Public Legal Education

Gary Streeter Excerpts

Tuesday 15th May 2018 Westminster Hall

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I do not disagree with the right hon. Lady, and she is absolutely right to say that the problem is broader. However, she will appreciate that there must be an ability to enforce the right before a tribunal; otherwise, of course, the right loses its meaning. I think that we all hope that, now those fees are gone, we will get back to a position where everyone who wants to bring such a case is able to do so.

I do not doubt for a moment the Solicitor General’s commitment, and I know that he has been at the forefront of efforts to set up a panel that will co-ordinate work in this area. I will quote what he said when he set up the panel, because I agree with it:

“Teaching people about their legal rights and responsibilities, together with helping them gain the confidence and skills to get access to justice, can really make a difference to people’s lives—as well as our legal system.

The new Panel will help drive forward Public Legal Education, so more people can reap the benefits.”

That is all absolutely right.

Similarly, I do not disagree with what the hon. Member for North East Hampshire said when he maintained that one of the benefits of public legal education might be that more people can settle disputes outside court. That is absolutely right, as well. Of course we all want to see that; we do not want to see unnecessary litigation.

At the same time, although it is not my intention to be unduly partisan in a Westminster Hall debate, I have to record the concern that exists about the ability of people to enforce their rights before a court irrespective of their wealth. “Our system of justice has become unaffordable to most”—those are not my words, but those of the previous Lord Chief Justice, Lord Thomas, who said them in January 2016 in his annual report to Parliament. There is concern that we have to put alongside an absolutely correct drive towards greater public legal education a similar ability for people to enforce their rights before our courts if they need to do so.

The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) mentioned a concern that exists about people in a very vulnerable position not having access to legal aid to enforce their rights. A very good example of that is state help in benefits cases, when people are indeed in a very vulnerable position and looking for advice as to how they can best enforce their rights and ensure the continuation of their income. The statistics on this are stark. In 2012-13, 83,000 people had the benefit of state help in those circumstances; by 2016-17, the figure was 440. That is a swingeing cut in help and assistance for those people to enforce their rights, and it is a great concern.

The hon. Member for Henley (John Howell), who is not in his place at the moment, rightly made the point that with the changing dynamics of our courts, with virtual courts and online courts, the idea of public legal education is becoming more important than ever. Far more people are representing themselves before the courts. In one sense, that reinforces the point about more public legal education, but there is a concern about the family courts in that regard. There has been a leap in those representing themselves from 45,000 people in 2012-13 to 64,000 in 2016-17, and the worry is that there is no protection in family courts for perpetrators of domestic violence to cross-examine their victims. Such a measure was included in the Prisons and Courts Bill, which was lost just before the general election of last year—I served on the Public Bill Committee. When will that provision be brought back? It would command wide support across the House, and the sooner it can be brought back and put into effect, the better for everyone concerned.

Legal aid is a huge concern across a number of areas, whether that is immigration, civil legal aid or criminal legal aid. I have looked at the figures, and between 2010-11 and 2016-17 there was a £950 million cut in legal aid. No wonder the legal profession has been driven to take the action it has, but it is about far more than figures; it is also about the idea that early legal advice can save money. I commend to the Solicitor General my noble Friend Lord Bach’s report, published in the past 12 months, in which precisely that issue of early legal advice is proposed as something that should be absolutely central in our justice system.

I think there is consensus about the importance of public legal education, and I am grateful to all those who do work in that area. I do not doubt for a moment the Solicitor General’s commitment and I am sure that progress will continue, but the means by which people can enforce their rights before the court should not be based on their personal wealth. At the same time as enhancing our public legal education, let us put legal aid back to where it was meant to be when it was introduced in 1949 as the fourth pillar of the welfare state.

[Mr Gary Streeter (in the Chair)]

Order. I remind Members that the debate closes at 4.17 pm. If the mover of the motion were given two minutes to have the final word that would be wonderful.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. Only last Friday I was doing that at a school in my constituency, the Ridgeway. I was talking to young people in the sixth form who did not have a background in the law about what opportunity there was for them. Like me, he no doubt has taken on youngsters in chambers deliberately with the knowledge that they did not have a background in law. In fact, I would not take people who had any connection with the law because I wanted to empower young people and give them a chance.

