Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Harper]

I am grateful for your guidance, Madam Deputy Speaker. My hon. Friend’s points are probably more relevant to the next group of amendments, when we will talk about adding some specific provisions to the Bill, so he might want to raise them then. If he does so, I shall be able to address them in an orderly way.

The Opposition supported the sunset provisions in the other place, and I anticipate that they will do so again today, so I want to point out why I think they would be wrong. Effectively, the sunset provisions drive a coach and horses through the principle of the Bill. On 24 November last year, the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) said:

“I want to reaffirm our commitment”

—the Labour party’s commitment—

“to fixed-term Parliaments. That means we have to lay down in statute that it is for the House, not the Prime Minister, to dissolve Parliament.”—[Official Report, 24 November 2010; Vol. 519, c. 328.]

I agree, but under these sunset provisions at the end of this Parliament we would give back to the Prime Minister the power to dissolve Parliament by seeking a Dissolution from Her Majesty the Queen. I do not think that that is in accordance with what the hon. Gentleman said then.

There are a number of other useful quotes. The Labour party manifesto of last year stated that

“we will legislate for Fixed Term Parliaments…We will let the people decide how to reform our institutions and our politics: changing the voting system and electing a second chamber to replace the House of Lords.”

I do not agree with the first, but I do agree with the second.

“But we will go further, introducing fixed-term parliaments”.

Furthermore, the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath said that a vote for Labour was a vote for fixed-term Parliaments.

I accept that Labour did not win the election, but it seems to me that if the hon. Member for Rhondda is going to carry out the spirit of that commitment, all the people who voted Labour at the last election will expect him to vote in favour of fixed-term Parliaments. If he does not agree to disagree with their lordships, he will not be carrying out that manifesto commitment.

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

I have not read the Conservative party manifesto recently, but so far as I remember it did not contain a commitment to fixed-term Parliaments. Therefore, if the hon. Gentleman were to take his own advice, he would withdraw his support for the Bill.

[Mr Harper]

The hon. Gentleman sets me up very nicely for my final quotation. In this Bill’s Second Reading debate—which took place a long time ago, on 13 September 2010, which goes to show that the Bill has enjoyed leisurely progress through both Houses with proper scrutiny in both Chambers—the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) said:

“I have long been in favour of fixed terms. I could dig out correspondence I had with Margaret Thatcher in 1983 about fixed terms. The Labour party committed itself to fixed terms in the 1992 election. What typically happens—this is why I welcome the measure and why I wanted that commitment in our manifesto—is that parties in opposition that are in favour of fixed terms go off the boil on them when they come into government.”—[Official Report, 13 September 2010; Vol. 515, c. 645.]

Interestingly, we have done the opposite. We were not very keen on them in opposition, but we have become keener on them in government, and this was in our coalition agreement.

Oral Answers to Questions

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Tuesday 5th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

T9. The Deputy Prime Minister has said on many occasions that if the House of Lords was reformed, this House would retain its primacy over the other place. In an article last week in The Times, his predecessor as leader of the Lib Dems, Lord Ashdown, said that if the House of Lords was reformed, it would have the right of veto over the decision to go to war. Who is right: the Deputy Prime Minister or his predecessor?

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

The House of Lords will clearly enjoy greater democratic legitimacy if it is wholly or largely elected, but that does not call into question the primacy of this House. Bicameral chambers all round the world manage this relationship perfectly adequately, with two directly elected chambers that have a relationship of subservience between the one and the other. That is precisely what will continue under the reforms that we have proposed.

House of Lords Reform

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

It is the view of the Government that this reform, which is long-overdue and long-debated, can take place without the embellishment and framework of a written constitution.

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

The right hon. Gentleman says that the Parliament Acts are the reason why this House will retain primacy, but they apply only to legislation that starts in this House, not to that which starts in the House of Lords or to secondary legislation. When the House of Lords overturned a piece of secondary legislation concerning large casinos that this House had supported, the right hon. Gentleman supported the House of Lords and not the House of Commons. That was the first time that that had happened since the Southern Rhodesia issue.

