and, as I am sure the Western Mail would remind us, one of 16 of the 56 signatories to the declaration who were of Welsh extraction. Jefferson’s argument is that the validity of any Government is bound up with their purpose of representing the will of the people. That could also claim to be the primary motive behind our new clause 3.
In Committee, we in Plaid Cymru tabled amendments, as my hon. Friend the Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr said earlier, that would grant further powers to the National Assembly, including the power for it to decide on the number of Assembly Members, change its name should it wish to do so, and make amendments to secure further financial powers. We were disappointed that more Members from other parties did not support those amendments, but this new clause encompasses them all.
We believe that decisions of this nature are better made when elected representatives have the backing of the people, and the most straightforward means of determining the will of the people on any particular subject is, of course, a referendum. New clause 3 would therefore give the National Assembly the power to hold binding referendums on issues already in its competence, and on questions relating to further transfers of constitutional or financial powers, such as those that have been proposed in respect of changes to income tax.
The National Assembly could ask the people of Wales questions such as how many Assembly Members they believe should sit in the Assembly, what the voting system should be, and whether new fields should be devolved if we do not get to the reserved powers model. That would give our people a clearer say in the Assembly’s decision-making process.
The Wales Bill allows for a referendum on the question of transferring to the Welsh Government power over 10% of income tax receipts, but the notion that there should be a new Bill in this place each time a referendum is needed on a reserved matter is convoluted, to say the least, and convoluted is not good: witness the wretched legislative competence order process. Plaid Cymru is not in favour of holding a referendum for the sake of it. For example, the transfer of minor taxes to Wales—as recommended by the Silk commission—without recourse to a referendum has set a precedent. We have argued that the planned referendum on income tax powers is not necessary, but circumstances will certainly arise in the future when holding a referendum will be the proper and practical way forward.
Unlike in other countries with written, codified constitutions, the transfer of such a power to Wales would require no official constitutional change; it could be done by an Order in Council. A recent precedent for that was signed into being by the Edinburgh agreement in 2012:
“The United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government have agreed to work together to ensure that a referendum on Scottish independence can take place…the referendum should: have a clear legal base, be legislated for by the Scottish Parliament, be conducted so as to command the confidence of parliaments, governments and people, deliver a fair test and a decisive expression of the views of people in Scotland and a result that everyone will respect”—
an excellent set of principles. The agreement goes on:
“The governments have agreed to promote an Order in Council under Section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998 in the United Kingdom and Scottish Parliaments to allow a single-question referendum on Scottish independence to be held before the end of 2014.”
There we have the basis for a referendum for Scotland and, I would argue, the basis for a power of referendum for the Assembly. That Scottish agreement is valid for that one referendum, and no other referendum can be held under those specific terms unless they are renewed. Our new clause, however, would confer a continuing power to the Assembly.
According to a recent study published by the Political Studies Association, there have been 49 independence referendums worldwide, both official and unofficial, with an average turnout of 79%—far higher than the average turnout in UK general elections over past years. I point out that in democratic countries after 1945, the average yes vote in such referendums has been 62%. Not all those referendums have been recognised by national or state Governments; for example, in 1946 the Danish Government refused to recognise the result of an independence referendum in the Faroe Islands. After negotiation, however, the islands were granted what we would now call devo-max: all powers except foreign affairs and defence were devolved.
The independence referendum due to be held in Catalonia on 9 November this year is highly likely to produce a yes vote. I suspect, however, that it will be ignored by the Spanish Government on their current form, as that has been Madrid’s response to the rolling programme of non-binding local community referendums on that subject, which have been held in hundreds of towns and villages across Catalonia from September 2009, and in which a large majority voted for independence. Madrid has ignored those developments to its cost: witness the enormous pro-independence demonstration by 1.5 million people out of a population of 7.5 million in Barcelona in September 2012. That was a huge show of public opinion, interest and support—we are talking about 20% of the entire population—and it perhaps would not have been quite so huge but for Madrid’s intransigence. That is why the Edinburgh agreement is so significant, and why I believe that, precedents having been set, Wales should have that same power. My discussions with Catalonian friends, and the attitude of the Spanish Government, bear out the superiority of the situation in the UK and the Edinburgh agreement. At least it is clear, and all sides are to be congratulated on that.
