Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Gregory Stafford Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th July 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

I hesitate to intervene on the hon. Gentleman, because he seems to be straying into the next grouping and I do not want to encourage him down that route, but now that he has raised it, I share his concern. I do not know what it is like in his area, but the ICB areas that local branches of healthwatch will be absorbed into are even larger than counties. In my area, Surrey and Sussex make up three administrative counties. That is an even larger area. The provisions are clearly not the solution to the problem that the hon. Gentleman is outlining.

[Dave Robertson]

In isolation, that criticism would be legitimate, but, alongside other changes being introduced, there are ways to mitigate that problem.

I am concerned that local healthwatch branches are not truly local. The healthwatch in Staffordshire has not held an event in my constituency for a number of years. I think its last three events were just volunteer fairs to get more volunteers involved. That is not to say that there are not significant numbers of people there who work very hard to support people in their engagement with the health service, but geographic changeability is real. On a national scale, Healthwatch England has a huge role to play.

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[Dr Prinsley]

I rise to speak to new clause 74 on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Rugby (John Slinger), who is in the Gallery, and also to some extent on behalf of my predecessor, Jo Churchill, who was the Member of Parliament for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket before me, and was also a Health Minister. This is about Healthwatch and the patient voice. The amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Rugby suggests that the Secretary of State create an impact report within 12 months of the Bill passing through Parliament to assess what the impact of the amalgamation or integration of the functions of Healthwatch into the ICB would in fact be, and in particular look at the effectiveness of the complaints procedure and the way in which complaints were responded to.

The theme is also that which we spoke about this morning on whether an organisation can successfully interrogate itself. I believe that with the appropriate safeguards it probably could, but I do think that the suggestion that there ought to be a formal report on the impact within 12 months is something worth considering.

[Gregory Stafford]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Ms Lewell. I think right hon. and hon. Members will be disappointed to know I am not going to speak too long on this, but they need not worry: in the next grouping, usual service will resume.

I want to pick up a few points on the abolition of national Healthwatch. When we took evidence from Sarah Woolnough of the King’s Fund, I asked her a fairly open-ended question about when she gave evidence at the Health and Social Care Select Committee. I put it to her that she

“seemed to suggest that the Government could achieve what they needed to in the 10-year plan without this reorganisation.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 15, Q23.]

She gave me an answer that essentially said it could all be done without the need for the reorganisation that is in the current NHS Bill. I then asked Mr Jacob Lant, a representative from National Voices, whether he would agree with that and, unprompted, because I did not mention Healthwatch in my question, he replied:

“Yes. I kind of think, as the debate goes on, that—with the changes to Healthwatch in particular—you could achieve so much without legislation. You could beef up the internal functions for listening to a patient and engaging with them without legislation—there is no requirement for that. You could invest more resource in that, and you could do the same with Healthwatch.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 16, Q24.]

We already know from the evidence that we received, unprompted, from National Voices and the King’s Fund that the abolition of NHS England will not solve the problems that the Minister, the Government and the Department think are there, and indeed it could be done in a different way.

I listened closely to the hon. Member for Lichfield. He seemed to be presenting a number of problems, but the solution that the Government have come up with does not hold water. As right hon. and hon. Friends have said, the removal of Healthwatch England and the introduction of a director for patient experience simply does not work because the independence—which is so fundamental to the HSSIB that we talked about— of local healthwatches, which we will talk about, and of Healthwatch England is fundamental to the ability of that organisation to do its job.

In a previous career I worked for the Getting It Right First Time programme in the NHS. When that programme first started, it sat outside the structures of what was then NHS Improvement, latterly NHS England. At that point we could make recommendations to the NHS— I do not mean this flippantly —in a way that was unrestricted. As soon as we were brought into NHS England, into a governmental structure, the recommendations that we put forward were looked at and scrutinised and we were told often, “We do not have the money to afford that”, or, “That is not in our plan.” And that is precisely what will happen if recommendations are put through the director of patient experience. As others have said, when this director of patient experience arrives at a Select Committee, he or she will be there to represent and defend the Department and Ministers, understandably, because that is who he or she will work for. They will not be able to stand up, go on television or the radio, do the broadcast interviews or make representations, because they will be a creature of the system rather than a scrutineer of the system and an advocate for patients. That is a fundamental problem, and while I accept that there may be ways to improve Healthwatch England, as Members have outlined, this simply will not do it.

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[Edward Argar]

Clause 65 and schedule 10 focus on local healthwatch arrangements. As I said when speaking to the previous group of amendments, Healthwatch is respected and trusted at a national level, and that is even more the case at a local level. I fear that the Government seek to remove something that works, that is effective and that ensures a strong patient voice in the system.