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

Perhaps I have not followed the hon. Gentleman’s point carefully enough, but that arrangement will not change. The asymmetry between the two Chambers rests not only on the Parliament Acts but on the different mandates, different terms and different electoral cycles of the two Houses, as occurs in the vast majority of the 61 bicameral, elected systems around the world, which seem to rub along perfectly well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sadiq Khan]

The hon. Gentleman heard the speech from the Deputy Prime Minister, who gave a number of examples whereby the other Chamber—[Interruption.] I will give the hon. Gentleman an example. Is it right that we have 828 Members in the other place, all of whom, except for the 92 who by good fortune of their DNA have to go through elections, are not elected? That is not acceptable in a modern democracy.

There are those who have, I accept, legitimate concerns that a directly elected upper Chamber might seek to assert its newly found democratic mandate by facing down the Commons, and it is critical that the Joint Committee addresses that issue. After all, the primacy of this House must remain. It currently rests on two principles, the first of which is legislative. The Parliament Acts removed the powers of the Lords over money Bills and empowered the Commons to override the Lords on non-money Bills. The second principle underpinning the primacy of the Commons is drawn from the elected nature of its Members, so if we move to a directly elected upper Chamber it is not unreasonable for some to ask whether this House faces a threat to its primacy.

[Graham Stringer]

I will try to have another go at the point I made to the Deputy Prime Minister. In today’s edition of The Times, the previous leader of the Liberal Democrats, Paddy Ashdown, says that the newly reformed House of Lords—the Senate—would be able to stop this House doing what it wanted on a manifesto commitment. I was completely against the poll tax, but it was in the Conservatives’ 1987 manifesto. The Liberal Democrats want more power to go to the other place. How would my right hon. Friend guarantee the primacy of this House on non-legislative matters?

[Sadiq Khan]

There are big questions about the powers and functions of the second Chamber, and my hon. Friend has given one example of the anomalies that arise. The hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mr Field) gave another example of the issues that those of us who are in favour of a 100% elected second Chamber need to address if we are going to win the argument not only in this House but in the other Chamber. That is why a simultaneous debate on powers, conventions and the relationships between the two Houses is absolutely fundamental if we are to get the reform right so that it delivers the bicameral system that serves our democratic needs effectively. Form and function go together, and I am afraid that there is scant evidence that that is recognised in the draft Bill and in the White Paper.

--- Later in debate ---

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

I do not complain, Mr Deputy Speaker.

This is both a bad Bill and a half-baked Bill, and I shall certainly vote against it. It is not improvable in that sense because of the principles on which it is based. Admittedly, we are in strange territory with the new coalition, but some very strange policies and constitutional principles are coming out. First, in the name of democracy we are reducing the number of elected MPs and increasing the number of Members of the other place. That is pretty strange.

Secondly, the Deputy Prime Minister—I am sorry that he has left the Chamber—annunciates, as the basis of his support for many policies, that he can support any policy he wants, even if it is in contradiction to his manifesto, because he did not win the election. Who ever expected the Lib Dems to form a Government on their own? He is saying that because they were not going to form a Government on their own, he can support any policy he wants, irrespective of what he said to the electorate.

Thirdly—this is a difficult but fundamental point—reform of the House of Lords was in the manifestos of all three parties. However, that means that there was no differentiation. The electorate could not choose to vote for one party or another on the basis of what was in a manifesto. We have just had a fairly ridiculous referendum between first past the post and the alternative vote, but how much more important are making fundamental changes by introducing a voting system and changing the balance of power between this House and the other place? Are we having a referendum on that? No we are not, even though the electorate had no choice during the general election.

[Duncan Hames (Chippenham) (LD)]

The hon. Gentleman mentions the lack of differentiation in the manifestos, but in actual fact one manifesto called for a referendum on the subject—the manifesto was for a party that was defeated at the election.

[Graham Stringer]

The hon. Gentleman may not have noticed, but all the parties lost the election. Nobody got a majority.

What is the problem? Is the problem in our democracy really the relationship between this House and the other one? I do not think so. Where has all the power gone from these Houses of Parliament? It has gone to Europe. Depending on which area people are in, 60% or 70% of our legislation is now passed by Europe. The proposals do not deal with that, but it is one of the most fundamental problems.

Within the power structure of our constitution—I accept that a lot of that power has gone away—the problem is not the House of Lords but the Privy Council, the royal prerogative and the fact that there is no separation between Ministers and Members of the legislature, which is almost never talked about when we compare Parliaments. It is fairly unusual in Parliaments around the world for Ministers to be accountable to themselves within a legislature. That is a big problem, and one reason why there is less Government accountability than one might expect, so the arguments for it are second rate and do not deal with the main problem.

