European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Gary Streeter Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 15th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle]

I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on some nice blue-sky thinking about what could come in the future, but I do not see how that is mutually exclusive to the new clauses that we are debating. They relate to values that the UK has signed up to through, among other things, the Rio principles and the Aarhus convention that are currently underpinned in EU law to ensure that they are binding in British law. Leaving the EU would mean that there is no underpinning for our courts to rely on them. The new clauses would allow the courts to use them and rely on them in other judgments. If the right hon. Gentleman’s blue-sky thinking comes forward, it could happen then as well.

[The Temporary Chair (Mr Gary Streeter)]

Order. I know that we are in Committee, but interventions must be brief.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

That was the subject of a previous intervention, and what I said in response then I will say again. The application of the principles in this Bill is a possible way to go and is not necessarily incompatible with later legislation, but it seems rather awkward to legislate inadequately and then to produce a good piece of legislation that repeals the inadequate legislation—we certainly would not want them to conflict—when it is extremely likely that the Bill in question will actually be marching through the Houses in parallel with the Bill that we are now discussing.

My second point is that the hon. Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Lloyd Russell-Moyle)—this is part of the reason why we have a slight difference of view about the means—has far more faith in the current TFEU principles than is justified. They are principles of procedure that govern proceedings and hence have a big effect on the formulation of EU directives. Had they been part of EU law in a strict sense, they would of course have been incorporated into the Bill that we are discussing, and the problems that the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion and I agree exist about this Bill not carrying them into UK law would not exist.

At the moment, we have weak procedural principles, and new clauses 60 and 67 seek to take those weak procedural principles and turn them into a weak procedural principle of UK law. I am recommending, and I think the Secretary of State is happy to take forward, a solid statutory basis for a powerful body operating against a statutorily based national policy statement approved in this House in order to create a binding mechanism that is far more ironclad than what is currently on offer.

--- Later in debate ---

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[The Temporary Chair]

Order. Thirteen colleagues, and possibly more, have caught my eye with 130 minutes to go before we conclude at 10 o’clock. You can do the maths, and it is not that great. Please be mindful of others, and let us not have too many interventions. Let those who wish to speak, speak.

[Matthew Pennycook]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), and I welcome the fact that he thinks this is a debate about means not ends. The debate should continue in that constructive spirit. I am particularly interested in his ideas for an environment Bill, presumably to be introduced before exit day, and his ideas about governance, which we will be debating in Committee on a later day.

I rise to speak to new clause 67 because I have not been entirely convinced by the right hon. Gentleman. The aim of the clause is simple: to ensure that the environmental principles set out in article 191(2) of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union—the precautionary principle, the principle that preventive action should be taken to avert environmental damage, the principle that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source, and the polluter pays principle—continue to be recognised and applied after exit day, which is important. In that respect, new clause 67 is broadly similar in its intent to new clauses 60 and 28. If either of those new clauses is pressed to a vote, we would be minded to support them.

The environmental principles set out in article 191 of the TFEU form an essential component of environmental law; they are not unique to environmental law, but they are principles of environmental law in general. The principles are also found in a number of international environmental treaties to which the UK is a signatory, including the convention on biological diversity, the convention on climate change and the convention on the law of the sea. At present, the UK gives effect to those obligations through its membership of the EU, and particularly through the Lisbon treaty.

As the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) and the right hon. Member for West Dorset said, the principles play three key roles: they are an aid to the interpretation of the law; they guide future decision making; and they are a basis for legal challenge in court.

The hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion set out in great detail the wide range of areas in which the principles have led to tangible environment improvement benefits. As it stands, the Bill does not ensure that the environmental principles will be recognised and available in domestic law after exit, and as such does not retain those three key roles. The principles are not preserved by clause 4 because they do not confer directly effective rights on individuals. According to the legal advice that I have received, neither do they fall within the definition of the general principles of EU law that are to some extent preserved by the Bill, although the Minister may want to comment on that. Whereas the general principles apply across all EU law, by their very definition some environmental principles apply only to environmental law and policy.

If we are to retain the law we have, to be effective custodians of the environment and to be world leaders when it comes to environmental standards, it is imperative that we embed the principles in the way policy operates. To his credit, the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has recognised that. However, the Government have argued that environmental principles are interpretive principles, and that as such they should not form part of the law itself. I argue that the environmental principles are not simply guidance; as the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion mentioned, they have been given effect in EU law. Article 11 of the TFEU states:

“Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.”

They are, therefore, a vital aid to understanding the role and function of existing legislation, as well as being an interpretative tool for decision makers and, if necessary, the courts.

For the principles to have equivalence on exit day, they must be placed in domestic legislation. I recognise that a consultation on this subject has been announced, but it will not report back before the Bill has progressed through this place. There is good reason to doubt that the direction of travel being signalled by the Government—namely, a reliance on UK case law, judicial review and some form of policy guidance—will do the job, even if all that operates alongside governance arrangements in the form of an as yet undefined watchdog, although the right hon. Member for West Dorset gave some valuable insight into what the Government are thinking in that respect.