I want to deal with some of the points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle (Huw Merriman) about the curriculum. The position has yet to be clarified because more work is being done, particularly on sex education in schools and the issue of consent and withdrawal. That is not yet a statutory part of the curriculum. Citizenship remains compulsory at key stage 3. We are talking about youngsters in years 7, 8 and 9 who can access that education in school, and it must include PLE. It is a matter for schools to determine how to deliver it, but by working collaboratively with professionals, a lot can be achieved.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller) made some important points about access in the workplace, particularly for women who have no knowledge—I say that with respect; it is not their fault—about their rights. That is why the regulatory objective in the 2007 Act is important. More has to be done to deal with the question of empowerment of our citizens via the regulatory bodies. That would not just include lawyers, even though the 2007 Act has that remit. I will go away and think about her point very carefully. Perhaps we can use it as the start of an important discussion. I thank all hon. and right hon. Friends and Members for taking part today. The law is not some mystical holy of holies and lawyers are not the high priests. We should demystify it, and that is where public legal education is so important.

[Mr Gary Streeter (in the Chair)]

Mr Jayawardena has 20 seconds to wind up.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Gary Streeter Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 15th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle]

I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on some nice blue-sky thinking about what could come in the future, but I do not see how that is mutually exclusive to the new clauses that we are debating. They relate to values that the UK has signed up to through, among other things, the Rio principles and the Aarhus convention that are currently underpinned in EU law to ensure that they are binding in British law. Leaving the EU would mean that there is no underpinning for our courts to rely on them. The new clauses would allow the courts to use them and rely on them in other judgments. If the right hon. Gentleman’s blue-sky thinking comes forward, it could happen then as well.

[The Temporary Chair (Mr Gary Streeter)]

Order. I know that we are in Committee, but interventions must be brief.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

That was the subject of a previous intervention, and what I said in response then I will say again. The application of the principles in this Bill is a possible way to go and is not necessarily incompatible with later legislation, but it seems rather awkward to legislate inadequately and then to produce a good piece of legislation that repeals the inadequate legislation—we certainly would not want them to conflict—when it is extremely likely that the Bill in question will actually be marching through the Houses in parallel with the Bill that we are now discussing.

My second point is that the hon. Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Lloyd Russell-Moyle)—this is part of the reason why we have a slight difference of view about the means—has far more faith in the current TFEU principles than is justified. They are principles of procedure that govern proceedings and hence have a big effect on the formulation of EU directives. Had they been part of EU law in a strict sense, they would of course have been incorporated into the Bill that we are discussing, and the problems that the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion and I agree exist about this Bill not carrying them into UK law would not exist.

At the moment, we have weak procedural principles, and new clauses 60 and 67 seek to take those weak procedural principles and turn them into a weak procedural principle of UK law. I am recommending, and I think the Secretary of State is happy to take forward, a solid statutory basis for a powerful body operating against a statutorily based national policy statement approved in this House in order to create a binding mechanism that is far more ironclad than what is currently on offer.

--- Later in debate ---

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[The Temporary Chair]

Order. Thirteen colleagues, and possibly more, have caught my eye with 130 minutes to go before we conclude at 10 o’clock. You can do the maths, and it is not that great. Please be mindful of others, and let us not have too many interventions. Let those who wish to speak, speak.

[Matthew Pennycook]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), and I welcome the fact that he thinks this is a debate about means not ends. The debate should continue in that constructive spirit. I am particularly interested in his ideas for an environment Bill, presumably to be introduced before exit day, and his ideas about governance, which we will be debating in Committee on a later day.

I rise to speak to new clause 67 because I have not been entirely convinced by the right hon. Gentleman. The aim of the clause is simple: to ensure that the environmental principles set out in article 191(2) of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union—the precautionary principle, the principle that preventive action should be taken to avert environmental damage, the principle that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source, and the polluter pays principle—continue to be recognised and applied after exit day, which is important. In that respect, new clause 67 is broadly similar in its intent to new clauses 60 and 28. If either of those new clauses is pressed to a vote, we would be minded to support them.