It simply does not work to have integrated care boards take on those responsibilities, as they will be marking their own homework rather than being the independent patient voice. It is a little like the discussion the Committee had during the previous grouping on HSSIB, in which it turned out that the CQC will be able to investigate itself, but the chief executive of the CQC would decide whether any protected disclosures could be published during that investigation. That measure brings things entirely within the system and removes the independent voice, which is exactly what this clause also does.

The ICB is the voice of the NHS system, not the voice of the patient. We need the grit in the oyster that is provided by an independent voice talking to the ICB. Being in the room with an ICB will not mean that the patient voice is heard more loudly or clearly, or that it will be acted on—it is probably more likely to mean that it is not. As an example from my constituency, the ICB did conduct a consultation exercise on the proposed closure of St Mary’s birth centre in Melton Mowbray, the response to which was overwhelming: the patient voice said that they did not want that to happen. That response was fed into the ICB, but the ICB did what I fear it planned to do all along and closed the centre. Given that that voice in the room came from a consultation exercise led by the ICB, it seemingly did not make a jot of difference to the outcome or decision, or to whether the patient was heard.

On the impact of local authority scrutiny panels, the NHS ICB in Melton previously recognised the need for increased GP provision in the town due to the increasing size of the town and the long waiting times, but just recently decided to reverse that position and say that it did not see the need for that. Members of the scrutiny committee, across all parties, were absolutely clear that they disagreed with that decision, but did that get listened to or make a jot of difference to the ICB? No—the ICB did what it was going to do anyway and changed its mind.

My concern is that we will see less grit in the oyster and patient voice, and more managerialism in the NHS ICB system. We heard from the hon. Member for North Shropshire and the shadow Minister about the challenges there would be, even were that patient voice to happen. Given the Government’s 50% cuts to ICB budgets, which are already impacting frontline services, ICBs will not be able to take on additional responsibilities without the funding that they need. That is quite apart from the principle that they should not be marking their own homework. I fear that “system knows best” will become the default.

We have also heard about the geographical challenges. Given that mergers and acquisitions are getting even bigger, ICBs are moving further and further away from what was conceived: for them to have the same geographical footprint as the upper-tier local authority providing social care, to ensure that the two organisations spoke to each other and were better integrated. Removing the representative from the local authority that provides that healthcare from the board, even if they are replaced with a mayor, does not bring about the reconnection with social care provision that is so central. Removing the voice of general practice or primary care from the ICBs again moves that independent challenge away from the system.

I fear that this is a fragmentation of those links at a local level and the weakening, if not silencing, of a patient voice that can challenge publicly and ensure that what patients need to have said is genuinely said. Being in the room does not mean that that voice is heard or acted on, as shown from the examples I have spoken about: there is a consultation exercise, the view is reflected on, and the ICB does what it was going to do anyway and does not change its position. I have genuine concerns about the loss of an independent patient voice in a local context.

The Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but I think she made the point in her opening remarks that we have lacked not recommendations and suggestions for changes but action to fix the issue. But it is not for Healthwatch to take action to fix the issue; it is for the ICBs and the NHS to act on those recommendations. We are proposing to give the bits of the system that have failed to take action and fix the issue not just the responsibility that they already have but the responsibility for reflecting patient voice. The one bit that is working—where patients’ voices are heard—is the bit that we are getting rid of. We are not seeking to fix the bits that have real pressure and genuine levers to compel an ICB to act on those recommendations when they are made independently, rather than simply marking its own homework.

As with my reflections on clause 64, I genuinely fear that in this weakening of patient voice, particularly at a local level, the patient will be the loser because the system will continue to do what it wishes to do. It will do its consultations, and it may have a director of patient experience at an ICB level, but they will be working for the ICB; they will not be there as an independent voice to challenge the ICB—including publicly—on what it is doing.

I hope that the Minister reflects further on the real diminution, if not the neutering, of patient voice that comes with some of these arrangements. As always, I look forward to her reflections when she winds up.

[Gregory Stafford]

I want to address this clause because I believe that the Government are making a significant mistake by abolishing Healthwatch England, as they have just done with the group of amendments, and local healthwatch organisations. The Government have sought to reassure the Committee that the functions currently carried out by Healthwatch will continue; however, that is not the question before us. The question is whether those functions can continue with the same degree of independence, credibility and public confidence once they are absorbed into the organisations that they currently scrutinise.