Most of the debate we have had today has been about whether these reforms would affect the primacy of the House of Commons. If we introduce a democratic element into the House of Lords, it is bound to undermine the primacy of this House for several reasons. First, what would happen if we introduced proportional representation—STV or any other form of PR? Some Members of this House believe that PR is a superior and more democratic system to first past the post. The electorate disagreed, but that is those Members’ honest and openly held view. If we were to elect the other place by PR, it seems reasonable that they would then argue primacy.

Secondly, is it more democratic to elect people who never have to go back to the electorate who elected them and account for themselves? I do not think so. It is just a method of appointment. Democracy implies not only the ballot box, but accountability in terms of justifying which way Members have voted. Otherwise Members could vote any way they wanted without any consequences.

[John Stevenson (Carlisle) (Con)]

In the election to this Chamber, someone could be elected on a Thursday night and on Friday announce to the world that they had no intention of seeking re-election five years later. Where is the accountability there, according to the hon. Gentleman’s argument?

[Graham Stringer]

It is difficult to argue that the fact that individual Members of this House could say that they would not stand again is a justification for every Member in the other place never standing again. That would be a very odd argument to make.

My third point is one that the Deputy Prime Minister made a great deal of, and it is that the elected senators or Lords in the other place would never have a fresher mandate than we have in this place. However, that cannot be guaranteed. Even the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill contains mechanisms that allow for elections and one could still have elections twice a year, so we could get out of phase with the other place and their mandate would be fresher. They would then argue that they had primacy. I have never come across anyone standing for election who does not really believe that their view is the right view or who does not want to prosecute that view as hard as they can. Otherwise, why stand for election in the first place?

My final point is about how this House would assert its primacy if the other place were 80% or wholly elected. If legislation started in this place, it would be subject to the Parliament Acts. That process takes a long time and is of limited use. Further, some lawyers would argue that there are real difficulties with the second Parliament Act of 1949.

Much discussion and debate is not about legislation, but about policy. It is about secondary legislation, and some Conservative Members were pleased when the House of Lords overturned the decision of this House on a statutory instrument on the super-casino. That was not a principled issue of this House against the other place—people who did not like very large casinos voted against it, even though the primary legislation had been passed in this House. The House of Lords overturned a detailed decision—and that happened before they had elections.

I can see no situation in which an elected house would not want to have more power. That would mean that we would have less and we would not be dealing with the fundamental issues. These proposals do not deal with the biggest issues facing our society at the moment. International experience is prayed in aid of the Bill. In nearly every international case there is a written constitution, often set up by the British Government after wars or revolutions, when people have to define the various powers of the president, the legislature and the Government. We do not have such a constitution and the real fight in history has been between the House of Commons and the Government, of whatever stripe. Unfortunately, increasing the power of the House of Lords is likely to reduce the power of the House of Commons and all elected Members to the benefit of the Government. That is why this is a very bad Bill.

European Council

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

I am very grateful to my hon. Friend, although I would not put my efforts in the same class as the famous Fontainebleau negotiation, because the British rebate still benefits Britain to a huge extent—even after the Labour party signed a large portion of it away. But I do hope people agree that they were a good step forward to keep us out of the situation.

On the budget, we have secured a very strong letter to the European Commission about future financial perspectives, saying that effectively there should be nothing worse than a real-terms freeze. That is what we got other countries to commit to, and I am sure that Government Members, like me, would wish to go further, but we are laying down the baseline of a freeze going into a negotiation, and that is a pretty good start.

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

What is causing disorder and instability in Europe is the fact that Greece is bankrupt. The whole world knows that, and nothing said in this Chamber will alter it or create greater instability in the world markets. If Greece can neither withdraw nor default, good money—our money—via the IMF, or European Union money via other mechanisms, will be wasted bailing it out. Why does not the Prime Minister discover his Eurosceptic self and lead an orderly withdrawal of Greece from the euro?