The environmental principles set out in article 191 of the TFEU form an essential component of environmental law; they are not unique to environmental law, but they are principles of environmental law in general. The principles are also found in a number of international environmental treaties to which the UK is a signatory, including the convention on biological diversity, the convention on climate change and the convention on the law of the sea. At present, the UK gives effect to those obligations through its membership of the EU, and particularly through the Lisbon treaty.

As the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) and the right hon. Member for West Dorset said, the principles play three key roles: they are an aid to the interpretation of the law; they guide future decision making; and they are a basis for legal challenge in court.

The hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion set out in great detail the wide range of areas in which the principles have led to tangible environment improvement benefits. As it stands, the Bill does not ensure that the environmental principles will be recognised and available in domestic law after exit, and as such does not retain those three key roles. The principles are not preserved by clause 4 because they do not confer directly effective rights on individuals. According to the legal advice that I have received, neither do they fall within the definition of the general principles of EU law that are to some extent preserved by the Bill, although the Minister may want to comment on that. Whereas the general principles apply across all EU law, by their very definition some environmental principles apply only to environmental law and policy.

If we are to retain the law we have, to be effective custodians of the environment and to be world leaders when it comes to environmental standards, it is imperative that we embed the principles in the way policy operates. To his credit, the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has recognised that. However, the Government have argued that environmental principles are interpretive principles, and that as such they should not form part of the law itself. I argue that the environmental principles are not simply guidance; as the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion mentioned, they have been given effect in EU law. Article 11 of the TFEU states:

“Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.”

They are, therefore, a vital aid to understanding the role and function of existing legislation, as well as being an interpretative tool for decision makers and, if necessary, the courts.

For the principles to have equivalence on exit day, they must be placed in domestic legislation. I recognise that a consultation on this subject has been announced, but it will not report back before the Bill has progressed through this place. There is good reason to doubt that the direction of travel being signalled by the Government—namely, a reliance on UK case law, judicial review and some form of policy guidance—will do the job, even if all that operates alongside governance arrangements in the form of an as yet undefined watchdog, although the right hon. Member for West Dorset gave some valuable insight into what the Government are thinking in that respect.

UK case law is unlikely to retain and capture the effect of all the principles set out in article 191, as that would limit enforceability to where the principles already exist in case law. It is difficult to see how judicial review, which looks only at the legality of a decision or action rather than its scientific merits, will materially apply core environmental principles. Likewise, reliance on policy guidance—something explicitly referred to by the Secretary of State recently in evidence to the Environmental Audit Committee—is arguably an inadequate basis on which to proceed. As the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion noted, policy guidance is necessarily limited in scope, but there is a strong case for ensuring that environmental principles apply across Government, informing law as well as policy, to match the rigour of the treaty obligations.

Policy guidance also entails a weaker duty on public bodies: policy statements are only guidelines or material considerations for public bodies to consider, meaning that they are less likely to influence a decision than a strict duty to comply. Policy guidance is impermanent; it is prey to changes resulting from short-term political agendas—under different Ministers and different Governments—and so does not provide long-term certainty, and it lacks the binding character of statute. There should be a clear duty to comply with environmental principles in statute, to match the current strong legal obligation set out in the treaty, and the courts should be able to enforce such a duty.

Sexual Abuse Offences

Gary Streeter Excerpts

Monday 3rd December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Gary Streeter (South West Devon) (Con)]

In February 2011, my constituent Margaret Felwick contacted the police to report a serious sexual abuse offence carried out on her by her brother, Mr Geoffrey Genge. The offence had taken place 50 years before, but Mrs Felwick had never felt able to bring the incident to light. On discovering that her sister and cousin had also been abused by Mr Genge, Mrs Felwick could be silent no longer. All three victims contacted the police.

The police handled the allegations with professionalism. They were sensitive in their approach, thorough in their investigation and also very reassuring. My constituents were concerned that it was too late to prosecute. The police assured them that it was not; although the incidents might have occurred 50 years before, there was strong evidence to support the case and an attempt to prosecute should be made.

