Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

Helen Goodman Excerpts

Tuesday 6th March 2018 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are considering new clause 8—Public registers of beneficial ownership of companies in the British Crown Dependencies—

“(1) For the purpose of preventing money laundering, the Secretary of State must consult with the authorities of governments in each Crown Dependency on establishing a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies registered in their jurisdictions.

(2) Within 6 months of this Act being passed, and every 12 months thereafter, the Secretary of State must report to Parliament on progress within the Crown Dependencies on establishing registers as referred to in subsection (1).

(3) In this section a ‘publicly accessible register of beneficial ownership of companies’ means a register which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, provides information broadly equivalent to that available in accordance with the provisions of Part 21A of the Companies Act 2006 (information about people with significant control).”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to consult with the governments in each Crown Dependency about introducing public registers of beneficial ownership of companies in the Crown Dependencies, and to report to Parliament on the progress of establishing such registers.

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

Before we broke for Justice questions, I was speculating about why David Cameron’s Administration were quite enthusiastic to make progress on this issue but the current Administration seem less enthusiastic. I had basically made my arguments and I was about to bring my speech to an end.

[Luke Graham (Ochil and South Perthshire) (Con)]

I say to the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland that there are Government Members who are in favour of public registers of beneficial ownership in British overseas territories. I studied international financial reporting standards extensively in my former life as an accountant—I draw Members’ attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests—and I am a member of the Public Accounts Committee. Having more transparency through country-by-country reporting and ensuring public oversight and increased transparency of a lot of our transactions will mean that we actually raise standards, not only in the UK mainland, where we have done so by introducing a public register, but in our overseas territories. Given the opportunity that Brexit provides us, in terms of having to reinvigorate our economy and our brand, it is important that we lead. Certainly, what is good enough for the mainland should be good enough for overseas territories.

I know from conversations with my right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe and the Americas that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has concerns about whether it is right to impose measures on overseas territories. There is precedent for that, as the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland said, but there are concerns about whether it would be right to do so in this case. I do not believe in “devolve and forget”, although overseas territories have different constitutional arrangements. As MPs, we are responsible for taking a leading role. Westminster is here to lead, not to follow, and the United Kingdom should be a leading light when it comes to financial transactions and financial transparency, as it has been on so many global reporting standards.

[Helen Goodman]

The distinction that the hon. Gentleman makes suggests to me that, although he may hesitate to vote for new clause 1, he will agree to new clause 8, which merely calls for a consultation.

[Luke Graham]

I will come to exactly what I am looking for in just a minute.

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[Sir Alan Duncan]

I am not directly involved in this, but as I have said frequently, I am very happy to offer the expertise of officials to the hon. Lady so that she can fully get to grips with the intricate detail of the question she has asked.

Hon. Members will recall that the Criminal Finances Act 2017 provides for a review of the effectiveness of the bilateral arrangements. That report must be prepared before 1 July 2019, and it will then be published and laid before Parliament. The reviews will provide a clear understanding of how the jurisdictions are meeting their commitments. At that point, we will be in a better position to consider what more might need to be done. I stress once again that we will engage with the overseas territories and dependencies; we do so already and we will continue to do so on a regular basis, with the clear objectives in mind of wanting consistent and constant improvements in the way in which their finances are organised.

A key feature of the Government’s approach has been to maintain a level playing field between all the overseas territories with financial centres and the Crown dependencies. As I have described, we have robust review processes regarding the implementation of these arrangements. If these reviews demonstrate that the full implementation of the exchanges of notes is not taking place in any individual jurisdiction, it would be right for hon. Members to consider this issue further. For the time being, however, we should continue to focus on the full implementation of the existing bilateral arrangements. We are on a good and solid track; therefore, I urge hon. Members to withdraw the new clause.

[Helen Goodman]

It is nice to see you in the Chair, Dame Cheryl. I wish to remind members of the Committee of two things: first, the Government’s own statement in 2012 that, as a matter of constitutional law, the British Parliament can legislate for Crown dependencies and overseas territories. Secondly, the current approach, where the authorities in London have to ask individual questions, is not as effective in tracking down and deterring illegality as having a transparent approach. That was demonstrated by the fact that, when the Panama and Paradise papers were leaked, they were able to initiate more inquiries and take more action against people because, as I was trying to explain this morning, they were able to see the overall pattern.

I am disappointed in the Minister’s response—not surprised, but disappointed—because he has not shown any flexibility at all. However, I do not wish to put the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire on the spot. I think we will come back to this on Report, so I do not wish to put the motion to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 2

Public register of beneficial ownership of UK property by companies and other legal entities registered outside the UK

“(1) In addition to the provisions made under paragraph 6 of Schedule 2, for the purpose of preventing money laundering in the UK property market and public procurement, the Secretary of State must create a public register of beneficial ownership information for companies and other legal entities registered outside of the UK that own or buy UK property, or bid for UK government contracts.

(2) The register must be implemented within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed.”.—(Helen Goodman.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to create a public register of beneficial ownership information for companies and other legal entities registered outside of the UK that own or buy UK property, or bid for UK government contracts, within 12 months.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Helen Goodman]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

In 2015, David Cameron said:

“London is not a place to stash your dodgy cash.”

That is why he wanted to set up a register of the real owners of UK property owned by companies registered overseas. Unfortunately, the timetable for that has slipped. Following his announcement in 2015, the Government made an announcement shortly before Christmas saying that they now expected to set up the register in 2021. That is six years. In the other place, it was Tory peers who pressed for this to be speeded up. Our new clause does precisely the same thing.

Last week, the right hon. Member for Newbury mentioned unexplained wealth orders. Indeed, the Security Minister got an excellent splash on the implantation of this part of David Cameron’s package on 3 February. It was headed:

“Russians in Britain told to reveal their riches. McMafia-style crackdown on ‘corrupt’ oligarchs.”

It said:

“The government estimates that about £90 billion of illegal cash is laundered in Britain every year.”

The Minister said:

“McMafia is one of those things where you realise that fact is ahead of fiction…It’s a really good portrayal of sharp-suited wealthy individuals, but follow the money and it ends up with a young girl getting trafficked for sex.

What we know from the Laundromat exposé is that certainly there have been links to the [Russian] state. The government’s view is that we know what they are up to and we are not going to let it happen any more.”

He then explained that unexplained wealth orders were coming into effect.

I cannot understand why, given that those orders are coming into effect, a start has not been made on one with the purchase from the Ministry of Defence of Brompton Road tube station by a Ukrainian gas magnate. For colleagues who have not been following this long-running issue, Dmytro Firtash is a friend of ex-President Yanukovych and an associate of both President Putin and Paul Manafort. He was arrested in Vienna on corruption charges at the request of the FBI. Latterly, attempts have been made to extradite him to the United States, first on Magnitsky charges and later in relation to his alleged role in masterminding an international racket that aimed to sell titanium to Boeing.

Like all rich people, he operates indirectly. For example, his foundation, New Century Media, paid for the £800 ticket to a summer ball for the Minister here today—the right hon. Member for Rutland and Melton—according to the Minister’s entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests from 2010. He also gave £85,000 to the Conservative party centrally. I would have thought that he was a prime candidate to receive an unexplained wealth order, and I hope that Ministers will see if that can be pursued.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Is the hon. Lady saying that New Century Media is owned by Mr Firtash?

[Helen Goodman]

Yes.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

It is owned by David Burnside—a former Member.

[Helen Goodman]

I think Mr Burnside is employed by Mr Firtash. That is the issue. These things are not exactly transparent.

Let us return to the question of whether the current state of the law is adequate. The Times also had a leading article which said:

“Three difficulties may blunt the effectiveness of the wealth orders. First, all the agencies involved in investigating and prosecuting those suspected of laundering dirty money in Britain are already over-stretched. They need experienced staff used to digging through multiple layers of shell companies and intricate business transactions, and they do not have enough of them.

Second, the orders freeze assets for an interim period and are only one early step in the process of bringing oligarchs to heel. The government has to be braced for legal marathons contested by the rich and corrupt. That requires political will.

Above all, the red carpet for crooks has to be rolled up. Too many people in the City of London, in the divorce and libel courts, in the art world and in high-end estate agencies have failed to look closely at the cash coming their way. An overdue step would be a public register revealing the true owners of overseas companies that own property in Britain.”

Until we have the public register, it is not going to be possible to identify who owns the properties and whether the wealth invested in them has been gained legitimately or illegitimately. In other words, are the wealth orders explained or unexplained? I am not quoting the Morning Star or the Daily Mirror—I am quoting The Times.

We think that this is all taking too long; it is a problem that it is taking too long. It is a problem because of its size, which I will describe. It is also a problem because Ministers are giving time to people to rearrange their affairs and to reorganise them in order to avoid the measures which are in train. A concrete example of that would be the use of trusts. That is why further we have tabled a new clause on trusts.

Global Witness and Transparency International believe that 86,397 properties in England and Wales are owned by companies registered in offshore secrecy jurisdictions; 87% of properties owned by foreign companies have owners in secret jurisdictions. Half of them are in London and half are in other parts of the country. The 10 most expensive properties owned by companies in tax havens are worth £1.5 billion. Furthermore, Transparency International believes that there are suspicions about £4.4 billion-worth of UK properties, over half of which—£2.36 billion—belongs to companies registered in the British Virgin Islands. They also say that these properties in secret jurisdictions account for 75% of all UK properties under investigation for corruption. If hon. Members or members of the public are interested in seeing what is going on, I recommend going to the Global Witness website where they can type in their postcode and see how many of those secretly owned properties with overseas owners are located on a map.

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[The Chair]

Unless any other Member wants to rise on a point of order, we will move on. If the hon. Lady wishes to respond, she may.

[Helen Goodman]

My understanding is—and this has been in the public domain and stated outside this House—that Mr Burnside was the executive chair, but that New Century Media represented the personal foundation of Dmytro Firtash.

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[John Glen]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for Newbury and to the Member for Nottingham North for their further observations. I understand the sentiments of frustration and impatience with the Government on this matter. I hope I have spelled out in some detail—in the areas of land registration; alignment around the different parts of the United Kingdom; and making sure that the penalties are appropriate and that the enforcement measures are set to meet the challenge—that the Government have bold ambitions to get this right and to be a world leader in this area. I acknowledge that this has taken rather longer than it would have done in ideal circumstances, but I can confirm and reiterate to my right hon. Friend that the Government are fully committed to delivering this as soon as possible, and that there is a commitment across multiple Departments and the ministerial team to ensure that this reflects the bold aspirations that we have as a nation. I hope that that would be sufficient for us to move on.

[Helen Goodman]

Ministers have heard that this is an issue of significant concern, and interest in making speedy progress has been expressed on both sides. We will return to this on Report and, that being the case, I do not intend to press it to a vote. I beg to move that the clause be withdrawn.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.





New Clause 6

Alignment of sanctions

(1) It shall be a negotiating objective of Her Majesty’s Government in negotiations on the matters specified in subsection (2) to continue the United Kingdom’s participation in the Political and Security Committee of the European Union in order to align sanctions policy with the European Union.

(2) Those matters are—

(a) the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, and

(b) a permanent agreement with the European Union for a period subsequent to the transitional period after the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union.

(3) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to lay a report before both Houses of Parliament in accordance with either subsection (4) or subsection (5).

(4) A report under this subsection shall be to the effect that the negotiating objective specified in subsection (1) has been achieved.

(5) A report under this subsection shall be to the effect that the negotiating objective specified in subsection (1) has not been achieved.

(6) This Act shall not come into force until a report under either subsection (4) or (5) has been approved via resolution of the House of Commons and considered by the House of Lords.—(Helen Goodman.)

This new clause would require the UK Government to seek continued participation in the Political and Security Committee so as to allow alignment on international sanctions.

[Helen Goodman]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

We now move to a slightly different aspect of the Bill—how decisions will be taken once we leave the European Union. The new clause would require that in negotiations with our European partners, we seek to maintain participation in the Political and Security Committee of the European Union, to align sanctions policy with the European Union, and would require the Government to report on those negotiations and on how they are going. As with the commencement plan, which I felt the Minister was vague and unclear about, so with this. How are we going to co-ordinate in the new world? How is this going to operate?

Sanctions will work if we co-operate and collaborate with other countries. We are all agreed that that is when they are most effective. They are effective in terms of putting pressure on those that are sanctioned, upholding the rule of international law and protecting national security. It is necessary for us to work with our European partners to make our international sanctions regime as effective as possible. One of the issues previously discussed —which Ministers bump up against all the time—is the difficulty of getting agreements in the UN Security Council. Obviously the sanctions that we had on Russia over the annexation of Crimea could not be agreed in the UN Security Council, and that stands to reason. We have been able to get effective sanctions at European level, however, and our security interests are obviously aligned with those of the European Union, objectively speaking, and therefore we are going to take a similar view. We propose that we need to carry on working through the Political and Security Committee. The withdrawal agreement produced by the Commission said some interesting things about decision making. On the subject of administrative co-operation in article 30, it says that,

“as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement, the United Kingdom shall have the status of observer in the Administrative Commission. It may, where the items on the agenda concern the United Kingdom, send a representative, to be present in an advisory capacity, to the meetings of the Administrative Commission and to the meetings of the Technical Commission”.

The section on institutions includes proposals on representatives of member states and the United Kingdom taking part in the work of the Union’s institutions. Chapter 4, article 104 states:

“Article 10…shall apply in the United Kingdom in respect of representatives of Member States and of the United Kingdom taking part in the work of the institutions, agencies, offices and bodies of the Union”

in so far as their participation in that work took place before the end of the transition period.

There is then a section on how the transition period should work, and that is in part 4 of the document produced by the European Commission.

