Wales Bill

Guto Bebb Excerpts

Tuesday 24th June 2014 Commons Chamber

[Hywel Williams]

With all due respect to right hon. and hon. Members who have spoken today, I would like to begin with a quote that, for me, exceeds anything that has been heard today for eloquence:

“The will of the people is the only legitimate foundation of any government, and to protect its free expression should be our first object.”

I quote that in support of our new clause 3, which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd). The quote comes from Thomas Jefferson, third President of the United States, primary author of the declaration of independence and, as I am sure the Western Mail would remind us, one of 16 of the 56 signatories to the declaration who were of Welsh extraction. Jefferson’s argument is that the validity of any Government is bound up with their purpose of representing the will of the people. That could also claim to be the primary motive behind our new clause 3.

In Committee, we in Plaid Cymru tabled amendments, as my hon. Friend the Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr said earlier, that would grant further powers to the National Assembly, including the power for it to decide on the number of Assembly Members, change its name should it wish to do so, and make amendments to secure further financial powers. We were disappointed that more Members from other parties did not support those amendments, but this new clause encompasses them all.

We believe that decisions of this nature are better made when elected representatives have the backing of the people, and the most straightforward means of determining the will of the people on any particular subject is, of course, a referendum. New clause 3 would therefore give the National Assembly the power to hold binding referendums on issues already in its competence, and on questions relating to further transfers of constitutional or financial powers, such as those that have been proposed in respect of changes to income tax.

The National Assembly could ask the people of Wales questions such as how many Assembly Members they believe should sit in the Assembly, what the voting system should be, and whether new fields should be devolved if we do not get to the reserved powers model. That would give our people a clearer say in the Assembly’s decision-making process.

The Wales Bill allows for a referendum on the question of transferring to the Welsh Government power over 10% of income tax receipts, but the notion that there should be a new Bill in this place each time a referendum is needed on a reserved matter is convoluted, to say the least, and convoluted is not good: witness the wretched legislative competence order process. Plaid Cymru is not in favour of holding a referendum for the sake of it. For example, the transfer of minor taxes to Wales—as recommended by the Silk commission—without recourse to a referendum has set a precedent. We have argued that the planned referendum on income tax powers is not necessary, but circumstances will certainly arise in the future when holding a referendum will be the proper and practical way forward.

Unlike in other countries with written, codified constitutions, the transfer of such a power to Wales would require no official constitutional change; it could be done by an Order in Council. A recent precedent for that was signed into being by the Edinburgh agreement in 2012:

“The United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government have agreed to work together to ensure that a referendum on Scottish independence can take place…the referendum should: have a clear legal base, be legislated for by the Scottish Parliament, be conducted so as to command the confidence of parliaments, governments and people, deliver a fair test and a decisive expression of the views of people in Scotland and a result that everyone will respect”—

an excellent set of principles. The agreement goes on:

“The governments have agreed to promote an Order in Council under Section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998 in the United Kingdom and Scottish Parliaments to allow a single-question referendum on Scottish independence to be held before the end of 2014.”

There we have the basis for a referendum for Scotland and, I would argue, the basis for a power of referendum for the Assembly. That Scottish agreement is valid for that one referendum, and no other referendum can be held under those specific terms unless they are renewed. Our new clause, however, would confer a continuing power to the Assembly.

According to a recent study published by the Political Studies Association, there have been 49 independence referendums worldwide, both official and unofficial, with an average turnout of 79%—far higher than the average turnout in UK general elections over past years. I point out that in democratic countries after 1945, the average yes vote in such referendums has been 62%. Not all those referendums have been recognised by national or state Governments; for example, in 1946 the Danish Government refused to recognise the result of an independence referendum in the Faroe Islands. After negotiation, however, the islands were granted what we would now call devo-max: all powers except foreign affairs and defence were devolved.

The independence referendum due to be held in Catalonia on 9 November this year is highly likely to produce a yes vote. I suspect, however, that it will be ignored by the Spanish Government on their current form, as that has been Madrid’s response to the rolling programme of non-binding local community referendums on that subject, which have been held in hundreds of towns and villages across Catalonia from September 2009, and in which a large majority voted for independence. Madrid has ignored those developments to its cost: witness the enormous pro-independence demonstration by 1.5 million people out of a population of 7.5 million in Barcelona in September 2012. That was a huge show of public opinion, interest and support—we are talking about 20% of the entire population—and it perhaps would not have been quite so huge but for Madrid’s intransigence. That is why the Edinburgh agreement is so significant, and why I believe that, precedents having been set, Wales should have that same power. My discussions with Catalonian friends, and the attitude of the Spanish Government, bear out the superiority of the situation in the UK and the Edinburgh agreement. At least it is clear, and all sides are to be congratulated on that.

[Guto Bebb (Aberconwy) (Con)]

I am slightly confused about the argument. As the hon. Gentleman rightly points out, the situation in Madrid is one of Madrid refusing to recognise the right of the Catalonian Government to hold a referendum. The situation in Edinburgh is of an agreement between the UK and Scottish Governments, which showed that the two Governments could work positively together. The argument in favour of the new clause seems to be based on the failure of another Government in another country.