[The Prime Minister]

First, as I said earlier, the IMF cannot lend money unless it believes that a country can undertake a programme that will lead it to pay back that money. Secondly, Britain’s interests are protected, because we will not contribute via the financial mechanism to Greece. Thirdly—I have said this before but I do think it important—the Greeks want some time, via some extra liquidity, so that they can take steps to get themselves back on a path to fiscal sanity. Of course, people can doubt whether that can happen, but the Greeks want to be able to get people to pay their taxes, to reduce spending programmes and to privatise assets so that they can get back to a position of financial sanity. That is the decision they have taken; that is the decision taken by members of the eurozone; and that is what the eurozone members themselves will support.

Oral Answers to Questions

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

I strongly agree with my hon. Friend. Opposition Members simply cannot get their heads around the fact that this Government are prepared to listen. We are prepared to listen to doctors, nurses, consultants and patients. What is more—this is something the Labour Government never did—when we think we can improve our proposals, we are prepared to do so.

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

T6. The Deputy Prime Minister has repeated ad nauseam that the commitment to reform the House of Lords was in all three parties’ manifestos. [Hon. Members: “It was.”] Of course it was. Does that not mean that the electorate did not have the choice to vote for somebody who did not want to reform the House of Lords? Is there not therefore a strong case for a referendum on this issue, which is much more important than AV?

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

A seriously surreal doctrine is emerging. The hon. Gentleman was unable to persuade his colleagues to exclude the issue from the manifesto, so he wants to circumvent the manifesto on which he stood at the last general election by way of a referendum.

House of Lords Reform (Draft Bill)

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Tuesday 17th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

Primacy is clearly set out in the two Parliament Acts, and was also clearly set out in my earlier statement. My view is that the fact of greater election to another Chamber does not in and of itself mean the balance between the two Houses is seriously disturbed. That is confirmed by examples of bicameral systems elsewhere in the democratic world.

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

The Deputy Prime Minister keeps asserting that the conventions will stay the same, but when the other place has 100% elected Senators or Lords and they take a different view from him, how will he assert this House’s authority over another elected House?

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

As I said earlier, I think that the Parliament Acts are very clear on that point.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

My hon. Friend, who has considerable expertise and has taken a great interest in this matter, makes an important point, which is that if the Libyan people choose a new future for themselves and their country, there might be huge opportunities to find out not only what really happened to PC Yvonne Fletcher, but about the support for Northern Irish terrorism that did so much damage in our country.

People will be rightly concerned that we should have a clear plan for what happens next in Libya—both in humanitarian terms, and also politically and diplomatically—following the successful conclusion of the no-fly zone. On humanitarian issues, the UK was one of the first to respond to the humanitarian needs arising from Gaddafi’s actions. We provided tents and blankets from our stores in Dubai for the thousands of migrant workers crossing the borders to escape the regime’s violence. We were the first country to provide flights to enable 12,000 migrant workers to return to their homes. This timely assistance prevented what was a logistical emergency from becoming a humanitarian crisis. The International Development Secretary announced last week that we will now support the International Committee of the Red Cross to deploy three medical teams. They will help to provide both medical assistance to the 3,000 people affected by the fighting, and food and essential items for 100,000 of the most vulnerable. From the beginning, we urged the United Nations to lead international pressure for unfettered humanitarian access within Libya. We are now planning for new humanitarian needs that may emerge as a result of the conflict.

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

I am sceptical about this country’s involvement in air raids on another Muslim and Arab country. However, I accept that there has been a huge success in saving lives in Benghazi. It would make me feel more relaxed about the resolution this evening if the Prime Minister gave a commitment to report back regularly to the House and to ask for further authority to continue the operations.

[The Prime Minister]

Of course there should be regular statements in this House. I gave a statement on Friday and we are having a debate on a substantive motion today. There should be regular updates on the humanitarian situation, what our defence forces are doing, and political and diplomatic activity. I do not believe that right now there is a need to go back to the UN for further permission, because the resolution could not be clearer. It combined three different elements: an immediate ceasefire, action for a no-fly zone, and action to protect civilians and stop the loss of life. It was an incredibly complete UN resolution, and that is why we should give it such strong support.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Miliband]

I will make a bit more progress. Many will ask one additional question: why are we intervening in Libya, but not in other countries around the world? It is a valid question, and it is right to say that there are many other hard cases. What is happening in Yemen is deeply troubling, and what is happening in Bahrain is equally troubling. Historically, the cases of Burma, Rwanda and other countries live on in our conscience, and yet here I do agree with the Prime Minister: the argument that because we cannot do everything we cannot do anything is a bad argument. In the world that we live in, the action that we take depends on a combination of principle and pragmatism—what is right, and what can be done. That is not perfect, but an imperfect world order is not an excuse for inaction.