Having listened carefully to the witnesses who appeared before the Committee, and having reflected on the debate on Second Reading, I do not believe that the Government have demonstrated that they care. Once again, the Government’s case rests largely on the recommendations of Dr Penny Dash. Dr Dash argued that patient engagement should sit much closer to those responsible for planning and delivering services, that providers and commissioners gather and respond to patient experience themselves, that integrated care boards already possess engagement functions capable of undertaking that work, and that the variation between local healthwatch organisations means that the current statutory model is no longer justified.

Those are interesting arguments, but they were examined by this Committee and, in my view, were not sustained by the evidence that we subsequently heard. Indeed, what struck me throughout the oral evidence sessions was not simply that witnesses disagreed with Dr Dash’s conclusions but that they challenged the central assumptions on which they depend. Dr Dash’s recommendations assume that independence is desirable but not essential. The overwhelming weight of evidence presented to this Committee suggests precisely the opposite.

That distinction matters, because this debate is not fundamentally about patient experience. No member of this Committee disputes that patients should influence the design and delivery of services; Healthwatch already exists to help to achieve precisely that. The issue before us is different: it is whether those speaking on behalf of patients should remain institutionally independent of the organisations whose decisions they are expected to scrutinise. Throughout our proceedings, I have become increasingly convinced that that is the question that Ministers have not answered adequately.

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[Dr Chambers]

New clauses 3 to 5 are related to the publication of risk assessments of contracts between NHS organisations and suppliers based outside the UK. They would place a duty on the Secretary of State to prioritise domestic, UK-based suppliers in the case of technology systems and contracts involving the handling of NHS patient data, and place restrictions on the signing of such contracts with non-UK-based suppliers. New clause 5 would require the Government to publish an NHS digital sovereignty strategy setting out how they intend to address risks to relevant information systems posed by foreign interference and reliance on foreign technologies, including by supporting the use of domestic technologies.

We had a Westminster Hall debate on this subject recently. The lack of transparency in how some contracts are awarded is one of the central concerns about Palantir’s involvement with the NHS. We are particularly concerned about the national security considerations of offshoring the whole of our nation’s health data to any foreign company, which makes us vulnerable to political and economic changes in other countries, but especially to companies of questionable integrity in an increasingly authoritarian jurisdiction with little respect for privacy and sovereignty. We should all be worried that our health data has been so closely linked with such an organisation, which has shown itself all too eager to work closely with Donald Trump’s Administration. We know that his Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency has been using health data to identify people’s immigration status, and there is a lot of concern that people are not coming forward for medical treatment as a result. Doctors and patients have already voted with their feet and shown that they do not trust Palantir and its system for this very reason, which is also a key reason for the limited uptake of the federated data platform so far.

As such, we have tabled various new clauses to try to address those concerns, to ensure that they do not plague the single patient record, which we absolutely support and want to help the Government to deliver, along with any other vital technology or data system. New clause 3 would ensure that a risk assessment is conducted of all non-UK tech and data suppliers, with particular regard for national security. It is centrally important that doctors and patients trust the systems that hold their health data and that, as a country, we trust them to be safe and secure. We should not trust rogue actors with our nation’s health information. New clause 5 deals with how we mitigate that risk. It would require the Government to publish an NHS digital sovereignty strategy, setting out how they intend to address the risks of foreign interference and reliance on foreign technologies.

Our potential answer to both those questions lies in new clause 4, which would prioritise domestic suppliers that handle sensitive or confidential NHS data. We recognise that that will not always be possible, but where domestic capability does not exist and it is therefore necessary to work with foreign suppliers, to ensure the transparency and effective oversight of a contract with a foreign supplier, it must be brought before Parliament. Should a contract be signed with a non-UK supplier, it would also be subject to consultation with patient groups, national security experts and staff unions to make sure that the system is onside. If it is not, uptake of it will be stunted, as we have seen with the federated data platform.

[Gregory Stafford]

Obviously, I have sympathy for what the hon. Member is trying to achieve—ensuring that our data systems are free from potential hacking by either state or non-state actors is very important—but I cannot see anything in new clause 4 about the size of contracts. Does his suggestion relate to any contract, however small, that was given to a non-UK-based company? It is not clear what he means by a non-United Kingdom company. Is that one that is headquartered here, one that is listed on our stock exchange, or one that has a CEO who is a British citizen? I am not quite sure what he means by a UK-based company, but if we can define an outside-based one, is he saying that any contract of any size given to such a company will have to come to Parliament?

[Dr Chambers]

The size of the contract would be pretty much irrelevant; what matters is the implications arising from the contract being signed. Does a contract potentially compromise our data sovereignty? Alternatively, if a contract failed for any reason, whether it was because of the action of a state actor or a non-state actor, would the service continue to function?