I am slightly confused about the argument. As the hon. Gentleman rightly points out, the situation in Madrid is one of Madrid refusing to recognise the right of the Catalonian Government to hold a referendum. The situation in Edinburgh is of an agreement between the UK and Scottish Governments, which showed that the two Governments could work positively together. The argument in favour of the new clause seems to be based on the failure of another Government in another country.
My remarks, which will appear in print tomorrow, will repay close reading, as that was precisely the argument I made. The position in Catalonia and the rest of Spain is far inferior to that in the UK, and I am pointing out the superiority of that Edinburgh agreement as the basis of my arguments for a legally binding system of referendums to be established for Wales.
In the UK, the important referendums and constitutional changes have occurred over the last 10 to 20 years, including the devolution referendum in 1979, the one in 1997, and the more recent referendum on our electoral system. In 2011, the people of Wales were asked in a referendum whether they wanted the Welsh Assembly to be given full and primary law-making powers; 63.5% of those polled voted yes. That stood in stark contrast to the results of earlier referendums that right hon. and hon. Members will remember. In 1979, for example, 79.7% voted against devolution; in 1999, there was a narrow majority of 50.3%, secured on a small turnout of 50.1%. That is how it was, but since then, I would argue that the people of Wales have grown to favour devolution, as have some right hon. and hon. Members in this place. The Assembly has grown in confidence, and as it gains further powers, it should surely have the power to ask the people of Wales what they think. That would be in the interest of legitimacy and accountability.
I referred to the Edinburgh agreement, and I suggest that a similar agreement in Wales should be called not “the Cardiff agreement” but “the Celyn clause”. This refers to Capel Celyn, which, Members will recall, was the village drowned in 1965 against the express wishes of elected and representative bodies throughout Wales—and, I understand, the wishes of every Welsh MP bar one. That was a transformational event in Welsh politics, and we have seen the effect of it over many decades. That effect is clear and provides a firm reminder of what can happen when the will of the people is so resolutely ignored. That is why we tabled new clause 3, giving the Assembly the right to hold legally binding referendums. I certainly commend it, but I assume that the matter will be discussed, possibly in greater detail, at some point in the future.
Let me make a few brief points about new clause 4. My Plaid Cymru colleagues and I have supported the reserved powers model for the National Assembly for a very long time. We are glad to see the Damascene conversion of the Labour Front-Bench team—better late than never! We certainly believe that this is the next step for our country; it would certainly clear up much of the confusion, not least in the minds of the public and others, as to the split of powers between the National Assembly and Westminster. I say to the Welsh public and others that I too often see people from the media refer to Assembly matters as if they were Westminster responsibilities, and vice-versa.
We in Plaid Cymru were, as I mentioned, against the LCO—legislative competence order—model, which so blighted the lives of those on the Welsh Affairs Committee and held up the pragmatic and practical transfer of the most innocuous of powers to the Welsh Government, as well as some rather more controversial powers. We wanted the boldest arrangements, but that was not forthcoming under the Government of Wales Act 2006—until the referendum. Circumstances have changed again, and the need for a move to a reserved powers model is even more pressing than before.
No one in this place or in the Assembly can be sanguine, given a recent survey showing how far we have failed as politicians to inform our constituents of the reality of the split in power. As I said, the media are far from blameless. Having said all that, it is disappointing that in the second part of their new clause 4, the hon. Members for Pontypridd (Owen Smith) and for Llanelli (Nia Griffith) have chosen to predicate any developments in relation to this matter on delaying the minor taxes. I must therefore view the new clause, I am afraid, as a delaying tactic at best, and as aimed at wrecking this part of the Bill at worst.
I support granting and extending borrowing powers to the Welsh Government. It is important that the Welsh Assembly has at least some facility to borrow what it deems necessary, as local government does. I also share the concerns expressed about the possibility of eventual tax competition, and I deeply regret that the Government have proposed no modification of the Barnett formula to address the shortfall in what Wales receives.
It also causes me concern that the Government do not appear to accept the need to address what we consider to be a fundamental shortcoming in the current devolution settlement. I believe that we need to move from a conferred powers to a reserved powers model, which would allow the Welsh Government to make law in any area unless it was clearly stated that they were unable to do so. That is why I support new clause 4.