UK case law is unlikely to retain and capture the effect of all the principles set out in article 191, as that would limit enforceability to where the principles already exist in case law. It is difficult to see how judicial review, which looks only at the legality of a decision or action rather than its scientific merits, will materially apply core environmental principles. Likewise, reliance on policy guidance—something explicitly referred to by the Secretary of State recently in evidence to the Environmental Audit Committee—is arguably an inadequate basis on which to proceed. As the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion noted, policy guidance is necessarily limited in scope, but there is a strong case for ensuring that environmental principles apply across Government, informing law as well as policy, to match the rigour of the treaty obligations.

Policy guidance also entails a weaker duty on public bodies: policy statements are only guidelines or material considerations for public bodies to consider, meaning that they are less likely to influence a decision than a strict duty to comply. Policy guidance is impermanent; it is prey to changes resulting from short-term political agendas—under different Ministers and different Governments—and so does not provide long-term certainty, and it lacks the binding character of statute. There should be a clear duty to comply with environmental principles in statute, to match the current strong legal obligation set out in the treaty, and the courts should be able to enforce such a duty.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Gary Streeter Excerpts

Committee: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 12th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[John Penrose]

I will endeavour not to try my hon. Friend’s patience too much; he is being very generous. I want to clarify one point. I think that his previous response on the difference between “necessary” and “appropriate” will have suggested to the plain non-lawyerly listener that he was accepting the principle that there should be no greater powers than are necessary to ensure that EU law is ported across correctly, and that the only argument he is making is that there might then be a legal interpretational problem when he has more than one choice. Will he at least confirm that he does not wish to bring in, for himself or for any other Ministers, powers that are higher than “necessary” as a basic principle, and that he will therefore try to find words that will give him that minimum level of—

[The Temporary Chair (Mr Gary Streeter)]

Order. This is a rather long intervention, and the Minister has made it clear that he does not wish to take too many more interventions as he is seeking to make progress.

[Mr Baker]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare for putting his own clarification into my remarks.

The Government wish to take the minimum powers necessary—the minimum powers required—to do the job before us, which is to deliver a working statute book by exit day. We do not intend to make any major changes of policy beyond those that are appropriate to deliver a working statute book, where the law after exit day is substantially the same as the law before exit day, so that individuals and businesses can rely on it. The issue surrounding the definitions of “necessary” and “appropriate” is a technical and legal one, rather than a general issue of intent, and I stand by what we have said. We understand that “necessary” would be interpreted as logically essential and could land us with the problem that I have illustrated, with Ministers facing a number of choices about how to proceed. So if I may, I will leave that issue there.

The use of the word “equivalent” in new clause 24 is just as problematic. Returning to the example of a reciprocal arrangement that no longer exists, if we were —with the support of this House and entirely appropriately in line with our agreements with the EU—to end the obligations that were placed on the UK in law, this new clause could lead to a court taking the view that that would not be keeping the equivalent scope, purpose and effect of the law in relation to how the law stood before exit. This would undermine the Bill’s core objective of maintaining a functioning statute book once we leave the EU. I therefore urge right hon. and hon. Members not to press their proposed amendments, and the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) to withdraw her new clause.

I now want to address new clauses 1, 6 and 26, and amendments 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 68, 129 and 130, tabled by the Leader of the Opposition and others. These would all change the scrutiny process for secondary legislation made under the Bill. We have heard some fine speeches from distinguished parliamentarians, and it is clear that a great deal of thought has gone into the amendments and the arguments supporting them. First, let me be clear that we are committed to appropriate parliamentary scrutiny throughout the whole process of our withdrawal from the EU—Members will know that we make statements, Committee appearances and so on—and, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has already made clear, Parliament will have a vote on the contents of the withdrawal agreement. Crucially, where we are seeking not to replicate current arrangements but to take substantially new approaches, there will be separate pieces of primary legislation for Parliament to work through, as we are beginning to see with the legislation that is being introduced.

However, we must be mindful of the large volume of statutory instruments necessary and the limited time available to work through them if we are to provide certainty and stability on exit. We are working to the timetable of the article 50 process, and there is over 40 years of EU law to consider and correct to ensure that our statute book functions properly on our exit from the EU. According to EUR-Lex—the EU’s legal database—more than 12,000 EU regulations and over 6,000 EU directives are currently in force across the EU. If the majority of statutory instruments do not complete the parliamentary process before we leave the EU, there will be significant gaps in domestic law, which could raise real problems with real consequences. Our law currently gives powers to EU regulators across a wide range of areas that affect people’s lives, from aviation safety to the environment, and we therefore have a duty to act.