The case was referred to the local Crown Prosecution Service. The CPS assessed the evidence and, in August 2011, notified Mrs Felwick that the prosecution would go ahead. The CPS believed that there was enough evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction. It believed it to be more likely than not that Mr Genge would be convicted. Mr Genge was summoned to attend a court hearing and charged with five offences of rape and sexual abuse between 1957 and 1961 relating to Mrs Felwick and her two relatives. He pleaded not guilty. The case was scheduled for trial on 27 March 2012.

Then, on 10 January, my constituents were told that the case against Mr Genge had been dropped. The announcement was made in a letter from the CPS that came out of the blue. There was no attempt to discuss the matter with the victims. From that moment onward, the handling of the case was a disaster. In explaining its decision, the CPS told Mrs Felwick that she had a strong case and described her as a respectable and believable witness. It even confirmed that the number of victims making a complaint against Mr Genge made the prospect of prosecution more likely.

However, there was a problem. The CPS had discovered that the defendant’s solicitor was preparing an abuse of process defence. He would argue that there were barriers to obtaining the evidence needed for a fair trial. He would say that too much time had passed since the abuses had occurred. The defence, he would argue, would not have a proper chance to put up the evidence they wanted to present.

The CPS then decided that, in view of the abuse of process defence, Mr Genge might well be acquitted. A casework lawyer wrote to my constituents explaining that

“it is not certain that this would happen and as I have said it is no reflection on your evidence. But it does mean that the Code for Crown Prosecutors requires me to stop the case rather than pressing for trial”.

Therefore, the police believed the victims and the CPS found them to be credible, but the case was stopped because of consideration for Mr Genge. No reference was made to the victims at all.

Why did the CPS give my constituents hope that the case would go ahead, charge the defendant, thus bringing the matter into the public domain, and then change its mind at the last minute? Abuse of process is not a novel concept; lawyers deal with these types of issues fairly regularly. If there was a problem with the evidence, and if the defendant’s application was likely to be successful, why did the CPS not think of that sooner?

The result of the decision was devastating. On 11 January, the much respected Plymouth Herald reported that Mr Genge had been wrongly accused of rape. It said that the prosecution had offered no evidence and so the case had been thrown out. The paper carried the comments of Mr Genge’s solicitor. He described my constituents’ evidence as “weak” and their charges as “odious”. He said that the case was

“a shocking waste of taxpayers’ money”

and claimed that the CPS had undermined

“the integrity of the criminal justice system”.

Naturally, my constituents felt like victims all over again. The CPS made no attempt to refute the outspoken and scandalous claims or to make it clear that the case was not stopped due to a lack of evidence. Not only had my constituents lost their chance for justice; now their reputations were being battered as well.

The upshot was as follows. My constituents were abused as girls by Mr Genge. They suppressed the damage and the injustice for 50 years. They discovered that others had suffered the same fate and so plucked up the courage to come forward. The police believed them. The CPS believed them. The case started. Proceedings were issued. Nothing changed except that the CPS discovered a law that it should have known about at the time proceedings were commenced, and the case was dropped. A local solicitor, whose rhetoric was truly disgraceful, was allowed to drag my constituents’ names through the mud. They came to me for help.

I set up a meeting with the deputy chief Crown prosecutor for the south-west to discuss the case. My constituents and the barrister who had advised the CPS not to proceed were also present. It was not an edifying experience. The barrister tried to talk us into submission. He clearly did not understand how much damage had been done to the reputation of my constituents, or their genuine distress. He gave the impression of complete indifference to their plight. I left the meeting very angry indeed. One of the claims that the barrister made was that the CPS wanted to protect the victims from the ordeal of a trial—but the victims were desperate for a trial. They wanted the hearing to take place so that the truth could come out after all these years. If the CPS had truly wanted to protect the victims, it would have pushed for justice. If justice could not be done, the CPS should have made a decision not to prosecute when it first considered the evidence.