[Graham Stringer]

My right hon. Friend and the Prime Minister have both enunciated what is really the Blair doctrine: “If you can’t do everything, it doesn’t stop you doing something.” I would be more supportive of that principle if there were clear criteria laid down in advance about when we should do something, rather than it looking as though it were an ad hoc decision on every occasion.

Oral Answers to Questions

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Harper]

My hon. Friend puts his finger on exactly why it was necessary to have more equally sized constituencies across the country, so that voters will have equal weight when they cast their votes. He will know that the boundary commissions have to report finally to Ministers by 1 October 2013. We expect that they will set out their initial proposals some time this year, but that is a matter for the independent boundary commissions.

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

Democratic Audit has said that equalising constituency sizes will lead to chaotic boundaries. Does the Minister think that the Deputy Prime Minister—or, to be more precise, his immediate successor in 2015—will be happy representing not only parts of Fullwood and Broom Hill, but Glossop, 20 miles away?

[Mr Harper]

I simply do not agree with the premise of the hon. Gentleman’s question. The 2011 Act provides for a spread of plus or minus 5% of the quota, which is quite a significant number—around 8,000 electors—so that the boundary commissions can take into account all the traditional things, such as local ties and local government boundaries, but ultimately they have to deliver constituencies of more equal size. At the moment, constituencies can vary by over 50%, which is simply not right.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Tuesday 15th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant]

Large parts of the Bill are not sufficiently precise, and the Opposition have tabled amendments to improve the quality of the legislation. The hon. Lady is a member of the Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform, but I am not sure whether she heard Professor Johnston’s evidence last week—[Interruption.] I see that she is brandishing a document, like Excalibur. My reading of his evidence is that he felt that, in certain situations, the Acton Burnells of this world could effect change. We want that to be possible under the new system. We want the people of Cornwall, if they want to, to say categorically, “We do not want to cross the Tamar in the creation of a constituency.” However, there is no provision in the Government’s Bill, either for that voice to be heard effectively and transmitted to the Boundary Commission, or for the commission to act upon it. The commission can do absolutely nothing to act upon it because it is bound by the 5% rule, which is why I hope that the hon. Lady will support the 7.5% rule. If she has a way of improving the provision so that it is more precise, I would be delighted to sit down with her later and draft a new version.

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

Is not the problem with the process that, in principle, after the public hearing, the High Court judge chairing the original boundary commission is effectively the appeal judge to his own decision? I cannot think of any other process in administrative or public law in such an unsatisfactory situation.

[Chris Bryant]

My hon. Friend makes a perfect point. He is absolutely right. Someone cannot be judge, jury and appeal judge of their own decision. The danger is that people will go to court to try to resolve the problem. That is inevitable. All the Cross-Bench lawyers who spoke in the Lords debate made that precise point. That is why we have tabled an amendment to a Lords amendment—I hope that we can divide the House on it, unless the Government are minded to accept it—that would make it clear that public inquiries are intended not just to allow somebody to make a representation, but to effect change if necessary.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Wednesday 24th November 2010 Commons Chamber

I profoundly disagree with the Government’s timetable for the boundaries and AV referendum Bill, but, given the time scale involved, it is at least understandable why they judge it necessary to push the legislation through. The Bill before us is on fixed-term Parliaments, however, and there is not the least prospect of an early general election at any time in the next three years.

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

My right hon. Friend is being slightly disingenuous. Is not the most obvious reason why the Bill is here, before us, that the coalition partners are worried that the other one will welsh out?

[Mr Straw]

Of course. I was going to come on to that, but I am grateful to my hon. Friend for leading me down that path. There is no reason to rush through legislation for a fixed-term Parliament, because, even if we do not have the Bill, there is no prospect of a general election being called, in almost any circumstances, within the next three years.

The Liberal Democrat and Labour parties were committed by their manifestos to the principle of a fixed-term Parliament, but the Conservatives’ proposal ran directly counter to that, because it stated that a general election should be called within six months of any change of Prime Minister, meaning that, if the Prime Minister had suddenly passed away or something else had happened to him and he was no longer in office, we could have had a general election within a twelvemonth.