Paragraph 2 of article 122 states:

“Should an agreement between the Union and the United Kingdom governing their future relationship in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy become applicable during the transition period, Chapter 2 of Title V of the”

treaty on European Union

“and the acts adopted on the basis of those provisions shall cease to apply”.

We then have the UK’s obligations with respect to financing defence and security operations, and finally, in article 157 under “Institutional provisions,” it is proposed that, on the date that the withdrawal agreement comes into force:

“A joint committee is hereby established”.

I am not saying that what the Commission proposes is the right way to go, but we are concerned that we have no sense of what the Government think we should do. That is why we tabled the new clause, which suggests that, with respect to sanctions policy, we should retain our membership of the Political and Security Committee of the European Union.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

The new clause would require the Government to commit to negotiating the UK’s continued participation in the EU’s Political and Security Committee after Brexit and delay the commencement of the Bill until a report had been laid before Parliament setting out whether that had been achieved.

The first point I make is that the Bill is about powers, not policy. The UK’s legal powers to implement sanctions flow largely from the European Communities Act 1972. The Bill will replace those powers and, as is recognised on both sides of the House, is necessary to enable the UK to impose sanctions. We are, of course, looking at our sanctions policy and have described our desired future relationship with the EU in a range of places, but it is not appropriate to place that in the Bill.

Secondly, as we have set out, the Government have an unconditional commitment to European security, and we continue to share common threats, interests and values with our European partners. That makes close co-operation, including on sanctions, in both our interests. The exact nature of the UK’s future relationship with the EU on sanctions still needs to be determined, but the UK will remain a critical player in both the European context and the global context.

The UK’s influence on sanctions derives in part from our membership of the EU, but it is not dependent on continued participation in EU bodies. A lot of it derives from the pre-eminence of the City of London in controlling so many flows of money. Our influence also comes from our status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and our membership of bodies such as the G7. That influence is underpinned by our strong economy and financial sector, and both public and private sanctions expertise. That makes the UK a key sanctions partner.

As the Prime Minister made clear at the Munich security conference a couple of weeks ago, our partnership with the EU should offer us the means and the choice to combine our efforts to the greatest effect where that is in our shared interest. That includes working closely with the EU on sanctions. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary was clear on Second Reading that he hopes

“we can act in tandem”

with the EU on sanctions because we

“will always confront the same threats and defend the same values.”—[Official Report, 20 February 2018; Vol. 636, c. 78.]

That demonstrates our commitment to close co-operation with the EU and other international partners regardless of the institutional framework.

Finally, we do not seek to attend EU meetings on the same basis as EU members. It is worth noting that the PSC is not the primary body that deals with sanctions. Sanctions pass through a range of EU institutions before adoption, from working groups to Council meetings. Committing the Government to seek to join the PSC for sanctions would not make sense from a sanctions policy perspective, and does not make sense in relation to our broader approach to negotiations with the EU. Although the details are a matter for negotiation, in the area of foreign policy as a whole we envisage both formal and informal mechanisms to allow regular dialogue, co-operation and close co-ordination.

To tie our objectives to one model would be counterproductive and would remove the freedom to explore new and better ways of working together with the EU on sanctions once we have left the European Union. However, we do not need text in the Bill to underline our commitment to working closely with international partners on sanctions, because that is what we will do. Given that, I respectfully ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the motion.

[Helen Goodman]

The question of how we will co-operate with our European partners on sanctions was debated last July in a general debate on sanctions. I am glad that the Minister now acknowledges that we need to do this, and I am glad that he said that we need formal and informal contacts. Given that he says that this is not the only piece of institutional architecture used at the moment, I will not press the motion to a vote. However, a slightly clearer view from Ministers on how they propose to handle this would be extremely helpful to the House at some point in the future. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

[The Chair]

Does the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland wish to put new clause 7 to a vote?

[Helen Goodman]

I would like to put new clause 5 and new clause 7 to a vote. Have I missed the opportunity to vote on new clause 5?

[The Chair]

Yes. You may press new clause 7 to a vote. Do you wish to?

[Helen Goodman]

Yes, I do.

New Clause 7

Parliamentary committee to scrutinise regulations

(1) A Minister may not lay before Parliament a statutory instrument under section 48(5) unless a committee of the House of Commons charged with scrutinising statutory instruments made under this Act has recommended that the instrument be laid.

(2) The committee of the House of Commons so charged under subsection (1) may scrutinise any reviews carried out under section 27 of this Act.—(Helen Goodman.)

This new clause would require a specialised House of Commons Committee to approve all statutory instruments laid under the affirmative procedure under this Act. The Committee would also scrutinise the Government’s reviews of sanctions regulations.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[John Glen]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for setting out her new clause, which would prohibit TCSPs that do not conduct business in the UK from incorporating UK companies, unless they are overseen by a UK anti-money laundering supervisor. As hon. Members will know, the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 specifically provide for TCSPs conducting business in the UK to be subject to a fitness and propriety test and to register with either Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs or the Financial Conduct Authority. In borderline cases where it is unclear whether a TCSP is conducting business in the UK—in which case it would be supervised by a UK anti-money laundering supervisor—HMRC would consider on a case-by-case basis whether registration for supervision is necessary. This acts as an anti-evasion mechanism preventing TCSPs from artificially claiming that they are outside the scope of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime.

The hon. Member for Oxford East asked earlier where this was based. The Government recently established the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision, known as OPBAS, within the Financial Conduct Authority. It works to secure consistently high standards of AML supervision of professional bodies, including TCSPs. These reforms follow the identification of risks associated with TCSPs in the Government’s 2016 action plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing. This found that service sectors such as TCSPs were a significant money-laundering threat.

Although it is for anti-money laundering supervisors to determine their areas of focus, they are required to have regard for the UK’s national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing when assessing risks in their own sector. The risk assessment that the Government published in October last year concludes:

“The highest risk TCSPs are assessed to be UK TCSPs which offer a wide range of services (including nominee directors, registered office services, and banking facilities)”.

Additionally, individual anti-money laundering supervisors are under a duty to identify and assess the international and domestic risks of money laundering and terrorist financing to which their sectors are subject.

[Helen Goodman]

I am surprised by what the Minister is saying. He obviously did not listen to the BBC “Analysis” programme that was broadcast about three weeks ago on the role of overseas TCSPs. We think it is great when people build real-life factories as a jumping-off point into the single market, but it is evident that TCSPs and banks located in the Baltic states, which do not have such good anti-money laundering regulatory regimes, attract money and are used as a jumping-off point to move that money into the European system. Does the Minister really think that the anti-money laundering regimes throughout the European Union are as effective the one in the UK?

[John Glen]

I cannot comment on the specific cases that the hon. Lady mentions, because I have not seen or studied them. I imagine that there is a degree of variability in the effectiveness of regimes, but I am trying to set out the Government’s rationale for what we have in place. I do not suggest that it is perfect, but some of the developments have occurred in response to shortcomings that have been identified.

The individual anti-money laundering supervisors are under a duty to identify and assess international and domestic risks, including the money laundering and terrorism risk, which ensures that the most intensive supervision is applied where the highest risks of money laundering exist. The establishment of OPBAS will assist with the consistent identification of such risks across the TCSP sector. Our national risk assessment makes it clear that the Government are aware of the money laundering risks connected with TCSPs, and further reform in the area should take account of the conclusions of the ongoing FATF review. I assure Opposition Members that the regime is a searching and exacting one. I know from ministerial meetings concerning preparations for it that the evaluation will be exacting. We expect the observations to be meaningful, and we will need to respond carefully to them. However, until we receive the outcome of that review of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime and of the experience of OPBAS as its role develops, it would not be appropriate to adopt the amendment.

Hon. Members should be mindful of the fact that anti-money laundering supervision around the world follows a territorial model. Simply requiring non-UK TCSPs to have a UK supervisor when they set up UK companies will not address the challenges of extra-territorial supervision. Effective anti-money laundering supervision depends on measures that include supervisory on-site visits and close engagement with higher-risk firms. Requiring a UK supervisor to do that in relation to a non-UK firm will not, in and of itself, address the issue that hon. Members have identified.

As was noted in the other place, the most effective means of combating international money laundering is cross-border co-operation to drive up the standards of overseas supervision and enforcement. For those reasons, we have imposed a duty on each UK anti-money laundering supervisor to take such steps as they consider appropriate to co-operate with overseas authorities. That is the agenda we pursue through the global FATF process. I therefore respectfully ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the new clause.

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[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. It may be the fact that we have been in this room for a few hours, but I am struggling a little with, in particular, the suggestion that new clause 16 would somehow tie the UK’s hands in implementing additional requirements beyond the FATF standards.

The Minister referred to the public register of property owned by non-UK entities. We had a discussion about that, but he is right: it would arguably be an innovation in the UK. Of course it is one that we need more than other countries, because of the use of our property market in many such cases, and the exponential rise in house prices. He could have talked—although he did not—about the register of beneficial ownership of companies being an innovation as well, but countries such as the Netherlands and Norway are putting those into practice anyway, so perhaps we are not quite as far-reaching in what we are doing as we might suggest. Particularly in relation to the charges and fines levied against those found guilty of money laundering offences, we seem to be in a different position from that of our North American counterparts, for example, as we have discussed. None the less, it is not clear how the new clause would stop us going further than those other jurisdictions where we wished to do so. It says that we would take account of the

“best international practice including EU sanctions regimes”,

not that we would be led by it.

[Helen Goodman]

On a point of order, Dame Cheryl, in the light of what the Minister said earlier, I would like to read precisely what was published by The Independent. I misinterpreted it and, consequently, I misled the Committee. I wish to apologise to him and to the Committee for that. This is what The Independent published in 2014:

“According to Electoral Commission records, New Century Media gave the Conservatives £85,000 in the months leading up to the 2010 general election…New Century represents the personal foundation of the Ukrainian billionaire Dmitry Firtash, who has been indicted on bribery and corruption charges, which he denies, in the United States…David Burnside, New Century’s executive chairman, has made…claims about his connections with senior Tories…The company has paid for a table at the last four Conservative summer balls and paid for…the International Development minister”—

who is now the Minister for Europe and the Americas—to be its guest

“at Conservative events at a cost of…£800”.

I am sorry. I misread it and misunderstood it, and consequently I misled the Committee.

[The Chair]

The hon. Lady has had the opportunity to put that on the record. If the Minister wants to add something, he may.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [Lords] (Sixth sitting)

Helen Goodman Excerpts

Tuesday 6th March 2018 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are considering new clause 8—Public registers of beneficial ownership of companies in the British Crown Dependencies—

“(1) For the purpose of preventing money laundering, the Secretary of State must consult with the authorities of governments in each Crown Dependency on establishing a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies registered in their jurisdictions.

(2) Within 6 months of this Act being passed, and every 12 months thereafter, the Secretary of State must report to Parliament on progress within the Crown Dependencies on establishing registers as referred to in subsection (1).

(3) In this section a ‘publicly accessible register of beneficial ownership of companies’ means a register which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, provides information broadly equivalent to that available in accordance with the provisions of Part 21A of the Companies Act 2006 (information about people with significant control).”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to consult with the governments in each Crown Dependency about introducing public registers of beneficial ownership of companies in the Crown Dependencies, and to report to Parliament on the progress of establishing such registers.

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

Before we broke for Justice questions, I was speculating about why David Cameron’s Administration were quite enthusiastic to make progress on this issue but the current Administration seem less enthusiastic. I had basically made my arguments and I was about to bring my speech to an end.

[Luke Graham (Ochil and South Perthshire) (Con)]

I say to the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland that there are Government Members who are in favour of public registers of beneficial ownership in British overseas territories. I studied international financial reporting standards extensively in my former life as an accountant—I draw Members’ attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests—and I am a member of the Public Accounts Committee. Having more transparency through country-by-country reporting and ensuring public oversight and increased transparency of a lot of our transactions will mean that we actually raise standards, not only in the UK mainland, where we have done so by introducing a public register, but in our overseas territories. Given the opportunity that Brexit provides us, in terms of having to reinvigorate our economy and our brand, it is important that we lead. Certainly, what is good enough for the mainland should be good enough for overseas territories.

I know from conversations with my right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe and the Americas that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has concerns about whether it is right to impose measures on overseas territories. There is precedent for that, as the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland said, but there are concerns about whether it would be right to do so in this case. I do not believe in “devolve and forget”, although overseas territories have different constitutional arrangements. As MPs, we are responsible for taking a leading role. Westminster is here to lead, not to follow, and the United Kingdom should be a leading light when it comes to financial transactions and financial transparency, as it has been on so many global reporting standards.

[Helen Goodman]

The distinction that the hon. Gentleman makes suggests to me that, although he may hesitate to vote for new clause 1, he will agree to new clause 8, which merely calls for a consultation.

[Luke Graham]

I will come to exactly what I am looking for in just a minute.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I am not directly involved in this, but as I have said frequently, I am very happy to offer the expertise of officials to the hon. Lady so that she can fully get to grips with the intricate detail of the question she has asked.

Hon. Members will recall that the Criminal Finances Act 2017 provides for a review of the effectiveness of the bilateral arrangements. That report must be prepared before 1 July 2019, and it will then be published and laid before Parliament. The reviews will provide a clear understanding of how the jurisdictions are meeting their commitments. At that point, we will be in a better position to consider what more might need to be done. I stress once again that we will engage with the overseas territories and dependencies; we do so already and we will continue to do so on a regular basis, with the clear objectives in mind of wanting consistent and constant improvements in the way in which their finances are organised.

A key feature of the Government’s approach has been to maintain a level playing field between all the overseas territories with financial centres and the Crown dependencies. As I have described, we have robust review processes regarding the implementation of these arrangements. If these reviews demonstrate that the full implementation of the exchanges of notes is not taking place in any individual jurisdiction, it would be right for hon. Members to consider this issue further. For the time being, however, we should continue to focus on the full implementation of the existing bilateral arrangements. We are on a good and solid track; therefore, I urge hon. Members to withdraw the new clause.