[Hywel Williams]

My remarks, which will appear in print tomorrow, will repay close reading, as that was precisely the argument I made. The position in Catalonia and the rest of Spain is far inferior to that in the UK, and I am pointing out the superiority of that Edinburgh agreement as the basis of my arguments for a legally binding system of referendums to be established for Wales.

In the UK, the important referendums and constitutional changes have occurred over the last 10 to 20 years, including the devolution referendum in 1979, the one in 1997, and the more recent referendum on our electoral system. In 2011, the people of Wales were asked in a referendum whether they wanted the Welsh Assembly to be given full and primary law-making powers; 63.5% of those polled voted yes. That stood in stark contrast to the results of earlier referendums that right hon. and hon. Members will remember. In 1979, for example, 79.7% voted against devolution; in 1999, there was a narrow majority of 50.3%, secured on a small turnout of 50.1%. That is how it was, but since then, I would argue that the people of Wales have grown to favour devolution, as have some right hon. and hon. Members in this place. The Assembly has grown in confidence, and as it gains further powers, it should surely have the power to ask the people of Wales what they think. That would be in the interest of legitimacy and accountability.

I referred to the Edinburgh agreement, and I suggest that a similar agreement in Wales should be called not “the Cardiff agreement” but “the Celyn clause”. This refers to Capel Celyn, which, Members will recall, was the village drowned in 1965 against the express wishes of elected and representative bodies throughout Wales—and, I understand, the wishes of every Welsh MP bar one. That was a transformational event in Welsh politics, and we have seen the effect of it over many decades. That effect is clear and provides a firm reminder of what can happen when the will of the people is so resolutely ignored. That is why we tabled new clause 3, giving the Assembly the right to hold legally binding referendums. I certainly commend it, but I assume that the matter will be discussed, possibly in greater detail, at some point in the future.

Let me make a few brief points about new clause 4. My Plaid Cymru colleagues and I have supported the reserved powers model for the National Assembly for a very long time. We are glad to see the Damascene conversion of the Labour Front-Bench team—better late than never! We certainly believe that this is the next step for our country; it would certainly clear up much of the confusion, not least in the minds of the public and others, as to the split of powers between the National Assembly and Westminster. I say to the Welsh public and others that I too often see people from the media refer to Assembly matters as if they were Westminster responsibilities, and vice-versa.

We in Plaid Cymru were, as I mentioned, against the LCO—legislative competence order—model, which so blighted the lives of those on the Welsh Affairs Committee and held up the pragmatic and practical transfer of the most innocuous of powers to the Welsh Government, as well as some rather more controversial powers. We wanted the boldest arrangements, but that was not forthcoming under the Government of Wales Act 2006—until the referendum. Circumstances have changed again, and the need for a move to a reserved powers model is even more pressing than before.

No one in this place or in the Assembly can be sanguine, given a recent survey showing how far we have failed as politicians to inform our constituents of the reality of the split in power. As I said, the media are far from blameless. Having said all that, it is disappointing that in the second part of their new clause 4, the hon. Members for Pontypridd (Owen Smith) and for Llanelli (Nia Griffith) have chosen to predicate any developments in relation to this matter on delaying the minor taxes. I must therefore view the new clause, I am afraid, as a delaying tactic at best, and as aimed at wrecking this part of the Bill at worst.

--- Later in debate ---

[Wayne David]

My right hon. Friend makes an extremely good point. He has tremendous experience in these matters—far greater than I have—and I would certainly bear out what he has said. A common sense way to approach disputes between different legislatures in the United Kingdom is to sit down and talk, and use the established structures, and not resort to expensive, time-consuming legal processes that are very obtuse to most people. That is one lesson to be learned.

We must also learn the lesson that we need a different model. We need a reserved powers model to form the bedrock of our developing devolution settlement in the United Kingdom.

[Guto Bebb]

I have listened carefully to the hon. Gentleman’s comments, and to those of the right hon. Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy) and the hon. Member for Llanelli (Nia Griffith), who is on the Opposition Front Bench. If the Labour proposal is to move to a reserved powers model, which is clearly the case judging from the arguments presented today, do Opposition Members believe that the report they envisage should look at the consequences for the largest part of the United Kingdom, which is England, because not once has any Opposition Member talked about any potential impact on the English electorate?

[Wayne David]

I have no qualms at all about talking about England, because we are a United Kingdom, but if I deviated from my notes and spoke at length about England, you would take me to task pretty quickly Madam Deputy Speaker.

It is important to recognise that the Local Government Byelaws (Wales) Act was not a one-off. We have seen an attempt—perhaps most significantly, politically—to prevent the Welsh Government from carrying through their legislative plans for the agriculture sector. That is a far more emotive issue, particularly for workers who are directly affected by this Bill—or, as may happen, the lack of it. However, that reinforces the constitutional point that the current situation is unsatisfactory, facing as we do ongoing legal challenges on the basis of politics, rather than, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy) said, Members sitting down together where there is a genuine dispute between the two legislatures and working things out.

The conclusion I come to is that we need a system that transcends party politics: a constitutional arrangement that is seen to be fair to everybody, and that respects the integrity of the United Kingdom but also the development of devolution in Wales; a settlement based on a reserved powers model that is far more intelligible to people in Wales, and that will help them to understand far more easily the basis of our devolution arrangements in Wales and the United Kingdom as a whole.