We know, however, that the structure of the Bill and the rush derive not from the pursuit of a sensible idea for which there is all-party support, but from narrow, partisan reasons related to the internal chemistry that both parties feared and, I think, still fear could be explosive in difficult circumstances.

--- Later in debate ---

[Graham Stringer]

I profoundly agree with the hon. Gentleman. Are there not two very offensive things about this proposal? It means that hon. Members of this House are equal apart from when there are votes for a Dissolution; if a Member is voting in a minority, their vote is worth more. Even more strange and offensive is that if a vote were to take place now, the electorate of Oldham East and Saddleworth would be enfranchised, when they are not enfranchised for any other vote in the House. Such a situation is absurd and offensive.

[Mr Cash]

The hon. Gentleman’s point is extremely sensible and full of common sense, which is what this Bill lacks. This is about something else; it is not about the manner in which our democratic system functions. It is about something completely different and I will come to that in a moment.

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[Mr Harper]

Excellent; that is an excellent step forward. [Interruption.] I shall take it as one.

Amendment 4 stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone and was also signed by Opposition Members. Effectively, it drives a coach and horses through these entire provisions; the hon. Member for Foyle picked that point up very well. It is because we want to provide for fixed-term Parliaments that the Bill specifies that an early general election can be triggered only if there is a majority of at least two thirds. If it were possible to have an early general election by way of a motion that gains a simple majority, we all know that in most circumstances that would mean that we have given the power back to the Prime Minister. If he felt an early general election was in the interests of the governing party and that view was shared by the governing party, the motion would be passed and we would have a general election, and we would therefore not have fixed-term Parliaments.

I am not surprised that my hon. Friend has tabled this amendment as it is clear from his speech that he does not like the concept of fixed-term Parliaments at all, and that instead he is happy with our current arrangements, which he is entitled to be. However, given that the Opposition have said they are broadly in favour of fixed-term Parliaments—albeit for four years, not five—I cannot understand why they have supported the amendment because, as I have said, it drives a coach and horses through the entire proposition.

[Graham Stringer]

This is a great constitutional innovation. In respect of these motions, can the Minister explain why some Members’ votes will have twice the weight of others’?

[Mr Harper]

I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman’s proposition about the weighting of votes. We have set out a straightforward position. We decided on two thirds partly because it is the majority required in the Scottish Parliament under the Scotland Act 1998, and partly because under the requirement for a majority of such a size no Government since the second world war would have been able to trigger an early election on their own. Effectively, the requirement for a majority of two thirds means that there would have to be some cross-party support and a general mood in the House that there should be an early election.

There was talk about the fact that the coalition agreement refers to 55%, and I acknowledge that. The coalition agreement was put together quite quickly however, and we have since reflected on this question. We wanted to be clear that the Government—both parties together—were going to put aside the prospect of being able to trigger an early general election and that, instead, that could happen only if there was a shared view across the House. The reason we alighted on two thirds was that it was the number used in the Scotland Act 1998, which set up the Scottish Parliament.

[Graham Stringer]

I understand the objectives. I am cynical about them and the motives behind them, but the numerical fact is that passing this motion will require the support of 400-odd Members, depending on the size of the Commons at that particular time—perhaps the figure will be 420—whereas stopping it will require only half that number. Therefore, someone’s vote against will carry twice the weight of someone’s vote in favour. Can the Minister be clear, not on the objectives, but on why he wants to give some hon. Members more voting power than others?

[Mr Harper]

I just do not agree with the way in which the hon. Gentleman has characterised this. We have said that the support of a significant number of Members is required to have an early election. It is very simple for the House to make a decision. If a simple majority is required to have an early election, we do not have fixed-term Parliaments because if the governing party or parties have a majority in this House, they will simply be able to table a motion, their own side will support it and we will have an election whenever the Prime Minister chooses. If that is what the House wants, fine. However, the House has already decided when it gave this Bill its Second Reading that it wants fixed-term Parliaments, and it did so again when we debated clause 1 last week and decided on the date and the fact that we would have five-year Parliaments. Our proposition is that if we allow an early election on a simple majority, we drive a coach and horses through the Bill.