This debate has come at a timely hour. Public interest in sexual abuse cases has been sparked by the shocking revelations about the late Jimmy Savile. For the first time, many victims have felt able to come forward and talk about the abuse they have suffered, and their stories have shocked people across the country. A full police investigation into abuse allegations is now under way. The police are being encouraged to follow the evidence where it leads them, and in recent weeks they have not been hesitant to arrest people in connection with allegations as and when they have arisen. Mr Freddie Starr was questioned about an incident relating to a young girl in the 1970s, Mr Wilfred De’Ath was questioned over allegations of abuse dating back to 1965, and Mr Dave Lee Travis was held over accusations of sexual assault relating to the late 1960s.

Of course it is right that these investigations take place. It is right that justice is done for victims whose lives have been damaged by abuse. However, if action can be taken in relation to offences by Jimmy Savile, who is dead, and if others are in the firing line about incidents relating to 30 or 40 years back, why can a prosecution not take place against Mr Genge? There is now a strong public interest in sexual abuse cases being investigated and prosecuted. The CPS must get its act together. It must make sure that prosecutions are dealt with in a sensitive, thorough and professional way. Every effort must be taken to ensure that justice is done.

The Felwick case is one of the worst I have come across in 20 years of doing this job, so let me ask the Solicitor-General some very specific questions. First, if abuse of process is a well known defence in cases of this kind, why did the CPS not consider it when it first decided to prosecute? Why was it suddenly so certain that the defence’s application for an abuse of process would be successful? Secondly, if prosecutions cannot be brought for cases which have occurred 30 years or more in the past, how can progress be made in investigating other historical offences? Thirdly, when the CPS decided to change its mind halfway through Mr Genge’s prosecution, why on earth did it not consult my constituents before the case was dropped? Finally, why did the CPS not do more to protect the reputation of my constituents? Why did it not make it clear that the prosecution was not stopped on the basis of weak evidence, as was claimed by the defendant’s solicitor, but because of a legal technicality and CPS timidity?

I have met Mrs Felwick many times. She is a gentle, reasonable and decent human being. I cannot think of a single motive she would have to raise this matter after all these years if it were not so that the truth could be told. Why would she want to put herself through the trauma of a trial if not for justice to be done? I have utter faith in Mrs Felwick and her relatives. I have absolutely no doubt that Mr Genge abused my constituents when they were children, and he is getting away scot-free. This is not British justice. I ask the Solicitor-General to review this case and the decision not to prosecute, and to ensure that justice is done.

Voting by Prisoners

Gary Streeter Excerpts

Thursday 10th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Gary Streeter (South West Devon) (Con)]

I support the motion. This matter is not really about whether prisoners in this country have the right to vote, but about whether this House has the right to make its own laws for its own people.

There are 85,000 prisoners in this country, about 12,000 of whom are foreign nationals who would have no right to vote in any event. The remaining 73,000 are spread over 650 constituencies, so even if they all voted, which as hon. Members know full well from the sort of people whom we have visited in prisons is most unlikely, just over 100 votes would be added in each constituency. On that scale, the rights of prisoners to vote is relatively unimportant. Nor is it the case that the removal of the right to vote acts as a deterrent. Few burglars in my constituency have ever, I suspect, hovered at the windowsill, jemmy in hand, and thought, “Oh no! I’d better not break in or I’ll be unable to vote for that nice Mr Streeter.”

The motion invites us to address a much more fundamental issue: whether or not we can pass our own laws. I completely understand the inclination of civil servants to advise Ministers to comply with the European Court of Human Rights judgment. I am sure that that advice is technically correct, and certain that that is how we have always done things, under Governments of all colours. In addition, I recognise the understandable reluctance of Ministers to go against that advice and to ignore a decision of the Court that we helped to create, especially if there could be financial implications in this time of austerity.

However, there comes a time when it is necessary to take a stand. I argue that right now, on this issue, it is right for this House, today, to assert its authority. The judgment of the ECHR in the Hirst case flies in the face of the original wording and purpose of the European convention on human rights, in which it was clearly intended that each signatory should have latitude in making decisions on the electoral franchise in that country.

[Andrew Bridgen]

Is it not clear from previous speakers that the Strasbourg Court is seeking to extend its power? Is it not the duty of hon. Members to resist that power grab?