[Helen Goodman]

It is nice to see you in the Chair, Dame Cheryl. I wish to remind members of the Committee of two things: first, the Government’s own statement in 2012 that, as a matter of constitutional law, the British Parliament can legislate for Crown dependencies and overseas territories. Secondly, the current approach, where the authorities in London have to ask individual questions, is not as effective in tracking down and deterring illegality as having a transparent approach. That was demonstrated by the fact that, when the Panama and Paradise papers were leaked, they were able to initiate more inquiries and take more action against people because, as I was trying to explain this morning, they were able to see the overall pattern.

I am disappointed in the Minister’s response—not surprised, but disappointed—because he has not shown any flexibility at all. However, I do not wish to put the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire on the spot. I think we will come back to this on Report, so I do not wish to put the motion to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 2

Public register of beneficial ownership of UK property by companies and other legal entities registered outside the UK

“(1) In addition to the provisions made under paragraph 6 of Schedule 2, for the purpose of preventing money laundering in the UK property market and public procurement, the Secretary of State must create a public register of beneficial ownership information for companies and other legal entities registered outside of the UK that own or buy UK property, or bid for UK government contracts.

(2) The register must be implemented within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed.”.—(Helen Goodman.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to create a public register of beneficial ownership information for companies and other legal entities registered outside of the UK that own or buy UK property, or bid for UK government contracts, within 12 months.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Helen Goodman]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

In 2015, David Cameron said:

“London is not a place to stash your dodgy cash.”

That is why he wanted to set up a register of the real owners of UK property owned by companies registered overseas. Unfortunately, the timetable for that has slipped. Following his announcement in 2015, the Government made an announcement shortly before Christmas saying that they now expected to set up the register in 2021. That is six years. In the other place, it was Tory peers who pressed for this to be speeded up. Our new clause does precisely the same thing.

Last week, the right hon. Member for Newbury mentioned unexplained wealth orders. Indeed, the Security Minister got an excellent splash on the implantation of this part of David Cameron’s package on 3 February. It was headed:

“Russians in Britain told to reveal their riches. McMafia-style crackdown on ‘corrupt’ oligarchs.”

It said:

“The government estimates that about £90 billion of illegal cash is laundered in Britain every year.”

The Minister said:

“McMafia is one of those things where you realise that fact is ahead of fiction…It’s a really good portrayal of sharp-suited wealthy individuals, but follow the money and it ends up with a young girl getting trafficked for sex.

What we know from the Laundromat exposé is that certainly there have been links to the [Russian] state. The government’s view is that we know what they are up to and we are not going to let it happen any more.”

He then explained that unexplained wealth orders were coming into effect.

I cannot understand why, given that those orders are coming into effect, a start has not been made on one with the purchase from the Ministry of Defence of Brompton Road tube station by a Ukrainian gas magnate. For colleagues who have not been following this long-running issue, Dmytro Firtash is a friend of ex-President Yanukovych and an associate of both President Putin and Paul Manafort. He was arrested in Vienna on corruption charges at the request of the FBI. Latterly, attempts have been made to extradite him to the United States, first on Magnitsky charges and later in relation to his alleged role in masterminding an international racket that aimed to sell titanium to Boeing.

Like all rich people, he operates indirectly. For example, his foundation, New Century Media, paid for the £800 ticket to a summer ball for the Minister here today—the right hon. Member for Rutland and Melton—according to the Minister’s entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests from 2010. He also gave £85,000 to the Conservative party centrally. I would have thought that he was a prime candidate to receive an unexplained wealth order, and I hope that Ministers will see if that can be pursued.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Is the hon. Lady saying that New Century Media is owned by Mr Firtash?

[Helen Goodman]

Yes.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

It is owned by David Burnside—a former Member.

[Helen Goodman]

I think Mr Burnside is employed by Mr Firtash. That is the issue. These things are not exactly transparent.

Let us return to the question of whether the current state of the law is adequate. The Times also had a leading article which said:

“Three difficulties may blunt the effectiveness of the wealth orders. First, all the agencies involved in investigating and prosecuting those suspected of laundering dirty money in Britain are already over-stretched. They need experienced staff used to digging through multiple layers of shell companies and intricate business transactions, and they do not have enough of them.

Second, the orders frieze assets for an interim period and are only one early step in the process of bringing oligarchs to heel. The government has to be braced for legal marathons contested by the rich and corrupt. That requires political will.

Above all, the red carpet for crooks has to be rolled up. Too many people in the City of London, in the divorce and libel courts, in the art world and in high-end estate agencies have failed to look closely at the cash coming their way. An overdue step would be a public register revealing the true owners of overseas companies that own property in Britain.”

Until we have the public register, it is not going to be possible to identify who owns the properties and whether or not the wealth invested in them has been gained legitimately or illegitimately. In other words, are the wealth orders explained or unexplained? I am not quoting the Morning Star or the Daily Mirror—I am quoting The Times.

We think that this is all taking too long; it is a problem that it is taking too long. It is a problem because of its size, which I will describe. It is also a problem because Ministers are giving time to people to rearrange their affairs and to reorganise them in order to avoid the measures which are in train. A concrete example of that would be the use of trusts. That is why further we have tabled a new clause on trusts.

Global Witness and Transparency International believe that 86,397 properties in England and Wales are owned by companies registered in offshore secrecy jurisdictions; 87% of companies owned by foreign company owners in secret jurisdictions. Half of them are in London and half are in other parts of the country. The 10 most expensive properties owned by companies in tax havens are worth £1.5 billion. Furthermore, Transparency International believes that there are suspicions about £4.4 billion-worth of UK properties, over half of which—£2.36 billion—belongs to companies registered in the British Virgin Islands. They also say that these properties in secret jurisdictions account for 75% of all UK properties under investigation for corruption. If hon. Members or members of the public are interested in seeing what is going on, I recommend going to the Global Witness website where they can type in their postcode and see how many of those secretly owned properties with overseas owners are located on a map.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Unless any other Member wants to rise on a point of order, we will move on. If the hon. Lady wishes to respond, she may.

[Helen Goodman]

My understanding is—and this has been in the public domain and stated outside this House—that Mr Burnside was the executive chair, but that New Century Media represented the personal foundation of Dmytro Firtash.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for Newbury and to the Member for Nottingham North for their further observations. I understand the sentiments of frustration and impatience with the Government on this matter. I hope I have spelled out in some detail—in the areas of land registration; alignment around the different parts of the United Kingdom; and making sure that the penalties are appropriate and that the enforcement measures are set to meet the challenge—that the Government have bold ambitions to get this right and to be a world leader in this area. I acknowledge that this has taken rather longer than it would have done in ideal circumstances, but I can confirm and reiterate to my right hon. Friend that the Government are fully committed to delivering this as soon as possible, and that there is a commitment across multiple Departments and the ministerial team to ensure that this reflects the bold aspirations that we have as a nation. I hope that that would be sufficient for us to move on.

[Helen Goodman]

Ministers have heard that this is an issue of significant concern, and interest in making speedy progress has been expressed on both sides. We will return to this on Report and, that being the case, I do not intend to press it to a vote. I beg to move that the clause be withdrawn.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.





New Clause 6

Alignment of sanctions

(1) It shall be a negotiating objective of Her Majesty’s Government in negotiations on the matters specified in subsection (2) to continue the United Kingdom’s participation in the Political and Security Committee of the European Union in order to align sanctions policy with the European Union.

(2) Those matters are—

(a) the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, and

(b) a permanent agreement with the European Union for a period subsequent to the transitional period after the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union.

(3) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to lay a report before both Houses of Parliament in accordance with either subsection (4) or subsection (5).

(4) A report under this subsection shall be to the effect that the negotiating objective specified in subsection (1) has been achieved.

(5) A report under this subsection shall be to the effect that the negotiating objective specified in subsection (1) has not been achieved.

(6) This Act shall not come into force until a report under either subsection (4) or (5) has been approved via resolution of the House of Commons and considered by the House of Lords.—(Helen Goodman.)

This new clause would require the UK Government to seek continued participation in the Political and Security Committee so as to allow alignment on international sanctions.

[Helen Goodman]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

We now move to a slightly different aspect of the Bill—how decisions will be taken once we leave the European Union. The new clause would require that in negotiations with our European partners, we seek to maintain participation in the Political and Security Committee of the European Union, to align sanctions policy with the European Union, and would require the Government to report on those negotiations and on how they are going. As with the commencement plan, which I felt the Minister was vague and unclear about, so with this. How are we going to co-ordinate in the new world? How is this going to operate?

Sanctions will work if we co-operate and collaborate with other countries. We are all agreed that that is when they are most effective. They are effective in terms of putting pressure on those that are sanctioned, upholding the rule of international law and protecting national security. It is necessary for us to work with our European partners to make our international sanctions regime as effective as possible. One of the issues previously discussed —which Ministers bump up against all the time—is the difficulty of getting agreements in the UN Security Council. Obviously the sanctions that we had on Russia over the annexation of Crimea could not be agreed in the UN Security Council, and that stands to reason. We have been able to get effective sanctions at European level, however, and our security interests are obviously aligned with those of the European Union, objectively speaking, and therefore we are going to take a similar view. We propose that we need to carry on working through the Political and Security Committee. The withdrawal agreement produced by the Commission said some interesting things about decision making. On the subject of administrative co-operation in article 30, it says that,

“as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement, the United Kingdom shall have the status of observer in the Administrative Commission. It may, where the items on the agenda concern the United Kingdom, send a representative, to be present in an advisory capacity, to the meetings of the Administrative Commission and to the meetings of the Technical Commission”.

The section on institutions includes proposals on representatives of member states and the United Kingdom taking part in the work of the Union’s institutions. Chapter 4, article 104 states:

“Article 10…shall apply in the United Kingdom in respect of representatives of Member States and of the United Kingdom taking part in the work of the institutions, agencies, offices and bodies of the Union”

in so far as their participation in that work took place before the end of the transition period.

There is then a section on how the transition period should work, and that is in part 4 of the document produced by the European Commission.

Paragraph 2 of article 122 states:

“Should an agreement between the Union and the United Kingdom governing their future relationship in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy become applicable during the transition period, Chapter 2 of Title V of the”

treaty on European Union

“and the acts adopted on the basis of those provisions shall cease to apply”.

We then have the UK’s obligations with respect to financing defence and security operations, and finally, in article 157 under “Institutional provisions,” it is proposed that, on the date that the withdrawal agreement comes into force:

“A joint committee is hereby established”.

I am not saying that what the Commission proposes is the right way to go, but we are concerned that we have no sense of what the Government think we should do. That is why we tabled the new clause, which suggests that, with respect to sanctions policy, we should retain our membership of the Political and Security Committee of the European Union.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

The new clause would require the Government to commit to negotiating the UK’s continued participation in the EU’s Political and Security Committee after Brexit and delay the commencement of the Bill until a report had been laid before Parliament setting out whether that had been achieved.

The first point I make is that the Bill is about powers, not policy. The UK’s legal powers to implement sanctions flow largely from the European Communities Act 1972. The Bill will replace those powers and, as is recognised on both sides of the House, is necessary to enable the UK to impose sanctions. We are, of course, looking at our sanctions policy and have described our desired future relationship with the EU in a range of places, but it is not appropriate to place that in the Bill.

Secondly, as we have set out, the Government have an unconditional commitment to European security, and we continue to share common threats, interests and values with our European partners. That makes close co-operation, including on sanctions, in both our interests. The exact nature of the UK’s future relationship with the EU on sanctions still needs to be determined, but the UK will remain a critical player in both the European context and the global context.

The UK’s influence on sanctions derives in part from our membership of the EU, but it is not dependent on continued participation in EU bodies. A lot of it derives from the pre-eminence of the City of London in controlling so many flows of money. Our influence also comes from our status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and our membership of bodies such as the G7. That influence is underpinned by our strong economy and financial sector, and both public and private sanctions expertise. That makes the UK a key sanctions partner.

As the Prime Minister made clear at the Munich security conference a couple of weeks ago, our partnership with the EU should offer us the means and the choice to combine our efforts to the greatest effect where that is in our shared interest. That includes working closely with the EU on sanctions. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary was clear on Second Reading that he hopes

“we can act in tandem”

with the EU on sanctions because we

“will always confront the same threats and defend the same values.”—[Official Report, 20 February 2018; Vol. 636, c. 78.]

That demonstrates our commitment to close co-operation with the EU and other international partners regardless of the institutional framework.

Finally, we do not seek to attend EU meetings on the same basis as EU members. It is worth noting that the PSC is not the primary body that deals with sanctions. Sanctions pass through a range of EU institutions before adoption, from working groups to Council meetings. Committing the Government to seek to join the PSC for sanctions would not make sense from a sanctions policy perspective, and does not make sense in relation to our broader approach to negotiations with the EU. Although the details are a matter for negotiation, in the area of foreign policy as a whole we envisage both formal and informal mechanisms to allow regular dialogue, co-operation and close co-ordination.

To tie our objectives to one model would be counterproductive and would remove the freedom to explore new and better ways of working together with the EU on sanctions once we have left the European Union. However, we do not need text in the Bill to underline our commitment to working closely with international partners on sanctions, because that is what we will do. Given that, I respectfully ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the motion.

[Helen Goodman]

The question of how we will co-operate with our European partners on sanctions was debated last July in a general debate on sanctions. I am glad that the Minister now acknowledges that we need to do this, and I am glad that he said that we need formal and informal contacts. Given that he says that this is not the only piece of institutional architecture used at the moment, I will not press the motion to a vote. However, a slightly clearer view from Ministers on how they propose to handle this would be extremely helpful to the House at some point in the future. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

[The Chair]

Does the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland wish to put new clause 7 to a vote?

