Pension Schemes Bill

Helen Whately Excerpts

Consideration of Lords message
Tuesday 28th April 2026 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

I call the shadow Secretary of State.

[Helen Whately (Faversham and Mid Kent) (Con)]

Let me begin by welcoming the Minister back to his place—we missed him last night, and it is good to see him back in the Chamber.

Throughout our many debates, we have broadly agreed on the policy intent behind most of the Bill, but as I have said time and again, agreement on the principles of a Bill is not the same as offering the Minister unqualified support for every measure in it, particularly the power contained in clause 40, the power of mandation—or the reserve power, as the Chief Secretary calls it—which enables Ministers to instruct pension funds where to invest. When the Bill was first introduced, that mandation power was truly breathtaking in its scope. It was extraordinary—an unconstrained power that would have allowed the Secretary of State access to 100% of at least £400 billion-worth of auto-enrolment default pension funds. It would have allowed Ministers to direct their investment in whatever way they saw fit.

What happened the moment that became clear to people? Members sitting opposite and, indeed, behind me—not least those in Reform UK—were already queuing up with pet projects and struggling sectors. They thought that savers’ money should be used for net zero schemes, steel and renationalising water. They were not proposing those measures on the grounds of the return on investment for savers, and the income that they would generate for people’s later life; that much is obvious. But we said no—no to politicians having that power, no to Ministers directing pension savings into their pet projects, and no to overriding the interests of savers in favour of politicians desperate for access to capital.

I was clear from the outset that the power was dangerous and had no place in the Bill. After sustained pressure from the industry, from the other place and from this side of the House, the Government have, very slowly, been forced to row back. They have rowed back from a power grab that threatened trust in auto-enrolment pensions and risked damaging savers’ retirement incomes. Let us be clear about what those concessions amount to. First, on allocation limits, the original Bill contained no cap whatsoever on how much of a saver’s pension could be mandated into specified assets. Now, after pressure, the Government have imposed hard limits. No more than 10% of a default fund may be directed into qualifying assets, and no more than 5% may be directed specifically into UK assets. That is a major retreat from the original proposal.

Secondly, on sunset and single-use restrictions, the Government have brought forward the expiry date of the reserve power to 2032, if unused. They will repeal the whole regime by 2035 unless it is renewed by fresh primary legislation, and have limited the core mandation power so that it can be exercised only once—another retreat. Thirdly, the scope has been narrowed. Mandation can now apply only to the main default auto-enrolment fund, not the entire pension scheme or every pot—again, another retreat.

Today we have had further concessions. The Government now accept that before this power can be exercised, regulators must conduct an independent assessment of whether a genuine collective action problem exists—whereby no one wants to be the first mover—and whether that problem is inhibiting investment in private markets. We have been consistent in our view that mandation is not the right solution, but we accept that requiring independent assessment before the power can be exercised is a safeguard against ministerial overreach, and I appreciate the Pensions Minister’s assurances from the Dispatch Box on the weight of evidence required. The Government have also accepted that the reserve power cannot be used before 2028—again, another retreat.

The Government have further strengthened the savers’ interest test following yesterday’s amendment. Schemes will no longer have to prove that compliance would likely cause “material financial detriment”. Instead, they need only demonstrate that compliance is likely not to be in the best interests of members, thereby aligning the test with trustees’ existing fiduciary duties. That matters, because fiduciary duty is sacrosanct and must be protected. Nothing is more important in a modern pension system than the duty to act solely in the best interests of savers. That duty is the foundation on which trust in our pension system rests. This amendment means that in a conflict between mandation and fiduciary duty, fiduciary duty wins—again, another important retreat. Finally, the Government have agreed to remove discrimination between investment vehicles by clarifying that both direct and indirect holdings in the relevant asset classes count towards compliance—the final retreat.

Every one of those changes tells the same story: the Government introduced a power that was too broad, too vague and too dangerous. Step by step, and under pressure, they have been forced to narrow it, constrain it and hedge it with safeguards. Why? Because the original power was indefensible, and because the Government knew that the concerns were real. The work that we have done has obliterated the Government’s original proposal. As it stands now, the mandation power looks nothing like how it was first imagined. What began as a sweeping ministerial power grab has been stripped back, pared down and boxed in on all sides. Only now, after our intervention, has it become at least palatable. It is a vestige of its former overmighty self—a shrivelled husk.

Let me be clear: we do not believe that the Government should direct private capital, or that Ministers should interfere in investment decisions that are properly left to trustees and markets. Here we have Labour doing what it always does: thinking that the Government are the answer, with the state going where it has no place to go. When the Conservatives return to government, we will remove mandation from the statute book entirely, because at the heart of this policy lies a dangerous assumption that Ministers in Whitehall know better than trustees, fund managers and markets on how to invest the public’s pension savings. I have yet to meet anyone who wants a politician managing their pension, and pensions belong to the people who earn them, not Government Ministers. It is as simple as that.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.