New clauses 1 and 26 and amendments 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 68, 129 and 130 would all give a parliamentary committee or either House of Parliament the role of deciding the scrutiny procedure that each statutory instrument must follow. We are sympathetic to the intention behind the amendments, which is why we made our announcement in relation to the Procedure Committee’s recommendations. All that is in harmony with the existing arrangements for the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee in the House of Lords.

Amendments 34, 37 and 40, tabled by the Leader of the Opposition, would apply the affirmative procedure to a statutory instrument of sufficient policy interest, which is ambiguous and does not involve a practical, clear trigger for the affirmative procedure. Ultimately, it would end up being for the courts to decide what is “of sufficient policy interest”, creating legal uncertainty, which is contrary to the Bill’s central aim. I hope that Opposition Members will agree that that has been superseded by our commitment to the sifting committee.

Amendment 22, tabled by the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), would introduce a means for the Leader of the Opposition or a certain number of MPs to trigger an automatic debate on an SI made under the negative procedure. Again, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept that that has been superseded by the sifting committee.

I will now address several amendments relating to the important matter of environmental protection, on which this Government have a proud record. Amendments 96, 97, 98, 138, 333 and 334 and new clauses 27, 62 and 63 were tabled by the Leader of the Opposition and others. We agree with the intentions behind the amendments and new clauses and understand hon. Members’ concerns, but it is essential that the clause 7 power exists as drafted in the Bill. Its purpose is to make changes, often of a technical nature, to deal with deficiencies in retained EU law. While simple in nature, it is essential to ensuring that legislation that protects the environment and rights remains consistent and continues to function effectively once we leave the EU.

Turning to new clauses 27, 62 and 63, the UK has always had a strong legal framework for environmental protections, and that will continue. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has recognised the risk of the governance gap, which has been explained, and that is why he announced on 12 November our intention to consult on a new independent and statutory body to advise and challenge the Government, and potentially other public bodies, on the environment, stepping in when needed to hold bodies to account and to enforce standards. We will consult on the specific scope and powers of the new body early next year. We understand the intention behind the new clauses, but they would create problems for our framework of environmental governance, about which we have made announcements.

New clause 27 would go further than the existing governance mechanisms for environmental protections set out in EU and UK law. For example, it would require the Government to give powers to this new independent body or bodies to set standards or targets and to co-ordinate action on the environment. Within the current EU mechanism, the exercise of those powers, such as legislating to set standards, would typically involve the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament; it does not normally rest solely with an independent body or bodies. Legislating for new standards and targets should be a matter for our Parliament in future.

New clause 62 would prejudge the consultation’s outcome and would necessarily limit the possible remit of a new body by requiring that it be established by regulations under clause 7. This power for functions currently exercised by EU institutions could be replicated by being given to UK bodies to exercise. Therefore, for example, significant domestic changes to the law post EU exit or new areas of the environment would fall outside its remit.

While we support the intention behind amendments 97, 98, 96, 138, 333, 334 and new clauses 62 and 63, they give no definition of what an environmental protection is or precisely how one might know that such protections were being weakened or narrowed. We believe that the hon. Members would be preparing the starting gun for a vast quantity of litigation so we cannot accept the amendments to clause 7, 8 or 9 or the new clauses.

Allow me to reiterate, Mr Streeter. Clause 7 powers are temporary powers limited in scope. Restricting the use of those powers further, as many of the amendments seek to do, would threaten rights and protections established in domestic and EU law, which we will be retaining. This is contrary to what I believe is the intention behind many of the amendments, so restricting the power as proposed would be counterproductive and we cannot accept the amendments.

Amendments 25, 26, 27, 52, 109, 111, 115, 266, 268, 267, 222, 363 to 373 and new clause 76, plus those amendments consequential on them, deal with the protection of rights in relation to the power in clause 7 or parallel restrictions in clauses 8 and 9. The UK has a long tradition of ensuring that our rights and liberties are protected domestically and of fulfilling our international human rights obligations. The decision to leave the EU does not change that. I reiterate the Government’s firm commitment to protecting rights throughout the EU exit process. As we have debated previously, the Bill ensures that, so far as possible, the laws we have immediately before exit day will continue to apply. As part of this approach, clause 4 will continue to make available any rights and so on which currently flow into domestic law through section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 within the overall scheme of the Bill.

Moreover, the clause 7 power is already restricted so that it cannot amend, repeal or revoke the Human Rights Act 1998 or any subordinate legislation made under it. The restrictions sought by amendments 25, 109, 363 and 364 are therefore not necessary. I am aware that amendments 365, 26, 366 and 367 would place the same restrictions on the powers in clause 8. The clause 8 power is already restricted so that it cannot amend, repeal or revoke the Human Rights 1998 or any subordinate legislation made under it. The restrictions sought by amendments 365 to 367 are therefore not necessary.