[Helen Goodman]

I would like to put new clause 5 and new clause 7 to a vote. Have I missed the opportunity to vote on new clause 5?

[The Chair]

Yes. You may press new clause 7 to a vote. Do you wish to?

[Helen Goodman]

Yes, I do.

New Clause 7

Parliamentary committee to scrutinise regulations

(1) A Minister may not lay before Parliament a statutory instrument under section 48(5) unless a committee of the House of Commons charged with scrutinising statutory instruments made under this Act has recommended that the instrument be laid.

(2) The committee of the House of Commons so charged under subsection (1) may scrutinise any reviews carried out under section 27 of this Act.—(Helen Goodman.)

This new clause would require a specialised House of Commons Committee to approve all statutory instruments laid under the affirmative procedure under this Act. The Committee would also scrutinise the Government’s reviews of sanctions regulations.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for setting out her new clause, which would prohibit TCSPs that do not conduct business in the UK from incorporating UK companies, unless they are overseen by a UK anti-money laundering supervisor. As hon. Members will know, the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 specifically provide for TCSPs conducting business in the UK to be subject to a fitness and propriety test and to register with either Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs or the Financial Conduct Authority. In borderline cases where it is unclear whether a TCSP is conducting business in the UK—in which case it would be supervised by a UK anti-money laundering supervisor—HMRC would consider on a case-by-case basis whether registration for supervision is necessary. This acts as an anti-evasion mechanism preventing TCSPs from artificially claiming that they are outside the scope of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime.

The hon. Member for Oxford East asked earlier where this was based. The Government recently established the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision, known as OPBAS, within the Financial Conduct Authority. It works to secure consistently high standards of AML supervision of professional bodies, including TCSPs. These reforms follow the identification of risks associated with TCSPs in the Government’s 2016 action plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing. This found that service sectors such as TCSPs were a significant money-laundering threat.

Although it is for anti-money laundering supervisors to determine their areas of focus, they are required to have regard for the UK’s national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing when assessing risks in their own sector. The risk assessment that the Government published in October last year concludes:

“The highest risk TCSPs are assessed to be UK TCSPs which offer a wide range of services (including nominee directors, registered office services, and banking facilities)”.

Additionally, individual anti-money laundering supervisors are under a duty to identify and assess the international and domestic risks of money laundering and terrorist financing to which their sectors are subject.

[Helen Goodman]

I am surprised by what the Minister is saying. He obviously did not listen to the BBC “Analysis” programme that was broadcast about three weeks ago on the role of overseas TCSPs. We think it is great when people build real-life factories as a jumping-off point into the single market, but it is evident that TCSPs and banks located in the Baltic states, which do not have such good anti-money laundering regulatory regimes, attract money and are used as a jumping-off point to move that money into the European system. Does the Minister really think that the anti-money laundering regimes throughout the European Union are as effective the one in the UK?

[John Glen]

I cannot comment on the specific cases that the hon. Lady mentions, because I have not seen or studied them. I imagine that there is a degree of variability in the effectiveness of regimes, but I am trying to set out the Government’s rationale for what we have in place. I do not suggest that it is perfect, but some of the developments have occurred in response to shortcomings that have been identified.

The individual anti-money laundering supervisors are under a duty to identify and assess international and domestic risks, including the money laundering and terrorism risk, which ensures that the most intensive supervision is applied where the highest risks of money laundering exist. The establishment of OPBAS will assist with the consistent identification of such risks across the TCSP sector. Our national risk assessment makes it clear that the Government are aware of the money laundering risks connected with TCSPs, and further reform in the area should take account of the conclusions of the ongoing FATF review. I assure Opposition Members that the regime is a searching and exacting one. I know from ministerial meetings concerning preparations for it that the evaluation will be exacting. We expect the observations to be meaningful, and we will need to respond carefully to them. However, until we receive the outcome of that review of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime and of the experience of OPBAS as its role develops, it would not be appropriate to adopt the amendment.

Hon. Members should be mindful of the fact that anti-money laundering supervision around the world follows a territorial model. Simply requiring non-UK TCSPs to have a UK supervisor when they set up UK companies will not address the challenges of extra-territorial supervision. Effective anti-money laundering supervision depends on measures that include supervisory on-site visits and close engagement with higher-risk firms. Requiring a UK supervisor to do that in relation to a non-UK firm will not, in and of itself, address the issue that hon. Members have identified.

As was noted in the other place, the most effective means of combating international money laundering is cross-border co-operation to drive up the standards of overseas supervision and enforcement. For those reasons, we have imposed a duty on each UK anti-money laundering supervisor to take such steps as they consider appropriate to co-operate with overseas authorities. That is the agenda we pursue through the global FATF process. I therefore respectfully ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the new clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. It may be the fact that we have been in this room for a few hours, but I am struggling a little with, in particular, the suggestion that new clause 16 would somehow tie the UK’s hands in implementing additional requirements beyond the FATF standards.

The Minister referred to the public register of property owned by non-UK entities. We had a discussion about that, but he is right: it would arguably be an innovation in the UK. Of course it is one that we need more than other countries, because of the use of our property market in many such cases, and the exponential rise in house prices. He could have talked—although he did not—about the register of beneficial ownership of companies being an innovation as well, but countries such as the Netherlands and Norway are putting those into practice anyway, so perhaps we are not quite as far-reaching in what we are doing as we might suggest. Particularly in relation to the charges and fines levied against those found guilty of money laundering offences, we seem to be in a different position from that of our North American counterparts, for example, as we have discussed. None the less, it is not clear how the new clause would stop us going further than those other jurisdictions where we wished to do so. It says that we would take account of the

“best international practice including EU sanctions regimes”,

not that we would be led by it.

[Helen Goodman]

On a point of order, Dame Cheryl, in the light of what the Minister said earlier, I would like to read precisely what was published by The Independent. I misinterpreted it and, consequently, I misled the Committee. I wish to apologise to him and to the Committee for that. This is what The Independent published in 2014:

“According to Electoral Commission records, New Century Media gave the Conservatives £85,000 in the months leading up to the 2010 general election…New Century represents the personal foundation of the Ukrainian billionaire Dmitry Firtash, who has been indicted on bribery and corruption charges, which he denies, in the United States…David Burnside, New Century’s executive chairman, has made…claims about his connections with senior Tories…The company has paid for a table at the last four Conservative summer balls and paid for…the International Development minister”—

who is now the Minister for Europe and the Americas—to be its guest

“at Conservative events at a cost of…£800”.

I am sorry. I misread it and misunderstood it, and consequently I misled the Committee.

[The Chair]

The hon. Lady has had the opportunity to put that on the record. If the Minister wants to add something, he may.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [Lords] (Fourth sitting)

Helen Goodman Excerpts

Thursday 1st March 2018 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Welcome to the cold blast. I understand that this morning Dame Cheryl said that hon. Members should wear their coats and hats as they saw fit, and there is no reason for me to dispense with that advice.

Clause 27

Review by appropriate Minister of regulations under section 1

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 24, in clause 27, page 20, line 39, leave out

“the purpose stated in them under section 1(3)”

and insert—

“(a) the purpose stated in them under section 1(3);

(b) the humanitarian impact;

(c) any British citizen, a British Overseas Territories citizen or British overseas citizen who is not the intended target of sanctions issued under this Act but who is directly or indirectly impacted by the imposition of such sanctions”.

This amendment would require the Government to review whether the sanctions regulations are still appropriate for their specified purposes, including their humanitarian impact and impact on British citizens who are indirectly affected by the imposition of sanctions.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 25, in clause 27, page 20, line 40, at end insert—

‘(2A) The review of the humanitarian impact under subsection (2)(b) must be conducted according to the methodology set out in Chapter 5 of the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s Sanctions Assessment Handbook: Assessing the Humanitarian Implications of Sanctions, published in 2004.”

This amendment, which is consequential on Amendment 24, would require the Government to carry out a humanitarian impact assessment when reviewing the regulations issued under section 1.

[Helen Goodman]

Welcome to cold Committee Room 12, Mr McCabe. As we discussed this morning, clause 27 was inserted by those in another place because it was agreed that we need reviews of what is going on. Amendment 24 would extend the coverage of the reviews. At the moment, the clause proposes one question for review: “whether the regulations” relating to the sanctions

“are still appropriate for the purpose stated in them under section 1(3)”,

which is whatever purpose the sanctions have. That is absolutely fine; we agree with it and think it completely sensible, but we want to add two other things that we think should be covered by the reviews. One is the humanitarian impact, and the other is the impact of the sanctions on British citizens who are not their intended target.

Let me tell the Committee about two episodes in which the humanitarian impact of sanctions was very significant and may have made them counterproductive, because they were simply punishing poor people in the countries involved, who were not responsible for the bad behaviour of their leaders. The sanctions had horrendous negative consequences, which led to a lot of anti-western feeling.

The first example is the comprehensive, multilateral, international sanctions imposed on Iraq in August 1990 under UN Security Council resolution 661. As some of us can remember, it was after the first invasion of Kuwait. Before the sanctions, Iraq had imported roughly 70% of its food, medicine and chemicals for agriculture. Obviously, Iraq was a very wealthy country because of its oil reserves, but with trade sanctions imposed, it could not use that wealth to buy food. Some time later, in 1998, Denis Halliday, the United Nations humanitarian co-ordinator in Iraq, said:

“We are in the process of destroying an entire society. It is as simple and terrifying as that.”

UNICEF came to the view that the sanctions caused the deaths of half a million Iraqi children. That is a terrible death toll and not one that any of us can be comfortable with. Although the idea was to have sanctions instead of hot war, the toll of death and suffering for the Iraqi people was probably as bad from the sanctions as it would have been from hot war. We think that should be taken more into account.

Of course, the situation in Iraq was and is highly contested, but that is why we have tabled amendment 25, saying that the assessment must be done in accordance with the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s “Sanctions Assessment Handbook”. We are saying we should have an agreed methodology for making this assessment, because that way we are more likely to reach an agreed assessment of what the impact of sanctions is; then people can stop arguing about the facts and start considering whether sanctions are justifiable or not. We are not saying that this is the only question to be considered. We are saying the questions should be, “Does it achieve the objectives?” and “What is the humanitarian impact?”

There was another serious case a few years later—all of this happened some time ago, but it is significant none the less. In Haiti, following the military coup of 1991 and the fraudulent elections of 2000, the international community reacted by imposing sanctions. Here again the impact on ordinary citizens was devastating. By 1994, the rate of malnutrition among children under five in many health institutions had increased from 27% to more than 50%. The UNICEF view was that thousands of children died as a consequence.

Of course, both those cases involved countries with a history of bad governance, so disentangling the results of bad governance and the results of the humanitarian sanctions is not absolutely straightforward, and I am not saying that it is absolutely straightforward. Nevertheless, these cases reinforce the argument for amendment 25.

We have also proposed adding that the impact on British citizens who are not the targets of the sanctions should be taken into consideration. It is quite easy to stand back in the Chamber and say, “Oh, we think we should impose sanctions on this person or that person.” The hon. Member for Witney is nodding fiercely; I hope he is nodding at what I am saying.

[Robert Courts (Witney) (Con)]

Oh, certainly.

[Helen Goodman]

Of course, sanctions also have an impact on British commercial and economic interests, and on British commercial and economic actors. I will give the Committee a couple of examples of that.

In a more recent example, from 2014, we decided to impose sanctions against Russia after the intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. One of the things that the sanctions covered was technology for oil and gas, which is obviously a very big sector in the Russian economy. SMD, a specialist engineering firm in Newcastle, makes sophisticated robots that operate on the seabed, doing the job of deep-sea divers. Those robots were banned and the chief executive of SMD—Andrew Hodgson, who I have met—highlighted the damage to his business. He said:

“Imagine we’re a 500 employee business and 20% of your business doesn’t exist, that’s 100 jobs and obviously we’ve been working hard on the technology”,

which is very modern technology. Normally, the company would have exported £20 million worth of equipment, but that business was lost, straight away. Another reason for considering the impact of sanctions on British citizens and the cost to the British economy is the possibility of counter-sanctions imposed by the person or country we are sanctioning. Russia retaliated by banning imports of agricultural and other produce from both the European Union and the United States, including mackerel from Scotland. That was not great for Scottish fishermen.

Nissan was also extremely badly affected, because the effect of the sanctions on Russia was that the rouble plummeted. Nissan had been paid for its car exports in roubles and was not hedged sufficiently to deal with a big drop in the rouble. It halted all the orders because it could not afford to take the loss, which was significant, although not as bad as if it had sold the cars at a loss.

We are pleased that the Government inserted clause 27 and that they are taking a consensual approach to the Bill—

[The Minister for Europe and the Americas (Sir Alan Duncan)]

Yo!

[Helen Goodman]

The Minister is encouraging me to go for it—

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Consensus.

[Helen Goodman]

I will therefore ask for an extension to what is covered in the review. We have given an explanation as to how we think that should be done.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

The Government are well aware of the concerns in the House about the humanitarian impact of sanctions. We are committed to finding constructive solutions through close engagement with non-governmental organisations and other humanitarian actors.

As part of the process of considering when to apply sanctions, the Government already consider the humanitarian impact on the individual or entity being sanctioned and on the general population, if the sanctions are countrywide. That is kept under close review, and we will continue to ensure that NGOs and other humanitarian actors can access the licences and exemptions needed to carry out their work in countries that are subject to sanctions.

