European Union (Withdrawal) Act

Hilary Benn Excerpts

Tuesday 15th January 2019 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney General]

Well, of course I would have been infinitely happier if the European Union had not laid down as one of its cardinal negotiating points and principles that there should be a backstop, but it has done that. On the basis of its own guidance to its own negotiating principles, it would have been a demand that it always sought, and we are faced with the position as it now is.

If we take this step of entering this withdrawal agreement, we will then enter a stage where we are to negotiate the second key to unlock our future outside the European Union. What I am commending to the House is that we take this key and we unlock the door to that first chamber—that airlock where we can then settle the permanent relationship that is set out in the political declaration.

[Hilary Benn (Leeds Central) (Lab)]

The Attorney General’s use of the airlock analogy is very striking, but does he realise that the reason many of us will vote against the deal tonight is that on the other side of the second airlock is a complete vacuum about our future relationship with our biggest, nearest and most important trading partner?

[The Attorney General]

I intend to address the very point that the right hon. Gentleman raises, because it is important to distinguish between the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration and the permanent treaties in which the long-term relationship between this country and the European Union will be settled. The political declaration sets the boundaries within which those permanent arrangements will be negotiated. The aims of the withdrawal agreement are to settle the outstanding issues that our departure creates. These are two separate and, importantly, distinguishable functions.

The withdrawal agreement commands across the House, I would submit, with the exception of two areas—the backstop and the political declaration—widespread consensus as to its necessity and its wisdom.

--- Later in debate ---

[Hilary Benn (Leeds Central) (Lab)]

I want to address what happens next, if, as seems likely, the Prime Minister’s deal is defeated this evening. The first question is “What will the Prime Minister do in that event?” Until yesterday, I thought that she might say “I am going back to Brussels to secure some more assurances”, but that route now appears to be blocked in the light of the letter that she brought to the House’s attention yesterday. I would like to think that she would take a bold step—that she would reach out across the House to look for a consensus, would say that she was prepared to consider a completely different approach, or would even announce that because she still believed in her deal, she would take it to the British people and ask them what they thought. That really would be political leadership. But if she does not do any of those things, the House of Commons will have to move swiftly to enable us to decide what we can agree on because, as the Prime Minister rightly said, the House of Commons can say what it is against, but in the end it will have to be for something. So we need to decide what a different policy might look like and how we get there.

One option is undoubtedly to leave without a deal. Some Members favour that, as we have just heard, but many of us think it would be a disaster—by the way, so do the Government. So let’s give the House of Commons a chance once and for all to make it clear what it thinks of that.

Then there are the alternative deals. There is Canada with a variety of pluses attached. There is the EEA and a customs union—which is what I have been arguing for—or a variation on that. And then there is the question of process: how do we enable any of the different approaches, if we can agree on them, to be negotiated with the European Union, and how can we do that when we are running out of time?

I think it is now inevitable that article 50 will need to be extended, whichever option the House of Commons chooses, assuming we can reach agreement on something. I support a series of indicative votes and I support the Bill that the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford (Nick Boles) and others have tabled, which, if approved, would give the House the legal means to give effect to what we decide, including on whether to extend article 50. If this House cannot agree, apart from deciding that we do not want to leave with no deal—in other words, if this House remains deadlocked, which is a possibility—someone else will have to decide. In all fairness, I have to say that I can see no other way of doing that in those circumstances than by resolving to go back to the British people and asking them what they think.

[Mr Gregory Campbell (East Londonderry) (DUP)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Hilary Benn]

I would give way, but time is very short and many other Members want to speak.

The reason the Prime Minister has got into such difficulty is that, as we will discover tonight, the House of Commons will not agree a deal because of fear, uncertainty and doubt: fear that we will be locked permanently into a backstop; uncertainty about entering into a process where we will be in an even weaker position than we have been in over the past two and a half years; and doubt about where this will all end up, in an age, as the Father of the House, the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), so eloquently put it, when it is the quality of the alliances you have that determines the ability to influence what happens in the world in the interests of the people we represent.

Faced with this set of circumstances, what would be the rational thing to do? It would be to seek to remove that fear, that uncertainty and that doubt, and to say to the European Union “Look, the only way we are going to get a deal is not by another exchange of letters or asking for another assurance, but by moving on to negotiate the future relationship now, so that everyone can see at the end of the process what it would involve before we formally leave.” I understand the legal position that in law the European Union cannot sign such an agreement, as the Attorney General pointed out, until the United Kingdom has ceased to be a member state, but it has a choice about its negotiating mandate and we all understand why the EU chose to structure the negotiations in the way that it did: because far from holding all the cards, we have, as the last two and a half years have demonstrated, held hardly any cards at all. But if we were able to negotiate more detail on the future relationship, which I recognise would be very challenging for the EU—and also for the Government, because they would finally have to confront the choices they have been steadfastly avoiding for the last two and a half years—at the end of that process we would know where we stood on the backstop and on the nature of the future relationship.

To do that we would have to extend article 50. If we want to reassure people—we may confront this choice at some point—that extending, or maybe revoking, article 50 is not a device for the House of Commons to overturn the referendum result in 2016, the House of Commons could say to the people, “Don’t worry, whatever the result is of this process we will put it back to you, so you take the final decision.” If we could undertake those negotiations while still a member, from the EU’s point of view, it would not really make any difference at all: we would still be paying the money—we are going to do that under the transition; we would still be accepting the rules of the ECJ—we are going to do that under the transition; we would still be a member of the single market and the customs union—we are going to be under the transition; and we would still be accepting free movement, which we are going to do under the transition.

I acknowledge that that would be difficult, but it would be the sensible thing to do and who knows where the EU will be in two or three years’ time, which we all know is how long these negotiations will take to complete. Indeed, if the EU were to say to other countries, not just to the UK, “You’re not going to get what you want if you leave, but if you remain then there is the possibility of reform,” that would be the kind of leadership that the EU could potentially offer. I do not know whether there is the strategic vision in the EU to do that, but it should provide it because the forces present in Britain are present in all of its member states and reform, including on free movement, would be in their interests as well as in ours.

If this is not possible, and if the Government will not reach out, then we as Parliament must take responsibility. That would not be us subverting democracy in any way; it would be us doing our job—it would be taking back control. The draft Bill I referred to earlier, and which I support, will give us the means to do so. It proposes to ask the Liaison Committee to take a role. It could be amended to give that responsibility elsewhere—

[Frank Field]

Will my right hon. Friend give way on that issue?

--- Later in debate ---

[Hilary Benn]

No, as I am going to conclude my remarks.

And the House of Commons will in the end have a chance to vote on that.

The referendum result came as a shock to many in this House, but it did not come as a shock to those who voted to leave. It was a cry of anguish as the EU became the lightning conductor for the feelings of 17.4 million people about the change they have seen in their communities, the disappearance of well-paid jobs, the shrinking of opportunities and—let’s be honest—above all about our collective failure to share with all of our citizens the prosperity of this, the sixth richest economy in the world. But that will not be solved by a damaging Brexit. It will not be remedied by the convulsion, the argument, the lack of direction and purpose, and the refusal to be honest about choices we face that have consumed almost all our energy, effort, attention and time.

We cannot let this carry on for the next five years. We owe it to our constituents to tell the truth. We owe it to ourselves to do the right thing and, in rejecting the deal today, as we should, we must show, as parliamentarians of all parties and all views, that we are, after the vote tonight, capable of coming together—to listen, to compromise, in the interests of the people we come here to serve.

[Several hon. Members rose—]