[Mr Streeter]

I completely agree and I intend to address that point in a moment.

We decided in this country centuries ago that convicted criminals should not have the right to vote, and I support that decision. After all, the punitive element of incarceration is the denial for the time being of certain rights and privileges that our citizens enjoy. We decided long ago that in addition to surrendering their liberty, convicted criminals while in prison would also give up their right to vote. That was the case in 1953 when the treaty on human rights was signed, and it remains the case.

What has changed since 1953? The answer is simply this: the European Court of Human Rights decided in 1978 that it could interpret the convention as a living document and effectively create law rather than purely reflect the provisions of the original convention.

[Mr Leigh]

There appears to be some sloppy thinking here. I oppose incorporation into our law, but the Supreme Court will always uphold prisoners’ appeals because we cannot pick and choose between the judgments we like and those we dislike. I am afraid that that is the law.

[Mr Streeter]

If my hon. Friend exercises a little patience, I will give him the solution before my five minutes are up. I can assure him that there is no sloppy thinking down this end of the Chamber.

The rights taken to itself by the ECHR is the clearest case of mission creep that we will ever see. It is the ECHR’s decision to award itself more power—much more power than the authors of the convention ever intended—that we must challenge today. That decision has led to a steady trickle of judgments and pronouncements over the past 30 years that have frequently left the British public baffled and extremely angry.

That is the real problem with the ECHR conducting itself in that way. Yet again, it has undermined the authority of this House, which leaves us wringing our hands hopelessly on the sidelines, and widens the gap between the electorate and their Parliament. If we, the people whom they send here on their behalf, cannot change things, what is the point of us being here, and therefore, what is the point of them voting?

[Andrew Bridgen]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Mr Streeter]

I will not give way, if my hon. Friend does not mind, because I have done so twice.

It is time to take a stand. I suggest three things—we are coming now to solutions. First, I suggest that we vote overwhelmingly today to reject the ECHR judgment and support the motion. In doing so, we will send a clear signal to our constituents that we understand and echo their desire not to put up with this nonsense any longer. We will also send a signal to ECHR judges that we do not appreciate, and will not accept, their attempts to legislate for us here in the United Kingdom. That is our job, not theirs.

Secondly, we need to start work immediately on amending, or at least on restricting or clarifying, the European convention on human rights. That will require the political will of the House and of the Government on this side of the channel, and political muscle and skill on the other side. Fortunately, machinery for that is in place—it is called the Council of Europe, which among other duties oversees the work of the European Court of Human Rights. I suggest that our Government, working with the British delegation of MPs to the Council, immediately set on a course to suggest to our friends across the channel amendments to the convention. They could suggest narrowing the rules governing the scope of the Court, or further protocols. We should use whatever the correct procedures are—I am sure that my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General can advise us on those—to take this important but increasingly abused convention back to its original purpose; namely, to underpin basic human rights, and to prevent the excesses of torture, imprisonment without trial and persecution perpetrated on European people in the second world war from ever being visited upon us again. I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr Leigh) that that will not be easy, but it is not impossible, and we should start that journey today.

Thirdly and finally, I know not whether Mr John Hirst, the axe murderer—nice man—fought his case on legal aid, but I am certain that he fought it either on legal aid or on a no win, no fee basis.

[Anna Soubry (Broxtowe) (Con)]

It was legal aid.

[Mr Streeter]

My hon. Friend shouts in my ear that Hirst fought his case on legal aid. In any case, we should now make a further change to the consultation process on legal aid reform that is currently being conducted by the Ministry of Justice, and make it clear that legal aid will no longer—from today—be available to prisoners or former prisoners suing the Government because they have been denied a vote. We are in the process of reducing legal aid for all kinds of legal action, so why not expressly exclude those claims, which the whole country deprecates? We have the power to do so and we should exercise it.

I was never any good at physics at school, but I remember one law: for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. Convicted criminals and their lawyers and the ECHR have conspired to create an action. Let this House today decide to put into place an equal and opposite reaction. I support the motion and hope that it receives an overwhelming majority.