In 2016, the UK secured amendments to the EU’s sanctions regime on Syria to provide a specific exemption for fuel purchases by humanitarian organisations, which assisted them in carrying out their operations in Syria while ensuring that they were still compliant with sanctions. As part of the consultation on the Bill, we hold regular roundtable meetings with NGOs and we take into account their concerns about the humanitarian impact of sanctions. A variety of tools and guidance are available for assessing that humanitarian impact, of which the UN handbook, which the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland referred to, is just one.

We take a case-by-case approach to the assessment of the humanitarian impact of each sanctions regime. We work closely with Department for International Development, as I recall happening when I was a DFID Minister, and with staff from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who may be in the relevant country —I am now familiar with what the FCO does on this as well. That ensures that the humanitarian impact is minimised and that licences and exemptions can be made available to NGOs carrying out humanitarian work.

The design and implementation of sanctions has moved on considerably since the handbook was drafted more than 10 years ago. Sanctions are now more targeted and focused directly on people whose behaviour we are trying to change. To restrict the way in which we assess the humanitarian impact to the methodology laid out in the UN handbook would limit our flexibility in making that assessment. In any case, of course, handbooks can change.

The hon. Lady also mentioned Iraq, where sanctions were imposed almost 30 years ago. Those were blanket sanctions. Modern sanctions practice is very different: sanctions are precise and targeted, and the humanitarian implications are much better taken into account. We have learned lessons from historical sanctions regimes. The example of Iraq is useful because it shows exactly the journey that we have been on to make sanctions more precise and effective.

The Government recognise the risks of unintended effects of sanctions on British citizens, as mentioned in the amendment, and on other individuals and entities. A thorough consideration of the possible unintended effects of sanctions is already part of the process of designing and implementing sanctions regimes, and it will continue to be in future. Given that sanctions have an international dimension, it is important that we do not just look at British citizens, but have safeguards for anybody who is unintentionally affected by a sanctions regime. Our concern for justice should not be confined to British citizens.

I assure the Committee that our review, which we will report annually to Parliament under clause 27, will assess the humanitarian impact of each sanctions regime; our approach to mitigating the risks of unintended effects; and our approach to humanitarian licences and exemptions that allow non-governmental organisations to continue their work in countries affected by sanctions.

I hope that that explanation has reassured the Committee sufficiently for the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland to withdraw her amendment.

[Helen Goodman]

I accept what the Minister says about amendment 25, but I do not understand. Basically, he is saying that he agrees with our proposal but does not want it in the Bill, which I do not find very reassuring, to be honest. I wish to divide the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

The provision amended here concerns a Minister’s review of regulations made under Clause 1 which state a purpose within Clause 1(2). The amendment expands the reference to Clause 1(2) so that it covers paragraphs (e) to (h) of Clause 1(2) (as well as paragraphs (a) to (d)).

[Helen Goodman]

I beg to move amendment 26, in clause 27, page 21, line 8, at end insert—

“(d) the steps taken to promote the adoption of sanctions on a multilateral basis;

(e) a summary of any representations made in relation to the exercise or proposed exercise of the powers and the response of the appropriate Minister to the same;

(f) a review from the Independent Reviewer, appointed pursuant to section 20 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (‘the 2011 Act’), of the operation of this Act in the reports by the Independent Reviewer produced pursuant to the 2011 Act.”

This amendment would require the review of regulations to include consideration of the steps taken to promote the adoption of sanctions, a summary of the representations made in relation to powers under this Act and an independent review of the operation of this Act.

I will not press the amendment to a vote, but moving it gives me the opportunity to make a couple of points and perhaps to ask a question. Proposed new paragraph (d) takes us back to whether we accept the Foreign Secretary’s rhetoric about being independent in how we implement sanctions, or whether we know that sanctions are most effective when we do them multilaterally. It is our firm view that we should implement sanctions multilaterally and that Ministers should explain to the House what they have done to secure international consensus on them.

Proposed new paragraph (e) was inspired by representations made to us by the voluntary sector, which wanted to be reassured that Ministers were listening to NGOs in their assessments. The clause says that Ministers have to explain the reasonableness of their “course of action”. That is a sensible thing to do. People will be confident that it is reasonable if they know that the views and information of NGOs have been taken into account. Mr Browder, whom the right hon. Member for Newbury referred to, was keen to have something along those lines, in order to demonstrate that the Government were in listening mode on the sanctions.

Proposed new paragraph (f), with the read-across to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, was also part of our Magnitsky package of measures. Rather than having a separate amendment with a new clause, I thought it was neater to wrap it in to the review at clause 27, to which Ministers have already agreed. I thought Ministers would find it easier to agree if we made this an amendment to clause 27.

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

The hon. Lady is right that this is a key part of the Magnitsky elements of the Bill. There may be a more elegant way of landing this and I am looking forward to hearing what the Minister says about it.

The review aspects are fundamental to achieving what I was talking about earlier: consistency with other jurisdictions. I know the Government are keen to work with us. It may be that that happens in the coming weeks and we find some mechanism by Report stage. Again, the Minister has this in his gift. There are those who say that what we propose would somehow be more than other countries have adopted as part of their Magnitsky legislation, but the US, for example, has a far more onerous oversight provision. It allows certain members of Congress the right to demand that the Government consider sanctioning certain individuals, and the Government have to respond within 120 days to give the reasons why they did or did not. That is called the congressional trigger, and there are other mechanisms in other jurisdictions elsewhere.

What we would like to achieve is that as soon as practicable after six months have elapsed, beginning with the day the Act is passed, and every 12 months thereafter, the Secretary of State prepares a report about the exercise of the powers conferred by the Act and lays that report before Parliament. Subject to issues of clear confidentiality—I absolutely accept that is a requirement—that report should include a summary of any representations made in relation to the exercise or proposed exercise of powers and the response of the appropriate Minister to do the same.

I think there may be some work to be done on the question of who the independent reviewer should be. I note the form of words, which I was initially attracted to by the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland. There may be machinery of Government issues, which mean that that is not the right place for the independent reviewer to reside, but I think there are many ways of skinning this particular cat. The review element is fundamental, because it is important that those organisations that are taking forward evidence are able to have that evidence independently verified and Government held accountable.

On a related issue, which is not specific to this Bill but that makes my point, campaigners—with very good evidence—have brought cases about people connected to serious organised crime from overseas who operate in this country. They have taken that to agencies such as the Serious Fraud Office, the National Crime Agency and others, but it has not been taken up. When they have done that in other countries, assets have been frozen, people have been subject to visa denials and other measures have been taken. Somehow, people slip between the cracks in our system, and this is an opportunity to close that gap.

On where that independent reviewer resides, I am open to suggestions from my right hon. Friend the Minister or anyone. I am glad that the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland has given us a bit of breathing room to resolve this. By Report, we really need to have a review process that is independent and comprehensive; that addresses the measures that we require to allow people who have access to information to bring it forward; and that holds Government accountable for how they deal with that kind of information.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

The amendment is important because it overlaps with our earlier discussions about the broader Magnitsky issue. It also introduces two other elements, so it has three distinct elements.

The first element is the issue of adopting sanctions on a multilateral basis, which is what sanctions are really for. It is quite rare for sanctions to be adopted by only one country. Their whole effectiveness depends on multilateral co-operation. UN sanctions, which we are obliged to implement, are multilateral by their very nature. All the other sanctions that we have imposed in the past have also been multilateral, because we have imposed them as part of the EU. Although our departure from the EU necessitates our having an autonomous sanctions regime, we envisage that its operation will almost inevitably be multilateral. We agree that sanctions are more effective when they are adopted by a greater number of countries.

The UK plays a leading role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council in negotiating sanctions measures that build on the entire international community. We also work closely with the EU and other international partners in a range of groupings, such as the G7, and we will continue to work hard internationally to gain the widest possible support for sanctions measures.

In the second element of the amendment, the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland asks us to show our hand at all stages and to show the manner in which we piece sanctions together. However, to publicly reveal our discussions and the steps that we take to work with international partners could be damaging to those efforts. We would not wish to embarrass partners who, for their own reasons, decline to align with our sanctions policy or to risk the targets of sanctions understanding too much about which country was in which position on any given sanctions regime.

A related issue is whether an individual can nominate someone to be sanctioned, which they can. Any person can write to the Government and the Government will respond. Individuals may request that the Government apply new or additional sanctions regimes, and we will of course consider that.

[Helen Goodman]

How often does that happen in the real world? Does the Minister get a long letter from Amnesty International every week or every month that says, “We’ve seen this person and this person, and we think there is a problem”? I give that as an example, because one might imagine that it happened in that kind of way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I both thank and congratulate my right hon. Friend for the elegance with which he has made his point, and I can say in clear and simple language, “Message received.”

Perhaps I can also take this opportunity to inform the Committee, in a little more detail, our feeling and understanding of what we know are the independent oversight powers in the Bill, because they are a central part of the broader picture of oversight.

We think the Bill finds the right balance of powers and independent oversight of those powers, because—rightly—the powers to impose sanctions are placed in the hands of the Executive. As such, the Government will decide whether or not to impose sanctions and on whom. Likewise, in the first instance the Government will decide when to lift sanctions. That is in line with the standard practice of the Executive deciding foreign policy and is consistent with international practice.

However, the role of the courts—as the independent arbiter and judicial authority overseeing the powers in the Bill—is significant. The courts can look at decisions made by the Government under the Bill and judge whether those decisions were correct. If not, the courts’ judgment will of course be binding on the Government. Furthermore, the Bill has significant transparency requirements and the Minister has numerous reporting obligations to Parliament. The reports will all be laid before and scrutinised by Parliament. As is the case now, parliamentary Committees can produce their own independent reports and can take evidence and make recommendations. That will continue. There is far more scope for such independent oversight by Parliament than there is now, where decisions are taken in Brussels and there are limited reporting requirements to the UK Parliament. As such, we believe that the Bill finds the right balance of Executive decision making, independent judicial arbitration by the courts and independent political oversight and scrutiny by Parliament.

[Helen Goodman]

We have had another interesting exchange. We are extremely grateful to the right hon. Member for Newbury, who knows about the issues in great detail. When it was first suggested to me that we involve the independent reviewer for terrorism, I was a bit taken aback as well. At first blush, one thinks that sanctions and terrorism are not quite the same thing. However, that person is looking at assets frozen under terrorism legislation as well, so it is appropriate, and I do not think that the job description-type points that the Minister made quite hit the nail on the head.

Had the Minister said to us, “No, we have thought about this, but the independent reviewer for terrorism is not the right person—we would propose that it would be X,Y or Z,” that would have been a good response. Then, we would have had more confidence in the Minister’s willingness to engage in the consensus-building process that we are all, across the House, looking for on the Bill. It seems to me that the Minister is being extremely cautious, to the point of not acknowledging that some changes will have to be made if the Government are to get the Bill on to the statute book. The Minister would have done well to have thought about that between 20 February and today, and he would do well to be more flexible now than he has been.

The suggestion that we rely on the courts is not very practical. That means, in effect, that people have to take the Government to court using the judicial review processes. It is incredibly ad hoc and unsystematic. It will mean that somebody with a lot of money who is critical of the Government’s actions can go to court and get their justice. This is not a place where we are about to have legal aid, is it?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

There are many stages to be gone through before it ever needs to go to court. One of the provisions that I really pressed hard for in the preparation of the Bill was that there could be swift and direct redress for someone caught up in sanctions unfairly—as they might see it—who needs to defend themselves but does not have money. That is why there is a process for being able to submit arguments that say they have been wrongly caught up. If they are justified, those issues can hopefully be resolved before there is any need to go to court. The hon. Lady is making a very valid point, and, if it were the case, that is addressed in the Bill.

[Helen Goodman]

I am sorry, but I think we are now conflating two things. The Minister is conflating the arguments that were had in the other place on designated persons, and the arguments here. The changes that were made with respect to designated persons were completely reasonable. I would go further than that: I would say that the Minister in the other place, Lord Ahmad, was right to resist the blandishments of Lord Pannick, who wanted to provide a court process for UN sanctions as well as non-UN sanctions, but that is not what we are talking about here. I am disappointed that the Minister has not shown a more flexible posture, and indicated more clearly that he is prepared to think again. His intervention was really a defence of the Bill. He did not indicate that he was prepared to go some way, but not to have this precise wording. That being the case, I think we do want to test the will of the Committee.

[Richard Benyon]

Perhaps there is an opportunity, in the relatively short period of time between now and Report, for us to work collectively with the Government to try to identify a structure that would read better in the Bill, and that would give the kind of assurances that the hon. Lady is after. Without having gone into the weeds of the issue, I am quite attracted by what Congress has—the congressional trigger is a relatively powerful means of holding the Executive to account. The Joint Committee on Human Rights may be a vehicle in Parliament to give it an added degree of independent oversight. I have not consulted to any great degree with those who have been working on this matter for longer than I have, or with those who understand more about drafting a Bill, but I would be very keen to work with the hon. Lady on trying to achieve that.

[Helen Goodman]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. I do not know whether the Minister would like to intervene again in the light of that, or whether he is content with what he has said.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Content.

[Helen Goodman]

Okay. In the light of the intervention from the right hon. Member for Newbury, I will stick with what I had first thought to do, and will not press the amendment. However, the Minister needs to understand that we will have to come back to this matter on Report. From his point of view, it would be best if he took the initiative. He has not taken any initiative so far. If he does not, we will. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Helen Goodman]

I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 27, page 21, line 17, at end insert—

“(5A) The Appropriate Minister who made the regulations must in each quarterly period lay before Parliament a report for each sanctions regime and regulation containing—

(a) the aggregate value of funds and other assets frozen;

(b) the number of suspected breaches and the aggregate value of such breaches; and

(c) actions taken on suspected breaches.”

This amendment would require the Government to report to Parliament on a quarterly basis about the impact of sanctions regimes, including the number and value of suspected breaches of those sanctions.

We discussed this matter a bit the other day. The amendment is a request for information from the Government on breaches to sanctions. I will not embarrass the Treasury Minister again by going into the full detail of how, on 8 February, he told me that the sanctions busting in 2017 was £117 million, but by 22 February it had shot up to £1.4 billion, and how concerned I was by that. Our interest in transparency did not begin with that episode. We think that it is important to have more information about this subject.

The amendment would require Ministers to report regularly on the value of funds and assets frozen, the number of breaches, and the actions taken on those breaches. We discussed this issue when we were looking at the Crown Prosecution Service guidelines on breaches. We need to understand this matter better, and we think that without shining the light of transparency on it, breaches can very easily be swept under the carpet and not acted on. We are not happy about that, particularly given how the Government have acted in the past when challenged.

I will share an episode with the Committee—it will take a couple of minutes, but I think that it is relevant. In July 2011, information was sought from the Treasury on its reasons for approving and licensing the CAMEC platinum deal—the CAMEC being the Central African Mining and Exploration Company. It bought a platinum mine in Zimbabwe from the sanctioned regime of Robert Mugabe. It transferred $100 million to the Mugabe regime as part of the purchase, and that injection of hard currency funded a campaign of violence against opposition supporters. The funds appear to have paid for weapons, trucks and the dispatch of youth militias and war veterans to crush the opposition.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

It is not about the reporting, but the frequency of the reporting. The point I am making is that to increase it to quarterly would add unnecessary compliance cost to industry, when that cost is already considerable if necessary. It would also result in an administrative burden for Government to produce figures that may not be of much practical use. We do not think that is the best way to spend the limited resource of public money.

Providing quarterly reporting regime by regime may also risk breaking other laws. At the moment we only provide regime figures for the largest regimes. For the small regimes there may only be a small number of designated persons with frozen funds in the UK so providing that specific information, which can easily be traced back to them, may risk breaching data protection laws.

The Government have already committed to being transparent where appropriate. As part of the monetary penalty guidance published last year by the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, the Government committed to publishing details of breaches and criminal prosecutions. That is a matter of public record.

For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland to withdraw the amendment.

[Helen Goodman]

I am sorry, but notwithstanding the blandishments of the right hon. Member for Newbury, I do not think that the Minister has made the case for keeping that information secret. The fact that the numbers can jump around in the way that they did last month suggests that the Government have not got a grip. One way to incentivise Ministers is through the OFSI, which after all is the body that the Treasury set up to run sanctions policy. We have a whole group of people there devoting their lives to that—perhaps they are even in room, supporting the Minister today—and to supporting Ministers to do that. It is a perfectly reasonable piece of information for us to be requesting. It would help Ministers to manage things better and help to give the public confidence that breaches of sanctions are being dealt with properly. I am afraid that I therefore wish to press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Helen Goodman]

I have some questions about chapter 3. It would not be appropriate to table amendments, but I want to ask the Minister for some explanation of what is going on with clauses 29 to 32, because I could not really follow them. It looks to me as if Ministers are taking the powers in chapter 3 for a transition period—we will leave the European Union at the end of March 2019, we will use the powers under chapter 3 during the transitional period, and then, when we move into our new deep and special relationship with the European Union thereafter, as the Prime Minister would describe it, we will use the other powers in the Bill. Will the Minister tell me whether I have understood that properly?

That being the case, we flip back to the end of the Bill. This is where I am slightly puzzled by what Ministers intend. Clause 55 on commencement says:

“The Secretary of State may by regulations make transitional or saving provision in connection”

with the provisions of the Bill coming into force. It is all about Ministers making regulations when they want to. I do not understand why Ministers have not tied up the commencement provisions, the transitional provisions and the enforcement of the regulations with the definitions that we have used in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, and why we are not using the words “exit day” here, which we defined in that other Bill.

Let me remind the Minister what it says in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill:

“ ‘exit day’ means 29 March 2019 at 11.00 p.m.”

and

“A Minister of the Crown may by regulations...amend the definition of ‘exit day’ in subsection (1) to ensure that the day and time specified in the definition are the day and time that the Treaties are to cease to apply to the United Kingdom, and...amend subsection (2) in consequence of any such amendment.”

The Minister will remember that we had a long debate, with the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) putting forward a new way of deciding on exit day, and the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) tabling an amendment that was eventually accepted. I do not understand why a different approach is being used here.

The point matters not just for neat-and-tidiness, but because it will need to tie up with the rest of the negotiations and the deal that Ministers are negotiating on Brexit. For sanctions to work, it will be necessary to have an agreed approach to information sharing, on criminal justice and on border control. None of that is covered in the Bill and it is therefore very unclear what will happen in practice.

I did not know how to table amendments to raise the point, which is why I am asking a simple question to the Minister on how he is handling it. I am not the only person who has noticed the problems. UK Finance, the coalition of the banks, has said that

“the ‘jurisdictional’ description is left rather open ended.”

They are saying, “We know when EU law applies and when it does not apply, but will European Court of Justice judgments apply?” I would like the Minister to explain in concrete terms how he thinks that will work in the period before we leave, in the transitional period and in the post-transitional world of the new deep and special relationship.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I will explain the clause, and I hope answer the hon. Lady’s questions. As part of our membership of the UN and the European Union, we currently impose sanctions on more than 2,000 people and organisations. Upon our departure from the EU, it may be that there has been insufficient parliamentary time or civil service capacity to comprehensively review all EU sanctions listings, and to prepare and pass appropriate statutory instruments to incorporate them under the regular powers conveyed by the Bill.

In those circumstances, to ensure that we meet our international obligations and do not become a route through which sanctioned individuals can move their assets, it may be necessary to retain some lists of persons sanctioned by the EU, as frozen EU laws under the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. The freezing of existing EU sanctions via the withdrawal agreement is a safeguard measure to make completely sure that there are no gaps in our sanctions regimes as a result of leaving the EU. If that proves necessary, Ministers will need powers to amend those lists by adding or removing individuals from them, and the clause provides that power. It is a backstop measure, operable only for a maximum period of two years after the date of departure. All it does is allow Ministers to amend the list of designated persons. It does not allow new regimes to be set up, or substantive changes to be made to retained regimes, such as setting up a new arms embargo. That would require action under clause 1.

[Helen Goodman]

We can debate the matter when we come to clause 55, if the Minister has been better briefed by then, but when does he picture Ministers starting to use the powers? Is it on 1 April 2019 or 1 January 2021? If it is not until 1 January 2021, what will happen during the intervening period? Is he satisfied that simply using the lists will work if we are in a period when we do not have integration on borders, criminal justice and so on?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

The clause enables us to exercise those powers, but we cannot at this stage provide the date specificity that the hon. Lady is seeking, because that is a matter of negotiation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 29 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 30 to 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34

court reviews: further provision

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

The purpose of the clause is to ensure that those acting in good faith and in compliance with this legislation are properly protected from damages being awarded against them. The clause will not protect individuals if they are found to have been negligent or to have acted in bad faith. The measure is aligned with existing EU law and is necessary to ensure, for example, that enforcement officers acting under the law may perform their duties without fear of destitution.

The clause also restricts the circumstances in which the court may award damages against the state. Sanctions are imposed to counter unacceptable behaviour. They may need to be applied quickly and in situations in which there is incomplete information. However, the clause will still allow damages awards where there is evidence of negligence or of acts in bad faith. In practice, therefore, the clause restricts damages awards only in cases where the Government act in accordance with the information available to them and lawfully apply a sanction on the basis of sufficient evidence.

If damages awards were allowed in those circumstances, applying sanctions would carry a very significant risk to the public purse. Indeed, it is likely that the larger and more important the sanction target, the higher the financial risk to the taxpayer. It is therefore important to allow the Government to respond swiftly to developing situations and to protect the taxpayer to restrict the availability of damages as a remedy in the specific circumstances of negligence or acts of bad faith.

There was consultation before the Bill. As a piece of legislation that covers the whole of the UK, we believe that the powers should be as consistent as possible.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 35 and 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37

Guidance about regulations under section 1

[Helen Goodman]

I beg to move amendment 28, in clause 37, page 29, line 39, at end insert—

‘(d) reporting obligations;

(e) licensing requirement provisions.

(3) Where civilian payments and humanitarian activity are exempt from any prohibitions and requirements imposed by the regulations, the appropriate Minister must issue guidance.

(4) The guidance under subsection (3) must include—

(a) best practice for complying with the processing of civilian and humanitarian activities to reduce the risk of funds benefiting designated individuals, entities or organisations;

(b) mechanisms to limit the impact of prohibitions and requirements on a permissible civilian and humanitarian activity;

(c) circumstances where the prohibitions and requirements may be relevant in the context of the otherwise permissible delivery of a humanitarian activity; and

(d) options setting out effective banking and payment corridors for the processing of payments in support of a civilian and humanitarian activity which is not subject to any prohibitions or requirements.’

This amendment would require that the guidance issued about regulations under section 1 includes guidance on reporting obligations and licensing requirements. It would also require the Government to issue guidance on civilian payments and humanitarian activity exempt from prohibitions and requirements imposed by regulations.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 27, in clause 37, page 29, line 39, at end insert—

‘(3) Where regulations under section 1 make provision as to the meaning of any reference in the regulations to a person “owned” or “controlled” by another person pursuant to section 50(3), the appropriate Minister must issue guidance.’

This amendment would require the Government to issue guidance setting out the meaning of a person “owned” or “controlled” by another person when regulations are issued to make provision for this purpose under section 50(3).

[Helen Goodman]

The amendments relate to the importance of having guidance. There is considerable concern in the voluntary and financial sectors that the regulations as provided for under clause 36—

“an appropriate Minister may make regulations”—

are a piece of volunteerism and not an obligation on the Minister. That is causing some anxiety and confusion among those actors who have to implement the sanctions, whether NGOs or the financial sector. I will give a slightly more detailed description of this, because it is a bit complicated.

Last year Chatham House looked at the issue in some detail. It concluded that a number of UN Security Council sanctions regimes authorise the imposition of targeted sanctions against non-state armed group parties to armed conflicts. Of particular relevance to humanitarian action are financial sanctions such as asset freezes, which, among other things, require member states to ensure that funds, financial assets or economic resources are not made available to or for the benefit of designated entities. Asset freezes can be problematic for humanitarian action. There is a risk that the obligation not to make assets available to designated groups will be interpreted as covering incidental payments that must be made to such groups—for road tolls or locally purchased fuel, for example—so that humanitarian relief reaches civilians in need. It may also be interpreted as covering humanitarian goods or equipment that are diverted to such groups or otherwise benefit them, directly or indirectly. The scope of potential liability for violating asset freezes is very broad, and no intent or knowledge is required for that to be an offence, which is harsher than the bar for other kinds of breaches.

Although asset freezes are most likely to have an adverse impact on humanitarian action and, consequently, they have received the greatest attention, other forms of sanction may have a similar impact. In Syria, the problem was oil and petrol. Broader financial crimes risks arising from the Financial Action Task Force have also complicated humanitarian work.

The role of the UK financial sector in implementing sanctions is also relevant. It is not clear whether, when assessing the impact of sanctions, the UK intends to borrow the EU’s 50% rule for ownership and control. UK Finance states that

“the clarity of the ownership and control structures becomes of paramount importance and can be one of the most complex elements of ensuring sanctions compliance. If ownership or control is established in accordance with set criteria, the making available of funds or economic resources to non-listed legal persons or entities which are owned or controlled by a listed person or entity will in principle be considered a sanctions breach. The EU, and indeed many other jurisdictions, tend to apply a 50 percent rule and criterion to establish the ownership and control of an entity…if a listed individual has 50 percent or more ownership of a non-listed entity, EU persons/entities are prohibited from making available funds”.

There is no reference in the Bill to existing EU standards. The purpose of amendment 27 is to clarify that.

[Alison Thewliss]

I am concerned about the use of the word “may” in the clause, which states that the guidance “may include guidance” about certain things. I am concerned that that is not sufficiently well developed. I very much support the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland’s amendments, which would add a wee bit more clarity, detail and guidance. The clause is worth while, but the Government would do well to listen to the detail that she laid out.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

I am not necessarily denying the role of Government in issuing guidance in a whole range of areas. What I am dealing with here is the necessity of adding the provision into the Bill when the need to give guidance is sufficiently catered for in the text of the Bill.

The Bill will put the requirements in a better place because of the new flexibility on exemptions, licensing grounds and the ability to provide general licences. We are therefore unable to agree to the level of guidance sought, and I ask the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland to withdraw her amendment.

[Helen Goodman]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 39

Revocation and amendment of regulations under section 1

Amendment made: 6, in clause 39, page 30, line 24, leave out “(d)” and insert “(h)”—(Sir Alan Duncan.)

The provision amended here is a condition which applies to the power to amend regulations made under Clause 1 which state a purpose within Clause 1(2). The amendment expands the reference to Clause 1(2) so that it covers paragraphs (e) to (h) of Clause 1(2) (as well as paragraphs (a) to (d)).

Clause 39, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 40 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 41

Power to amend Part 1 so as to authorise additional sanctions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alison Thewliss]

I want to express some concerns that I mentioned on Second Reading. The clause grants a lot of powers to Ministers. It allows them to amend the definition of sanctions. What I and the House of Lords Constitution Committee are concerned about is how that is then scrutinised by Parliament. I do not know whether the Minister has had any time to think about how it might work since Second Reading, but I am concerned that the legislation does not include a mechanism to look at sanctions that is similar to the one that exists in the European Scrutiny Committee. I would like a wee bit further clarity on whether the Government have plans to do that. If not, why not? What might the mechanism look like?

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

I beg to move Government amendment 7, in clause 43, page 33, line 13, leave out subsection (2).

This amendment removes the provision that prevents contraventions of regulations under Clause 43 (money laundering and terrorist financing etc) from being enforceable by criminal proceedings.

In moving this amendment, I acknowledge the recognition that this House has given to the importance of a rigorous anti-money laundering regime. To ensure the robustness of future anti-money laundering regulations, corresponding powers to create criminal offences are necessary. At the same time, I recognise that Lord Judge and others in the other place expressed significant concerns about the scope of criminal offence powers in the Bill upon its introduction. It is important to note that those concerns were not about the existence of offences for breaching anti-money laundering regimes; instead, they were concerns about the unchecked ability of Ministers to create offences.

The amendment reinstates the power to create criminal offences, while the package of amendments as a whole directly addresses those concerns through additional safeguards, which narrow the scope of and the ability to use these powers. I shall elaborate upon these safeguards, which the Government have discussed with Lord Judge since the passage of this Bill through the other place, and then I will turn to amendments 10, 11 and 12. Before I do so, however, it would be useful to consider how anti-money laundering regulations have operated with criminal offence powers in the past.

In accordance with standard practice, when implementing EU directives on money laundering, criminal offences in this area have been created by Ministers in secondary legislation made under the powers in the European Communities Act 1972. That was done under the negative procedure, with no prior consultation with Parliament and no need to seek Parliament’s consent. That position will be improved for future money laundering regulations made under the Bill. They will now be made under the draft affirmative procedure, so Parliament will consider and vote on them before they come into force. Using the affirmative procedure is a direct response to the concerns raised, to ensure that where changes need to be made, they will be properly scrutinised.

Criminal offences were created by both the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 and their predecessors, the Money Laundering Regulations 2007, which were brought into force by the then Labour Government. As hon. Members can see, the approach has been supported on a cross-party basis in the past. The detailed provisions in such regulations set standards and procedures for regulated businesses. They are designed to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing and to help law enforcement authorities to investigate those crimes, and should also be seen in the context of a separate penalty regime for the key substantive money laundering offences. Such offences are established under part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which provides for more punitive prison sentences of up to 14 years, for example for those guilty of directly laundering the proceeds of crime. Money launderers are typically prosecuted through those offences as they allow for longer sentences.

Without the power to create new criminal offences in secondary legislation, the enforceability of new regulations would be seriously weakened. That would dramatically lower the effectiveness of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime. More generally, it is not unusual for requirements to be set in delegated legislation that can be enforced using criminal penalties, In the area of financial services, for example, the regulated activities order, made under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, specifies which activities are or are not regulated. Carrying on such activities without permission from the regulator is a criminal offence. It remains the position of the Government that it is neither unusual nor improper for Parliament to confer powers of that type to Ministers.

[Helen Goodman]

I just want to clarify with the Minister the status of his conversations with Lord Judge. I do not know if he was trying to give us the impression that Lord Judge had agreed the amendments. I felt on Tuesday that he was trying to give that impression, so I spoke to Lord Judge, who told me that he had indeed had conversations with Ministers, but he did not say to me that he had approved the amendments. Is the Minister now trying to tell us that Lord Judge has agreed Government amendment 7?

[John Glen]

What I can tell the Committee is that officials have had sensitive conversations with Lord Judge. It is not for us to presume the outcome of his deliberations at this point. I am setting out what we have discussed and the consequence of those discussions. Clearly, Lord Judge will make his position known in his own way in due course.

I would like to set out why the ability to create criminal offences for the UK’s anti-money laundering regimes is necessary. The issue has been considered previously, when the Government consulted specifically on whether to remove the criminal offence provisions in the Money Laundering Regulations 2007. The British Bankers Association stated that removing such provisions would be at odds with the objective of driving an effective anti-money laundering regime.

Further, the Crown Prosecution Service argued that provisions for creating criminal offences in the Money Laundering Regulations that are different from those of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 serve a separate and useful function in tackling money laundering. In some instances, prosecuting according to the Proceeds of Crime Act could jeopardise ongoing investigations. It said that in such cases, the ability to prosecute for a regulatory offence relating to defective anti-money laundering counter-terrorist financing systems can be an important tool. Finally, HMRC noted in response to the same consultation that abolishing criminal sanctions for breaches of regulations carries significant risk to its ability to tackle money laundering.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

Helen Goodman Excerpts

Tuesday 27th February 2018 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I am sure it will not be your only contribution. We do have a small heater over here in the corner, but unfortunately we cannot share it around the room. I am sure the debate will be lively and will keep us all hot. Without further ado, we will begin with amendment 21 to clause 17 on enforcement.

Clause 17

Enforcement

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 21, in clause 17, page 16, line 36, at end insert—

“(8) An appropriate Minister must publish guidance from the Crown Prosecution Service on when it is in the public interest for a breach of a sanctions regulations to be prosecuted.”

This amendment would require the Government to publish guidance on when it is in the public interest for a breach of sanctions regulations to be prosecuted.

It is a great pleasure to see you in the Chair this afternoon, Dame Cheryl. It is not quite as sunny as it was this morning, but it is still very cold.

The clause is about enforcement of sanctions regulations. Breaching sanctions is a criminal offence, and this morning we discussed whether the legislation on those criminal offences is appropriate. It is fair and reasonable that people have a clear view of what the penalties will be for any breach of sanctions. Our amendment would require the Crown Prosecution Service to say when it is in the public interest that a breach of sanctions regulations be prosecuted.

The Treasury published some guidance a few months ago entitled “Monetary Penalties for Breaches of Financial Sanctions”. I am sorry to say that it does not include the sort of detail that we would expect. The stark reality was brought to our attention last week, when the Economic Secretary to the Treasury had to correct an answer to a written parliamentary question. I had asked him what the total level of breaches was in 2017 and on 8 February, he told me it was £117 million. On 22 February, he told me that the estimate had shot up to £1.4 billion—a tenfold increase, which suggests that the Treasury is not keeping the beady eye that it ought to be keeping on this matter.

Many years ago, I was a Treasury civil servant. One year, I was responsible for the Budget arithmetic and I had to go and tell Chancellor Nigel Lawson that I had lost £50 million from the Budget arithmetic and it was very embarrassing. I never lost £1.2 billion, which is what current Treasury Ministers seem to have managed to do. The fact that the figures are so large tells us that the level of breaches is significant. It is hard for us to believe that, in a great wodge of £1.2 billion, there are not some breaches that should be prosecuted. From the information Ministers have given us, we have no idea whether this figure involves many small breaches or three or four really big breaches.

A report published in December in a magazine called Nikkei Asian Review says that 49 nations have breached North Korean sanctions. The sanctions against North Korea have been agreed at the UN Security Council—they could not be more important. We have a situation where North Korea is trying to develop nuclear weapons. Everybody in this House and this country knows that that would be disastrous—completely destabilising to the region and potentially the whole world. If North Korea acquires nuclear weapons, the risk of proliferation is immense. I know Foreign Office Ministers understand this. The report suggests that 13 of the countries that have breached North Korean sanctions have engaged in arms trading; they are primarily countries with a history of political turmoil such as Syria, Angola, Iran, Myanmar and Sir Lanka, but even Germany and France were deemed culpable in certain respects.

Obviously, breaching weapons of mass destruction sanctions against North Korea is something that nobody would take lightly. One would think that this would be a case where it would be appropriate to prosecute, but because of the lack of transparency, we have no idea whether we in this country have made mistakes in the same way as the Germans and French have. Obviously there would be nothing intentional about it, but accidents too can be dangerous. That is why we think the Government should be stronger and clearer on enforcement. The Government could make matters clearer by publishing CPS guidelines explaining how and when they believe prosecutions are in the public interest. If the Economic Secretary could tell us a little more about what happened with this mistake—how the figure came to be £1.2 billion out—and whether the Treasury has looked back over previous years to see the pattern of breaches, I am sure that would be of great interest to the Committee.

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship for the first time, Dame Cheryl.

First, I would like to address the serious matter that the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland raised with respect to Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation data. She is quite correct to assert that there was an error; this was caused by technical and data problems. Officials have now manually checked each case by reference to the original information and have confirmed that the revised figures for suspected breaches reported in 2017 accurately answer the question. I wrote to the hon. Lady at the earliest opportunity and apologised to her.

The Government take financial sanctions evasion extremely seriously and have made an unprecedented commitment to tackling it, increasing the dedicated resources and providing new enforcement powers to deal with breaches, including new penalty powers and an increase in the criminal offence’s maximum sentence from two to seven years. We cannot go into specifics on the size of the breaches but I can assure the hon. Lady and the whole Committee that I do not anticipate difficulties in future.

Amendment 21 would require the Government to provide specific guidance, produced by the Crown Prosecution Service, on the prosecution of sanctions breaches. Hon. Members will be interested to know that the CPS already publishes guidance on how the public interest is taken into account in any decision to prosecute in “The Code for Crown Prosecutors”. This public interest test is the same one that we applied in decisions to prosecute sanctions offences. The Government’s view is that no additional public interest guidance is necessary for a sanctions prosecution decision. The public interest is a fundamental assessment in any decision to prosecute, and “The Code for Crown Prosecutors” includes factors relevant to public interest tests such as the seriousness of the offence and the level of culpability of the suspect. These and other factors included in the code are relevant to the decision to prosecute in sanctions cases. There is therefore no need for separate guidance on this amendment.

We will be discussing clause 37 and the Government’s duty to issue guidance later in Committee. Clause 37 sets out a comprehensive duty to provide guidance where it is required, but the Government believe that in this instance separate guidance is not required.

[Helen Goodman]

That is rather unsatisfactory, because the general guidance is intended for the practitioners. As we were discussing this morning, it is for the NGOs and for the banks. I am sure that the Minister understands that the CPS guidance is for the lawyers, and although the banks and NGOs may be advised by lawyers it does take a different form. The Treasury guidance addresses processes; it does not look at the public interest in this context. I am not satisfied with what the Minister says and I do wish to test the view of the Committee on this amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made

--- Later in debate ---

Extra-territorial application

[Helen Goodman]

I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 18, page 17, line 7, leave out subsection (4) and insert—

“(4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(b), a body incorporated or constituted under the law of any part of the United Kingdom includes a body incorporated or constituted under the law of the following—

(a) any of the Channel Islands;

(b) the Isle of Man;

(c) any of the British Overseas Territories.”

This amendment would require the Government to include any of the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and any of the British Overseas Territories in the definition of “United Kingdom person” under subsection(2).

Clause 18 was not much discussed in the other place, but the Opposition tabled amendment 22 because we think it important that part 1, which relates to sanctions, be extended automatically to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the British overseas territories. We will be able to revisit the subject at the very end of our deliberations when we consider clauses 54 and 55, but I thought we should take the opportunity to consider it now.

As a matter of constitutional law, the UK Parliament has unlimited power to legislate for the overseas territories. Some overseas territories and Crown dependencies have their own legislatures, but they legislate on domestic matters, whereas sanctions are a lever in foreign policy—a Foreign Minister is leading the Bill, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is very much in the lead when it comes to driving sanctions policy. It cannot be argued that legislation on sanctions policy is domestic or in the normal purview of Crown dependencies and overseas territories, so the amendment seems logical.

There is a further reason for extending the definition automatically. There is a lot of controversy about the secrecy in how some Crown dependencies and overseas territories run their financial services, which gives them scope to be part of sanctions busting, whether deliberately—which I doubt—or inadvertently. That brings us back to the question of North Korea. The US Department of Justice alleges that companies based in the British Virgin Islands and Anguilla are linked to a North Korean bank. The Guardian reported on 20 February:

“The China-based Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Company was placed under US sanctions in 2016.”

I am sure the Minister is familiar with the Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Company. It was sanctioned after it was

“accused of operating on behalf of the Korean Kwangson Banking Corporation, which was itself sanctioned in 2009 over alleged links to North Korean weapons development. The shell companies, some of which appear in the Panama Papers, were part of a network of offshore entities used to obscure the acquisition of millions of dollars of fertiliser, coal and other commodities, according to the complaint.”

The report continued:

“US sanctions prevent North Korean financial institutions from dealing in US dollars. However, because some commodities vendors require sales to be conducted in dollars, North Korea needs to be able to access the currency in order to obtain goods and services that are unavailable domestically.

The criminal complaint, filed in 2016, alleges that KKBC used DHID to obtain access to US dollars, in part by establishing a network of 22 different shell companies in various jurisdictions that would obscure its role in the commodity transactions.”

I think I have made it clear that there is a case for applying sanctions in a straightforward and automatic way to the Crown dependencies and the overseas territories. It is clear, as the Government stated in 2012:

“As a matter of constitutional law, the UK Parliament has unlimited power to legislate.”

Given that is the case, I am sure Ministers will be keen to accept amendment 22.

[The Minister for Europe and the Americas (Sir Alan Duncan)]

The UK is responsible for the foreign affairs and security of the Crown dependencies and overseas territories. That is the constitutional position. However, there is another important constitutional point, which is that our long-standing practice is not generally to legislate for those jurisdictions without their consent.

Sanctions are a tool of foreign policy or are used to protect our national security. We have been clear that the overseas territories and Crown dependencies must follow the UK Government’s foreign policy, including the sanctions we apply. The Foreign Office has discussed that with the overseas territories and Crown dependencies, and they also accept that point of principle.

The hon. Lady referred to the current distinction. There are two ways in which sanctions are implemented by the overseas territories and Crown dependencies. The UK legislates directly for the majority of the jurisdictions with their consent through Orders in Council. Other jurisdictions choose to legislate for themselves but follow precisely the sanctions implemented in the UK. That model is well established and respects the rights of those different jurisdictions.

The Bill is drafted to reflect that reality. It is consistent with the current implementation model for UN and EU sanctions, as well as measures under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010. It allows those jurisdictions that choose to follow UK sanctions through their own legislation to continue to do so. It also allows the UK to legislate directly for certain overseas territories.

The amendment would drive a coach and horses through that well established model by deeming legal entities formed or incorporated in the overseas territories or Crown dependencies to be UK persons. At a stroke, it would bring those legal entities within the ambit of UK sanctions confined to the territory of the UK and subject to UK courts. It would disenfranchise those overseas territories or Crown dependencies by legislating for their legal entities without their consent. It would also give rise to the unusual situation in which a legal entity incorporated in an overseas territory is bound by UK sanctions, but those UK sanctions do not extend to the overseas territory in question and so do not bite on the entity’s activities in that territory. The amendment in such a case would not seem, therefore, to have any practical purpose.

I do not see the Bill as the right place to change these long-standing constitutional arrangements, nor do I see a compelling case for needing to do so. I am sure Members would not wish to jeopardise the achievements that friendly co-operation with these jurisdictions has already made. Nor would they seek to disenfranchise those territories that have chosen to legislate for themselves. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment.

[Helen Goodman]

I accept that the Government are right to proceed through mutual agreement with the Crown dependencies and the overseas territories. I can also see, from what the Minister said, that there is a more elegant way of achieving what I wish to achieve with the amendment later in our proceedings. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Mike Freer.)

[Helen Goodman]

I think this motion is an extraordinary development on the part of the Government Whip. I have been a Member of this House for 13 years, and I have never been in a Bill Committee where it has been suggested that we adjourn after three hours of sitting and half an hour of the second session. We have another 40 clauses, two schedules, 11 Government amendments and 36 Opposition amendments to consider. They all concern extremely important matters. I am frankly astonished that the Government think it acceptable to behave in this way on these issues.

We agreed yesterday to the Government reshuffling the order of the consideration of the clauses. We agreed to their request that we consider clause 1 after clause 18. We did not demur from that; we asked them why. I do not know whether they are trying to avoid that consideration, whether they are uncomfortable about the many speeches they heard on Second Reading on the Magnitsky amendments that we have tabled, or whether they want to avoid fully debating their record on anti-money laundering. Do they not want us to discuss the secret regimes of the overseas territories? Are they uncomfortable about what they have overseen with foreign corrupt oligarchs buying property in London? Do they wish to supress exposure of those matters? There is certainly not a consensus in this Committee for adjourning now.

[Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)]

I agree that this motion is quite disrespectful to the Committee. We have only been here for half an hour, and we all want to press on. We have got only two more days to look at this huge number of amendments to a very important Bill. It smacks to me of game playing on the part of the Government to move the motion and to be so disrespectful. We are all here in this House, and if the Minister turns around, he will see that the weather outside indicates that we are not going anywhere soon. We are pretty much getting snowed into the building as we speak. We may as well sit here, huddled together, and finish the work that we have begun here this afternoon.

Oral Answers to Questions

Helen Goodman Excerpts

Tuesday 16th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

Yes, I can agree with my hon. Friend on that. Any party that aspires to government and is serious about properly managing the public finances should be able to explain how it would fund the expenditure it is committing to—and to do so without consulting an iPad.

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

The Chancellor says that he does not want to incur more debt, but yesterday the Treasury approved a minute providing for a contingent liability on Carillion, for which we have had no estimate. Will he please explain to the House what sort of expenditure will be covered—I see that he has given an indemnity to the receiver—and how he will report to the House on how much money the Government will be liable for?

[Mr Hammond]

Yes, the Government have given an indemnity to the official receiver so that it can take on the role of special manager of Carillion’s assets to ensure the continuity of public services in the many schools, hospitals and local authorities that have contracts with Carillion. The Treasury has provided the official receiver with a line of credit that enables the official receiver’s office to operate the company’s public sector contracts, after which it will, in due course, recover the costs from the Department that would have paid fees for those services anyway. The official receiver can only step in and do this with the Treasury’s underwriting, and we deemed it appropriate to give that underwriting.

Banks and Communities

Helen Goodman Excerpts

Thursday 11th January 2018 Westminster Hall

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gapes, and a great pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian (Martin Whitfield), who made an excellent speech.

When HSBC decided to close the last bank in Shildon, a town of 10,000 people in my constituency, the mean spiritedness of the bankers was fully on display. We asked them to make a £10,000 contribution to the local credit union. They could not afford to do that, but let us look at the fancy salaries of the people at the top of these banks. This debate is about the values of those institutions. RBS is closing its branch in Barnard Castle, and there is a massive petition going in Barnard Castle and Teesdale. Many local people, small businesses, charities and churches ask, “How are we going to manage?” They are outraged that, even though we own that bank, the Government fail to put controls on what it does.

Hon. Members have rightly spoken about broadband. Branches are being closed in low-income, predominantly rural areas—precisely the areas with the worst broadband, where it is most difficult to access internet banking. This is a structural problem. People in my constituency have to drive all the way to Leeds to have any kind of sensible discussion about a business issue. That is a four-hour round trip. That means that someone who is trying to run a small business has their day taken up by visiting the bank.

I suggest to the Minister that we should look at changing the competition rules. It seems to me that it might be possible for some banks to share premises, which would undoubtedly enable them to save money, but they say that that would be a breach of competition legislation. That tells me that the competition legislation and the competition authority’s mandate are wrong. There should be a public interest test as well as a competition test so that the banks do what they are meant to do: serve the public.

Exiting the EU: Costs

Helen Goodman Excerpts

Wednesday 29th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

I can assure my hon. Friend that we are determined to get the best possible deal for the British taxpayer, and we need to look at the deal in the round to see what represents value for money. Absolutely, the money should be spent on our public services and on keeping taxes low for our hard-working citizens.

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

Last week, the Treasury published the Red Book, which showed that there would be no more payments to EU institutions from 2019. It also said there was £15 billion of headroom and that debt would then fall. Does the news overnight not show that there is a £30 billion hole in the public finances and that there is no possibility of debt falling on that timescale?

[Elizabeth Truss]

The hon. Lady is not correct about that. The OBR has made predictions on EU payments and those are included in the Budget. Indeed, that was raised by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) in the Budget debate last week.

Budget Resolutions

Helen Goodman Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Rachel Reeves]

I am not making my own forecasts; I am taking those of the Office for Budget Responsibility. What people in St Albans, Mid Bedfordshire and Leeds West want is affordable housing and the ability to get on to the housing ladder, and that requires stable house prices and an increase in housing supply. According to the OBR, however, there will be no improvement in supply on the basis of the measures announced today, and house prices will be 0.3% higher than they would otherwise have been, so the measures will not have the desired effect. I understand that the hon. Lady wants her constituents to have those opportunities, but it does not sound as though her Chancellor’s Budget will enable them to do so. In fact, I think it will have the opposite effect.

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Rachel Reeves]

I will make a little more progress, if that is okay.

On page 128 of its document, the OBR says that after the stamp duty changes, on the basis of its analysis, prices paid by first-time buyers will be higher with the relief than without it. Thus, it argues, the main gainers from the policy will be people who already own their properties, not first-time buyers. That is a terrible indictment of these housing policies. If that was supposed to be the Budget’s fanfare announcement, I am afraid that it has ended up being a bit of a damp squib.

[Helen Goodman]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is absurd to have a stamp duty limit for first-time buyers of £500,000, which implies they have an income of £150,000?

[Rachel Reeves]

Yes. The OBR’s earnings forecast shows that that is another impediment to many people getting on the housing ladder. Incomes need to keep pace with the rising cost of living, especially house prices, but the average earnings forecast suggests that it will be harder still for many people to get on the housing ladder.

--- Later in debate ---

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

I am pleased to follow the hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey (Drew Hendry) and to take part in the Budget debate today. The British economy has two problems, the first of which is low productivity growth. A worker in France or Germany can go home on a Thursday night having produced X number of things and a British worker would have to continue until Friday night to have made the same amount of stuff. The second problem is the high level of uncertainty at the moment. As hon. Members probably know, the pound fell again after the Chancellor sat down.

The forecasts show that the situation is not getting better: GDP growth is down; productivity growth is down so far that in year 1 there is no productivity growth; and we will have £40 billion less to spend and/or to have in tax cuts at the end of the forecast period than we thought we would have this time last year. As a consequence, the forecasts are also showing average earnings falling. What did the Chancellor do to tackle this productivity problem? Obviously, it is a long-run problem and there are no instant solutions—nobody would be foolish enough to think that there were—but one thing that is worth noting is that the productivity problem has a regional dimension. The Institute for Public Policy Research has found that productivity outside the south-east is 44% lower than it is elsewhere. So when hon. Members talk about investing in the regions, we see that this is a matter of not just social justice, but economic efficiency. At the moment, the north-east gets £220 per head spent on transport, whereas London gets £1,940—almost 10 times as much. Why do the Government not re-order their investment projects and do HS3, linking Newcastle to Liverpool, before HS2?

When we look at what was in the Budget for the north-east, we see that we are talking about tiny sums: the figure for the north of Tyne devolution deal was £20 million a year; the money for the Tyne and Wear Metro will not be released until 2022, which is five years from now; the only new money for the Redcar steelworks was £5 million; and the Tees valley is being offered something that has no price tag at all—it is being invited to “enter discussions”! This is the situation for not just the north-east, as Midland Connect is getting £6 million. However, the London business rate retention, which is being piloted, is going to give London £7.5 billion. As for the stamp duty cut, the average house price in my constituency is £106,000, so people are not going to benefit from that cut. So this is another £650 million that is going to go to the wealthy parts of the country.

The second aspect of all this is skills. My constituency has an excellent further education college, Bishop Auckland College, which plays a vital role, but between 2009 and 2015 further education has been cut by 27% and adult education has been cut by 50%. The Chancellor announced extra money, but at £60 million it is 2% more—that is tiny compared with the massive cuts we have had. Brexit and the public’s desire to control immigration mean we must start investing more in our skills. There are regional disparities in this area, too. Of course people do not have jobs for life, but if we are to help them through this transition we must do more for adult education. The Association of Colleges produced a manifesto that contained some very sensible things. It said we should spend another £200 per student on 16 to 19-year-olds; that we should extend child benefit to people who are in further education, just as we do for people who are doing A-levels; and that we should spend some money on public transport for young people. In my constituency, a young person on a young saver’s ticket going from Cockfield to Bishop Auckland has a weekly bill of £31 and a young person going from Bishop Auckland to Darlington for their education has a bill of £45 a week. Those are substantial numbers.

The most disappointing thing is that the Chancellor has not won more battles on Brexit and has not been able to see off those people who want a cliff edge from 1 April 2019. We all thought when the Prime Minister made her Florence speech that the Chancellor had won this argument, and on this side of the House we were all extremely pleased, but it seems that that was not so. Business wants certainty now. It is nearly Christmas; Ministers need to get their skates on.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Andrew Stephenson.)

Debate to be resumed tomorrow.

Oral Answers to Questions

Helen Goodman Excerpts

Tuesday 24th October 2017 Commons Chamber

[Andrew Jones]

The Government are working to continue their progress on the superfast broadband roll-out. We expect to reach 95% by the end of this year. We have already seen some changes from the internal reorganisation within British Telecom, separating out Openreach. The progress will be maintained through Government expenditure in that programme and in the digital infrastructure investment fund.

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

The Office for Budget Responsibility has just reported on the poor productivity record in this country. Investment in broadband is crucial to improving that, so when will the Minister respond to the letter that I wrote to him on 1 September about broadband in Teesdale?

[Andrew Jones]

I absolutely agree that broadband and digital progress are critical to the productivity of our economy. I am not aware of that letter. I will look into it with immediate effect, and I apologise for the delay.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Speaker]

We all remember when the hon. Gentleman was a Transport Minister and he enjoyed telling us how he travelled to work by bus; I remember thinking that the fellow passengers on the bus must have been absolutely exhilarated to know that they were accompanied at the time by the Under-Secretary of State for buses.

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

The Chancellor acknowledged earlier that the fall in the exchange rate following the Brexit vote has pushed up inflation. What is the Treasury’s estimate of the impact of that on people’s standard of living?

[Mr Philip Hammond]

The hon. Lady will be aware of the increase in inflation—CPI inflation stands at 3%. Most forecasts suggest that it might go 0.1% higher before falling steadily from late this year. Obviously any increase in inflation will have a negative impact on real wages, and we very much look forward to CPI inflation falling and real wage growth resuming in this country next year.

Economy and Jobs

Helen Goodman Excerpts

Thursday 29th June 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I give way to the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman).

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

I want to ask the Chancellor a question that I think he does know the answer to. Does he agree with the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), who said yesterday that some tax rises will be needed in this Parliament to maintain the quality of public services, or will he stand at the Dispatch Box and rule out any tax rises?

[Mr Hammond]

I read the comments of my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), and I am sure that what he said will prove to be a very important contribution to a debate that we will have, and should have, in the House. I welcome that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jeremy Quin]

rose—

[Helen Goodman]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)]

Order. I am sorry to interrupt, but the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman) wishes to raise a point of order.

[Helen Goodman]

I wonder whether I could give the Chancellor of the Exchequer an opportunity to correct a false statement that he just made. Turkey is not in the European Union, and it is in the customs union. The legal barriers that the Chancellor is creating simply do not exist.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I should say to the House, for the benefit of new Members, that there is a difference between an intervention in a debate and a point of order. The hon. Lady is being clever in using her wisdom about how the House works, but she knows that that was not a point of order, and that it is not something that I can answer. What she really wants to do is intervene on the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

For the benefit of new Members of the House, let me make it clear that a point of order should not be used to make an intervention that the Chancellor has not taken. The Chancellor is perfectly capable of choosing the interventions that he wishes to take. He has taken many, and I am sure that he will take many more.